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THE STATE IN THE INDUS RIVER VALLEY

by

ADAM STUART GREEN

Under the Direction of John Kantner

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the concept of the state in the context of the Indus River Valley, located in northwest India and Pakistan. In the first section, I synthesize several popular trends in state discussion from both inside and outside of archaeological theory. I then apply my synthesized approach to state definition to the archaeological record from the Indus River Valley. The resulting work visits both the concept of the state and the rich cultural history of the Indus Civilization. I determine that there was a state in the Indus River Valley, but that the Indus state was very different from others scholars have identified in the archaeological record.

INDEX WORDS: State Development, Indus River Valley, Harappan Civilization, Indus Civilization, State Definition, Egalitarian Communities, Socio-political Differentiation, Development of Elites

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Georgia State University

2006

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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview

The Keepers of the Roaring Water…

Thousands of years ago, the peoples of the Indian subcontinent began writing down their sacred hymns. These sacred hymns, known as Vedas, were spiritual parables, stories that taught their audiences lessons about the nature of the cosmos. These texts not only form the foundation of one of the largest and most ancient religions in the world, they are also the earliest decipherable records of India's rich cultural history.

But the Vedas also allude to a much more ancient era in India's past, an era for which historical records can say little, an era for which we have only remnants of shattered texts, written in a language as mysterious to contemporary scholars as the civilization that produced it. The oldest of the Vedas, the Rig-Veda, appears generations after this ancient civilization collapsed. Within its hymns are references to an empire of fortresses that stood sentinel over the mighty rivers of ancient India. The following is an excerpt from a popular translation of the Rig-Veda that references this mysterious, ancient civilization.

> I let forth the roaring water; the gods followed after my wish. Ecstatic with Soma, I shattered the nine and ninety fortresses of the Sambara all at once, finishing off the inhabitant as the hundredth, as I gave aid to Divodasa Atithigva…. [Doniger 1981:129]

This text illustrates a lingering cultural memory of an ancient people that once inhabited Northwest India (Wheeler 1968). To the writers of the Rig-Veda, this once

great civilization was little more than hulking ruins quietly guarding the Indus and Saraswati rivers. History can tell us little more about who these people were and what they were like. In order to address the mysteries of this once magnificent civilization, we must turn to other sources of information.

This thesis addresses whether the Indus Civilization, which shares many of the same socioeconomic advantages with the other pristine civilizations, but lacks the defining characteristics of social control that define statehood in social theory, can be considered a state. Was there a state in the Indus River Valley? If so, why was it able to avoid the nastier aspects of social complexity while reaping the benefits of statehood? What made the Indus Civilization an exception to the apparent laws of socioeconomic evolution?

Defining the Indus Civilization in Space and Time

Within the Punjab and Sindh regions of Northwest India and Pakistan, ruins litter the floodplains around the Indus River. The civilization that produced these ruins has been given many titles by archaeologists and other scholars. The most popular title is the "Harappan" civilization, so named after the first of the sites to receive significant attention from archaeologists. The earliest archaeologists to work in the region believed that Harappa was the capital of the civilization.

Not long after work began in Harappa, another, larger site called Mohenjo Daro, "Mound of the Dead" in the local language, was discovered. This led some archaeologists and other scholars to refer to the sites collectively as the "Indus" civilization, identifying the predominant geographic region that encompasses both sites.



Figure I: Map of major geographical features and sites discussed in the text. Modified from Kalayanaraman 2006, Kenoyer 1998: 27,Possehl 2002:41, http://maps.google.com

As of the turn of the twenty-first century, the number of surveyed sites along the course of the now-dry Saraswati River has increased dramatically, leading some scholars to identify the sites as the "Indus-Saraswati River System Civilization."

I will not be referring to the subject of this work as the "Harappan" civilization, as the implication that the cultural group discussed is centralized culturally, politically, or economically within the city of Harappa is false. Nor will I refer to the "Indus-Saraswati River System Civilization" either, even though it is the most accurate label for the subject of this project. It is too awkward, and as of yet, no sites have been unearthed along the

ancient Saraswati that justify such a title. If and when more archaeological work is done along the Saraswati, it is possible that the true "capital" of the civilization will be unearthed. Then a change in terms may be necessary. I will use the term "Indus Civilization" to discuss its subject. It retains an appropriate level of accuracy in pinpointing the ancient cultural complex without becoming cumbersome.

The Indus Civilization was located within one of the most fertile floodplains in the world. Thousands of years ago, the Indus and Saraswati rivers flowed from the foothills of the Himalaya Mountains with much velocity. They cut through what is now Northern Pakistan, picking up fresh, fertile soils from the rich mountain foothills and depositing them within their floodplains when they reached the lower, flatter regions approaching the coastline. A rich layer of riverine silt developed around the slower sections of the rivers' courses. Combined with the warm, temperate climate bestowed upon the region by currents flowing from the Arabian Sea and the rain-shield formed by the Himalaya Mountains, these river floodplains were positioned most fortuitously. Climate and geography converged to form the most productive breadbasket in northern India. These fertile floodplains were the perfect draw for the budding agriculturalists of Northwest India and Pakistan.

The Indus and Saraswati were mountain rivers; their output varied from year to year with the various tectonic and glacial processes that shaped and reshaped the Himalayas. Today, the very processes that gave life to these rivers have all but taken it from the Saraswati, and drastically altered the course of the Indus. Tectonic activity stripped the Saraswati from its source springs, reducing it to a trickle (McIntosh 2002).

Despite the difficulty tectonic activity added to predicting the rivers' flood cycles, the ancient Indus and Saraswati formed the backbone of an agricultural society that grew into the Indus Civilization. After generations in the region, Indus farmers developed the techniques necessary to cope with the floods' irregularities (McIntosh 2002).

The Indus people made extensive use of the lands within and surrounding the floodplains. Archaeological sites extend all along the length of the ancient Saraswati River's course and follow the trail of the Indus all the way to the coastline. The Arabian Sea forms the civilization's southernmost boundary. The remains of ancient forts have been found to the far northwest, within the grassy foothills of Baluchistan, a region named for the tribes that have historically farmed and foraged there. To the northeast, sites extend all the way to the Himalaya Mountains. All in all, the Indus Civilization controlled a region that was larger than any of the civilizations of ancient Mesopotamia or Egypt (Kenoyer 1998; McIntosh 2002).

It is clear from the archaeological record that the people of the Indus were, during the height of their ancient civilization, expert farmers and fishermen. They were masters of prediction, maintaining a tenuous relationship with the cyclic floods from the rivers that gave their cities life (McIntosh 2002). Their expert planning paid off in the form of a manageable subsistence base that lasted their civilization thousands of years. They produced vast amounts of food. The Indus farmers' efforts made possible the growth of a population in the tens of thousands. The surplus food allowed for the development of a plethora of specialists that included bead-makers, potters, lapidaries, metalworkers, flintknappers, and many, many other specialized professionals. Generations of artisans,

given economic viability by the hard-working farmers of the Indus and Saraswati floodplains, lived their lives in comfort within the high walls of their monumental cities.

Before they began building cities, they were master foragers and pastoralists. The peoples of the Indus valley developed a number of domesticates, including cattle, goats, and many other fauna. Indeed, even as the city limits of Harappa and Mohenjo Daro grew, entire societies of nomads traveled in between the cities of the Indus, trading goods and allowing for economic development (Kenoyer 1998).

The peoples of the Indus Civilization were technologically advanced. The specialists of Harappa were masters of metallurgy. They produced a great number of copper and gold ornaments; bangles and bracelets adorned the well to do of the city's citizenry. They were also masters of lapidary and carving. Tiny, steatite beads have been found in many ancient Indus households. (Mackay 1935)

The Indus Civilization had a system of writing that took the form of complex steatite and clay seals. Each tiny square was impressed or inscribed with a pictogram surrounded by a number of etchings or other symbols. These intricate symbols were used to seal pots and mark walls. Some were arranged into long lines of script that adorned city entrances and other architecture. Scholars have not yet been able to translate the ancient Indus script.

A number of intricate clay spheres and cubes have been recovered from cultural deposits in the Indus valley. These artifacts form what many scholars believe to be a uniform system of weights and measures. Judging from food and artifact remains archaeologists have uncovered, the Indus Civilization not only possessed the ability to produce vast amounts of food and trade goods, they were able to record amounts of food

and goods they had produced. Such economic development in a civilization from this era is most impressive.

Indus cities were paragons of planning and organization. Neighborhoods were proportioned very similar to one another, with wide walkways and uniform construction. Homes were built with complete gutter-drainage systems that led to street-level facets for runoff collection (Mackay 1935). Without this multifarious system for dealing with rain and runoff, the dense, mud-brick structures would have melted away in a heavy rain. Modern city-planners could take a lesson from these ancient masters of architecture.

Scholars often describe the peoples of the Indus Civilization as religious (Kenoyer 1998, Mackay 1935, McIntosh 2002). A common icon found on many of the seals recovered from Harappa and Mohenjo Daro is that of a thin, seated figured with many arms. Some scholars suggest that this icon represents Shiva, one of the central gods in the Hindu pantheon (Mackay 1935). This motif is repeated on pots and on buildings. The Indus Civilization built what some scholars believe was a public bath in one of their largest cities (Possehl 2002). This may have been used for ritual bathing, a social institution associated with the modern Caste system in India (McIntosh 2002).

The Indus Civilization was the first large-scale socio-political entity in or around the Indian subcontinent. The earliest phase of the Indus Era, called Mehrgarh, began as early as 6500 BC. The civilization reached its height around 2600 BC, when Harappa expanded to what would be its greatest size.

Solving the Mysteries of the Indus

The Indus Civilization left an archaeological footprint that is different from all of the other independently established, or pristine, civilizations. The states that came to dominate the other five pristine civilizations, Egypt, South American, Mesoamerica, Mesopotamia, and China, all left behind archaeological records that are choked with violence and oppression. Extreme sociopolitical differentiation characterizes these ancient states. Hundreds were sacrificed upon the death of the elites in some of these civilizations. The rich were very rich, and the poor were very poor. Some lived long, healthy lives, and some ambled through their lives with undernourished, pathology-ridden skeletons. Traditions of warfare and violent expansion are themes that repeat over and over in the archaeological remains of these civilizations.

Relative to the cultural remains of other ancient civilizations, the Indus Civilization is devoid of similar forms of violence and inequality. This is not to say that the archaeological assemblage from the Indus Civilization is without violence or inequality, but rather when compared to other assemblages, evidence for these phenomena is hardly significant. Violence and inequality are difficult to identify within Indus cultural remains.

This is problematic because the Indus Civilization developed in many ways parallel to the other pristine civilizations. The peoples of the Indus floodplains had most if not all of the technologies that the other pristine civilizations enjoyed. They built cities that were larger, more crowed, and more energy-expensive than most of the other pristine civilizations could manage. Their civilization expanded across a region as far and wide as that of the other pristine civilizations. The Indus Civilization pursued the same

riverine subsistence strategy as many of the other pristine civilizations, facing the same environmental and demographic pressures. They had to time their plantings and manage the flow of country goods into and out of their cities just as did the other civilizations. Yet, the Indus Civilization seems to have dodged the pitfalls associated with statehood in the other pristine civilizations. The Indus peoples lived their lives relatively free of oppression or extreme inequality. Warfare, in the sense of organized campaigns and territorial expansion, is completely absent, and violence appears to have occurred rarely if at all (Cork 2005).

Chapter 2: The State

Manifesting the State

In order to address whether or not there was a state in the Indus River Valley, we must identify and define the concept of the state independently from the research question. Social scientists have utilized the concept for generations. Sometimes, the state is used as a convenient term for identifying governmental process. The works of the early Greek philosophers discuss the powers of the state in this way. Sometimes, such as in the work of Foucault or Bourdieu, the state is enveloped in other concepts such as power and ideology. In other cases, the state is the final stage of a cultural evolution that proceeds in neat order from the simplest bands to the most complex empires.

If the state is to serve as an identifiable concept, an independent definition that is not contingent on the data from the Indus Civilization must be established. Once this is accomplished, the definition can be applied to the specific case of the Indus River Valley, and the question of whether or not there was a state in region can be properly addressed.

Social scholars often assume that the audience already shares their impression of what the state is and how it works, rendering specific definition and discussion of the concept unnecessary. This is the primary reason the state is used so variably in social theory. Because modern scholars are identifying the socio-political entity they live in, they neglect specific definition of that socio-political entity.

How then, should we approach the task of defining the state? In this chapter, I will address the importance of the state as a socio-political entity. Next, the implications of any research on the state will be identified, and the strongest methodology for defining the state will be established.

The state is the most pervasive form of socio-political organization humanity has ever seen. Every person living today is subject to the sovereignty of one of the world's many states. They have been around for only a short time in the grand scheme of humanity's past, but they wasted no time in expanding all across the globe. They comprise one of the most powerful forces for evolution of culture, and are largely responsible for the worldview held by the people that inhabit them. This is the most important reason for studying the state.

Scholars interested in understanding the state must understand the context from which their research takes place. Modern academia is, itself, one of the many facets of the modern state; if the modern world were not organized into states, modern academia would not exist. Without modern academia, this project would not exist. Of course this affects the outlook this project will impose upon its subject. This project is a construction of the very institution it seeks to study.

It is impossible to achieve an objective perspective when discussing cultural phenomena. This means that scientific approaches are of limited use to modern social theory. When humans research themselves or something they created, they become both the observers and the observed. They use the culture they wish to learn about to interpret the world around them. This project acknowledges this boundary in academic discourse. All research projects bring with them a certain set of biases and assumptions that pre-shape their conclusions before data are ever even analyzed. This dilemma has plagued social science since its inception.

Luckily, social theorists are a creative bunch, and a handful of post-modern thinkers borrowed a concept called "the critical hermeneutic" from the textual sciences. Basically, the critical hermeneutic reminds the researcher that she is as much a subject of her research as the "text" she is studying (Roby 2005). Every reader brings his or her own impressions to any set of information. It follows that every reader is affected by the text they are studying, as their own biases and impressions are changed or unchanged depending on the content of the subject research. The researcher must, therefore, analyze herself and her impressions of the data set just as thoroughly as the text she is studying.

This may appear complicated, but it is really quite simple. This project studies the state from the context of modern academia, a facet of the state. It is, therefore, examining the very socio-political factors that created it. By defining the state, it defines itself. The conclusions this project makes about the Indus Civilization have direct meaning and importance to the project itself because they are contributing to the knowledge of the system that created it. The problem of objectivity is embraced because both the observer and the observed are shaped by the research. All facets of the project,

the data set and the analyzer, are subject to interpretation. In a sense, everyone and everything involved in the development of a research project is a subject.

Identifying the presence or absence of a state within the Indus River Valley enhances our understanding of the state within contemporary society. Once the state is defined via social theory, its application to the Indus River Valley will illustrate one of two things. It may show that the region was not home to the rise and fall of a state, that the method of socio-political organization used by the peoples of the Indus Civilization was fundamentally different from that used by people today. Conversely, it may illustrate that the region was home to a state, fundamentally similar to contemporary forms of socio-political organization. In that case, this project would serve as a testament to the potential flexibility inherent to the state. Either way, thanks to the application of the critical hermeneutic, this project advances both the knowledge of the state and the knowledge of the Indus Civilization.

This project must acknowledge its bias towards of applicability. Models of the state tend to be tailored towards the project for which they were developed. Many of these models fail when they are applied in comparative work across disciplines. Indeed, many of these models are impossible to apply to any data set outside of their parent discipline. This makes the use of extra-disciplinary knowledge of some fields of social science inaccessible for use in some case studies. Highly idiosyncratic data are difficult to subject to comparative analysis.

This work focuses upon an archaeological assemblage. Therefore, the state definition that will ultimately be applied to the Indus Civilization must function within the discipline of archaeology. However, this project will build its definition from

knowledge bases both within and beyond the discipline of archaeology. Its definition will be useful in arenas beyond archaeology. The project will establish a synthetic conception of the state, one that is applicable both within and outside of archaeology. In doing so, I overcome the bias of applicability. The collective effort of many different facets of social inquiry will be used. This project seeks to look beyond insular, conventional understandings of the state and apply a broader discussion of the concept to the Indus Civilization specifically.

Discussions of the State in Social Science

The study of the state is as old as the socio-political institution itself. As humans began materializing their thoughts and opinions in writing, one of the most important topics was the role of the state. Early works were concerned with the bounds of governmental power. Plato's *Republic* is one of the earliest accounts of the state. In this work, he addresses topics that range from authority and power to demographics and trade. The desire to understand the world he lives in drives him to analyze the socio-political entity he finds himself a part of, just as the goal of gaining a greater understanding of the state motivates this project's research.

Social theory today, though grounded in the work of ancient thinkers all over the world, owes its current basis to scholars working during the great cultural mix-ups of the past five hundred years. Colonialism brought about the birth of the first generation of dedicated social scientists. The Industrial Revolution brought about the second wave of founding figures in social theory. The rapid change brought about by the rise of capitalism and the foundation of modern globalization inspired scholars to tackle

complex socio-cultural issues, such as the definition of the state. It is within this context that first explicit discussion of the state begins.

The disciplines of anthropology and sociology begin the process of defining the state, along with many other social and cultural phenomena, in earnest during the mid-nineteenth century. To summarize the origins of the debate succinctly, anthropologists looked outward towards other cultures in an attempt to find universals and understand cultural change. Many anthropologists, such as Franz Boas, were disheartened by the encroachment of industrialism on indigenous cultures. To them, every culture was a text, to be recorded and preserved before it disappeared (McGee and Warms 2004).

Sociologists looked inwards to processes taking place within their own societies. Subjugated and oppressed segments of society become the subjects of intense study. Many early sociologists, such as Karl Marx, became so enraged by the plight of the poor and alienated classes that they actively urged other social scientists to become voices for the down and out.

Of course, not all sociologists were as moved by the plight of the working class as Marx. Some apologist scholars, such as Herbert Spencer, wrote that form society had taken was natural. Spencer is famous for a work in which he compares the modern state to a human organism. Inspired by the work of Charles Darwin, Spencer argues that segments of society are naturally selected to be poor workers and that some are selected to become the thinking elite.

Both disciplines sought to understand the same socio-culture changes humanity is subject to. There was a great deal of crossover between the fields. The inward focus of sociology led to more specific discussion of the state among its scholars. Anthropologists

largely contrasted studies of smaller socio-political entities to the Western behemoth. Still, when examining the founding theoretical texts behind both disciplines, one encounters the names of the same theorists over and over. A social theorist was a social theorist, no matter his or her specific discipline.

Social evolution is one of the most important trends in social theory. It was based in the principle of natural selection and change described by Darwin-era biologists. The basic tenant of social evolution is that societies evolve in much the same way as biological animals. As a society grows in population and in technological achievement, it becomes more complex. Human societies begin their existence as bands. As they grow and become more complex they change into tribes, chiefdoms, and eventually states. Most social evolutionists would agree on that much.

The exact nature of social evolution - that is, the mechanisms behind social change and the cultural specifics resulting from that change - is a matter of contention. The earliest evolutionists believed that all humans are on one universal track from primitive to civilized. The state was the epitome of this progressive journey. Others believed that the end point for any given society depends on environmental factors. The earliest discussion of the state took place within this context. What factors caused a precursor society to change into a state? Even after satisfactorily answering that question, the more challenging one remains: What exactly is a state?

While few modern social theorists would describe themselves as evolutionists, it would be difficult for most to deny the influence social evolution has had on social theory. It was the dominant paradigm in pre-positivist thought, and its essence remained in social theory for many years. The reason for this is quite simple. Evolution is all

about change, and it is an undeniable fact that culture changes. Archaeology is especially aware of cultural change. Due to the anatomy of archaeological deposits, changing cultures are often crystal clear beneath the many stratigraphic layers in a site.

The idea of cultural change in its rawest form, revolution, became the founding tenant for one of the most important trends in social theory today. Like the other social evolutionists of his time, Karl Marx found himself swept up in the scientific fervor the Enlightenment inspired in the nineteenth-century European intelligentsia. Struck by the plight of the working class within the changing world of the industrial revolution, Marx collaborated with another intellectual named Frederick Engels to produce an evolutionary work that shocked the other social theorists of his day. Where other scholars, such as Spencer, had used social theory to identify and reinforce the dominant power structure, Marx and Engels capitalized on the same body of theory to expose and undermine that structure.

They assigned a great deal of importance to conflict between the classes. In the pivotal synthesis of their work, *The Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels (1848) claimed that societies were dynamic changing entities whose cultural specifics were determined by society's material needs. They focused on the class relationships that define the socio-political entities. Their primary concern was to describe and elucidate how their society functioned. Because Marx and Engels lived in a state society, an understanding of how classical Marxism works is crucial to understanding how the concept of the state has evolved over time.

In Classical Marxism, one factor trumps all others in determining how a given society will appear culturally and economically. That factor is what Marxists call the

mode of production. The mode of production is the basal relationship a society has with its environment. It is comprised of the means of production, the technologies and materials that allow a society to produce what it needs to survive, and the relationships of production, or the way each class interacts with the mode of production. The mode of production provides the foundation of support for the rest of society, or the super-structure. Change comes from the mode of production, and reverberates upwards into the rest of society.

Classical Marxism claims that all societies throughout history have been plagued by the unequal distribution of wealth. Societies are comprised by classes, groups of people that are defined by their access to the means of production. The ruling class controls the means of production. The means of production are exactly what they sound like: materials such as land, tools, and raw resources that allow a society to pursue its mode of production. Classes are in a constant struggle with one another, each striving for better access to the means of production. Social change occurs only through competition between social classes. Revolution occurs when one class seizes control over the means of production.

In their example, the myriad states of Industrial Europe, the mode of production was capitalism. Capitalism was the economic system succeeding Feudalism. To Marx, Capitalism was a disease, destroying the planet in its relentless hunger for raw materials. In this case, the means of production consisted of the factories and other productive facilities that made capitalism possible. The root conflict was between the owners of the means of production, the ruling class or bourgeoisie, and the workers who used the means of production to produce wealth, the proletariat. It is in the best interests of the ruling

class to take as much from the proletariat as possible so long as the proletariat can still get by. It is in the best interests of the proletariat to rise up and seize control of the means of production for themselves. Therein lies the class conflict Marx and Engels (1848) so passionately described. One day, the proletariat would rise up and seize control of the means of production themselves, and alter the mode of production forever. The *Communist Manifesto* (1848) was a call to arms for the working class. In Classical Marxism, the only way for society to change was through revolution, and if a revolution failed to occur soon, capitalism would destroy the world. In a very real sense, Marx and Engels were the very first praxis anthropologists.

One last note about Classical Marxism: the bourgeoisie were an infinitely crafty bunch. Elites, in Classical Marxism, use their control of the means of production to impose their ideology on the rest of society. Ideology consists of beliefs, religion, and philosophies held by members of society. The dominant ideology in any given society was handed down to the working class by their capitalist oppressors, and was used to keep people in line. Social change still came from changes in the basal, productive levels of social structure, but ideology was everywhere, stabilizing the social system and preventing workers from becoming aware of their class interests. Ideology was, however, nothing but a reactionary band-aid that guarded against the threat workers' awareness could have for the status quo.

Engels (1942) published a book specifically on how he imagined the state coming into being. To Engels, the state was the mechanism by which the ruling elite kept workers in line. It existed to allow such institutions as the army to develop and maintain the social hierarchy the ruling class needed to survive. The state was an ephemeral, pre-

established concept. His work was more an attempt to explain why the state exists than to define what the state is.

Marxism was a force in social theory for quite some time. However, with historical events come academic consequences, and Marxism fell out of favor with the West's ivory towers for almost half a century. Luckily, with the post-modern critique of the late twentieth century, social theorists turned their back on positivist approaches and looked towards Marxism for new inspiration. The emphasis Marxism placed on social activism and political importance brought it back into favor with social theorists, and a whole new wave of Marxist thinking was set to begin. With this new wave came an entirely new and much more useful way to think about the state.

From a dank prison cell within an Italian penitentiary, Antonio Gramsci wrote a diary that redefined how many social theorists conceptualized power and the state. He was a fan of Classical Marxism, but two hundred years had passed, and there had been no workers' revolution. There had, however, been a great deal of socio-political change. This led him to refine many of the concepts Classical Marxism had established. If society had changed, and there had been no workers revolution, something else must driving social change. Gramsci is responsible, in large part, for the evolution of Marxism into Neo-Marxism, Karl and Frederick's theoretical grandchild.

In Neo-Marxism, there are other factors at work besides revolution. Contemporary society is best understood in terms of ideology (Gramsci 2002). Marxism remains theoretically sound, but in order to explain many of the changes that take place in society, Classical Marxism has to be flipped on its head. In the "Prison Notebooks," Gramsci describes the power the ruling class has in controlling and manipulating

ideology. Specifically, the ruling class can control the process of enculturation. By changing what ideology is taught to children in schools, the ruling class can create an obedient and servile working class. Power relationships present in schools favor a top-down hierarchy in which students are judged and controlled by a group of "elites," teachers and other professionals. Because the ruling class enjoys hegemonic control over the minds of these students, they have complete control over academic enculturation. The curriculum reinforces this method of control. Students are taught concrete notions about the world. They are given conclusions without first being introduced to problems. This deprives them of the capacity to arrive at these conclusions themselves. Left without ways to think, students revert back to what they have been taught in a faulty, concrete sense. Teachers reproduce the dominant culture in the minds of the students via their socio-political position (Gramsci, 2002).

Thereby, Neo-Marxism assigns the ruling class a much more active part in controlling and maintaining ideology. The ruling class can do more than create a defensive ideology that justifies their reign; they can actually increase their power by actively manipulating the way people think. Neo-Marxism attributes much more importance and power to ideology and yields to the ruling classes a much more sinister position of power. They have the power to directly influence the minds of the people whom they exploit.

In his revision of Marxism, Gramsci introduces a much deeper role for the state. The state, according to Neo-Marxism, is a vehicle for defending hegemony, or the complete cultural domination of the minds of its subjects (Alonso 1994). This allows centrally controlled socio-political entities to colonize lands, forming territories that can

eventually transform into nations. The transformation of land into territory and inhabitants into citizens results from the active efforts of agents in the ruling class. Ideology is a facet of this transformation. The state is the tool by which the ruling class transforms its ideology and transfers it down into the rest of society.

Gorlier (2002) reminds contemporary readers that Neo-Marxism too is an expression of Western socio-political and economic theory. As such, it is subject to the control of the ruling class. Sometimes, class interest can create enough consciousness to drive holes into the complete hegemony the ruling class often enjoys. The discourse between these facets of class interest and the ruling ideology is important to keep in mind. Neo-Marxism is a force in academia, and is, itself, a facet of the dominant ideology. Therefore, it should be used in a self-acknowledging, self-critical, and confrontational manner.

Neo-Marxism is concerned with ephemeral cultural concepts such as ideology and discourse. These concepts are often difficult to detect archaeologically. Luckily, they do affect the creation of material culture in ways that can leave an archaeological trail. This project must make a special effort to transfer the principles of statehood from Neo-Marxism into a form that is useful for examining archaeological remains.

While Gramsci was compiling Neo-Marxism, other social theorists focused strictly on societal super-structures such as power and ideology in social theory. Many post-modernists isolated specific concepts found in many social paradigms. They then began to discuss these concepts separate from the paradigms that had established them. Power and social change are two important examples of this process.

Power is the manifestation of the ability to coerce others into enacting one's will. Power comes from control over something of great importance within society. Often, power comes from the control of ideology. Thus, ideology is the mechanism by which power is reproduced and strengthened. The state is the protector of ideology. The interaction between power, ideology, and the encroachment of social change fascinated many scholars, and was the primary impetus behind the works of scholars such as Bourdieu.

Boudieu (1977) asserts that there need to be working models for the upkeep of ideology. Like Marx, Gramsci, Engels, and Spencer, Bourdieu believed that there was an underlying structure that made society appear the way it does. However, Bourdieu clung to the idea that the ruling class could only maintain so much control over ideology. Individuals belonged to many different groups and each of those groups maintained its own set of beliefs about the world and how it worked. Thus, in Bourdieu's work, change could and often did come from ideology, but the agents of change need not always be the ruling class. He creates another set of analytical tools for dissecting and understanding society, some of which are useful for understanding why the state may express itself one way in one instance, and another way in another instance. (Bourdieu 1977)

To Bourdieu, there are systems of classification that structure ideology. People belong to many different social fields. Examples of these fields include femininity, government, leadership, or adolescence. These fields are organized via a defined hierarchy (Moi 1991). This hierarchy is determined by the status of the individuals who comprise various fields. Within these fields, members compete for social capital in hopes of attaining legitimacy. Social legitimacy allows an individual more control over the

discourse occurring within a field. Changes in one field may affect others only if that field is sufficiently high in the society hierarchy. A field's power is determined by the social status of the people it consists of.

Each field contains a set of rules. These rules are unique to one field, and are irrelevant to other fields. They are determined by the nature of the field in which they occur. All of the members of a given field take part in the establishment and maintenance of those rules. The sum total of these rules is called habitus (Moi 1991).

Individuals act as agents within their fields. Agents establish and maintain the structure of the fields they compete in. Each field has an agenda. Each has its own set of goals. The individual or group within a field that has the most social capital, and thus, legitimacy within their field, sets forth that field's agenda and leads it towards completing that agenda.

The deepest, most intrinsic structure in Bourdieu's society is called the doxa. As society changes, heterodoxy challenges the unspoken but omnipresent structure of society. When an element of the doxa comes under attack from heterodoxy, it becomes orthodoxy, a source of conservative defense. Often, orthodoxy exaggerates whatever aspect of doxa it originated from.

One must have social legitimacy in a field to actively create heterodoxy. Therefore, competition occurs not only at a macro, or class-dominant level. It occurs on every tier of society. The ruling class has an interest in maintaining the doxa, as the doxa allows the status quo to persist. Challenges to the doxa often arise through the work of a variety of agents. Crises weaken the doxa, and are often the impetus behind new forms

of heterodoxy. The state, according to the Bourdieu, is the institutionalized defense of the doxa and competition within society.

Bourdieu isolates structures that dictate the way society functions. His goal, according to critics, is to combine the objective and the subjective, thus eliminating the fallacy of positivism while continuing to allow for cross-societal comparison and analysis. Because he separates habitus from the social fields it structures, habitus becomes a quantifiable, independent entity, free of human biases (King 2000). Unfortunately, any objectivity-based analysis has serious problems, as discussed previously in this work. This does not render Bourdieu's tools of analysis unusable. Rather, it necessitates the critical and sparing use of Bourdieu's theory, applying it only where it is most informative.

Summary of the State in Social Science

The proceeding explanations of various trends in social theory are not exhaustive. Rather, the proceeding section summarized only a handful of the most useful analytical tools social science has to offer this project. The state was rarely discussed specifically by any of the above authors, however it is a critical component of each of their analyses.

Social evolution provided the first definition of the state. Unfortunately, the state is only intrinsically defined in social evolution. It is the end result of evolutionary processes. While this explains little about what the state is or how it can be recognized archaeologically, it does provide a basis for one of the leading paradigms for state discussion: Marxism.

Marxism makes many important contributions to the discussion of the state. The base of any state is its mode of production. The interactions between the productive forces and the ideology, which is the vehicle by which the ruling class governs the lower classes, determine the actual character of the state.

Gramsci adds that power is the ability for the ruling class to directly impose its will upon the masses. Power is exercised through ideology; the ruling class controls the worldview of the masses through enculturation. The elite use ideology to mold the lower classes into whatever is needed to maintain the status quo. States, in this context, are the vehicles by which ideology is maintained. In order to determine whether or not a state is present in any give society, one must determine whether or not ideological control is present in a given society. If no ideological control is present then the presence of a state is doubtful. This control need not be universal. There is room for competition between certain factions within society.

The State in Archaeology

Archaeological theory paralleled the development of social theory as a whole. Evolution had the same impact in archaeological theory as it did social in theory. After all, archaeology is in the best position among the social sciences to observe change over time. Because change is easy to view over time, evolution is an almost natural conclusion when faced with data from the archaeological record. As such, the state was framed in the context of development.

Most archaeological work undertaken in the mid-twentieth century utilized the positivist interpretive approaches of New Archaeology to come up with analyses.

This sort of theorizing was very processual and deterministic. Humans had concrete interactions with their environments, and those interactions led to the transitional behaviors that gave socio-political entities such as the state life.

One of the most pervasive trends in archaeological theory from this era was the idea of evolution. Evolution was and is an important aspect of any discussion of socio-politics within archaeology. Societies change from generation to generation, and the state had to in some ways be the result of changes in societies that predated it.

Elman Service (1958) made one of the earliest attempts at directly defining the state in archaeology. Service was a four-field anthropologist. His writings reflected more than just archaeological fieldwork. Service was an ethnographer and believed he could discern patterns in past cultures by categorizing them with information garnered from living populations. He describes four steps on an evolutionary ladder that a society progresses through as it develops from very primitive to very complex. All peoples begin organized via band-level societies. Band societies are small, hunter-gatherer groups with simple customs. They leave behind little material culture to be found by archaeologists. As band societies grow, they fission into multiple bands, which aggregate to form tribes. Tribes may consist of multiple bands that meet ever so often. They may also be comprised of many sedentary villages that are linked socio-politically. Regardless, tribes evolve into chiefdoms when one sedentary village comes to dominate the others in an area. Chiefdoms have centralized leadership and powerful ruling elites. When multiple chiefdoms expand, primitive states develop. States are characterized by immense populations and ruling classes. Warfare, oppression, and a whole suite of modern-day

problems are associated with this conception of the state. States are characterized by a much more rigid hierarchy than chiefdoms (Covey 2003).

Service's initial description of the primitive state became near-dogma in archaeology. Even though the concept was defined so superficially, Service's works were often used as textbooks in archaeology. Archaeologists who later discussed the state in their work often overlooked the task of defining the state as they planned to use the concept, falling back on Service's initial work. The result is a corpus of archaeological literature that tends to avoid directly discussing what the state is. Rather, archaeologists prefer writing about the state's origins and making binary determinations of whether or not the state exists in a particular assemblage.

Another approach that archaeologists use when defining the state is functionalism. The state arises due to the needs of society. For example, the theory of circumscription claims that the state arises from the need for defense and warfare (Carneiro 1970). A growing chiefdom that begins facing its competitors with violence and expansion tends to be centralized in a location that is circumscribed by defensive geography.

Some theories that archaeologists have proposed claim that the state is a response to the organizational vacuum that develops atop a populous chiefdom's super-structure. For example, in some treatments of the archaeological state, the state arises as a society's mode of production demands more organized group labor (Stanish 2001). Still, the state itself goes undefined. The state often serves to centralize control for an expanding sphere of territory (Spencer and Raymond 2004). Rather than defining the concept of the state specifically, archaeologists merely identify what the state does.

In the proceeding examples, the power vacuum left by certain socio-economic developments is a deterministic entity. The fortuitously located circumscription state is *determined* by its location. Unfortunately, determinism is a flawed concept in social theory because it oversimplifies cultural development. For example, under an environmental deterministic paradigm, all societies that arose in the desert would develop into identical or very similar entities. The determinism characterized by circumscription theory is environmental; it does not provide an explanation for populous chiefdoms located in circumscribed environments that did not develop into states. This problem leads Roscoe (1993) to write that archaeology is failing to keep up with the other cultural sciences when it comes to the application of ideology and hegemony to social change. This project attempts to overcome determinism, thus offering a more dynamic conception of the state.

Agency-based definitions of the state are also popular in modern archaeological interpretation. According to agency-based definitions of the state, societies utilize a certain set of leveling strategies to maintain their egalitarian characteristics. Elites must brush aside these leveling strategies in order to reproduce their power, allowing a permanent upper class to develop (Covey 2003). Some claim that there will always be individuals in any society grabbing for the socio-political advantage (Blanton *et al* 1996). This political corpus of archaeological theory comprises a very important part of this project's definition of the state.

The discussion of the state in archaeology here is far from exhaustive, and only a few important trends in state discussion have been integrated into this research. The state in archaeological theory is a step in socio-cultural development. Large populations are

indicative of state-level society. They arise through the actions of elites, but are predicated by the societal need for centralized organization. In cooperative models for the development of the state, society elevates elites to deal with specific organizational problems it is experiencing. In political models, elites take advantage of historical circumstances to inscribe themselves at the top of society. A decent synthesis of these positions would assert that conditions arise under which centralized organization and power are possible, and a small number of individuals act on those conditions to create a permanent elite.

Synthesizing the Archaeological State with Social Theory

In the preceding discussion, I discussed many different notions about what the state is and how it works. Now, the task at hand is to refine from the previous sections the key components of state definitions. Combining these various components will yield a coherent, consistent set of requirements for confirming the presence or absence of a state within the Indus Civilization.

There are three general sets of requirements for statehood. The first set of requirements is evolutionary; as many archaeologists have stated previously, states are the result of cultural change. The second set is economic. The economic requirements for statehood are closely related to the evolutionary requirements. The third set is the most complex; ideology is a definite facet of statehood, and confirmation or denial of certain ideological processes is necessary not only in determining the presence or absence of a state, but also in understanding exactly how states work.

The evolutionary requirements for statehood are very straightforward. States do not simply materialize out of nowhere. Human populations form states, and states have never been the first stage of human occupation in a region. States are conglomerations of smaller polities, brought together as a burgeoning elite class centralizes power. Thus, in order for an archaeological assemblage to indicate the presence of a state, there must be evidence for one or more smaller socio-political entities beneath the evidence for the state in question. There must be evidence for a direct lineage between the proposed state and its forebears.

Economic requirements follow these evolutionary requirements very closely. Along with the evidence of smaller polities predating an alleged state, there must also be indications of increasing economic complexity. The reason for this requirement is quite simple. New technologies are often necessary to accommodate larger numbers of people. In addition, as populations begin materializing more aspects of their culture, such as designing new motifs to coincide with their religion and building new kinds of structures, they begin experimenting with new stylistic techniques. Artifacts become more complex, and more numerous. A greater number of steps are required for their production. Many items require raw materials that can only be acquired from far away sources. States build trade networks that extend across their territories to bring raw materials to their artisans. Select individuals are able to specialize in the production of just one type of artifact; not everyone has to participate in subsistence. At the state level, complex artifacts are produced for all people in very large amount. Many individuals, who can trace their power back to the ruling regime, regulate the economy itself. Unlike a chiefdom-level complex economy, the state-level complex economy produces vast amounts of goods that

infiltrate every niche in society, rather than producing a small number of prestige goods for elites. The volume of trade that occurs within a state-level economy requires the development of bureaucracy, individuals who represent the elite and regulate this trade. This kind of economic development and specialization should be visible within the archaeological record. Workshops, intricate artifacts, and trade routes are all identifiable in the archaeological record. A complex economy creates a demand for more steam-lined organization. Generally, the complex economy will coincide with territorial expansion, an effect way of opening up new resources for integration with a complex economy. As such, states control a significantly larger region than the smaller polities they replaced.

These economic requirements are comparative; there is no pre-defined amount of land a single socio-political entity must control in order to achieve statehood. There are no specific technologies a civilization must develop in order to become a state. Rather, in order to be a state, a polity must acquire and control a larger amount of territory than its forebears controlled. It must establish trade routes and fund artisans with this territory. Technological development should reach new peaks. It must be more economically complex than the polities it replaced.

The final set of requirements, the ideological requisites, are the most complicated and most important. According to almost every major thinker in social theory who has tackled the subject, states are the vehicles by which top-down ideology is maintained. This means many things, the foremost being that there is a civilization-wide ideology the state is maintaining. Evidence for ideology, such as predominant stylistic patterns and evidence for ritual, should reach from the top of society towards the base. Ideology is the vehicle by which the status quo is maintained. Control, or adequate means by which the

ruling class can manipulate their power, is an indicator of statehood. The specific methods of control, including its scale and particular strategies, provide the essence of states. Evidence for social control varies greatly. In some societies, warfare or slavery can be seen archaeologically. In others, priest-kings order their people to build massive temples and pay tribute. Such control strategies are evident in the archaeological record. In order to establish the presence of that kind of control in the archaeological record, there must be evidence for top-down ideological changes. There should be evidence for elites. Elites, in this case, need not be the fat cats associated with the Western perception of wealth. Rather, elites are the ones who enjoy a significantly higher status than the bulk of the population. They are the ones in control of society. Elites occupy a centralized, elevated position in society, a perch from which they can monitor the people under their control. There must be evidence for their status. A good example of elite status would be stylistic motifs that emphasize individuals or people in power.

These requirements must be taken for what they are; Western conceptions of what an elite should look like or what a complex economy is must be left at the door. An elite is merely a central organizer who enjoys more status than her peers. A complex economy merely refers to a greater number of steps and specialists than was present in the economy of several generations ago. This means that even among states that perfectly conform to this definition, there is still a great degree of wiggle-room. Elites need not always cut themselves a larger piece of pie, especially if status within their society is not determined by material possessions.

With a synthesized definition of the state established, we can now move forward and apply our own perception of the state to evidence from the Indus Civilization.

Chapter 3: The Indus Civilization

History of Research

The first reports of the Indus civilization came from the sketchy writings of a British army deserter in the early nineteenth century (Kenoyer 1998). Travelers in the Punjab region of what is now northwest India and southern Pakistan told tales of a vast ruined city just outside of the city limits of a town called Harappa. The site had been brick-mined for centuries, and many of the buildings in modern Harappa are made of bricks from one of the largest cities in the Indus Civilization. The British took notice of the ruins, and mined brick for the construction of the Indian railway system (Kenoyer 1998).

Early archaeologists began working on the site several decades later. The working hypothesis was that the ruins belonged to the ancient Mauryan Empire, at the time, the oldest known civilization in the region. Several small excavations were made, and a site several miles to the south was discovered. The first site became known as Harappa, taking its name from the modern city it was nearby, and the southern site became known for its name in the local language: Mohenjo Daro, or mound of the dead.

Work in earnest did not begin until an archaeologist named John Marshall, after confronting data from both sites, determined that they belonged to an as-of-yet unnamed civilization. In 1924, he announced the discovery of the "Harappan" civilization to the world (Kenoyer 1998, McIntosh 2002). Marshall was the first scholar to associate the sites together, and began writing about the Indus Civilization (Possehl 2002).

Marshall did many excavations at the Harappa site. His methods, like those used by his contemporaries, were primitive. Artifacts that weren't complete were tossed aside. Sherds that would, today, be used for stylistic analysis, were left on the ground at the site, their provenience lost. Charcoal samples that could have been used with modern radiocarbon dating were ignored or thrown away. Combined with the brick-mining activity, early archaeological methods compromised much of the initial data from Harappa and, to a lesser extent, Mohenjo Daro.

Regardless, Marshall was the first archaeologist to bring a defined paradigm to the Harappa site (Possehl 2002). Marshall was an environmental determinist and claimed that the Indus Civilization was the result of the favorable climate that once persevered in the region. He used data from the site to corroborate his environmental analysis. The baked brick used in the houses of Harappa and Mohenjo Daro was a response to a rainy climate. Street drains and complex gutter systems were required to compensate for the rain. This, combined with the conspicuous lack of the lion, a dry season animal, in Indus iconography, according to Marshal, was evidence that the Indus Civilization was a response to the favorable climate in the region today (Possehl 2002). Marshall's analysis of the Indus Civilization's socio-political structure was based largely on comparisons with assemblages from Mesopotamia.

Marshall's paradigm became the foundation for later archaeologists' research. His ideas lived on in the works of others. However, it was not his environmental determinism that scholars remembered. Along with his initial descriptions of the Harappan excavations, Marshall made a claim that would persist in Indus archaeology for many years: Harappa was home to a peaceful people who knew nothing of war and

conquest (Cork 2004). He made this claim through comparison with archaeological assemblages from Mesopotamia and Egypt. Other ancient civilizations are home to a ton of evidence that indicates violence and warfare. Because the Indus Civilization lacked these indicators of violence and warfare, Marshall proposed that the Indus Civilization was home to a peaceful people.

Later archaeologists began work in the Indus region with the notion that the Indus Civilization was an idyllic, peaceful utopia. Working under this assumption, they did research projects that supported this view. Thus, an entire tradition of archaeologists that described the Indus as unique and utopian cropped up. Admittedly, this very project works from the perspective that the Indus Civilization is unlike other civilizations, though in no way does it assert that it was an idyllic utopia. Marshall's claim established a theme that would survive in works all the way to the treatise written by McIntosh (2002).

Not every Near Eastern scholar was affected by Marshall's initial paradigm. Some have worked very hard to bring a critical eye to the early works written about the "peaceful Harappans" (Basham 1949).

Sir Mortimer Wheeler of the British colonial force is another major figure from the initial archaeological work done in the Indus Valley. The Indian Archaeological Survey did many projects before Wheeler came onto the scene. Unfortunately, reports from these projects are difficult to obtain. The poor state of site reporting and data preservation in the archaeology of his day inspired Wheeler to write a number of scathing critiques of his fellow archaeologists. To Wheeler, an excavation that went unpublished was worse than no excavation at all.

Wheeler was an experienced archaeologist long before he began his reformation and re-organization of the Indian Archaeological Survey. He was experienced with Mesopotamian assemblages. Comparison with those materials guided much of his work in the Indus Valley. His initial analysis of the Indus Civilization's socio-political organization hinged on the idea priest-king nations, similar to those found in ancient Sumer.

Wheeler's greatest contribution to Indus Archaeology was his careful and detailed work in creating and formalizing site reports. He also began a detailed analysis of weapons and tools found in the Indus Valley. Wheeler (1968) claimed that the knives and arrows turning up in Indus deposits were the tools of artisans, not the weapons of soldiers. Indus bows and arrows would have been much more useful to the hunter than they would have been to the warrior. Because Wheeler had been an important figure in interpreting the archaeological records of the civilizations in Mesopotamia, a group of very warlike and brutal polities, it is logical to assume he was competent in analyzing the warfare capabilities of the Indus people (McIntosh 2002).

Wheeler confirmed Marshall's assertion that the Indus Civilization was home to a peaceful people, but did so with a caveat. Wheeler uncovered a layer in Harappa that was littered with bodies that had not received proper mortuary treatment. He believed these bodies were the remains of massacre victims. He went on to claim that the massacre marked the invasion of the Aryans, and the end of the Indus state (Wheeler 1968).

Work in Mohenjo Daro marked an expansion of archaeological fieldwork in the Indus Valley. Wheeler himself led many of the excavations in Mohenjo Daro. Thanks to

his publication crusade, the quality and integrity of reports from that site are considerably greater than those from many other Indus sites.

Mohenjo Daro was organized much like Harappa. Mohenjo Daro is somewhat younger than Harappa, but both cities share many traits (Possehl 2002). Both were well-planned cities with large public structures archaeologists call "citadels." Each is positioned strategically along the flow of the Indus River. In the cities' heyday, the viewshed from the upper levels of the buildings in both cities would have allowed for a view far down the river's course. The buildings were organized into integrated neighborhoods. Both cities cover a land area of around 100 hectares.

Harappa and Mohenjo Daro are the largest of the Indus sites. This led many of the archaeologists working during the early excavations to refer to the cities together as the "Twin Capitals" of the Indus Civilization.

With the excavation of Mohenjo Daro, archaeological work on the Indus civilization spread into a region known as the Sindh. Archaeologists surveyed sites up and down the ancient course of the Indus and Saraswati rivers. Between 1200 and 1500 sites have now been identified that were associated with the Indus Civilization (Kenoyer 1998, McIntosh 2002). The sites that archaeologists believe comprised the Indus civilization covered an area that doubles that of any of the Mesopotamian Civilizations or Ancient Egypt.

A great many of these 1500 sites are not located along the course of the ancient Indus. Rather, they drew life from the course of the ancient Saraswati (McIntosh 2002). A temporal bias has shaped work in this region; today, the Indus is a much more impressive river system than the Saraswati. Therefore, archaeological work has

concentrated on sites along the Indus River. The irony is that, during the time of the Indus Civilization, the Saraswati was a much more productive river (McIntosh 2002). The true capitals of the Indus Civilization may yet lie beneath thousands of years of Saraswati sediments. Harappa, Mohenjo Daro, and the other cities of the Indus River may have been mere outposts of the Indus Civilization.

Work in the Indus valley continues to this day. While it has been several years since any work has been done in Mohenjo Daro or Harappa, many archaeologists are now focusing on outlying sites (McIntosh 2002). One can learn only so much about a civilization from its capitals. It is important to see how the dominant culture changed as it spread across the countryside. Recent work has also done a very good job in identifying the sources of the Indus Civilization's raw materials. New perspectives on the Indus Civilization's expansion and subsequent defense are coming out of these recent projects.

The Indian Archaeological Survey retains and preserves many of the records and reports from excavations done in the Indus River Valley. Indian archaeologists are publishing a great deal of literature about the sites. The fall of the Indus civilization and its connection with the Vedas is a matter of great interest today. A great number of archaeologists no longer believe that the Aryans directly encountered the Indus civilization as they migrated into the region many thousands of years ago. Rather, the Aryan Invasion was a much slower process in which populations mingled and cultures merged.

Finding the State

The Indus, though central to Indian and Pakistani cultural history, has suffered from a lack of enthusiastic inquiry. Because Indus sites do not produce extravagant artifacts like sites in Egypt and Mesopotamia, they have never caused the same kind of fervor (in the West particularly) as other civilizations. This is both positive and negative. Sensationalism brings lots of money to archaeological sites, but excavation in such cases is hasty and many conclusions are reached before excavation even begins. Public-enthused archaeology resembles treasure hunting in that only the most fantastic finds from sites are announced.

Indus archaeology has been very honest since its inception. Work in the Indus Valley was done in the spirit of expanding the cultural history of the region. Archaeologists knew they weren't going to find golden tombs or diamond statues, so they focused on analyzing the materials they were finding, rather than longing for extravagant riches.

Another reason Indus archaeology is so much less prevalent than work done in other civilizations is that the unique historical conditions of the Indus Civilization create a disconnection between ancient and modern culture. The coming of the Aryans after the fall of the Indus led to a massive cultural transformation in the region. Aryan-Vedic culture was a completely new phenomenon, and while it retained many aspects of the native culture it replaced, it was an entirely new entity. The Indus Civilization fell into a state of vague cultural memory. The peoples of the region do not remember the Indus Civilization per se; only historical vestiges such as enigmatic references in the Rig Veda remain in the popular cultural corpus.

Another important barrier has stood in the way of Indus archaeology. The Indus Civilization had a written language, but it remains un-deciphered. The ability to read the Indus Script would surely change the way scholars interpret the Indus remains (Kenoyer 1998).

Finally, political turbulence in the region cannot be ignored. India and Pakistan have political tensions that go back to Pakistan's formation. The Indus Civilization happens to be located on their disputed border. There is, as such, a conflict of interests when it comes to working with and interpreting the sites.

In spite of these limitations, Indus archaeology is a vibrant and fruitful field of research. I will now apply the state requirements discussed in Chapter 2 to the corpus of knowledge that has developed around the Indus Civilization. Applying the definition to Indus materials will determine whether or not there was a state in the Indus River Valley, and answer this project's research question.

The first set of requirements for statehood established in Chapter 2 pertained to the evolution and development of states. States are temporal entities. The state in archaeology stems from a set of historical and demographic conditions. States develop from pre-existing socio-political polities. They do not simply materialize in a vacuum. If there was a state in the Indus River Valley, there must be a direct evolutionary link between the state in question and a proceeding collection of socio-political entities.

The second set of requirements for statehood is economic. The state develops from the niche political economy creates in society. Economic complexity is the harbinger of elites. Elites arise because there is a purpose they can serve, and that purpose is organization.

We must now determine whether or not the archaeological remains of the Indus Civilization fit these requirements. Because change occurs over time, a narrative chronology, compiled from the archaeological records of Indus sites, will provide an impression of the Indus Civilization from which we can determine whether or not the evolutionary and economic requirements for statehood have been met. In order to frame such a chronology, we will examine the work of Jonathan Kenoyer.

Kenoyer (1998) identifies a chronology of the Indus Civilization that takes much of the archaeological record in the region into account. According to his chronology, there were four main phases in the development of the Indus Civilization. The first of these phases is known as the "Early food-producing era." The Early Food-Producing phase began around 6500 B.C., and lasted 1500 years. During this phase, the Indus region was home to small populations of nomads living alongside very early sedentary foragers. Both groups took advantage of the natural bounty provided by the rich floodplains.

The earliest culture that archaeologists have identified in the region is called the Mehrgarh. The Mehrgarh was identified early on in Indus excavations (Kenoyer 1998, Possehl 2002, McIntosh 2002). Remnants of Mehrgarh culture are identified by specific architectural and burial practices. The people of the Mehrgarh phase lived in mud brick houses that, in all likelihood, had wooden roofs. Narrow alleys and passageways connected the houses to one another (Kenoyer 1998). These were probably the homes of the early sedentary foragers. The earliest cultivars to be used in the Indus River Valley are wheat and barley (Fuller 2000). Remains of both food types have been recovered from Mehrgarh levels, indicating that they were probably well on their way to developing

agriculture (Kenoyer 1998). The Mehrgarh were also in possession of the earliest forms of technologies, such as the proto forms of lapidary, ceramics, metallurgy, and bead making, that dominated Indus River Valley during later eras (Kenoyer 1998, Possehl 2002).

During the next phase, the "Regionalization Era," development of the region's political economy began. Regionalization took place between 5000 B.C. and 2600 B.C. The sedentary communities grew, and many of the technologies now associated with the Indus Civilization were developed. Crafts such as pottery, metallurgy, lapidary, and seal making began. Sedentary communities began growing crops to supplement their food supply. They began learning the flood cycles of the Indus and Saraswati Rivers.

The Mehrgarh culture survived well into the Regionalization Era. Possehl (2002) further divides the Indus chronology into many sub-phases, illustrating that the Mehrgarh were a cultural carry-over between the Food-Producing and Regionalization Eras. As communities spread across the Indus floodplain, the peoples of the region perfected many of the technologies that would dominate the region. Polities began developing, as trade networks for trading exotic resources for more specialized production became necessary.

As these communities grew and became more complex, they began to form multi-village polities. This led to the "Integration Era." The Integration Era (2600 B.C.-1900 B.C.) is characterized by the lumping together of the various communities that developed during the Regionalization Era. During this era, the nomads, who had inhabited the region during the earliest era alongside the sedentary foragers, adopted a trading lifestyle (Kenoyer 1998). The Harappan cultural phase arises during the Integration era. These

traders were one of the key components to the formation of the Indus Civilization. The end result is a united cultural group that comprised a much more powerful entity.

The final phase, "Localization," was characterized by the degradation of ties between communities formed during the Integration era. The Localization Era was the period during which the Indus Civilization collapsed.

The lowest levels of Harappa are associated with the Mehrgarh cultural phase. This means that the founders of Harappa belonged to the Mehrgarh tradition. As the Integration Era dawned in the Indus River Valley, the cultural development of the region continued. According to Possehl (2002), integration occurs as the Harappan site moves into the "Early Harappan" phase. All around the site, sedentary communities are transforming into either centers of the newly established Indus Civilization, or they are becoming satellites, dependant on the political economy anchored in the larger cities.

Economic complexity is reaching new heights. A new system of craft organization rises to regulate the flow of goods between the cities of the Indus River Valley and the countryside (Kenoyer 1997). Long distant traded routes are formed to bring exotic materials into the larger cities. Lapidary and metallurgy develop into fine arts. The ornaments of the integration phase are fare more intricate than those from previous cultural periods (Mackay 1935**,** McIntosh 2002). Traders are transporting materials from far outside the limits of the larger cities into the economic hubs of the Indus Civilization. There is a definite increase in economic complexity from the earliest settlements in the Indus River Valley to the height of the Indus Civilization.

Within the Indus River Valley, there was a clear progression from small, regionally organized polities into a single, large-scale, socio-political entity. Not only do

settlements become larger and more developed, but also the political economy of the region becomes exponentially more complex than it had been. At the Harappan site specifically, there is a clear cultural progression from the pre-Harappan socio-economic phases to the Mature Harappan phase. This phenomenon is not limited to the Harappan site; it occurs all across the Indus River Valley. The region transforms culturally, technologically, politically, and economically. The Indus Civilization, therefore, meets all of the evolutionary and economic requirements for statehood. The economy of the Indus Civilization is considerably more complex than the pre-state one it replaced, and the Mehrgarh culture provides the demographic precursors for a state to develop in the region.

Ideology in the Indus Civilization

The ideological requirements for statehood are much harder to identify. Ideology is an ephemeral cultural phenomenon. Luckily, ideology affects people deeply, and they give it physical form in the material culture they create. In order to fulfill the ideological requirement for statehood, it must be evident that individuals, acting alone or in concert, are enacting change within their society, and that change is not coming from mere environmental or developmental reasons.

As explained previously, large-scale control of ideology by a single class or individual must be evident in order to confirm the ideological processes inherent to statehood. Marxism alleges that no elite class can ever have complete, uncontested control over society; some competition is always occurring. It must be confirmed,

however, that the ruling class has and has used the power to enact its will upon individuals belonging to a lower class.

Were there elites in the Indus River Valley? One of the most effective ways archaeology has to identify elites within a society is mortuary analysis. Archaeologists make several assumptions when using mortuary analysis. Elites tend to be buried with material representations of the power they held during their lifetimes. As an individual belonging to the ruling class approaches the end of her life, she uses her power to make arrangements for her funeral. If her power persists across life states, agents that support her, possibly including the next generation or tier of elites, invest a great deal in her mortuary treatment. Individuals of lower standing are made to invest energy in the burial ceremony of a fallen elite. Often, this energy investment comes in the form of burial goods, objects of value that are buried or disposed of with the deceased.

During the Mehrgarh phase, a variety of material objects were included in flexed burials (Kenoyer 1998). Some burials during this era contained a great number of grave goods, while others had less. Burials tended to contain some amount of material culture. As the Early Harappan phase begins, the Harappans begin burying their deceased with fewer and fewer grave goods. During the height of the Indus Civilization, many of the burials from Harappa contain only few grave goods, if any at all (Kenoyer 1998).

However, most graves from the Indus River Valley contained at the very least a little material culture. In order to determine the secular value of buried goods, they must be compared to those found in a secular setting. Thus, materials from “hoards,” or secular deposits of artifacts, must be considered in order to determine the value of grave

goods (Rissman 1988). Cultural deposits from graves are impossible to analyze if one has no sense of the raw value a society associates with a given material.

Hoards are large deposits of artifacts and materials found separately from burials. In Harappa, they are often located behind homes, under the floors of structures, and in discreet hiding places along streets (Mackay 1935). The identification of a cultural hoard is often confused by the presence of "stockpiles." Stockpiles are caches of raw materials associated with a nearby workshop. It is important not to confuse the two concepts; a hoard is a "personal stash," while stockpiles are controlled by whomever controls the workshop. An important distinction separating hoards from stockpiles is that individuals often bury hoards, whereas the environmental and cultural processes that form the site from which they are recovered bury stockpiles. Of course this is not universal; sometimes stockpiles are buried and sometimes hoards are left in containers of various kinds. The primary diagnosis of a hoard or stockpile must be determined through careful analysis of the site. (Rissman 1988)

Rissman (1988) did a comprehensive analysis of grave goods in the Indus Civilization. His sample included sites from all across the Punjab and Sindh. In order to control for conditional changes throughout different temporal phases, he examines only materials belonging to the height of the Indus Civilization. He includes many materials from hoards and burials, and analyzes each with the other in mind. Materials such as gold, copper, and semi-precious stones fill the hoards from various archaeological deposits all across the region, while simple clay ornaments and jewelry adorn the dead. Indeed, an entirely different spread of materials occurs in the ossuaries of the Indus Civilization than occurs in the hoards. Rissman (1988) proposes that the Indus

Civilization had two axes of value, one secular and one spiritual. Materials that were valuable spiritually had absolutely no value on the secular market, while secular goods were seen as worthless to the dead. Grave goods alone seem to suggest that there were not elites in the Indus Civilization.

Another method of mortuary analysis involves diagnosing the health of individuals found in different graves. The underlying assumption here is that the skeletons of elites will be in better health than those of commoners. Such analysis reveals little difference in the health of graves believed to be the well to do of Harappa (burials that contain wood coffins or light jewelry) and the commoners (McIntosh 2002). Everyone appears to have been eating the same food, doing the same work, and living similar lives. The peoples of the Indus Civilization were living very congruent lives.

Elite burials appear to have been absent in Harappa and Mohenjo Daro. This, of course, does not mean that there were no elites in the Indus Civilization; it simply means that their ideas about wealth and the afterlife differ from other cultures in the archaeological record. It is possible that the Indus Civilization simply did not place the same emphasis on the individual as other cultures. Some scholars suggest that the Indus Civilization practiced a proto-caste system, similar to that of present day India (McIntosh 2002). In that case, the caste, not the individual, is the most important. When an individual died, the caste would continue; the occurrence of death may have been largely meaningless.

One last possibility is that the Indus elites were simply treated differently in death than the broad populace (McIntosh 2002). Perhaps elites were cremated in elaborate feasting events that did, indeed consume a great amount of energy. Archaeologically, the

remains of such events would be very difficult to distinguish from regular feasting. If all traces of the events were burned, they may be completely invisible to archaeologists.

Another method archaeologists use to identify status differences within a society is analysis of architecture. Individuals with many resources on hand are apt to build more elaborate living quarters than the rest of society. Cities can be laid out in order to benefit the interests of certain groups. Building entrances, the sizes of streets, the thickness of walls, and the accessibility of public works may all provide clues into the social structure of the society that built them. Here we have a little more luck in identifying social differentiation within the Indus River Valley.

Indus cities were positioned in locations that afford a wide view of the surrounding landscape (Kenoyer 1998). They were planned, well built, and very organized (Mackay 1935). Of critical importance is the fact that large Indus cities were surrounding by massive earthworks (Kenoyer 1998, Mackay 1935, McIntosh 2002, Possehl 2002, Wheeler 1968). Cities were clearly differentiated from the surrounding countryside. This does not indicate the presence or absence of elites, but it does indicate that Indus Cities were designed with power over the surrounding landscape in mind.

In many Indus cities, sections are elevated slightly higher than other sections (Wheeler 1968). Kenoyer (1998) suggests that this is one sure sign that there were elites living in the Indus Civilization. Though their burials may be absent or difficult to identify, the elites of Harappa and Mohenjo Daro built their homes or favored neighborhood on higher platforms than the common people.

Neighborhoods in the great cities of the Indus Civilization were discrete entities. A single neighborhood was separated from the rest of the city via rows of smaller houses



Figure II: Building layout of Mohenjo-Daro that illustrates the scattering of large structure. Some scholars suggest that housing clusters around larger buildings comprise neighborhoods. From Wheeler 1968:48

and wider streets (Kenoyer 1998). Neighborhoods consisted of many different sized structures, all-interlocking to form one cohesive unit. Smaller houses formed the peripheries of neighborhoods. They were connected via street-level passages and possibly wooden rooftops to medium-sized houses that formed the rows that outlined the centers of neighborhoods (Mackay 1935). Large structures that many scholars believe were houses were found in the interior of neighborhoods. If discrete family groups lived in each of these large houses, then the urban landscape of the Indus Civilization consisted of many districts, each controlled by its own group of elites. Elites, therefore, would not have lived together, as the raised platforms in some parts of the Indus Cities suggest;

rather, they would have lived among the commoners, proximal to the people directly under their control. On the other hand, these structures may not be residential.

Public works are the final trait of Indus Civilization architecture this project will take into account. Large "citadel" mounds have been discovered in almost every large Indus city (Kenoyer 1998, Mackay 1935, Possehl 2002, Wheeler 1968). The exact purpose of these structures is unknown. Some have suggested that they were palaces, but very few items of substantial secular wealth have been recovered from these sites (Rissman 1988). They could be organizational centers, used by the top members of each of the elite groups that run the various neighborhoods in Indus Cities. They could also be defensive works a last line of defense should the city come under siege (Wheeler 1968). This, of course, seems unlikely, for evidence of warfare is scattered and scant in the Indus Civilization.

These sites are generally located alongside or at least associated with other large public works structures. In Mohenjo Daro, a huge structure now believed to be public baths stands slightly offset from the rest of the city (Possehl 2002). Ritual bathing is also associated with Hinduism and could corroborate McIntosh's (2002) assertion that social structure in the Indus Civilization was predicated by a caste system. Another public building associated with the large Indus Cities is the "granary" in Harappa, identified by Wheeler (1968) in one of his many exploration digs at the site. The granary is located near the citadel, seeming to indicate some degree of organizational importance at the citadel.

Where there elites in the Indus Civilization? Though burials are absent, and secular wealth seems to be somewhat evenly distributed, there is a fair amount of

evidence for the great organizational power of a select group of individuals within the Indus Civilization. The cities themselves are positioned strategically, taking advantage of the potential power over the surrounding landscape a location has to over. Though public buildings and centers are evident in the archaeological record of the region, access to them is difficult to identify. Houses in the Indus River Valley are different from one another; some are large and some are small. Based upon this evidence, it is likely that there was some kind of high-status individuals acting as organizers in the Indus Civilization. It is difficult to discern what kinds of rewards they were getting for their efforts; they appear to be in the same state of physical health and well being as the commoner in the Indus River Valley. Can we call these individuals elites? They did occupy the highest status positions within Indus society, and they did hold organizational power over their peers. But did they organize Indus Civilizations? In order to call these individuals organizers, we must determine whether or not they were truly in control of the Indus Civilization. This brings us to the next phase of this project: identifying control in the Indus Civilization.

There is definitive evidence for control in the Indus Civilization. The first and most apparent manifestation of control is the Indus Seals, components of the enigmatic writing system used by the peoples of the Indus River Valley. These small, steatite squares carry many different motifs, some purely symbolic and some pictographic. They depict many different things. The most common Indus symbol is a shape similar to a fish (Robinson 2002). Cows and bulls are the second most common theme for seals (Mackay 1935). Of great interest is a common seal that depicts a seated figure with many arms. Mackay (1935) thinks that this seal represents a super-natural entity that would evolve



Figure III: The most common symbol on Indus seals. Some scholars believe it represents a fish. Others believe it represents a chiefly individual. Modified from Robinson 2002:273

and change throughout the cultural evolution of the region to become Shiva, the Hindu god of creation and destruction.

The ideological importance of the Indus Seals comes not only from the symbols they carry, but also from the materials from which they were made (McIntosh 2002, Kenoyer 1998). Indus seals of many different materials have been recovered from the streets of Harappa and Mohenjo Daro. Some seals are made of high-quality steatite, while others are made of clay (Mackay 1935). It is feasible to think that some may even have been made of wood. Seals may have been worn as ornaments (Kenoyer 1998).

The difference in material composition and manufacture of Indus seals may have been the most important divide between the elites and commoners of the Indus Civilization (Kenoyer 1998, McIntosh 2002). Everyone in the Indus River Valley may have had access to materials for making axes, but some individuals had axes made of

much nicer materials than other individuals (McIntosh 2002). There is some possible evidence for ideological control along these lines. Archaeologists have found Indus seals manufactured of many different kinds of materials. Seals made out of some materials are found in much smaller quantities. This means that not everyone in the Indus Civilization possessed seals of the same material. Perhaps elites wore seals of exotic materials, while commoners emulated these seals with clay or less expensive materials (Kenoyer 1998). In such a case, commoners would unwittingly reproduce elite ideology through emulation of their seals..

Another artifact supports this perspective on the control of ideology in the Indus Civilization. Bangles, circular ornaments worn by the peoples of the Indus Civilization, were made of many different materials and carried many different symbols (Mackay 1935). Copious amounts of script have come out of sites believed to be the workshops of artisans who specialized in the production of these ornaments (McIntosh 2002). There seems to have been a great deal of concern for the exact process by which these bangles were produced. McIntosh (2002) believes that there were few of a specific kind of bangles being produced. Only a few individuals would have been able to consume these bangles. Assuming the script associated with these workshops was about bangle manufacture, such a copious amount may be indicative of elites trying to control their production.

There were other societal functions that would have most assuredly fallen under the control of elites. An important indictor of elite control in any archaeological assemblage is warfare. Warfare is associated with the rise and establishment of elites in every known society in the world. Warfare is a form of social control that not only

expands the power of elites, it forfeits and devalues the peoples below the elites who are dying to enforce the elites' will.

Of course, warfare is almost completely absent in the Indus Civilization. Though some violence most likely did exist (Wheeler 1968, Cork 2005), it was not on the scale that can be found in other civilizations. While some violence may have occurred in Indus cities, it was small-scale and likely between individuals wielding tools as weapons. This suggests that if warfare in fact occurred, it was internal and resistive. The Indus Civilization's economy was not concentrating on churning out weapons and warriors, indicating that violence arising in the region would be likely be small-scale. If there was a state in the Indus River Valley, it did not wage military campaigns or concern itself with territorial dominance. Artifacts designed specifically for the killing of other humans are almost completely absent in the archaeological record of the Indus Civilization.

One final method of social control that may have been used in the Indus Civilization is trade regulation. As mentioned earlier, a complex set of weights and measures has been recovered from all of the great cities of the Indus Civilization (Kenoyer 1998, McIntosh 2002, Possehl 2002). These weights and measures are standard across all Indus cities. They take the form of tiny clay cubes and spheres. The standard weight is about 13.7 grams (McIntosh 2002, Possehl 2002). From that size they double in size, or shrink by half. The smallest increment is 1/16 the size of the original unit.

Scholars often assumed that traders used these weights to expedite economic activity. Kenoyer (1998) has a different theory. His work shows that there were not nearly enough complete sets of the weights for every Indus trader to have been using

them. Rather, there were relatively few sets of weights concentrated at points in the city that would have been important for maintaining bureaucratic control. The largest concentrations of weights in Harappa were found at gates. Because these weights and measures would have been in the hands of a select few, it is likely that these highly standardized and official weights and measures were used not as everyday bartering tools, but as devices for maintaining control over the economy. Elites might have been taxing trade coming into Indus cities with their weights and measures (Kenoyer 1998). It is wholly possible that Indus elites were using these standardized weights and measures to control the Indus economy.

Based on the above section, the Indus Civilization does, in fact, meet the ideological requirements for statehood. Elites, though elusive and challenging to detect archaeologically, do exist. They lived in larger houses than the rest of the populace, and probably wore ornaments made of rare materials. The seals, while serving as a system of writing and communication, may have also been used as symbols of the elites. They exerted power over the economy through strategic city placement, control of public structures, and through control over the economies of the Indus cities. It is difficult to determine the reasons elites would want to control the Indus Civilization. They do not appear to have been gaining vast hoards of material wealth. They do not appear to have been healthier than the common populace. Were they controlling Indus life so that they could live in slightly larger houses? Perhaps there were less tangible benefits to serving in an elite capacity in the Indus Civilization, such as permanent status for one's offspring or access to the monumental baths or citadel.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

There are a number of factors that hinder this analysis of the Indus Civilization. The region where the Indus Civilization once stood is very temperate. Wet seasons and cold seasons alternate throughout the year. This makes archaeological preservation very sketchy. As described at length by Mackay (1935), the Indus River Valley was harsh to the brick buildings that once comprised the Indus cities. Mud filled in the spaces around the bricks that lined the walls of Harappan structures. Excavating mud from brick is difficult no matter what time period one is working in. Also, salt leached from these bricks, melding them together and making structural interpretation difficult. Additionally the changes in the course of rivers throughout the region scarred the Indus ruins. Preservation in the region is poor, and any conclusions about the people who once lived there must take it into account.

Archaeological work done during the earliest phase of Indus excavations was very primitive. Like all archaeological projects pursued during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the excavations at Harappa and Mohenjo Daro were crude. Early archaeologists were more interested in finding artifacts and confirming historical accounts than building a chronology for the Indus Civilization.

The Saraswati region, though heavily surveyed, needs to receive more attention. A great many sites are clustered along its ancient course, some of which may be as larger or larger than Harappa or Mohenjo Daro. The true capital of the Indus Civilization may yet be under the soil (McIntosh 2002).

Because relatively few archaeologists have tackled the mysteries of the Indus Civilization, dominant paradigms such as John Marshall's "peaceful Harappan"

perspective have had a profound impact on archaeological work. Archaeologists began working under the assumption that the Indus Civilization was peaceful, leading them to find only evidence that supports the model and limiting evidence to the contrary. Most of the data analyzed in this project reflects this paradigm. Though I attempted to find perspectives that refute or at least acknowledge this bias, it should come as no surprise that this work reflects this paradigm.

The Indus script stands as an important obstacle to interpreting Indus assemblages. Cracking the Indus code would add an entirely new depth of knowledge to archaeological analyses. The historical record for the Indian subcontinent would extend back another several thousand years. Perhaps we could finally determine who the elites were in the Indus Civilization, and understand how they operated.

Despite these notable hindrances to understanding the Indus Civilization, this project has satisfactorily determined several things. There was a state in the Indus Civilization. The evolutionary requirements for statehood are clearly met. The Indus Civilization is the culmination of a cultural tradition that dates back to 6500 BC. Polities that long subsisted on the bounty of the floodplains joined together to form the first large-scale socio-political entity in the region. The economy became much more complex, and trade networks brought resources to the mighty centers of Indus power. Elites, though they may be hard to find, were definitely present. They expressed their status via larger houses and intricate ornaments (Kenoyer 1998, Mackay 1935, McIntosh 2002). Control is everywhere in the Indus Civilization. From weights and measures in the gatehouses to the strict organization by which Indus cities were laid out, the elites controlled trade and

society strictly. Though they appear to have been benevolent trade leaders, and not rapacious dictators, elites were definitely organizing the Indus Civilization.

The Indus Civilization teaches us about the potential flexibility of the state. The state need not be a vehicle for oppression, and the organizers of society need not be greedy individualists. It is not human nature to be capitalist survivalists. The Indus state achieved statehood without resorting to large-scale violence and warfare. The Indus people reaped the benefits of trade and group labor without dealing with unpleasant consequences like warfare and oppression

Of course, how the Indus people managed to create this kind of society, how they dodged the metaphorical bullet of differentiated society, is a whole other question, and requires a much more detailed examination of the origins of the Indus state and the Indus elite. That is a matter of future research. The Indus Civilization has much still to tell us about human nature and the potentials of socio-political organization.

What's Next?

There are, of course, many more questions to be answered about the Indus Civilizations. Future research should take into account the hindrances I noted in the conclusions of this project. Additionally, there are a couple more suggestions I would like to make for the future of Indus archaeology.

A better synthesis of research done by Indian, Pakistani, and other archaeologists is necessary. The sites themselves are part of the direct cultural patrimony of the inhabitants of the Punjab and Sindh, and should forever be under their charge. However, the information coming from the sites is crucial to the understanding of human political

organization as a whole. Any scholar writing about the state or differentiation needs to take into account the evidence from the Indus River Valley.

I also encourage more research on the sites themselves. As mentioned several times in this paper, the Saraswati is home to thousands of sites that have barely been studied. Information from these sites could redefine how we think about the Indus Civilization. Luckily, interest in the religious connection between the Indus Civilization and the origins of Hinduism is now driving further research in the region. The connection between the Indus sites and the Vedas has inspired a great deal of work pertaining to the collapse of the Indus Civilization.

Finally, scholars should redouble their efforts at breaking the Indus code. Though we cannot be sure, it is likely that their written documents contain a great deal of information about Indus life. Unfortunately, we are unable to read them. Establishing a historical record alongside the archaeological record would easily double what we know about the Indus Civilization. No other discovery could yield as much information about the Indus way of life.

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