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FRAUDULENT ELECTIONS, POLITICAL PROTESTS, AND REGIME TRANSITIONS

by

ALLA MANUKYAN

Under the Direction of Jennifer L. McCoy

ABSTRACT

This research studies protests after fraudulent elections in a collective action framework, examining the impact of the potential cost, benefit and likelihood of success of protest on the occurrence and intensity of protests. Quantitative analysis of fraudulent elections in about 100 countries from 1990 to 2004 shows that the odds of protest after fraudulent elections are greater when the level of state repression is moderate with a possible backlash effect of high repression, when the opposition is united, and when international monitors denounce election results. The analysis only partially supports the benefit of protest argument. Also, the research uses case

studies from Eurasia (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, and Russia) and mini-case studies from Africa and Latin America to study in more detail the effects of the factors identified in the quantitative analysis and to identify overlooked but important explanatory factors using a set of extensive interviews conducted in the United States and during fieldwork in Armenia, Georgia, and Russia with politicians, domestic and international election monitors, and country experts.

INDEX WORDS: Protest, Demonstrations, Elections, Election fraud, State repression, Opposition cohesion, International election monitors, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Russia, Collective action, Cost of protest, Benefit of protest

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by

ALLA MANUKYAN

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2011

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Alla Manukyan

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# FRAUDULENT ELECTIONS, POLITICAL PROTESTS, AND REGIME TRANSITIONS

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November 2011

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply thankful to my great dissertation committee and incredible Chair for directing, advising, and correcting me throughout this journey towards completing my doctoral research, as well as for inspiring me in many more ways. I greatly appreciate the value added to my research by many in-person and phone interviews with international election monitors and experts from the Carter Center, Democracy International, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, International Republican Institute, and Organization of American States, country experts and professors from leading U.S. universities, as well as politicians, political analysts and election observers from Armenia, Belarus, Georgia and Russia.

I thank Professor Judith Kelley at Duke University for sharing with her insight on the subject matter and generously granting early access for my research to selected data from the Project on International Election Monitoring datasets. I also thank Professor Nikolay Marinov at Yale University for kindly granting me early access to selected data from the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy dataset.

My sincere gratitude and best wishes go to everyone in our prospering Department of Political Science at Georgia State University for their invaluable contribution to my intellectual and personal growth.

Last but not least, my love goes to my family – in the United States and in Armenia – for they have been the best motivation and support team throughout my doctoral study and research at Georgia State University.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..... iv

LIST OF TABLES ..... vii

LIST OF FIGURES ..... viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..... ix

CHAPTER ONE Introduction: Why Explain Political Protest after Fraudulent Elections? ..... 1

CHAPTER TWO Collective Action Theory of Political Protest ..... 11

2.1 What Explains Post-Election Protests? ..... 11

2.2 Refining the Collective Action Theory of Post-Election Protests ..... 25

CHAPTER THREE Quantitative Analysis of Post-Election Protests within Collective Action Framework ..... 34

3.1 Framework of Analysis ..... 34

3.2 Findings ..... 43

3.3 Conclusion ..... 55

CHAPTER FOUR Post-election Protests in Eurasia – Belarus and Russia ..... 67

4.1 Belarus ..... 69

4.2 Russia ..... 85

4.3 Conclusion ..... 103

CHAPTER FIVE Post-election Protests in Eurasia – Armenia and Georgia ..... 104

5.1 Armenia ..... 105

5.2 Georgia ..... 117

5.3 Conclusion ..... 130

CHAPTER SIX Post-Election Protests in Africa and Latin America ..... 137

6.1 Africa ..... 138

6.2 Latin America ..... 158

6.3 Conclusion ..... 186

CHAPTER SEVEN Conclusion: The Implications of This Research and Thoughts for Future Research ..... 192

REFERENCES ..... 202

APPENDIX ..... 229

# LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Opposition strategies of protest against authoritarian elections ..... 7

Table 2: Frequency distribution of post-election protests by international reports of fraud ..... 8

Table 3: Explaining protest after fraudulent elections ..... 62

Table 4: Moderate repression and protest after fraudulent elections ..... 64

Table 5: Factor change in odds of protest ..... 66

Table 6: Disputed national elections and post-election protests in Belarus, 2000-2010 ..... 84

Table 7: National elections in Russia, 1993-2008 ..... 102

Table 8: Disputed national elections and post-election protests in Armenia, 1995-2008 ..... 115

Table 9: Disputed national elections and post-election protests in Georgia, 1995-2008..... 129

Table 10: Summary of main arguments from the analysis of postcommunist elections ..... 136

Table 11: Protests after disputed elections in selected African and Latin American countries.. 184

Table 12: Summary of main arguments from the analysis of African and Latin American mini-case studies..... 190

# LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Electoral Fraud and Post-election Protest ..... 37

Figure 2: Percentage of protest along levels of repression ..... 49

Figure 3: Frequency of protest along levels of repression ..... 49

Figure 4: Protest and grouped levels of repression ..... 49

Figure 5: Protest and a dummy variable of repression ..... 49

Figure 6: Repression and protest after fraudulent elections ..... 51

Figure 7: Repression and different levels of protest after fraudulent elections ..... 51

# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| AC | Action Congress |
| AD | Alliance for Democracy |
| AI | Amnesty International |
| ANM | Armenian Pan-National Movement |
| ANPP | All (Nigerian) People's Party |
| APRA | American Popular Revolutionary Alliance |
| ARF | Armenian Revolutionary Federation |
| AU | African Union |
| BCEN | National Bureau for Electoral Complaints and Challenges |
| BFTU | Belarusian Federation of Trade Unions |
| BPF | Belarusian Popular Front |
| CEC | Central Electoral Commission |
| CEP | Provisional Electoral Council |
| CEPR | Center for Economic and Policy Research |
| CIRI | Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project |
| CoW | Commonwealth |
| CUD | Coalition for Unity and Democracy |
| CUG | Citizens Union of Georgia |
| DI | Democracy International |
| DIEM | Data on International Election Monitoring |

| | |
|---|---|
| DP | Democratic Party |
| DPI | Database of Political Institutions |
| ECK | Electoral Commission of Kenya |
| EPRDF | Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front |
| EU | European Union |
| EU EOM | European Union Election Observation Mission. |
| FEPADE | Office of the Public Prosecutor for Electoral Offences |
| FH | Freedom House |
| FL | Lavalas Family |
| FNG | For New Georgia |
| FORD | Forum for the Restoration of Democracy |
| FREDEMO | Democratic Front |
| HM | Hausman-McFadden |
| HRW | Human Rights Watch |
| IAEP | Institutions and Elections Project |
| ICE | Imputation by Chained Equations |
| ICG | International Crisis Group |
| ICRG | International Country Risk Guide |
| IEOM | International Election Observation Mission |
| IFE | Federal Electoral Institution |
| IFES | International Foundation for Electoral Systems |
| IIA | Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives |
| IISEPS | Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Politycal Studies |

| | |
|---|---|
| IPAC | Inter-Party Advisory Committee |
| IPPG | Inter-Parties' Parliamentary Group |
| IRI | International Republican Institute |
| JCE | Central Electoral Board |
| KANU | Kenya African National Union |
| LDPR | Liberal Democratic Party of Russia |
| LR | Likelihood-Ratio |
| MNLM | Multinomial Logit Model |
| NARC | National Rainbow Coalition |
| NCEC | National Convention Executive Council |
| NDC | National Democratic Congress |
| NDI | National Democratic Institute |
| NDU | National Democratic Union |
| NEBE | National Electoral Board of Ethiopia |
| NELDA | National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy |
| NGO | Nongovernmental Organization |
| NIT | Nations in Transition |
| NPN | National Party of Nigeria |
| OAS | Organization of American States |
| ODIHR | Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights |
| ODM | Orange Democratic Movement |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| OPL | Lavalas Political Organization |

| | |
|---|---|
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| PACE | Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe |
| PAN | National Action Party |
| PARNAS | People's Freedom Party |
| PDP | Democratic Party |
| PLD | Dominican Liberation Party |
| PNDC | Provisional National Defense Council |
| PRD | Dominican Revolutionary Party |
| PRD | Party of the Democratic Revolution |
| PREP | Preliminary Electoral Results Program |
| PRI | Institutional Revolutionary Party |
| PTS | Political Terror Scale |
| QED | Quality of Elections Data |
| SDP | Social Democratic Party |
| SH | Small-Hsiao |
| SPS | Union of Right Forces |
| TCC | Carter Center |
| TEPJF | Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary |
| TMG | Nigerian Transition Monitoring Group |
| TPLF | Tigrayan People's Liberation Front |
| UDF | United Democratic Forces of Belarus |
| UEDF | United Ethiopian Democratic Forces |
| UN | United Nations |

| | |
|---|---|
| UNC | United National Council |
| UNM | United National Movement |
| UNOMIG | United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WACSOF | West African Civil Society Forum |
| WB | World Bank |
| WDI | World Development Indicators |
| WVS | World Values Survey |

# CHAPTER ONE

## Introduction: Why Explain Political Protest after Fraudulent Elections?

Though there is little consensus in the literature on the democratizing effect of elections or the conditions under which elections reinforce democratization, recent studies have acknowledged post-election protests as a common trend across successful cases in the electoralist path to democracy. Democratization scholars have been primarily interested in the outcome of these opposition-led movements and have produced different accounts of recent electoral revolutions, without having explained the occurrence of post-election protests in the first place. Interestingly, even the analyses of those electoral revolutions that emphasize the importance of structural factors relative to opposition strategies and diffusion recognize the importance of large-scale protest to overthrow strong authoritarian regimes. But surprisingly, post-election protest has received little systematic attention in recent democratization studies. While a few studies examine factors that make post-election protests more likely we lack a compelling theory of protests after fraudulent elections.

Protest in general has been instrumental throughout divergent cross-regional paths of political transition of the third wave of democratization (Bunce 2000). One of the important factors of this global wave was the "growth in public demand for democracy – in particular, through political protests against authoritarian rule and through public support of liberal opposition parties in elections that authoritarians hold to legitimate themselves, but in some cases with the mistaken assumption that they have a full control over the results" (Bunce 2006, 604-605). Across different rounds of democratization in the postcommunist era (1989-1992, mid

1990s, and starting 2000), two factors have been key for democratization – mass mobilization and the triumph of liberal opposition at elections (Bunce 2006, 613). For example, in many postcommunist transitions the driving force for democratization was not the elite but a strong, organized and mobilized society that forced the communist elites to negotiate their exit (Ekiert and Kubik 2001, 46). Protest played an essential role in toppling the communist rule and ultimately for consolidation of democracy in Eastern and Central Europe, especially in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Slovakia; "[d]uring transitions, when institutional orders of societies undergo major reformulation, protest actions may become the principal tools of institution building and an important mechanism through which the public sphere and the domain of the political are being reconstituted and new boundaries between the state and society established… protest actions may become a major factor contributing to the emergence of new organizations and collective identities" (Ekiert and Kubik 2001, 10).

Similarly, in Sub-Saharan Africa, protest is pointed out as a common trend throughout Africa's transitions in the early 1990s; "[t]ransitions away from one-party and military regimes started with political protest, evolved through liberalization reforms, often culminated in competitive elections, and usually ended with the installation of new forms of regimes" (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 3). With respect to Latin American transitions, for which pacting has been recognized as the main mode of regime change (Bunce 2000) and the electoralist path has been found less helpful (McCoy and Hartlyn 2009), in several countries protests with the support of international actors have proven effective to bring regime change, as in Panama 1989, Peru 2000-01, and Dominican Republic 1994-96.

Finally, popular uprisings in the Middle East since the end of 2010 with historic events in Tunisia and Egypt mark the importance of anti-regime protests for the demise of their dictators.

Though the fate of democracy in those countries and in the region overall is still to be observed in the future, it is clear that regime transformation has unfolded triggered by popular protests rather than international invasion or pressure, splits in the regime, or radical changes in domestic structural or socioeconomic factors.

Particularly, protests after disputed elections have emerged as a common trend in the electoralist path to democracy, either through making the regime accept defeat at the polls or leading to negotiations on electoral reform and/or power sharing mechanisms until the next electoral cycle (Tucker 2007; Beisinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2006b; Howard and Roessler 2006; McFaul 2005, Thompson 2004; Eisenstadt 2004; Schedler 2002b, Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Thompson (2004, 10) attributes an essential role to political protest, arguing that "mass mobilization, not a well-developed civil society, is decisive in democratic revolutions." Beissinger (2007, 261) underlines the use of stolen elections as an occasion for mass mobilization against pseudo-democratic regimes, and protest upon the announcement of election results as two basic elements of revolutions in postcommunist countries. Moreover, research underscores the democratizing effect of post-election protests together with efforts of international democracy promotion. For example, data on postcommunist and Latin American countries show that the success rate of international democracy promotion increases from 12% to 49% if accompanied by post-election protests (Donno 2008).

Protests after fraudulent elections may become agents of political transition by making the incumbents accept defeat at the polls (e.g. Serbia 2000), order recount or cancel the election results and hold new elections (e.g. Ukraine 2004). Protests may pressure incumbents to resign after fraudulent elections even when their office was not contested (e.g. Georgia 2003, Kyrgyzstan 2005). Protests after fraudulent elections may pave a way for incumbents'

resignation following political scandals (Peru 2000) or threats to the regime (e.g. Philippines 1986). Also, protests after fraudulent elections may unfold a protracted or a more incremental process of political transition through political concessions on the part of the incumbent (e.g. Dominican Republic 1994), electoral reform that may enhance the credibility of elections and lead to peaceful alternation in power in future (e.g. Ghana 1992), and power sharing mechanisms the fate of which albeit is not always clear (e.g. Kenya 2007). The consequences of protests after fraudulent elections may sometimes be less significant or obvious, such as resulting in small concessions in favor of the opposition, lowering the threshold of proportional parliamentary elections (e.g. Georgia 2008), or annulling the results of parliamentary elections in several disputed constituencies (e.g. Gabon 1990) or altogether (e.g. Mali 1997). Nevertheless, even under such circumstances protest after fraudulent elections is an important phenomenon of electoral politics that warrants systematic analysis.

The studies that are primarily interested in the outcome of electoral protests and their implications for democratization underscore the importance of electoral protests, both successful and suppressed. First, these studies underscore the long-term democratizing potential of post-election protests that brought turnover. Such movements are shown to have reversed the authoritarian trend in those countries though the ultimate fate of democracy has depended on the elements of the diffusion model and structural factors (Hale 2006; Kalandadze and Orenstein 2008; Bunce and Wolchik 2011). Secondly, dispersed protests that did not bring alternation in power are not necessarily as inconsequential as they appear at first glance. Though a trend of deepening authoritarianism has been observed in some countries where post-election protests were repressed and did not bring immediate turnover (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 308), there is little evidence that subsequent deteriorations in the democracy scores of those countries would

not have happened in the absence of dispersed protests (Kalandadze and Orenstein 2008). Moreover, the experience of mass mobilization, even when it does not immediately succeed in ousting the authoritarian regime, may have important constitutive effects on the political culture of protest. The effect of social movements is not confined to its immediate outcomes; the power of movement is cumulative and even when it fails to achieve its goal it opens a way for future movements by constituting collective identities and ideologies (Tarrow 1998). For example, it has been argued that "the Orange Revolutions had been several years in the making" as several waves of protest prior to 2004 protests in Ukraine played an important role both in mobilizing public support and for the success of the 2004 protests (Kuzio 2005b, 129). Though protests after the Kuchmagate scandal in 2000 failed to change the regime until 2004, they produced political awakening among the Ukrainian public, which helped mobilize extensive public support in 2004 and the experience of protests during those four intervening years prepared opposition members to lead the Orange Revolution.[1]

Finally, the success or failure of protests to bring turnover is often explained with the characteristics of protestors, including the size, the organizational nature, and strategies of challengers (Kuzio 2006). Protests are more likely to succeed if they are large-scale (Kuzio 2005b, 126). For example, a close look at several waves of protests in Ukraine since the 1990s up to the Orange revolution of 2004 shows that without large-scale mobilization the 2004 protests might have ended in violence and failure much like the small-scale protests of the previous years. Youth organizations may play a major role in mobilizing support for electoral

[1] It should be mentioned that the literature also offers some conflicting arguments on the long-term implications of post-election protests for democratization, such as reporting no statistically significant link between post-election protests and democratic reform and arguing for a democratizing potential of major election boycotts as a special type of pre-election protest (Beualieu 2006), or conversely disputing the democratizing effect of both boycotts and post-election protests and arguing for the democratizing power of opposition participation and acceptance of the election outcomes over a sequence of multiparty elections (Lindberg 2006b).

revolutions, by providing the movement with structure and purpose, and building coalitions among divided opposition parties. Training of youth organizations by other local and international civic activist groups and their use of modern communication, humor and ridicule against the regime, and music festivals play an important role for the success of electoral protests. Moreover, protestors may increase the chances of success by influencing the elite strategies, especially the security forces, by adopting specific strategies of nonviolent action (Binnedijk and Marovic 2006, 412). Movement organizers may increase the cost of repression and undermine the willingness of security forces to repress protestors by adopting a combination of persuasive and deterrent techniques.[2] Thus, a systematic analysis of post-election protests that explains the occurrence and the intensity of protests after fraudulent elections, which is undertaken in the present research, can also contribute to our understanding of the outcome of those movements.

Nevertheless, this growing evidence on the importance of post-election protests for regime transitions has not been matched with qualitative or quantitative studies on protests. While a few quantitative analyses examine factors that make post-election protests more likely, such as electoral fraud (Schedler 2006a), international reports of fraud (Hyde and Marinov 2008), and intergovernmental organizations' involvement (Donno 2008), we lack a compelling theory of electoral protests. In fact, more attention has been paid to electoral boycott as a special case of pre-election protest than to post-election protests, perhaps because the former is easier to

[2] Binnedijk and Marovic (2006, 427) argue that transitions in Serbia and Ukraine were realized by protestors' efforts to raise the stakes of repression on security forces through mobilizing large crowds, using international attention, and unofficial media coverage; to persuade lower-rank military and policemen to refrain from repression through demonstrating broad-based popular support for its political objective; and to avoid confrontations with security forces and regime's attempts to call them "terrorist" organization through maintaining nonviolent discipline.

quantify (Schedler 2006d, 2007; Lindberg 2006b; Beaulieu 2006, 2007; Beaulieu and Hyde 2007).

Recent election data collection projects with electoral protest data reveal that in most of the cases people do not protest after fraudulent elections. For example, Table 1 presents the results of Schedler's (2006a) frequency distribution of opposition strategies to authoritarian elections. In a dataset of authoritarian elections in the world between 1980 and 2002, Schedler (2006a) reports post-election protests in only 30% of the cases. In fact, acquiescence with election outcomes is opposition's most frequent strategy. But his frequency distribution does not distinguish between relatively clean and manipulated elections.

Table 1: Opposition strategies of protest against authoritarian elections
Source: Schedler (2006a)

| | **Authoritarian Elections** | |
|---|---|---|
| **Electoral protest** | **N** | **%** |
| Acquiescence | 88 | 39% |
| Rejection | 70 | 31% |
| Active protest | 69 | 30% |
| Total | 227 | 100% |

This distinction is introduced in Table 2 reproducing Hyde and Marinov's (2008) frequency distribution table of post-election protests by international monitors' declaration of fraud and anticipation of fraud. In a dataset of all national elections between 1960 and 2006, excluding consolidated democracies, Hyde and Marinov (2008) report that only 46% of elections

declared fraudulent by international monitors were challenged by protests. In 52% of cases people did not protest even when fraud was anticipated and declared by international monitors. Moreover, election data from Latin America and postcommunist countries between 1990 and 2005 (Donno 2008) show that in the absence of international observers or when they accept the election results, only 17% and 21% of fraudulent elections were protested.

Table 2: Frequency distribution of post-election protests by international reports of fraud
Source: Hyde and Marinov (2008)

| | | **If international monitors were present, did they declare fraud?** | | **If monitors were present and fraud was anticipated, was fraud declared?** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **No** | **Yes** | **No** | **Yes** |
| **Were there riots and protests after the election?** | **No** | 88% | 54% | 84% | 52% |
| | **Yes** | 12% | 46% | 12% | 48% |

Thus, notwithstanding the potential of post-election protests to push for regime transitions, there is clear evidence that most of the cases of fraudulent elections are not protested. What explains the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections? The present research addresses this question examining post-election protests within the collective action framework. It examines the effect of potential cost, benefit, and likelihood of success of protests on the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections. The research is based on both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis. First, it tests the effect of the cost, benefit, and likelihood of success of protests on the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections worldwide, excluding democracies and single-party regimes, from 1990 to 2004. Secondly, the effects of the

explanatory variables found statistically significant in the quantitative analysis are studied in more details in mini-case studies of selected countries from Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America.

The research argues that the cost-benefit calculation of participation in protests is not a strong predictor of the occurrence of protests. It expects to reject a simple linear relationship between state repression and occurrence of protests, and to highlight the importance of factors related to the likelihood of success for the occurrence of protests. By doing so, the research fills in an important theoretical gap, and settles scholarly disputes on the effects of state repression, as well as socioeconomic and political grievances on the occurrence of electoral protests.

The relevance of the present research goes beyond the concerns of democratization literature. The findings of this research have a potential to make cross-cutting contributions to social movement, social revolution, and electoral behavior theories. The findings also have a potential to make far-reaching policy implications for opposition parties caught in a perpetual struggle against incumbents who, in spite of some level of political opening, manage to reproduce themselves election after election. Last but not least, this research is relevant for international democracy promoters and may point to many lost opportunities to facilitate regime transitions.

The research is laid out in five parts. Chapter 2 reviews most relevant social movement theories and recent democratization studies for propositions about the occurrence of electoral protests and refines the collective action theory of protest deriving three sets of hypotheses on the effects of the cost, benefit, and likelihood of success of protests on the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections. Chapter 3 tests these hypotheses in quantitative analysis of fraudulent elections in electoral autocracies or hybrid regimes from 1990 to 2004. Chapters 4 and 5 study the effects of the statistically significant factors in more detail in the context of elections in

Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, and Russia, using fieldwork in those countries (except Belarus). Chapter 6 presents mini-case studies of elections and post-election protests in selected countries from African and Latin America. The concluding chapter highlights the main findings and their implications, and makes suggestions for future research.

# CHAPTER TWO

## Collective Action Theory of Political Protest

This chapter provides a broad literature review of what we know and do not know about the occurrence of post-election protests, looking at both most recent democratization studies and some of the most relevant works from the social movement literature. Using insights from social movement and recent democratization studies, this chapter refines the collective action theory of protests and develops hypotheses to be tested in the following chapter.

### 2.1 What Explains Post-Election Protests?

#### 2.1.1 Insights from Social Movement Literature: Political Opportunity Theory

The voluminous social movement literature provides a sound theoretical background for studying electoral protest. The social movement literature is not homogeneous in any sense and offers different conceptualizations and explanations of social movements[3], neither of which is complete by itself but each helps understand different questions regarding the origins, mobilization, and the outcome of social movements. Three waves of theorizing can be discerned in the post-World War II social movement literature based on modernization theories, theories of organizational resources and political opportunities, and identity-formation theories.[4]

Postwar scholars saw social movements as mostly "social-psychological consequences of the rush to modernization," referring to modern trends of societies' becoming increasingly urban, literate, bureaucratized, mechanized, and organizationally large-scale (Zirakzadeh 2006, 6).

[3] Social movements can be defined as "collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities" (Tarrow 1998, 4), or more simply as "series of collective actions conducted to bring about change in social structures" (Jenkins 1981, 82).
[4] See Zirakzadeh (2006) for a brief comparative review of these waves of theorizing.

Social movements of the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s were explained as social turbulences in response to rapid and large-scale changes in modern societies. Based mostly on classical pluralist theory and ideas of liberal democracy and modernization, these theories held that people had extensive institutionalized channels for representation and hence saw social movements as irrational behavior driven by "short-circuited thinking" and sought by socially dislocated and marginalized groups (Jenkins 1995, 19). Grievances experienced in transforming modern societies were considered sufficient to explain social movements.

This view was criticized in the late 1960s largely on pressing evidence of higher social activism among better organized rather than dislocated groups, growing links between conventional politics and social activism, frequent use of non-institutionalized channels of representation, and imperfect pluralism of liberal democracies, all in contradiction to the bases of classical pluralism. Scholars abandoned the view of social movements as irrational, retrograde, and destructive forces, and assumed rationality of participants, and significant political and economic inequalities in societies. Several traditions of theorizing have developed within this wave: *resource-mobilization* theory which underscores the role of organization, leadership, and social networks for the mobilization of social movements; *indigenous-community* theory which unlike the early postwar theories of social movements saw a growth of small-scale social interactions in modern industrialized societies that facilitated the formation of social movements; *rational choice* theory of protest which introduced the "free-rider" problem; and *political-process* theory which challenged classical pluralist theory's assumption about the presence of a guaranteed floor of opportunities in liberal democracies and instead underscored variation in political opportunities for different groups and explained mobilization and movements' choice of tactics through changes in political opportunities and constraints.

A third wave of social movement theorizing that started developing in the late 1960s and the 1970s is the cultural approach of social movements. Within its realm, scholars focused on insurgent consciousness, consensus mobilization, collective identities, framing of collective action, etc. These theories deal both with the *why* and *how* of social movements, but by itself the cultural approach offers limited explanations of social movements.

Thus, different theories offer different explanations focused on different aspects of social movements. For example, collective behavior theorists, who suggested grievances as the main explanation of mobilization (Gurr 1971; Smelser 1963; Turner and Killian 1972), explain the origins of social movements but fall short of explaining the dynamics of movements. Resource mobilization theorists, underscoring leadership and organization, explain the mobilization of social movements but lack explanations about their origins. The political opportunity structure theory focuses on conditions for mobilization, especially the opportunity-threat to challengers and facilitation-repression by authorities (Tilly 1978).[5] Tarrow elaborates on political opportunity structures, arguing that social movements are better explained through changes in opportunities and constraints for collective action rather than existing social and economic conditions. He explains the emergence of contentious politics through incentives created by changes in political opportunities and constraints; "contentious politics is triggered when changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives for social actors who lack resources on their own. They contend through known repertoires of contention and expand them by creating innovations at their margins. When backed by dense social networks and galvanized by culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols, contentious politics leads to sustained interaction with opponents. The result is the social movement" (Tarrow 1998, 2).

[5] For more details see Dough McAdam's (1982) political process model.

For the purpose of the present research, it is worth further exploring the elements of the political opportunity theory. Among different social movement theories outlined above, the political opportunity structure offers the most multifaceted analysis of social movements and it is especially helpful for explaining movements directed towards structural change. For example, changing political opportunities have been used to explain democratic breakthroughs in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Tarrow 1998; Misztal and Jenkins 1995). Tarrow's (1998, 76) analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which briefly outlines major developments that triggered political contention and led to democratization, points out five changing dimensions of the political opportunity structure that led to the structural change – the opening of access to participation for new actors, political realignment, elite splits, appearance of influential allies, and decline in a state's capacity or willingness to repress challengers.

Another benefit of exploring the political opportunity theory for understanding political protest is its focus on the interaction between the state and its challengers, which has not been a central issue for other social movement theories. Changing opportunities are examined along with three dimensions of state – state's strength (strong/weak), state's strategies towards its challengers (inclusive or exclusive) and repressiveness (Tarrow 1998). Studying collective action in the context of these factors offers explanations regarding the mobilization, tactics and forms, and the outcome of political protests. First, weak states are argued to provide a more favorable setting for mobilization. The strong vs. weak state distinction is made based on the degree of territorial centralization, functional concentration of state power, coherence of public administration, and presence of institutionalized direct democratic procedures (Kriesi 1995). For example, "[f]ederal, fragmented, and incoherent states with direct democratic institutions find it particularly difficult to arrive at decisions and to impose them on society. Centralized,

concentrated, and coherent states with no direct democratic access, on the other hand, have a strong capacity to act" (Kriesi 1995, 172).

Secondly, the impact of state's dominant strategy (inclusive vs. exclusive strategies) to deal with its challengers on mobilization is less definite. While inclusive strategies are said to "preempt protest", exclusive strategies (especially repression) can affect collective action in different ways (Kriesi 1995, 177). On one hand, state repression may prevent mobilization by raising the cost of organization and mobilization or may directly suppress mobilization, the former being the more effective strategy in the long run. On the other hand, state repression may have a reverse impact on challengers, such as "a radicalization of collective action and a more effective organization of opponents, as moderate dissenters defect into private life and more militant ones take center stage" (Tarrow 1998, 84-85). Repression may have such impacts for several reasons. "[F]irst, repression reinforces the identity of countercultural movements, which may stimulate offensive reaction of a rather radical type on the part of these movements. Second, repression may itself become a crucial issue for the challengers. Finally… repression may focus media attention on the challengers, which may enlist the support of third parties that would otherwise not have supported the movement" (Koopmans 1990, referred to in Kriesi 1995, 177). Also, contention increases when people are threatened with costs that they cannot bear or which outrage their sense of justice (Tarrow 1998, 71).

Thirdly, we can examine the combined impact of state's strength and dominant strategies on social movements. Thus, four clusters of situations can be distinguished – full exclusion (strong states with exclusive strategies), full procedural integration (weak states with inclusive strategies), formalistic inclusion (weak states with exclusive strategies) and informal cooperation (strong states with inclusive strategies). These settings can determine the strategies and forms of

protest. Full exclusion invites large-scale disruptive strategies by challengers, as they are normally denied any formal or informal channels of access. Full integration invites moderate and conventional strategies by challengers; like a sponge, "it absorbs all kinds of protest without granting much in the way of concessions to meet the demands of the challengers" (Kriesi 1995, 178). Both strong states with inclusive strategies and weak states with exclusive strategies invite moderate strategies by challengers. Regarding the success of protests, challengers in settings of full exclusion are more likely to get substantial concessions on the part of the state, as a strong state is best equipped to make such concessions; "proactive success is difficult to attain anywhere, [however] it is most likely to be forthcoming as a reaction to great social unrest in a strong state, which, in contrast to a weak state, is more likely not only to provoke a state of crisis, but also to have the capacity to end it by making proactive concessions" (Kriesi 1995, 178). Thus, state's strength and strategies towards its challengers can be important factors to explain the level of mobilization, strategies and forms, and success of challengers.

### 2.1.2 The Free-Rider Problem and the Threshold Model of Collective Action

Protest may appear the most rational response to electoral fraud. However, as it has been discussed in *Introduction*, over half of the cases of fraudulent elections are not protested. Thus, the problem addressed in the present research has two sides. On one hand, it is puzzling why in over half of the cases people do not protest against electoral fraud. On the other hand, it is puzzling how, in cases where it does happen, protest overcomes problems of collective action.

Political protest, like other social-political phenomena, involves collective action problems. In contrast to the traditional theory of groups according to which groups of people with common interests will cooperate in pursuing their shared interests, Olson (1971, 2) argues that "unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or

some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, *rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest*." Protesting electoral fraud with a goal to correct the fraud can be viewed as an example of seeking collective good, and according to Olson's thesis (1971, 21) though almost everyone in a society would benefit from obtaining the collective good, they do not have collective interest in paying the cost of providing the good. As the group gets larger, even more people will prefer to free-ride.

Though Olson's theory, having emerged as a reaction against the early social-psychological explanations of social movements that viewed protest as irrational behavior, was a major advance in understanding collective action, it has been criticized by other rational choice approaches of collective action. Having offered solutions to the free-rider problem,[6] many scholars shifted their focus to the problem of mobilizing "enough" protestors for the success of collective action. For example, analyzing collective action in game-theoretic terms, Chong (1991) solves the free-rider dilemma by reformulating a collective action problem as an assurance game rather than Prisoners' Dilemma problem. Chong (1991, 233) argues that the social and psychological benefit of participating in collective action "alters the choices facing the potential activist" by making him or her choose participation over free ridership under the condition that "enough others also participate to make collective action successful." The problem here is the creation of a critical mass that is considered "enough" for solving the free-rider problem and ultimately for being a success. This problem is at the core of the present research as it helps to understand what builds a momentum for post-election protest mobilization.

[6] For example, resource mobilization theorists acknowledged Olson's collective action problem but offered Social Movement Organization (SMO) as a solution to the problem - "expanded personal resources, professionalization, and external financial support available to movements" (Tarrow 1998, 16). The emergence of social networks is another solution to Olson's problem of collective action in large groups, as the latter have been argued to resemble "an interlocking network of small groups, social networks, and the connections between them" (Tarrow 1998, 23). Olson himself offered a theory of "by-products" of selective incentives as a solution to the free-rider problem, which was later attacked by arguments that it did not account for collective action that is not driven by material gains and individual honors, but rather by solidarity commitments and ideological incentives.

Several social movement theories have focuses on the process of mobilization momentum, the factors that affect the number of participants, and the importance of the number of participants for movements' success (Granovetter 1978; Schelling 1978; DeNardo 1985; D'Anieri 2006). These problems have been effectively studied by using "threshold models" (Schelling 1978; Granovetter 1978). The threshold is "the number or proportion of others who must make a decision before a given actor does so; this is the point where net benefits begin to exceed net costs for that particular actor" (Granovetter 1978, 1420). Threshold models study why some protests grow bigger reaching a point when protest becomes self-reinforcing and why some protests do not reach a tipping point and break down. This model can be effectively summarized in two steps; "[f]irst, individuals are sensitive to the costs and benefits of participating in a protest … and have different "thresholds" – different payoffs at which they will join. Second, individuals' perception of the costs and benefits are dependent upon the number of people already participating… Each additional protestor, by lowering costs and raising benefits, increases the chance that someone with a higher threshold of participation will join" (D'Anieri 2006, 333). This process produces self-reinforcing cycles as the perceived likelihood of success grows with more participants, which attracts even more participants with higher thresholds. Conversely, skepticism about success keeps people back from participating in protests and makes others quit protests, which in its turn reduces the chances of success.[7]

The purpose of the above review of several social movement and collective action theories is to provide a broad theoretical background for studying electoral protest. Though none of these theories may fully explain electoral protests, they offer arguments based on grievances, internal and external resources, political opportunities and constraints, collective identity and framing, etc., that may explain different aspects of post-election protests. The penetration of

[7] Also see Chong (1991) for analysis of bandwagons and cascading defections.

social movement theories in democratization studies is not new and it may greatly promote explanations of electoral protests, which remain largely understudied in the literature.

### 2.1.3 Post-Election Protests in Recent Democratization Studies

*Diffusion argument and its structural critique*

A large part of recent democratization literature comprises small-N comparative studies, usually with a regional focus. Though these studies attribute high significance to the role of protests in regime transitions, they do not provide a compelling explanation of post-election protests. First, there are only few quantitative large-N analyses of post-election protests (Schedler 2006a; Hyde and Marinov 2008; Donno 2008). Secondly, many qualitative studies of regime transitions suffer from analyzing the effects of more explanatory factors than the number of cases included. Moreover, they do not sufficiently explain the occurrence of protest in the first place but rather consider its impact among other explanatory factors on regime transitions.[8]

Recent democratization studies have mostly evolved around the debate on the diffusion (Bunce 2006; Bunce and Wolchik 2006a; Karatnycky 2005; Silitski 2009, 2005) and structural explanations of democratization (Way 2008, 2009). Both arguments deal with electoral protest, though attributing different amounts of significance to its role in regime transitions, and both are useful to understand protest. The diffusion[9] argument explains the recent wave of democratization through the spread of the electoral model[10]. This argument has mostly been

[8] For example, McFaul (2005) offers a rather comprehensive list of factors that explains color revolutions, embracing both diffusion and structural arguments. Among many factors, large-scale protest after fraudulent elections is considered a critical factor for those democratic breakthroughs.

[9] Diffusion is "a process wherein new ideas, institutions, policies, models or repertoires of behavior spread geographically from a core site to other sites" whether within or across states (Bunce and Wolchik 2006a, 286).

[10] Bunce and Wolchik (2009, 70) unfold the electoral model into "a distinctive and unprecedented set of activities that are consciously designed to maximize the prospects for an opposition victory at the polls: orchestrating large-scale voter-registration and turnout drives; forming a united opposition, linked to NGOs, that campaign ambitiously throughout the country; making extensive use of rallies, rock concerts, street theater, and alternative media; and

studied in the context of postcommunist color revolutions,[11] but electoral revolutions are not confined to this region[12] (Bunce and Wolchik 2006a; Kalandadze and Orenstein 2008). Electoral revolutions can be described as "attempts by opposition leaders and citizens to use elections, sometimes in combination with political protests, to defeat illiberal incumbents or their appointed successors" (Bunce and Wolchik 2006a, 284). The electoral model can be traced back in the Philippines 1986, and in Chile 1988, spreading to Nicaragua, Indonesia, and Mexico (Bunce and Wolchik 2006a). In the postcommunist region the wave of electoral revolutions evolved in 1996 in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia, then moving to Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, accompanied with several unsuccessful attempts of electoral revolutions in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (Bunce and Wolchik 2006a). The electoral model spread within and across regions, thanks to the effect of successful precedents, the very nature of the electoral model, similarities and perceptions of similarities between the sending and receiving countries, the existence of local and cross-national collaborative networks, and international democracy promotion (Bunce and Wolchik 2006a).

The literature also provides challenging arguments against the diffusion explanation of democratization – the structural argument. For example, Way (2008) argues that the literature on recent postcommunist authoritarian breakdowns has unduly focused on regional diffusion, leadership strategies, and popular protests. Way does not altogether eschew the importance of

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pressuring regimes to improve the quality and transparency of electoral procedures through domestic and international election monitoring and parallel vote tabulation."

[11] The term has been commonly used by scholars to highlight the similarities of the Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia in 2000, the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005.

[12] The postcommunist region has been the primary site for electoral revolutions, because of favorable domestic conditions, such as strong opposition and weak authoritarian regimes, absence of tradition of politicized military, long experience with elections in general and fraudulent elections in particular, high level of public education, and strong international support (Bunce and Wolchik 2006b, 7-10). Next to electoral revolutions in postcommunist countries, Kalandadze and Orenstein (2008) study attempts of electoral revolutions in Togo and Zimbabwe; Bunce and Wolchik (2006a) refer to more recent cases of electoral revolutions in Ethiopia, Togo, Zimbabwe, and earlier cases in Cameroon, Chile, Indonesia, the Ivory Coast, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and the Philippines.

these factors. In fact, he acknowledges that "in many of these cases, the opposition's only realistic alternative to the use of elections and protest would have been the admission of defeat" (Way 2008, 58). Still, he argues that diffusion has not been as decisive for recent postcommunist authoritarian breakdowns as for nationalist mobilization in the former Soviet states, and Eastern European and Sub-Saharan transitions throughout the late 1980s to the early 1990s. Moreover, even when applied correctly, the same opposition strategies have not always secured a successful outcome, such as in Belarus 2006, and Armenia 2003 and 2008.

Instead, Way (2008) suggests looking at the strength of a country's links to the West and the strength of the incumbent regime's autocratic party or state (the presence of a single party, a strong coercive apparatus, or state discretionary control over the economy) as two important factors that make a regime more or less vulnerable to opposition mobilization and diffusion strategies. Supporting this argument, Dimitrov (2009) adds incumbent popularity to explain authoritarian resilience and breakdowns. Way (2008, 62) argues that in "low-linkage cases… regime collapses have resulted more from authoritarian weakness than opposition strength." However, it remains unclear whether even vulnerable regimes would collapse in the absence of political protests. Referring to the 2003-04 Georgian transition – an example of a weak state – Way (2009, 94) argues that "although incumbent weakness certainly does not provide an exhaustive explanation for the Rose Revolution, a fragile state and party did reduce the level of strength needed by the opposition to oust the regime. In short, weak state capacity increases the odds that a variety of contingent factors will result in authoritarian breakdown." But the structural argument tends to have a highly deterministic view that these transitions "*had* to happen" (Beissinger 2009, 74) and that they can be explained solely by structural factors (Bunce

and Wolchik 2009, 70), and fails to answer whether and when for example political transition in Georgia would happen had the 2003 election not been protested.

The structural and diffusion arguments are not mutually exclusive, and both acknowledge the importance of protests though to different extents. Without discarding the role of structural factors, the diffusion argument stands against the supremacy of such factors over other explanations (Beissinger 2009; Silitski 2009). They hold that "structure, agency, and process are all important" to explain regime transitions, and explain that authoritarian regimes often succeed to stay in power not only because of their structural capacity and ability to hide weaknesses but also because of often divided and disputatious opposition parties and demobilized and disunited citizens (Bunce and Wolchik 2009, 70-72). Similarly, the structural argument admits that large and sustained protest is required to overthrow strong authoritarian regimes. "[I]n Serbia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan… opposition succeeded in large part because the military and security services quickly dispersed in the face of serious protest" (Way 2008, 62), and in the case of the Orange revolution "[t]he relative strength of the Ukrainian state made regime overthrow impossible without large-scale protest" (Way 2008, 64).

However, neither the diffusion nor structural explanation of democratization focuses on the puzzle raised in this research – the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections in the first place. The diffusion argument explains to some extent the occurrence of post-election protests as an integral part of the electoral model of democratization (Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2006a). Though it does not directly address the question why protest does not happen after most of the cases of fraudulent elections, it makes some predictions regarding the timing, the nature, and the outcome of these attempts. For example, towards the closing of diffusion cycle, we should see "declining mass participation, more violence and less powerful democratic

consequences" (Bunce and Wolchik 2006a, 288). This is linked to the cyclical nature of diffusion, and it is argued that diffusion "has run its course, largely because of less supportive local and international conditions" (Bunce and Wolchik 2006a, 283; also Beissinger 2007). As the electoral model spreads across countries, the weight of two important factors is predicted to change; "[t]he cross-national impact of precedent increases, but it is joined with weaker and weaker local structural support for change" (Bunce and Wolchik 2006a, 287). This happens as local requirements for change are underestimated in light of successful precedents, and the elites also learn what to expect and how to keep the status quo. On the other hand, the structural argument points to political opportunities, national pride, and access to media as explanations of protests, and deals more with factors that explain not only the occurrence but also the outcome of protests, such as elite defections and state repressive capacity (Way 2009).

Thus, bridging the diffusion and structural accounts of democratization, the diffusion argument may be more useful when explaining the occurrence and the nature of protests, while the structural context plays a more important role in explaining the outcome of these movements. The diffusion argument shows "how subversive repertoires of contention were spread, their impact on mobilization, and the ways in which they evolved in response to local conditions. Yet… diffusion – even though it clearly affected opposition strategy and forms of protests – had a relatively modest impact on actual authoritarian breakdown" (Way 2009, 96) and thus structural factors must be considered when studying the success of these protests.

*Quantitative analyses of post-election protest*

There are only few quantitative studies of post-election protest. A few exceptions include Schedler's (2006a) analysis of the relationship between particular violations of democratic norms by authoritarian regimes and opposition strategies to protest before or after elections. His

analysis reports counterintuitive bivariate patterns of correlation between authoritarian strategies of election control, like political repression, legislative disempowerment, institutional bias, opposition exclusion, or electoral fraud on one side, and opposition strategies of pre-election protest, boycott, or post-election protest on the other side. It finds little evidence for the impact of political repression, media restrictions, institutional discrimination, and exclusion on opposition protest, explained by the fact that "[d]ue to countervailing strategic considerations not examined here (like fear, resource constraints, or organizational weakness), opposition parties may not be able to respond to these grievances through public protest" (Schedler 2006a, 18).

Among authoritarian strategies of election control, Schedler finds electoral fraud (and disempowerment of legislatures to a less extent) to have the strongest effect on opposition behavior, high levels of fraud being consistently positively correlated with high levers of protest, both before and after elections. For example, in authoritarian regimes post-election protest occurs in 7.7% of clean presidential elections as contrasted to 61.5% of fraudulent elections. Schedler (2006a, 21) reveals the effect of fraud on opposition strategies as "the ultimate trigger of opposition protest" and finds that "[e]lectoral fraud is the mother of electoral protest." However, the analysis does not explain those cases in which people do not protest even when they know the elections were fraudulent.

Another important contribution to understanding post-election protests is made by Hyde and Marinov's (2008) research on the importance of international election monitoring for the quality of elections, which finds a highly significant relationship between international and/or domestic reports of fraud and post-election protests. International monitors' declarations of fraud may legitimize post-election protests (Hyde and Marinov 2008). Similarly, Donno (2008) supports this argument in her analysis of 38 cases of fraudulent elections in Latin America and

the postcommunist region, finding international organizations' involvement and their rejection of election outcomes as two major factors to predict protest after fraudulent elections.

## 2.2 Refining the Collective Action Theory of Post-Election Protests

### 2.2.1 Tucker's Collective Action Framework for Explaining Color Revolutions

This research has been inspired by Tucker's (2007) research note on postcommunist electoral revolutions. Tucker suggests using the collective action framework to explain why protests occur after fraudulent elections and how fraud can help solve the exiting collective action problems. Collective action problems are described as "situations in which a group would benefit from cooperation, but the lack of individual incentives to engage in the actions necessary to achieve this cooperation prevents the goal from being attained" (Tucker 2007, 540). The present analysis is not concerned with the free-rider problem (solutions to these problem have already been discussed) of collective action as much as with the problem of dependence of the decision to participate in protests on the number of others.

This problem of participation in protests has already been discussed within the framework of threshold models, which focus on sustaining protest to a tipping point beyond which it becomes self-reinforcing. It is worth adding here that the electoral cycle may offer a powerful solution to this problem. Elections (especially fraudulent elections) are said to create a "focal point" for action by drawing everybody's attention to elections, raising popular outrage, and calling for immediate action; "[by] creating a single grievance for all citizens to focus on simultaneously, stolen elections provide an ideal mobilization opportunity" (D'Anieri 2006, 335). While similar revolutionary attempts have been made outside the electoral cycle (e.g. protests in Uzbekistan in response to arrests of businessmen), protests have been most successful

in toppling authoritarian leaders when following fraudulent elections.[13] The popularity of the electoral model of democratization is in fact largely explained by the characteristics of the electoral cycle that reduce the collective action problem; "[the electoral model] translates citizen anger against the regime into two acts vital to defeating dictators – turning out to vote and increasing support for the opposition. It also puts in place many of the conditions necessary for protests after the elections – for example, the mobilizing potential of high-energy elections, the availability of a barometer of public sentiment based on polling and campaign rallies and the generation of competing vote tabulations. In this way, it helps to overcome the formidable constraints of collective action that frequently block, even under ideal structural conditions, popular mobilization" (Bunce and Wolchik 2009, 72).

Thus, the following section refines the collective action framework to study electoral protest. While the collective action framework cannot fully explain protests, the present research represents the most systematic and multifaceted project to explain the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections. Linking back to the social movement and recent democratization studies, it generates three sets of hypotheses on the cost, benefit, and likelihood of success of protest on the occurrence of protest after fraudulent elections.

### 2.2.2 Hypothesis Generation

*Cost of participation*

Elections and electoral fraud may decrease the potential cost of participating in anti-regime actions. Tucker (2007, 541) compares the potential cost of confronting an abusive regime

[13] However, different actors and different events may serve the same role for mobilizing collective action. D'Anieri (2006, 335) shows that anti-government protests were triggered by imprisonment of leading Andijan businessmen in Uzbekistan in 2005, by changes in social welfare benefits in Russia in 2005, and by fraudulent elections in cases of color revolutions. Similarly, some cases of electoral revolutions got more mobilization support from abroad (Ukraine 2004) than other cases (Kyrgyzstan 2005). Thus, talking in general terms of mobilization capacity and political opportunity structure helps better generalize explanations of post-election protests.

through individual action in day-to-day life with the potential cost of confronting the abusive regime with a crowd as the "entire country is experiencing the same act of abuse simultaneously." Also, the likelihood of repression is argued to be lower after elections as regimes are believed to be more vulnerable during the electoral cycle (Beissinger 2007, 263). Moreover, the cost of participating in political protest is going to be lower with the expansion of the movement; by the virtue of the dynamics of social movement, "[o]nce a cycle (of contention) begins, the costs of the collective action are lowered for other actors, and master frames and models of activism are defused" (Tarrow 1998, 8).

However, though it is generally accepted that the cost of protest discourages participation in protests, there are conflicting arguments and evidence regarding the relationship between state repression and participation in protest. It has already been discussed above (see social movement theories) that state repression, especially strong and inconsistent repression, may have a reverse impact on protest. Some social movement scholars have observed a curvilinear relationship between the cost of participation (state repression) and protest, "erratic or inconsistent use of force tending to create more militant and larger challengers" (Timberlake and Williams 1984, referred to in Jenkins 1995, 23). Political process theories of opportunity have provided evidence that protest is more likely and more intense in moderate authoritarian and neopatrimonial regimes than in liberal democracies or authoritarian regimes; "there was cross-national evidence of a U-shaped relationship between formal opportunities in terms of political and civil rights and protest," when mixed regimes (chiefly moderate authoritarian and neopatremonial regimes) are more likely to create greater and more intense protest while liberal democracies and state socialist regimes are less conflict-prone (Timberlake and Williams 1984, Gurr 1989, referred to in Jenkins 1995, 22).

Thus, it is important to check the validity of the prevailing proposition in the literature about the negative impact of cost of participation on the occurrence of protest. This research aims to reconciling the competing propositions on the relationship between repression and protest, and expects to find a curvilinear relationship between them.

*Benefit of participation*

The benefit of social and political protests is often attributed to the level of grievances. However, there are disagreements on whether grievances may directly cause action, and whether it is the objective or perceived level of grievances that matters. Within social movement theories, Opp (1988) discerns three main propositions on the role of grievances in social movement participation – essential and unconditional effect of grievances in (relative) deprivation theory, conditional effect and negligible importance of grievances (especially in large groups) in collective-action theory, and important role of grievances albeit conditioned on social structures in resource-mobilization theory. Likewise, recent democratization studies debate the role of grievances during political transitions. While Kuran (1991) views grievance as a direct causal factor for political protest, Tucker (2007) does not believe that the variation in mass mobilization after electoral frauds is directly explained by the level of grievances people face in a country. Tucker (2007, 544) argues that "grievances create a reservoir of potential protestors, should external circumstances change." By putting a country under close international watch, elections may create opportune circumstances for people to express their grievances against the government through political protest. The benefit of seeking the collective goal becomes more obvious especially after stolen elections (Thompson and Kuntz 2006). An empirical study on the relationship between grievances and political protest is conducted by Javeline (2003a). A survey of over 2000 Russians on whether they attribute blame for grievances to specific culprits or

problem solvers reveals that the greater the specification of blame attribution, the greater the likelihood of protest. It is important to note that the absolute level of grievances may not be as important as the interpretation of the facts, and some skepticism has been expressed "about the possibility of discovering any constant combination of objective factors in a society which will predictably set off a chain of events leading up to a collective movement," and it is important to "consider not only the conditions of the society but also the symbolic interpretations and judgments that people at that time make of them" (Chong 1991, 237).

Though most of the literature focuses on socioeconomic grievances as a potential benefit of collective action, the benefit of electoral protests cannot be confined to those conditions, either objective or subjective. People can be expected to care equally for the protections of their civil rights and freedoms. And if the regime does not expect their rights and freedoms, people may connect the protection of those rights with regime change, sometimes triggered by popular protests.

Thus, the present review draws hypothesis on the positive impact of the benefit of protest on the occurrence of protest after fraudulent elections.

As already discussed, social movement theories offer great insight into the impact of the cost and benefit of collective action on the occurrence of social and political movements. They also point out an often overlooked factor that is closely related to the cost-benefit calculation and may greatly affect protest mobilization – the threat to interests and values of individuals and groups. The resource mobilization theory of social movements holds that those who have the least to lose are often those who have the greatest resources and thus are most likely to mobilize. However, social movement theories that focus on resources external to challengers also underscore the threats from inaction and expect those who have the most to lose to be those most

likely to use openings in political opportunities and participate in collective action (Tarrow 1998, 86). Tversky's "prospect theory" argues that people respond differently to hopes for gain and threat of loss; "[a]n individual's attitude toward risk depends on whether the outcomes are perceived as gains or losses, relative to the reference point" (Quatrone and Tversky 1988, 722, quoted in Tarrow 1998, 86). Building on this theory, it has been argued that the threat of loss is more effective in triggering collective action than hopes for gain, as it underscores the loss from inaction. For example, "peasants living through social-structural transformations that lead … to increased vulnerability to subsistence crisis … would view a choice in favor of status quo not as neutral but as a loss" (Berejikian 1992, 653). Though this argument is difficult to test empirically and has been criticized on different grounds, it is important to note that if social movement organizers understand public reaction to threats of loss and hopes for gain, they can properly frame collective action to attract high level of participation (Tarrow 1998, ch7).

The cost-benefit calculations of rational actors involved in collective action can be a starting point in understanding the logic of mass mobilization after fraudulent elections. However, considering the net benefit of participation (costs vs. benefits) seems to be necessary but insufficient to explain variation in mass mobilization after electoral fraud. Real-world examples of protest after fraudulent elections do not necessarily point to the countries where people face the highest level of grievances (high benefit), or where the risk of repression is the lowest (low cost).

*Likelihood of success*

To better understand the logic of post-election protest as a collective action problem, it is important to incorporate into the analysis the likelihood of success. This is a fluid concept and can be operationalized in many ways. Success can be understood as achieving the protestors'

publicly stated goals. The perception of the likelihood of success can be affected by a number of factors. First, opposition strength and coordination during elections affects people's perception about the likelihood of success. Bunce (2006) identifies strong liberal opposition as the best predictor of democratization throughout postcommunist transitions. Opposition can also raise the perception of success by cooperating and presenting a possible political alternative. A crucial factor during either presidential or legislative election is "a viable alternative to the incumbent leader" (McFaul 2005, 9). Opposition unity is also important for sending a clear and positive message to the public; "thus when the electoral fraud does occur, citizens are more likely to get a clear signal from opposition leaders regarding both the logistics and goals of the protests, which in turn should help increase their beliefs in the likelihood of the protests succeeding" (Tucker 2007, 542). For example, in Ukraine opposition's failure to mobilize large-scale protests prior to 2004 is explained by its failure to cooperate; "[t]he splits within the opposition rendered it unable to produce common policy proposal, which in turn limited its capacity to mobilized popular support" (Kuzio 2005b, 122). In addition, divided opposition was unable to offer a positive message and instead relied on negative campaign.

Thus, this review draws hypothesis on the positive impact of opposition strength and cohesion on the occurrence of protest after fraudulent elections.

Secondly, electoral fraud usually attracts significant international attention, which may reduce the chances of repression especially by regimes that seek international legitimacy, and thus may improve the likelihood of success (Tucker 2007, 542). International organizations and election monitors have been argued to be reluctant to instigate post-election violence and favor stability and incremental improvements in the quality of elections (Kelley 2009). However, international condemnation or endorsement of election results plays an important role in

legitimizing the claims of either the regime or the opposition. International monitors' reports of electoral fraud may legitimize post-election protests, as in the 2005 Azerbaijani legislative elections when the opposition waited for the monitors' reports to start protest, whereas positive reports on elections may undermine the opposition's efforts to overturn election results, as in the 2005 Ethiopian and 2006 Mexican legislative elections (Hyde and Marinov 2008, also Donno 2008). However, these findings should be treated with caution given inherent problems involved in international election monitoring (McCoy and Hartlyn 2006), the recent development of a "shadow market" of observers and reluctance by some international observers to outcry the results of fraudulent elections (Kelley 2008b).

Thus, this review draws hypothesis on the positive impact of international criticism of elections on the occurrence of protest after fraudulent elections.

*Other related factors*

Past experiences of protest, both domestic and international, may also affect people's perception about the cost, the benefit, and the likelihood of success of protests. For example, previous success or failure of protests domestically or in neighboring countries can affect the expectations of both potential costs of participation in protest and the likelihood of success. Explaining motivations to participate in collective action, Chong (1991, 96) underscores the importance of successful precedents, originated from within the movement or in other social movements. Because motivation to participate in collective action is affected by beliefs about actions of others, people are argued to join the movement because either "it has already proven successful and therefore shown prospective activists that it is a worthwhile investment," or whether "successful or not, a sufficiently large number of other activists have already committed themselves to the campaign" (Chong 1991, 147).

The above-mentioned problem of collective action addressed by Chong (1991) arises primarily from uncertainties regarding both the action of others and the possible cost of participation. The latter source of uncertainty is especially acute in authoritarian regimes where people enjoy little guarantees against discretionary state action. This problem can be alleviated in societies with more active political culture of protest and greater interpersonal trust (Benson and Rochon 2004). Interpersonal trust is important both in motivating participation and raising the intensity of protest. Interpersonal trust leads to anticipation of lower expected cost of protest and higher potential benefit of protest (and thus higher chances for success), which in turn fuel protest participation and intensity (Benson and Rochon 2004). While these concepts are very difficult to quantify, this analysis considers the impact of overall political culture of protest in a country on the occurrence of protest after fraudulent elections.

The next chapter operationalizes the cost, the benefit and the likelihood of success of protest and tests these hypotheses based on these variables in large-N multivariate regression analysis. The findings are further illustrated in following chapters on case studies of selected countries from Eurasia, as well as mini-case studies of elections in Africa and Latin America.

# CHAPTER THREE

## Quantitative Analysis of Post-Election Protests within Collective Action Framework

The purpose of this chapter is to test the hypotheses developed in the theoretical chapter on the occurrence of political protest after fraudulent elections. It analyzes the relationships between protest on one side and the potential cost, benefit and likelihood of success of protest on the other side of the equation. Thus, it tests three sets of hypotheses.

(H1) The likelihood of protest after a fraudulent election increases as the potential cost of protest decreases.

(H2) The likelihood of protest after a fraudulent election increases as the potential benefit of protest increases.

(H3) The likelihood of protest after a fraudulent election increases as the likelihood of success increases.

The main expectation is that the variables related to the likelihood of success will best explain the occurrence of protest after fraudulent elections. With a categorical dependent variable, the analysis is based on generalized logit regression. Dealing with the problem of missing data, the analysis uses Amelia II multiple imputation method.

### 3.1 Framework of Analysis

The present analysis has been possible due to recent advancement in electoral studies – creation of cross-country times-series data on elections by the Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP) at Binghamton University, the Quality of Elections Data (QED) and the Data on

International Election Monitoring (DIEM) datasets by Kelley's Project on International Elections Monitoring at Duke University, and Hyde and Marinov's (2010) National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) at Yale[14] and thanks to early access to selected data from DIEM/QED and NELDA granted for this research. The data compiled for this analysis include all direct multiparty presidential and legislative elections in the world between 1990 and 2004, with a few exceptions. It excludes elections in single-party regimes[15] as well as in established democracies, i.e. almost exactly the set of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) members.[16] Constituent assembly elections are included, while by-elections are omitted from the analysis. The sample is limited to fraudulent elections, fraud being defined as patterns of electoral manipulation favoring one party over another. The sample variable captures problems in the legal framework, political and administrative problems in pre-election period, and Election Day problems. It distinguishes among elections with no problems, and those with minor, moderate or major problems. Only elections that experience moderate or major problems are included in regression analysis.

### 3.1.1 Dependent Variable

Table A1 in Appendix summarizes the dependent and independent variables. Table A2 in Appendix A provides the summary statistics of these variables. The dependent variable is

[14] The IAEP is a collection of data on political institutions and practices and political elections for all countries in the world from 1972 to 2005 (http://www2.binghamton.edu/political-science/institutions-and-elections-project.html). Judith Kelley's Project on International Election monitoring, sponsored by NSF, provides two data sets - the Quality of Elections Data (QED) and the Data on International Election Monitoring (DIEM) (http://www.duke.edu/web/diem/data.html). The QED codes the quality of legislative and presidential elections in 172 countries from 1978 to 2004, based on State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The DIEM codes the activities and assessment of legislative and presidential elections by eighteen international election monitoring organizations from 1980 to 2004, based on their election reports. NELDA covers all executive and legislative elections from 1960 to 2006, excluding OECD countries (http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/).

[15] The research uses Kelley's Project on International Election Monitoring Supplementary Data coding of single-party regimes (http://www.duke.edu/web/diem/data.html).

[16] It includes Eastern European member states Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Poland, as well as Chile, Israel, Mexico, and South Korea, but most observations from these countries are dropped in regressions as they do not meet the threshold of the sample variable (elections with moderate or major problems).

political protest after fraudulent elections. IAEP's ordinal measure of post-election protests is used here. IAEP codes "the extent of public participation in the protest" based on two criteria: the number of participants (whether it is under or over 1000 protestors) and the number of locations of protest (single or multiple locations). Protests with under 1000 people and at a single location are coded 1 (low protest), protests with under 1000 participants at multiple locations or with over 1000 people at a single location are coded 2 (moderate protest), and protests with over 1000 people at multiple locations are coded 3 (widespread protest). Thus, the dependent variable is coded 0 (no protest), 1 (low protest), 2 (moderate protest) and 3 (widespread protest).

A few shortcomings of this coding should be noted. It does not capture other important features of post-election protest, like the duration of protest or its organizational strength; however, it is a much better measure than a dummy variable of protest used in almost all cross-country studies that use protest either as a dependent or an independent variable in their analyses (Schedler 2006a; Hyde and Marinov 2008; Donno 2008). Another weakness of IAEP's coding of protest is the merging of protests with under 1000 participants at multiple locations and protests with over 1000 people at a single location into a single category coded 2 (moderate protest). It may be argued that these are two different categories of protest, one closer to category 1 (low) protest and the other closer to category 3 (widespread) protest. This shortcoming becomes apparent in regression analysis with two problems; first, whether this measure of protest should be treated as an ordinal or a nominal variable; and secondly, whether these categories provide distinguishable alternatives with respect to the independent variables in the model.[17]

While this study focuses on the occurrence of protest after fraudulent elections, data are compiled on both clean and fraudulent elections. Figure 1 shows the distribution of protest

[17] As explained later in the chapter, this problem is dealt with in the present analysis by using both a partial proportional odds model and a multinomial logit model in regression analysis. Also, the results of Likelihood-Ratio (LR) and Wald tests for combining alternatives are discussed later in the chapter.

grouped by the level of electoral problems. It reveals two patterns that support the decision to restrict this analysis to moderate and major problem elections. First, post-election protest is not a frequent phenomenon even when elections have moderate or major problems. Only five percent of clean elections are protested. And more surprisingly, only 24% and 32% of elections with moderate and major problems respectively are protested. Secondly, as the level of problems increases, the percentage of post-election protests increases and so does the ratio of widespread protests relative to moderate and low protests. Elections with no or minor problems almost never result in widespread protests, while seven percent of elections with moderate problems result in widespread protests and twice as many elections with major problems result in widespread protests. This analysis explains the distribution of protest in the last two columns only in order to determine under what conditions elections with problems result in protest, while others do not.




**Figure 1: Electoral Fraud and Post-election Protest**

### 3.1.2 Independent Variables

This study explains the occurrence of protest within a collective action framework as laid out in the theoretical chapter. How much is the occurrence of post-election protest conditioned

by the calculation of the potential cost and benefit of participation in protest? How important is this cost-benefit calculation when the likelihood of success is low? The present statistical analysis seeks to answer these questions. To do so, the analysis examines three explanatory variables – the potential cost, benefit and likelihood of success of protest. The section below discusses and justifies the operationalization of these variables.

*Cost of participation*

The cost of participation in protests after elections, especially after stolen elections, is theorized to be lower than the cost of protest participation outside the normal election cycle for a number of reasons. For example, regimes become more vulnerable during elections (Beissinger 2007), and stolen elections provide a focal point for action, aggregate grievances, and put the country under the international community's close watch (D'Anieri 2006, 335; Tucker 2007). However, the incentives to participate in protests after such elections is a matter of debate. On one hand, the collective action framework suggests that the higher the cost of participation in protest, the less likely protest after fraudulent elections. At the same time, arguments abound in the literature that state repression, especially strong and inconsistent repression, actually increases participation in social movements and protest (Timberlake and Williams 1984; Gurr 1989). Thus, this research aims to establish both the direction and the shape of the relationship between the cost of participation and protest.

The cost of participation is understood as the potential for state repression in response to involvement in protests. This is measured here by the Gibney/Dalton Political Terror Scale (PTS) lagged a year to treat possible endogeneity. PTS captures the extent of political repression based on the Amnesty International (AI) and State Department reports and ranges from 1 (non-

repressive) to 5 (most repressive).[18] An alternative measure would be the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project (CIRI) Physical Integrity Rights Index. However, PTS suits the purpose of this research better as it captures not only the scope or different types of violence being carried out by the state, but also the intensity of employing a given type of abuse and the portion of the population targeted for abuse (Wood and Gibney 2010).[19] Another alternative measure of cost of protest considered for this analysis is Hyde and Marinov's NELDA measure of the use of government violence against demonstrators, lagged an election cycle. While this may be the closest proxy for the potential cost of protest, lagging this variable one election cycle may cause a memory problem when for example the last time elections were held four or more years ago. Thus, the analysis uses only PTS to measure the cost of participation in protest.

*Benefit of protest*

One of the challenges of measuring the cost and the benefit of protest is clearly distinguishing between the two. The cost and the benefit of protest may sometimes be understood as two sides of the same coin. For example, a strong state may denote both high potential cost and high potential benefit of protest if protestors succeed in toppling the regime. This problem is reduced if we distinguish between state repressive and infrastructural capacity. The repressive state capacity is more closely related to the potential cost of protest, while the

[18] The coding goes as follows (Wood and Gibney 2010, 373): 1 (Country is under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view; torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare); 2 (However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare); 3 (There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted); 4 (The practices of level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas); 5 (The terrors of level 4 have been expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals).

[19] Note that the correlation between the two variables is very strong (0.8).

deficiency of infrastructural capacity may be a cause of grievances – dissatisfaction with the regime, and hence a measure of potential benefit of protest if those grievances can be addressed. While such grievances may be addressed either by removing the incumbent or by pressuring the incumbent to be more accountable to voters, only the first channel of redress is assumed in the benefit of protest hypothesis. Outside the election cycle people protest with different claims, including socioeconomic and political reforms, but when they take to the streets after fraudulent elections most often they demand nothing short of change in the regime.

In the literature the benefit of collective action is often related to the level of grievances. However, there is disagreement on whether grievances may directly cause action, and whether it is the objective or perceived level of grievances that matters. Thus, the present analysis uses two measures of socioeconomic grievances – the objective level of grievances measured by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) *Socioeconomic Conditions*[20] variable, lagged a year, and the subjective level of grievances measured by the World Values Survey (WVS) *Life Satisfaction* variable. The *Socioeconomic Conditions* variable provides "an assessment of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction" (ICRG 2006). It ranges from 0 (bad) to 12 (good conditions) and combines measures of unemployment, consumer confidence, and poverty. The *Life Satisfaction* measure captures the average response to the question: "All things considered, how satisfied are you with life as a whole these days?" and is rescaled 0 (dissatisfied) to 100 (very satisfied).[21]

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[20] For the methodology of the ICRG data see http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx.

[21] Instead of taking the data directly from WVS, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Democracy Assistance Project at Pittsburg, which compiles data from different datasets, is used as the source here. The project uses the original item A170 in the World Values Survey (10-point scale), and LS3 in LAPOP (4-point scale). When the WVS has more than one data point for a given country, the project takes the mean of all waves. For countries not covered by WVS, it uses other sources if an equivalent item is available. For the USIAD project description and data see http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html. For more on the WVS see http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp and WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL

The third measure of potential benefit of protest is the civil liberties protection. Following McCoy and Hartlyn's (2009) discussion of alternative measures of civil liberties protection, a modified CIRI Empowerment Rights Index, lagged a year, is used here. The modified index includes the Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Workers' Rights, Freedom of Religion, and Assembly/Association Rights indicators and excludes the Political Participation indicator. It is an additive index of these five variables, all (re)scaled 0 to 2, and it ranges from 0 (no government respect for these rights) to 10 (full government respect for these rights).

*Likelihood of success*

Success is understood here as achieving the protestors' publicly stated goals, and while these may include a host of issues, success of post-election protests can be understood as undoing the electoral fraud, either by changing the election results, holding new elections or negotiating meaningful reforms that guarantee more free and fair election in the next election cycle. The likelihood of success can be affected by a number of factors. In this analysis the likelihood of success is measured by three variables – opposition cohesion, opposition strength, and international monitors' criticism. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, the opposition may improve the likelihood of success when it is strong enough to present a viable alternative, when it is not divided during the election campaign, and can send a clear and positive message to the public. In addition, the international monitors' assessment of the election results may play an important role in shaping the likelihood of success by providing information about election quality and by legitimizing the claims of either the regime or the opposition.

Opposition cohesion is coded 1 if most opposition parties run with a single candidate during presidential elections or make a pre-election coalition during legislative elections, and it is

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AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.

coded 0 otherwise.[22] Pre-election opposition power is the percentage of opposition seats in the legislature, calculated by dividing the number of opposition seats before the election by the total of government, opposition and non-aligned seats. The data come from the World Bank (WB) Database of Political Institutions (DPI).

International monitors' criticism is measured by a combination of two variables from Kelley's DIEM – *election quality* and *extent of problems.* The coding of both variables is based on international election monitors' reports and captures the organization's overall assessment of the elections. The *election quality* is coded 0 (acceptable), 0.5 (ambiguous), or 1 (unacceptable). The *extent of problems* is coded 0 (no problems) to 3 (major problems). When there are disagreements among different election monitoring organizations' reports regarding the overall election quality or the extent of problems, the strictest assessment is used.[23] The combined variable ranges from 0 (acceptable, no problems) to 5 (unacceptable, major problems).[24]

### 3.1.3 Controls

The analysis controls for five factors. The presence of fraud has been shown in previous research to explain the occurrence of protests after elections in general; "[e]lectoral fraud is the mother of electoral protest" (Schedler 2006a, 21). With a focus on fraudulent elections, the

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[22] While opposition cohesion almost always shows up in case studies or small-N comparative studies of democratization through elections, it has not been used in large-N analysis. The three recently compiled election datasets accessed for this research do not have a coding of this measure either. Thus, this is the only variable that I have coded myself for this research. The information has been cross-checked using different sources, primarily the Election Watch section in Journal of Democracy, the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/), African Elections Database (http://africanelections.tripod.com/index.html), Countries of the World – 16 Years of CIA fact books (http://www.theodora.com/wfb/abc_world_fact_book.html), as well as Lexis/Nexis news reports.

[23] According to Kelley's DIEM coding of nearly 600 observation missions to 385 elections between 1974 and 2004, observer assessments contradict each other in 22 percent of elections (Kelley 2009).

[24] 0 of the *election quality* can pair with 0, 1 or 2 of the *extent of problems*, and 1 of the *election quality* can pair with only 2 or 3 of the *extent of problems*. The combined *overall assessment* variable takes the following values: 0(acceptable, no problems), 0.5(ambiguous, no problems), 1(acceptable, minor problems), 1.5 (ambiguous, minor problems), 2(acceptable, moderate problems), 2.5(ambiguous, moderate problems), 3.5(ambiguous, major problems), 4(unacceptable, moderate problems), and 5(unacceptable, major problems).

present analysis controls for the impact of the extent of election problems on protests after fraudulent elections. It includes a dummy, coded 1 for major problems, and 0 for moderate problems, using Kelley's QED *extent of problems* variable.[25] The analysis controls for the type of the election – presidential, legislative, or simultaneous presidential and legislative elections. Legislative election is used as the reference category in regression analysis. It is anticipated that post-election protest is more likely after presidential and simultaneous presidential and legislative elections. The analysis also controls for the level of democracy, using the Polity IV *polity2* score on the -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic) scale, and the level of economic development, using WB World Development Indicators (WDI) GDP per capita purchasing power parity, both variables lagged a year. Finally, the analysis controls for the extent to which the society has been active in protest in general. It uses a modified Banks' *Weighted Conflict Index*. The original index is a weighted additive of the frequency of eight anti-government measures.[26] Only general strikes, riots, and antigovernment demonstrations are included in the modified *Weighted Conflict Index* and the average of the past five years is used.

## 3.2 Findings

### 3.2.1 Statistical Analysis

The present analysis uses unbalanced time-series cross-sectional data. It includes data on both clean and fraudulent national level elections in about 100 countries between 1990 and 2004, with on average four elections per country and occasionally more than one observation for a country in a given year. There are missing values of both the dependent and several independent

[25] This is also used as the sample variable. It is coded 0 (no problems), 1(minor problems), 2 (moderate problems) and 3(major problems) and only those elections that score 2 or 3 on this variable are included in the analysis.
[26] The specific weights are as follows: strikes (20), riots (25), anti-Government Demonstrations (10), assassinations (25), guerrilla warfare (100), government crises (20), purges (20), and revolutions (150).

variables. In comparative politics the problem of missing data has primarily been dealt with by using listwise deletion, filling in the holes in data with average values of the variables, the researcher's best guess, etc., which may be very problematic.[27] Instead, the present analysis uses a multiple imputation approach to address this problem which uses all the available information running a statistical model to impute multiple values for the missing data and then constructs multiple completed datasets by sampling values from the posterior predictive distribution. An advantage of multiple imputation over other ways of dealing with missing data is that it "removes the overconfidence that would result from a standard analysis of any one completed data set, by incorporating into the standard errors of our ultimate quantity of interest the variation across our estimates from each completed data set. In this way multiple imputation properly represents all information in a data set in a format more convenient for our standard statistical methods, does not make up any data, and gives accurate estimates for the uncertainty of any resulting inferences" (Honaker and King 2010, 563).

The analysis uses a relatively recent approach of multiple imputation implemented in an easy-to-use software package called Amelia II within or outside the R Project for Statistical Computing (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2010). Amelia II reduces the problems of bias, inefficiency and overconfidence that may be caused by listwise deletion and ad-hoc methods of imputation like mean imputation or researchers' best guess. Preliminary analysis for this study also used a Stata user-written approach of multiple imputation by chained equations (ICE)[28], which gave similar results during regression analysis.[29] The Amelia II approach is chosen over Ice for its superiority in handling time-series cross-sectional data and producing more reliable

[27] For example, listwise deletion drops a whole row of observations because of holes in it, thus discarding any information about partially observed cases. Filling in holes with different statistical estimates may cause overconfidence in the results by biasing the standard errors and the confidence intervals (Honaker and King 2010).
[28] ICE is written by Patrick Royston. For more on ICE see STATA Library Multiple Imputation Using ICE.
[29] The results are presented in Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix A.

results (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2010). It has been argued that existing approaches like Ice work poorly for time-series cross-sectional data, and a new method has been proposed; "these [existing] methods are especially poorly suited to … the types of data available in the fields of political science where missing values are most endemic and consequential, and where data structures differ markedly from independent draws from a given population, such as in comparative politics and international relations" (Honaker and King 2010).

To create multiple imputed datasets for this analysis, the dependent and all the independent variables described in the previous section plus eight relevant additional and alternative variables were used.[30] The inclusion of additional information makes the estimates in the imputed datasets more efficient. As the sample variable – level of fraud – has missing values, the imputation was not limited to fraudulent election. Fixed effects and ridge prior equal to five percent of the number of observations[31] were added to the imputation. Five imputed datasets were created and then regression analysis was conducted with these datasets.[32]

With an ordinal dependent variable, this research first used an ordered logit model for regression analysis, which makes the parallel regression assumption, i.e. the slope coefficients are identical across levels of the outcome variable and each probability curve is only different in being shifted to the left or right (Long and Freese 2006, 197-98). A Wald test by Brant (1990)

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[30] It includes an alternative measure of fraud from NELDA, an alternative measure of protest from NELDA, a variable if western monitors were present from NELDA, a variable if any monitors refused to go to the country because of anticipation of fraud from NELDA, an alternative measure of state repression from CIRI, a variable if the elections were marked as high-profile in the State Department Country Human Rights Reports from QED, a variable if elections represented the will of the people from QED, and Banks' original Weighted Conflict Index.

[31] Adding ridge priors is equivalent to adding empri artificial observations to the dataset with the same means and variances as the existing data but with zero covariance, and it shrinks the covariance among the variables toward zero without changing the means and variances (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2010, 23). This analysis uses the recommended moderate value for a ridge prior – 5 % of the number of observations. The use of ridge priors is well-justified here for two reasons. Ridge priors are helpful when the data suffers from high degree of missingness, very strong correlations among the variables, or small number of observations relative to the number of variables. High missingness is not a concern in the present dataset, but high correlation is, due to alternative variables included in the imputation as recommended. Also, the inclusion of FE increases the number of variables.

[32] Stata *micombine* command was used to conduct analysis using the five imputed datasets together and get combined estimates (Carlin, Greenwood, and Coffey 2003; Rubin 1987).

showed that several explanatory variables, most importantly *Repression* and *Opposition cohesion*, violate the parallel regression assumption. A problem with using ordered logit model with such variables is that it assumes that the effect of independent variables is the same for all levels of the dependent variable while both the direction and the magnitude of the impact of independent variables may vary across the levels of the dependent variable. To address this problem, a partial proportional odds model was used next, which assumes that some but not all variables meet the parallel regression assumption (Long and Freese 2006; Williams 2006). With *pl()* option a partial proportional odds model allows to constrain the parallel lines assumption to the variables that pass the Brant test, getting a single slope coefficient for all levels of the dependent variable, and to relax the parallel lines assumption for the variables that do not pass the Brant test, getting unique slope coefficients for different levels of the dependent variable.

A multinomial logit model (MNLM) is another alternative when the parallel regression assumption is violated but it is less parsimonious than the partial proportional odds model. It treats the categories of the dependent variable as nominal rather than ordinal and estimates the effect of the independent variables for all pairs of the dependent variable. Multinomial logit regression is used here as a robustness test on the less common partial proportional odds model. The use of multinomial logit regression is also warranted by the concern that the way the dependent variable is constructed could potentially be viewed as categorical rather than ordinal.

MNLM assumes that adding or deleting alternatives of the dependent variable does not affect the odds among the remaining alternatives, i.e. the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (Long and Freese 2006, 243). The Hausman-McFadden (HM) and the Small-Hsiao (SH) tests were used to test this assumption. However, these tests may provide

conflicting information on IIA.[33] According to several SH tests, the null hypothesis that IIA holds could not be rejected; thus, we can conclude that the MNLM assumption is not violated.

Also, Likelihood-Ratio (LR) and Wald tests for combining alternatives were conducted. If the explanatory variables do not significantly affect the odds of one alternative versus the other, these alternatives are said to be indistinguishable with respect to the variables in the model (Long and Freese 2006, 239), and more efficient estimates may be obtained by combining these alternatives. LR and Wald tests show that we can reject the hypothesis that the pairs 0-1, 0-2, 0-3, and 1-3 are indistinguishable. However, neither LR nor Wald test suggests that we can reject the hypothesis that the pairs 1-2 and 2-3 are indistinguishable.

To deal with the time-series cross-sectional nature of the data, the models include regional and year dummies. The observations are grouped into four regions – Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America – using the United Nations (UN) region identifier. Africa is used as the reference category in analysis. Dummies for years from 1990 to 2004 are included in analysis, and 2004 is dropped as the reference category. Cluster-robust standard errors are used to account for violations of the assumption of independent observations within countries.[34]

The results are reported in tables 3 and 4 at the end of this chapter. Table 3 reports the main results, comparing the partial proportional odds model and multinomial logit estimates. To further examine the curvilinear relationship between repression and protests, Table 4 replicates the models in Table 3 replacing the repression variable, originally scaled 1 to 5 as repression increases, with a moderate repression dummy variable, coded 1 for moderate repression and 0 for

[33] Long and Freese (2006) do not encourage using these tests, referring to Cheng and Long's (2005) experiment on the properties of these tests. Instead, they leave the decision to use the multinomial model with the analyst if he/she believes the alternatives are distinct and weighted independently.

[34] Cluster-robust standard errors assume that the observations are independent across clusters (countries in the present dataset) but not necessarily independent within clusters. Compared to robust standard errors used in preliminary analysis, cluster robust standard errors only slightly change statistical significance of the coefficients.

either low or high repression. The first three columns in tables 3 and 4 report the estimates from the partial proportional odds model. As the dependent variable has four categories, the analysis reports three different coefficients for each variable that violates the parallel regression assumption and one variable for those variables that meet the assumption. The last six columns show the multinomial logit estimates for each possible pair of protest categories.

The results reinforce the argument that the variables related to the likelihood of success (opposition cohesion and international monitors' criticism) are key explanatory factors, both increasing the likelihood of protest. The relationship between repression and protest follows an inverse U-shape, moderate protest being most likely at moderate levels of repression, with a backlash effect of high repression which can make moderate protests escalate into widespread protests. Among three measures of benefit of protest, only civil liberties impacts protest. To understand the magnitude of impact of these explanatory variables found statistically significant in tables 3 and 4, the odds ratios of relevant coefficients are shown in Table 5 at the end of this chapter. Coefficients larger than one indicate an increase in the odds of protest and coefficients smaller than one indicate a decrease in the odds of protest.[35] The first figure in each cell shows the factor change in odds of protest for a unit change in the independent variable, and the second figure shows the factor change in odds of protest for a standard deviation change in the independent variable.

[35] The odds ratio of GDP per capita is 1, denoting that it does not affect the odds of protest this way or the other; however, the coefficient is not reported in the table as it is not statistically significant at $p<.10$ level.

### 3.2.2 Discussion of findings

*Cost of protest*

The results confirm the argument that the relationship between repression and protest is more complicated than projected by a simple negative relationship hypothesis. But before discussing the results of the regression analyses, it is helpful to look at patterns of relationship between repression and protest in simple frequency histograms and scatterplots.




**Figure 2: Percentage of protest along levels of repression**




**Figure 3: Frequency of protest along levels of repression**




**Figure 4: Protest and grouped levels of repression**




**Figure 5: Protest and a dummy variable of repression**

The distribution charts of protest grouped by levels of repression (figures 2 to 5) present interesting patterns of protest. Protest is most frequent at moderate levels of repression and is least frequent at low and high levels of repression (Figure 3). At the same time, moderate levels of repression experience the highest percentage of widespread protests (Figure 2). There is no case of moderate protest at very high levels of repression (4.5 and 5) which may denote that too much repression increases the likelihood of moderate protests to escalate into widespread protests or to die down. Figure 4 evenly groups levels of repression into 3 categories: low (merging categories 1, 1.5, and 2), moderate (2.5, 3, and 3.5) and high (4, 4.5, and 5). Figure 5 combines low and high levels of repression from figure 4 into a new category of extreme level of repression (low or high) and leaves the moderate level of repression, thus creating a *Moderate repression* dummy variable (used in Table 4 regression analysis).

Figure 6 plots protests after fraudulent elections along the levels of repression and adds a fourth degree polynomial trendline. It shows an inverse U-shape relationship between protest and repression with a slightly rising tip at high levels of state repression, which may denote the backlash effect of repression on protest. In fact, both the literature review and the analysis of coding of protest provide strong arguments to believe that widespread protest is very different from no protest and lower intensity protests in connection with the impact of state repression. Thus, Figure 7 distinguishes between the scatterplot of moderate/widespread protests and the scatterplot of no protest and low/moderate protests by adding two separate trendlines for these two plots. While the trendline of no/low/moderate protests resembles the one presented in Figure 6, the trendline of moderate/widespread protests supports the argument for backlash effect of repression. However, these histograms and scatterplots do not provide any information on the statistical significance or the magnitude of the impact of repression on protest. Nor do they

account for the effect of other relevant factors. These questions are dealt with in the multivariate regression analyses presented in tables 3 and 4.




**Figure 6: Repression and protest after fraudulent elections**




**Figure 7: Repression and different levels of protest after fraudulent elections**

The *Repression* coefficients in Table 3 shows that moderate protest is more likely than no protest when the level of repression decreases; however, as the level of repression increases, it is more likely for a moderate protest to escalate into a widespread protest. The *Moderate repression* coefficients in Table 4 confirms that the likelihood of moderate protest relative to no protest or low protest increases as repression moves from low or high levels to a moderate level. The substantive effect is great. For example, the odds of moderate protest relative to no protest

are over five times greater at moderate repression than at extreme repression. Similarly, the odds of moderate protest relative to low protest are almost eight times greater at moderate repression than at extreme repression. On the other hand, one point increase in the level of repression makes the odds of widespread protest relative to moderate protest almost three times greater.

Summarizing the effect of the potential cost of participation in protest, when a state employs moderate repression, it is most likely to experience moderate protest after fraudulent elections, and when a state is not repressive or employs very high repression it is more likely to experience no protest or low protest. At the same time, high repression may backfire increasing the chances of moderate protest to grow into widespread protest.

*Benefit of protest*

The benefit of protest hypothesis is only weakly supported by this analysis. Among three variables used to measure the potential benefit of protest – objective socioeconomic conditions, life satisfaction, and level of civil liberties protection – only the latter may explain protest. The sign of the coefficient is in the expected direction (negative). At the borderline of p=.091 significance level, it can be generalized that when the level of civil liberties protection decreases (potential benefit increases), the likelihood of protest after fraudulent elections increases. The substantive effect of civil liberties protection on protest is moderate. One standard deviation decrease in the civil liberties protection level (2.7 points on the 0 to 10 scale) makes the odds of protest 1.4 times greater.

*Likelihood of success*

*Opposition cohesion* helps overcome the collective action problems that protests require: a unified opposition helps to get to moderate and/or widespread levels of protest from no protest and/or low protest. It especially increases the chances of widespread protest relative to low

protest. The substantive effect of opposition cohesion on protest is great. For example, the odds of having widespread protest compared to low protest are four times greater when the opposition is united than when the opposition is divided.

The argument that opposition power in the legislature before elections makes protest more likely does not hold in this analysis. The *Opposition seats* coefficients are not statistically significant in any model and in fact take a negative sign (more opposition seats, less likely protest) in most of the models. The model was reanalyzed omitting *Opposition cohesion* without getting any substantive change in the *Opposition seats* coefficient, indicating that multicollinearity does not bias the effect of opposition strength on the likelihood of protest. The insignificance of the coefficients may be explained by poor measures. In fact, the measure of opposition strength used here accounts for the percentage of seats held by the opposition in the legislature but does not reflect how many opposition parties share the total opposition seats, i.e. how fragmented the parliamentary opposition is. Also, the impact of opposition strength on protest is not well-theorized in the literature and future research on this factor might need to come up with a better measure and a more sound theoretical argument on its impact on post-election protests.

Among the variables measuring the likelihood of success, international monitors' criticism emerges as a key explanatory factor. Monitors' strong criticism makes it more likely that a fraudulent election will be protested, and that the protest will be major. One standard deviation increase in *Monitors' criticism* variable (1.34 points on the 0 to 5 scale) makes the odds of protest twice greater. *Monitors' criticism* matters especially for widespread protest

compared to no protest. One standard deviation increase in *Monitors' criticism* makes the odds of widespread protest relative to no protest three times greater.[36]

*Controls*

The level of fraud does not explain protest after fraudulent elections. The level of fraud matters for protest when similar analysis is conducted using a larger sample of both fraudulent and clean elections. This confirms previous findings that fraud is the mother of protest (Schedler 2006a). However, once the sample is limited to fraudulent elections, the extent of fraud does not have explanatory power, a finding that in its turn underscores the importance of this research to explain why some fraudulent elections are protested while others are not.

The type of election greatly affects the odds of protest. Presidential elections and simultaneous presidential and legislative elections improve the odds of protest, especially widespread protest. For example, the odds of widespread protest relative to no protest are 4.5 times greater after presidential elections than after legislative elections. Note that the impact of the election type on protest grows for bigger protests.

Democracy may increase the chances of protest after fraudulent elections, but its impact on protests is only moderate. One standard deviation increase in democracy score (5.6 points on the -10 to 10 scale) makes the odds of widespread protest relative to no protest 1.5 times greater. However, this does not represent the instances of protests in democracies as the sample excludes established democracies and thus does not allow an unbiased assessment of the relationship

[36] The substantive effect of this variable is even stronger when considering how it is constructed. The *Monitors' criticism* variable is a combination of two variables – one measuring whether the election is overall considered acceptable or unacceptable by the monitors and the other measuring the extent of problems. For example, an election with moderate problems (scored 2 on the 0 to 3 scale) can pair with either acceptable assessment (thus scoring 2 on the 0 to 5 scale) or unacceptable assessment (thus scoring 4 on the 0 to 5 scale). For example, if any two elections experience moderate problems but overall one is considered unacceptable and the other acceptable by the monitors (resulting in a two-point difference in the monitors' criticism variable), the odds of widespread protest relative to no protest are about five times greater (this represents the impact of a two-point change in *Monitors' criticism*, i.e. $2.210^2$) in the first case of the election than in the latter.

between the level of democracy, fraudulent elections, and occurrence of protests. The rest of the controls – *Economic development* and *Culture of protest* do not yield statistically significant coefficients in any model. Finally, it is interesting to note that protests after fraudulent elections are less likely in Latin America than in Africa and the pattern of temporal connection of post-elections protests is less clear in these results, albeit present.

### 3.3 Conclusion

Studying post-election protest within the collective action framework lays out a sound theoretical foundation to explain this political phenomenon. The statistical analysis reinforces the arguments about the importance of the cost of protest participation and likelihood of success for the occurrence and the intensity of protests after fraudulent elections. The odds of protest after fraudulent elections are greater when the level of state repression is moderate (especially for moderate protest) with a possible backlash effect of high repression, when the opposition is united (especially for widespread protest), and when international monitors denounce the election results. The benefit of protest argument is only partially supported by the analysis. Thus, protests after fraudulent elections are more likely to occur when the cost of protest is moderate and the likelihood of success is high, and notwithstanding the potential benefit of protest.

The contribution of the analysis is perhaps most valuable with respect to establishing the shape of the relationship between state repression and protest and marrying seemingly conflicting arguments on this relationship found in the literature. The statistical results of this analysis are very much in line with the political opportunity structure explanations of social movements directed towards structural changes. For example, a decline in the cost of participation (explained by a decline in either a state's capacity or willingness to repress

challengers) is used as one of the changing dimensions of the political opportunity structure that triggered political contention in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Tarrow 1998; Misztal and Jenkins 1995) and eventually led to democratization in the region. However, this analysis brings clarity when the theory is ambiguous. Focusing on the interaction between protests and state characteristics (Tarrow 1998), the political opportunity theory accepts that unlike state's inclusive strategies to deal with its challengers which preempt protests, exclusive strategies and especially repression can affect protests in different ways, such as prevent protests by raising the costs of mobilization, directly suppress mobilization, or conversely trigger protests. Consistent with the theory, the analysis shows and specifies that no protest or low protest is more likely than moderate protest when the state is not repressive (non-repressive/inclusive state strategies to deal with challengers preempt protest) or when a state is very repressive (repressive state strategies prevent or suppress mobilization); hence, the inverse U-shape relationship between repression and protest.

Alternatively the political process theories of opportunity argue that protest is more likely and more intense in moderate authoritarian and neopatrimonial regimes than in liberal democracies or authoritarian regimes, which they explain through a U-shape relationship between formal opportunities in terms of political and civil rights and protest, with mixed regimes creating greater and more intense protests (Timberlake and Williams 1984; Gurr 1989). A similar argument is also found in more recent studies (Hewitt 2008) that it is the institutional inconsistency of moderate authoritarian regimes that makes them more prone to political instability. However, as the present analysis shows, even after controlling for the level of civil liberties protection and the level of democracy, the relationship between repression and protest follows an inverse U-shape.

At the same time, the analysis reinforces and clarifies the backlash effect of repression on protest – high repression may backfire making moderate protest turn into widespread protest. Repression may have such impacts for several reasons, such as by reinforcing the identity of the challengers, by repression itself becoming a crucial issue for the challengers, and by inviting media attention on the challengers which may attract the support of third parties that would otherwise have not supported the movement (Koopmans 1990, referred to in Kriesi 1995, 177). After all, too much repression may make people outraged about their sense of justice and threatened with costs that they cannot bear (Tarrow 1998, 71), and as an expert on African elections commented during an interview for this research on the occurrence of widespread post-election protests in highly risky environments, there is only so much that people can bear. For example, the December 2010 – January 2011 Tunisian crisis, though having evolved outside the election cycle, illustrates how too much state repression can trigger more protests; "the violent response of the authorities – with the police opening fire on demonstrators – appears to have exacerbated anger and ignited further protests" (BBC 19 January 2011). What started as a desperate act by an unemployed man set off protests in his home town and then elsewhere in the country and turned into deadly clashes as the government used excess force against demonstrators.

If at very high levels of repression the most likely opposition strategies involve either no protest or widespread protest, an interesting question that arises is when these states face widespread post-election protests and when they do not face protests at all. Of course, a number of other factors, including those analyzed here, may come into play. A factor that has not been included in the present study and is worth exploring in interaction with state repression is the state strength measured by several aspects of state's institutional structure – the degree of

territorial centralization, functional concentration of state power, coherence of the public administration, and presence of institutionalized direct democratic procedures (Kriesi 1995). Exercise of repressive strategies by strong states, characterized as centralized, concentrated, and coherent states with no direct democratic access, creates a situation of "full exclusion" that invites large-scale and disruptive strategies by challengers, given other factors are favorable for mobilization. On the other hand, exercise of repressive strategies by weak states, characterized as federal, fragmented, and incoherent states with direct democratic institutions, creates a situation of "formalistic inclusion" that invite low-scale and moderate strategies by challengers (Kriesi 1995, 178).

Another important contribution of this analysis is its support for the factors measuring the likelihood of success. International monitors' assessment of the elections stands throughout the analysis as the most highly statistically significant factor. International monitors carry out this power through at least two interrelated functions that they perform. Their missions provide reliable and accurate information on the elections to both domestic and international audiences (Kelley 2012; Hyde and Marinov 2008; Bjornlund 2004) and by taking on this task they inevitably become "legitimizers" (Kelley 2012, 6). For example, international monitors' declarations of fraud certainly legitimized the opposition claims after the 2005 Azerbaijani legislative elections, and their endorsement of the elections outcome undermined the opposition efforts to overturn the 2005 Ethiopian election results (Hide and Marinov 2008). However, it is difficult to distinguish what impacts post-election protests more – their role of a credible information provider or their authoritative status. If they impact protests by improving the quality of information on elections, it is interesting if the same function can be carried out by well-developed domestic actors, or whether it is key for the "legitimizers" to be international. The

present analysis does not include any information on the nature of and assessments by domestic monitors but this question can be explored in the case studies that follow.

The analysis also confirms that united opposition helps overcome the collective action problems that protests face. They can do so by presenting a more viable alternative to the regime and by conveying a more positive and coherent message to the public unlike when they have to fight both the incumbent and each other. While many case studies of the postcommunist colored revolutions reiterate the importance of opposition strength and opposition cohesion as helpful but insufficient factors in those transitions (Bunce and Wolchik 2007b), these factors are surprisingly missing in recently compiled elections datasets and quantitative studies. While the social movement literature supports the argument that the organizational strength of the opposition should be an asset for mobilization after fraudulent elections, how opposition strength relates to their post-election strategies remains largely under-theorized in the democratization literature. Measured as opposition share of seats in the legislature a year prior to the elections, opposition strength does not show up statistically significant in the present analysis. Though this may be a problem of bad measure of opposition strength, further analysis might help explore if opposition parties already represented in the parliament may prefer a strategy of cooperating with the incumbents over contesting the election results in public protests.

The present analysis only partially supports the benefit of protest hypothesis by settling an argument in the literature between those who view grievances as a direct causal factor for protests (Kuran 1991; Javeline 2003a) and those who believe that grievances instead create a "reservoir of potential protestors" (Tucker 2007). Among three measures of potential benefit of protest, only civil liberties protection matters, confirming the argument that a decline in civil liberties protection (an increase in potential benefit of protest) improves the likelihood of protests

after fraudulent elections. The results also make moot an argument about whether protests are triggered by the objective socioeconomic conditions that societies face or rather by their perceptions and interpretations of those conditions (Chong 1991, 237) as both appear statistically insignificant in the present analysis.

Among the controls used in the analysis, only the type of election consistently shows up as statistically significant. The odds of protest after fraudulent elections are greater when the campaign involves a race for presidency. This may be explained by the fact that fraud is easier to detect and report during presidential elections, and that it is easier to succeed in toppling one incumbent than changing the balance of power in the legislature. The case studies that follow also show that people act rationally and in countries where the real power is vested with the president people connect little hopes with the parliament and care little about how is election to the parliament. The rest of the variables perform poorly in explaining protest after fraudulent elections. Most interestingly, while fraudulent elections are more likely to be protested than relatively clean elections, the level of fraud does not explain protest once the sample is narrowed down to fraudulent elections.

Overall, the contribution of this analysis may be incremental but important for the study of protests. It may not present a powerful tool to predict if a fraudulent election will be protested[37] but it certainly promotes a better understanding of the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections or the lack thereof. The findings of the analysis have both theory-building and practical implications. To the social movement and democratization through elections

[37] The regression models presented in the previous section perform moderately in terms of model fit. The Count $R^2$ .76 in the multinomial logit regression is the portion of correct predictions of the outcome; but as in such models one can correctly predict at least 50% of the cases by choosing the outcome category with the largest percentage of observed cases without any knowledge of the independent variables, it is more useful to look at the Adjusted Count $R^2$ .13, which shows the portion of correct predictions beyond the number that would be correctly guessed by choosing the largest marginal (Long and Freese 2006, 111-112).

scholars, the analysis presents a coherent theoretical framework to explain electoral protest and employs a rigorous test of hypotheses found in the literature on the impact of the cost, benefit, and likelihood of success on the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections. While a few previous studies examine factors that make post-election protest more likely, such as electoral fraud (Schedler 2006a), international report of fraud (Hyde and Marinov 2008) and intergovernmental organizations' involvement (Donno 2008), they fall short of building a compelling theory of electoral protest.

To international actors promoting democracy and especially international election monitors, the analysis conveys both a normative and a practical message. The analysis reinforces the importance of the international election monitors' assessment of elections for protests and hence suggests that they should be cautious about the significance of the role that their reports play in legitimizing either the incumbents' or the oppositions' claims about the election outcomes. International observers often call elections a good opportunity for the leaders in politically troubled countries to be more responsive to the aspirations of their people and embrace political reform, but the elections also represent a good opportunity for the international observer missions to promote political change by overcoming factors that may influence their assessments, such as special relations with the country, the progress bias, fear of conflict, etc. (Kelley 2012, ch 4) and by denouncing manipulated elections.

To opposition parties that are caught in a perpetual struggle against the incumbents that manage to reinstall themselves election after election, the practical implication of the analysis is straightforward – to unite their efforts, especially when presidential elections are involved, in order to overcome the collective action problems that protests require and to advance from no protest and/or low protest to moderate and/or widespread levels of protest.

Table 3: Explaining protest after fraudulent elections

| | *Generalized Ordered Logit* | | | *Multinomial Logit* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No Protest v. Protest | No/Low Protest v. Moderate/ Widespread Protest | No-Moderate Protest v. Widespread Protest | No Protest v. Low Protest | No Protest v. Moderate Protest | No Protest v. Widespread Protest | Low Protest v. Moderate Protest | Low Protest v. Widespread Protest | Moderate Protest v. Widespread Protest |
| Repression [a] | -0.205<br>(0.202) | -0.217<br>(0.258) | 0.473<br>(0.457) | -0.184<br>(0.301) | **-0.752***<br>**(0.422)** | 0.135<br>(0.401) | -0.568<br>(0.473) | 0.319<br>(0.460) | **0.887***<br>**(0.540)** |
| Socioecon conditions [a] | -0.016<br>(0.140) | 0.036<br>(0.163) | -0.006<br>(0.314) | -0.065<br>(0.166) | -0.103<br>(0.275) | 0.112<br>(0.312) | -0.038<br>(0.294) | 0.177<br>(0.324) | 0.215<br>(0.436) |
| Life satisfaction | 0.015<br>(0.014) | 0.015<br>(0.014) | 0.015<br>(0.014) | 0.010<br>(0.022) | 0.010<br>(0.03) | 0.019<br>(0.024) | 0.000<br>(0.035) | 0.008<br>(0.032) | 0.009<br>(0.035) |
| Civil liberties | **-0.132***<br>**(0.078)** | **-0.132***<br>**(0.078)** | **-0.132***<br>**(0.078)** | -0.055<br>(0.120) | -0.073<br>(0.147) | -0.223<br>(0.173) | -0.018<br>(0.164) | -0.168<br>(0.218) | -0.150<br>(0.228) |
| Opposition cohesion [a] | 0.281<br>(0.365) | **0.919***<br>**(0.510)** | 0.911<br>(0.650) | -0.524<br>(0.692) | 0.877<br>(0.853) | 0.913<br>(0.689) | 1.401<br>(1.050) | **1.436***<br>**(0.796)** | 0.036<br>(1.033) |
| Opposition seats | -0.003<br>(0.008) | -0.003<br>(0.008) | -0.003<br>(0.008) | -0.005<br>(0.014) | -0.008<br>(0.016) | 0.003<br>(0.015) | -0.003<br>(0.023) | 0.008<br>(0.021) | 0.011<br>(0.019) |
| Monitors' criticism | **0.490*****<br>**(0.135)** | **0.490*****<br>**(0.135)** | **0.490*****<br>**(0.135)** | **0.319***<br>**(0.18)** | 0.347<br>(0.271) | **0.811****<br>**(0.328)** | 0.028<br>(0.285) | 0.492<br>(0.383) | 0.464<br>(0.387) |
| Fraud | -0.264<br>(0.478) | -0.264<br>(0.478) | -0.264<br>(0.478) | -0.219<br>(0.715) | 0.001<br>(0.688) | -0.458<br>(0.878) | 0.221<br>(0.877) | -0.239<br>(1.061) | -0.459<br>(0.930) |
| Executive election [a] | 0.633<br>(0.400) | **1.066****<br>**(0.507)** | **1.310****<br>**(0.599)** | 0.288<br>(0.440) | 0.297<br>(0.732) | **1.508****<br>**(0.643)** | 0.009<br>(0.731) | **1.220***<br>**(0.656)** | 1.211<br>(0.870) |
| Exec/leg election [a] | **1.166****<br>**(0.509)** | 0.602<br>(0.581) | 0.630<br>(0.724) | **1.379***<br>**(0.783)** | 1.234<br>(0.968) | 1.540<br>(1.033) | -0.145<br>(1.199) | 0.161<br>(1.200) | 0.306<br>(1.368) |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Democracy | **0.072*** | **0.072*** | **0.072*** | 0.042 | 0.020 | 0.119 | -0.022 | 0.077 | 0.099 |
| | **(0.043)** | **(0.043)** | **(0.043)** | (0.066) | (0.092) | (0.085) | (0.103) | (0.114) | (0.127) |
| GDP pc ppp | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Culture of protest | -0.005 | -0.005 | -0.005 | | | | | | |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | | | | | | |
| Asia | -0.554 | -0.554 | -0.554 | -0.369 | 0.382 | -1.297 | 0.751 | -0.928 | -1.678 |
| | (0.480) | (0.480) | (0.480) | (0.683) | (0.912) | (0.993) | (1.046) | (1.043) | (1.300) |
| Eastern Europe | -0.474 | -0.474 | -0.474 | -1.235 | 0.176 | -0.566 | 1.411 | 0.668 | -0.743 |
| | (0.591) | (0.591) | (0.591) | (0.966) | (0.951) | (0.858) | (0.975) | (1.078) | (1.155) |
| Latin America | **-1.434**** | **-1.434**** | **-1.434**** | -0.918 | -0.768 | -3.111 | 0.150 | -2.192 | -2.343 |
| | **(0.692)** | **(0.692)** | **(0.692)** | (1.013) | (1.415) | (1.986) | (1.822) | (2.146) | (2.384) |
| Constant | -0.757 | -2.135 | -4.939 | -0.345 | -0.606 | -5.534 | -0.26 | -5.189 | -4.928 |
| | (1.493) | (1.571) | (2.921) | (2.539) | (2.676) | (4.058) | (3.605) | (4.476) | (4.772) |
| # observations | 337 | 337 | 337 | 337 | 337 | 337 | 337 | 337 | 337 |
| # clusters | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 |
| Count $R^2$ | | | | .75 | .75 | .75 | .75 | .75 | .75 |
| Adj Count $R^2$ | | | | .10 | .10 | .10 | .10 | .10 | .10 |

Note: The table reports the slope coefficients and (cluster-robust standard errors). Coefficients for year dummies are omitted. Africa is used as the reference category. Statistically significant estimates are marked bold. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

[a] Brant tests show that these variables violate the parallel regression assumption imposed by the ordered logit model. Thus, the parallel regression assumption was relaxed with respect to these variables in the partial proportional odds model using pl() option.

Table 4: Moderate repression and protest after fraudulent elections

| | *Generalized Ordered Logit* | | | *Multinomial Logit* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No Protest v. Protest | No/Low Protest v. Moderate/ Widespread Protest | No-Moderate Protest v. Widespread Protest | No Protest v. Low Protest | No Protest v. Moderate Protest | No Protest v. Widespread Protest | Low Protest v. Moderate Protest | Low Protest v. Widespread Protest | Moderate Protest v. Widespread Protest |
| Moderate repression [a] | 0.332<br>(0.311) | **1.005*****<br>**(0.345)** | 0.345<br>(0.737) | -0.404<br>(0.473) | **1.661****<br>**(0.714)** | 0.338<br>(0.634) | **2.065****<br>**(0.811)** | 0.742<br>(0.692) | -1.323<br>(0.971) |
| Socioecon conditions | -0.017<br>(0.122) | -0.017<br>(0.122) | -0.017<br>(0.122) | -0.022<br>(0.164) | -0.055<br>(0.284) | 0.071<br>(0.313) | -0.032<br>(0.306) | 0.094<br>(0.332) | 0.126<br>(0.445) |
| Life satisfaction [a] | 0.015<br>(0.013) | 0.022<br>(0.015) | 0.025<br>(0.021) | 0.004<br>(0.021) | 0.009<br>(0.03) | 0.022<br>(0.023) | 0.005<br>(0.036) | 0.019<br>(0.029) | 0.014<br>(0.035) |
| Civil liberties | **-0.114***<br>**(0.063)** | **-0.114***<br>**(0.063)** | **-0.114***<br>**(0.063)** | -0.045<br>(0.112) | 0.028<br>(0.142) | -0.227<br>(0.168) | 0.073<br>(0.158) | -0.182<br>(0.21) | -0.255<br>(0.226) |
| Opposition cohesion [a] | 0.251<br>(0.339) | **0.794***<br>**(0.450)** | **0.865** [b]<br>**(0.538)** | -0.428<br>(0.667) | 0.848<br>(0.789) | 0.906<br>(0.698) | 1.276<br>(1.027) | **1.334***<br>**(0.795)** | 0.058<br>(1.023) |
| Opposition seats | -0.003<br>(0.007) | -0.003<br>(0.007) | -0.003<br>(0.007) | -0.003<br>(0.014) | -0.003<br>(0.018) | 0.003<br>(0.015) | -0.001<br>(0.024) | 0.006<br>(0.02) | 0.006<br>(0.02) |
| Monitors' criticism [a] | **0.486*****<br>**(0.137)** | **0.485*****<br>**(0.181)** | **0.509***<br>**(0.267)** | **0.337***<br>**(0.172)** | 0.305<br>(0.296) | **0.783****<br>**(0.329)** | -0.032<br>(0.308) | 0.446<br>(0.383) | 0.477<br>(0.389) |
| Fraud | -0.259<br>(0.432) | -0.259<br>(0.432) | -0.259<br>(0.432) | -0.273<br>(0.710) | -0.064<br>(0.735) | -0.424<br>(0.877) | 0.209<br>(0.913) | -0.151<br>(1.084) | -0.36<br>(0.965) |
| Executive election [a] | 0.579<br>(0.366) | **1.091****<br>**(0.459)** | **1.636*****<br>**(0.622)** | 0.281<br>(0.454) | 0.154<br>(0.773) | **1.470****<br>**(0.62)** | -0.127<br>(0.802) | **1.189***<br>**(0.646)** | 1.316<br>(0.881) |
| Exec/leg election [a] | **1.073****<br>**(0.470)** | 0.511<br>(0.501) | 1.049<br>(1.098) | **1.382***<br>**(0.789)** | 0.824<br>(0.946) | 1.536<br>(1.023) | -0.558<br>(1.228) | 0.154<br>(1.188) | 0.712<br>(1.413) |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Democracy | **0.075**** | **0.075**** | **0.075**** | 0.031 | 0.020 | 0.122 | -0.012 | 0.091 | 0.102 |
| | **(0.036)** | **(0.036)** | **(0.036)** | (0.066) | (0.107) | (0.083) | (0.117) | (0.111) | (0.139) |
| GDP pc ppp | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Culture of protest | -0.005 | -0.005 | -0.005 | | | | | | |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.004) | | | | | | |
| Asia | -0.713 | -0.713 | -0.713 | -0.286 | 0.046 | -1.309 | 0.332 | -1.023 | -1.355 |
| | (0.439) | (0.439) | (0.439) | (0.689) | (0.986) | (0.946) | (1.163) | (0.986) | (1.31) |
| Eastern Europe | -0.598 | -0.598 | -0.598 | -1.088 | -0.081 | -0.561 | 1.007 | 0.527 | -0.480 |
| | (0.496) | (0.496) | (0.496) | (0.957) | (0.932) | (0.833) | (1.013) | (1.038) | (1.174) |
| Latin America | **-1.765***** | **-1.765***** | **-1.765***** | -0.733 | -1.719 | **-3.201*** | -0.987 | -2.468 | -1.481 |
| | **(0.655)** | **(0.655)** | **(0.655)** | (1.051) | (1.614) | **(1.921)** | (2.017) | (2.114) | (2.463) |
| Constant | -1.632 | -3.518 | -4.464 | -0.721 | -4.293 | -5.271 | -3.573 | -4.550 | -0.977 |
| | (1.308) | (1.273) | (2.185) | (2.437) | (2.279) | (3.415) | (3.453) | (3.968) | (3.86) |
| # observations | 337 | 337 | 337 | 337 | 337 | 337 | 337 | 337 | 337 |
| # clusters | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 |
| Count $R^2$ | | | | .76 | .76 | .76 | .76 | .76 | .76 |
| Adj Count $R^2$ | | | | .13 | .13 | .13 | .13 | .13 | .13 |

Note: The table reports the slope coefficients and (cluster-robust standard errors). Coefficients for year dummies are omitted. Africa is used as the reference category. Statistically significant estimates are marked bold. * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

[a] Brant tests show that these variables violate the parallel regression assumption imposed by the ordered logit model. Thus, the parallel regression assumption was relaxed with respect to these variables in the partial proportional odds model using pl() option.

Table 5: Factor change in odds of protest

| *Variable* | *Generalized Ordered Logit* | | | *Multinomial Logit* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No Protest v. Protest | No/Low Protest v. Moderate/ Widespread Protest | No-Moderate Protest v. Widespread Protest | No Protest v. Low Protest | No Protest v. Moderate Protest | No Protest v. Widespread Protest | Low Protest v. Moderate Protest | Low Protest v. Widespread Protest | Moderate Protest v. Widespread Protest |
| Repression | | | | | 0.471* [0.495] | | | | 2.428* [2.292] |
| Moderate repression | | 2.732*** [4.515] | | | 5.265** [12.079] | | 7.885** [22.143] | | |
| Civil liberties | 0.876* [0.699] | 0.876* [0.699] | 0.876* [0.699] | | | | | | |
| Opposition cohesion | | 2.507* [1.426] | | | | | | 4.204* [1.742] | |
| Monitors' criticism | 1.632*** [1.930] | 1.632*** [1.930] | 1.632*** [1.930] | 1.376* [1.534] | | 2.250** [2.970] | | | |
| Executive election | | 2.904*** [1.640] | 3.706** [1.836] | | | 4.518** [2.013] | | 3.387* [1.761] | |
| Exec/leg election | 3.209*** [1.445] | | | 3.971* [1.546] | | | | | |
| Democracy | 1.075** [1.494] | 1.075** [1.494] | 1.075** [1.494] | | | | | | |

Note: The coefficients reported are the odds ratios for a unit change in the independent variable and [odds ratios for a standard deviation change in the independent variable]. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

# CHAPTER FOUR

## Post-election Protests in Eurasia – Belarus and Russia

The following two chapters examine the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections in four postcommunist countries – Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, and Russia. The choice of this region for a closer examination of protests is conditioned by the occurrence of several "color revolutions" and attempts of such regime transitions in the region during the first decade of the 21st century. The choice of Armenia, Belarus, and Georgia maximizes the variation in the dependent variable as the range of protests after fraudulent elections in each of those countries varies from widespread protest to no protest. The choice of Russia is primarily made to address the puzzle why Russia has never experienced protests after federal elections despite deteriorating quality of elections.

The primary purpose of these case studies is to further examine the effect of the explanatory factors identified in the quantitative analysis in the preceding chapter. The case studies do not fully follow the predicted pattern of protests, such as the occurrence of post-election protests in the absence of strong international condemnation in Georgia (2008) and Armenia (2010), or the occurrence of post-election protests in the absence of opposition cohesion in Belarus (2010). The analysis identifies the driving factors for post-election protests in such circumstances, and when the case studies follow the predicted pattern of protests the analysis examines in more detail the processes by which the explanatory factors identified in the quantitative analysis unfolded on the ground. Thus, after a concise narrative of elections in each country, the case studies examine the role of repression, opposition cohesion, international

election monitors' assessment of elections, and the type of election in explaining the occurrence of post-election protests. The case studies assess how these factors matter for mass mobilization after fraudulent elections, as well as help to distinguish among the effect of those factors on the occurrence and the success of protests. The primary source of information for these case studies is a set of extensive interviews conducted with politicians as well as domestic and international experts on elections in those countries, which help to test the validity of findings of the quantitative analysis and to identify other key but overlooked factors.

This chapter contrasts elections in Belarus and Russia. These two countries have always had closer political, economic, and social characteristics than any other pair of post-Soviet republics. Their regimes share many common features, especially high levels of repression, heavy reliance on preemptive attacks on opponents to secure regime survival, popularity of their dictators, very strict nongovernmental organization (NGO) and electoral legislation, control over media, and hindering of international assistance to opposition and civil society, yet Belarus has made headlines with protests after fraudulent elections more than once and Russian has never experienced protest after national elections. Tables 6 and 7 at the end of this chapter summarize disputed elections in Belarus and Russia, post-election protests and key explanatory factors.

Belarus, being the most Sovietized republic, did not witness a rise of a nationwide mass movement for independence and democracy during or after the collapse of the Soviet Union; indeed, the first democratic movement – Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) – enjoyed little popularity (Potocki 2002). The first presidential election in Belarus (1994), which brought Lukashenka to power, and the first parliamentary election (1995) were considered free and fair. Since then, Belarus has held three parliamentary (2000, 2004, 2008) and three presidential elections (2001, 2006, 2010), none of which met international standards for democratic elections.

The 2001 and 2004 elections were followed by protests of a few thousand people but died out quickly. Both the 2006 and 2010 elections were challenged by widespread protests, unprecedented each time for Belarus.

Russian elections present another interesting case study where electoral protests have a regional character – protests occur in connection with regional or municipal elections, but not after federal elections. Nation-wide protests have occurred in Russia for the past years outside the electoral cycle and in connection with socioeconomic issues. Thus, the case study examines the lack of protests after national elections notwithstanding deteriorating quality of elections and changing domestic and international factors.

### 4.1 Belarus

Lukashenka came to power through free and fair elections in 1994, gaining about 80 % of the votes in the second round against Prime Minister Kebich. Being the first presidential election, the environment was marked by a "fair degree of political openness" as the late creation of the post of president "had prevented the concentration of power and left room for a certain level of political and social pluralism" (Silitski 2005, 83-4). Lukashenka owed his popularity during the presidential race to the fact that he was a political outsider, to his post of the chairman of the parliamentary committee for corruption investigations and his anticorruption rhetoric, criticizing the government for deteriorating economy and living standards, and calling for closer cooperation with Russia (Potocki 2002; Silitski 2005). However, from the beginning the authoritarian nature of his regime became clear. Being an outsider and lacking the support of a political organization, Lukashenka relied solely on his public ratings, which declined shortly after his election due to economic conditions. He secured his power first through his personal

control over state administration, economy and media and later through his dominance over the legislature and the judiciary and his attacks on opposition party and civil society activities (Silitski 2005).

The first parliamentary election in 1995 was viewed as rather democratic. Lukashenka tried to manipulate the election by holding a parallel referendum on adopting Russian as an official language and returning to soviet-era symbols, thus appealing to nostalgic sentiments among the public. However, the newly elected parliament remained relatively independent and in 1995 the parliamentary opposition initiated Lukashenka's impeachment, albeit unsuccessfully. In response, in November 1996 Lukashenka pushed through a referendum to amend the 1994 constitution, though the referendum was found nonbinding by the Constitutional Court.

The European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) observers, among other international monitors, found the 1996 referendum neither free nor fair, while many international organizations had refused to observe the referendum due to the illegitimacy of the entire process (U.S. Department of State 1999). Most violations occurred during the pre-election and the early voting period, which accounted for one-third of the votes, as the opponents to the referendum were denied access to media, the names of early voters were not recorded, the text of the proposed constitution became available to voters seven days after the early vote had begun. Moreover, as the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) Chairman refused to verify the results, Lukashenka fired him though the effective Constitution vested this power in the Parliament (U.S. Department of State 1999). However, the referendum did not trigger mass protests: "[i]ndependent election observers recorded more than two thousand violations nationwide, but this sparked little public protest. Among the abuses was an early-voting procedure, inaccessible

to observers, that forced one-third of all eligible voters to cast their ballots in the two weeks preceding the day of the referendum—before many of them had even received the text of the proposed constitution" (Silitski 2005, 87).

The new constitution extended Lukashenka's term in office from expiring in 1999 to 2001, gave extensive powers to presidency, established a weak bicameral legislature, gave presidential decrees the power of law, transferred the power of appointing the CEC and the Constitutional Court members to the president, etc. (Silitski 2005). Lukashenka dissolved the elected parliament and appointed his loyalists to a newly created Chamber of Representatives (Nix 2008). Thus, the 1996 referendum completed the institutionalization of personalist authoritarian rule in Belarus (Silitski 2005, 88).

Three parliamentary elections have been held since the 1996 referendum (2000, 2004, 2008), none of which met international standards for democratic elections. Among the most problematic features of those elections have been the obstacles for opposition parties to field candidates and to campaign in an unlevel playing field, the lack of transparency at all stages of the electoral process, and abuse of the early voting procedure. The regime often uses the legal requirement for public organizations to have a non-residential address to deny registration or to close down opposition organizations. Participation in activities of non-registered organizations is criminally liable (OSCE/ODIHR 2011). Many parties are prevented from fielding their candidates as they fail to meet the requirement to have offices in the constituency where they want to field a candidate (OSCE/ODIHR 2008b). Overall, political parties play a marginal role in parliamentary elections and most candidates run as non-partisans. In 2004 and 2008 the opposition won no seats in the parliament, while independents, who are generally considered

pro-governmental, won most of the seats (98 and 102 out of 110 seats) and the rest of the seats went to two pro-governmental parties – the Communist Party and the Agrarian Party.

Except for the 2004 election, parliamentary elections have not gathered mass protests. The 2004 protest was rather directed against the results of a parallel constitutional referendum on lifting the presidential term limit, which "overshadowed the parliamentary elections, both in terms of the visibility of the respective campaigning, and in terms of the relative importance that political actors across the spectrum attached to the two events" (OSCE/ODIHR 2004d, 3). According to official results, the opposition won no seats in the parliament; however, Gallop exit polls showed that the opposition could have won as many as 40% of the seats (Silitski 2005) and International Republican Institute (IRI) polls showed the opposition would win 22 out of 110 seats if the votes were fairly counted and reported (Nix 2008). The referendum passed with 77 % approval; however, according to Gallup polls the referendum gained only 48.4% of the votes - less than the 50 % approval required to pass the amendment (Nix 2007). A few thousand opposition supporters protested the election, but the protest was quickly dispersed.

Lukashenka was re-elected three times (2001, 2006, 2010) gaining about 75 to 83 percent of the votes in the first round of elections with 83 to 93 percent turnout. In 2001 he won over united opposition candidate Hancharyk, who failed to gather large crowds to protest the election results. The incumbent proved to be a more charismatic and energetic leader than the united opposition candidate, who was pushed forward too late into the campaign, lacked a well organized campaign, was not favored by many democratic opposition forces and did not cooperate effectively with political parties, civil society and media (Potocki 2002, 148). Moreover, international factors were not in favor of the opposition. The West had cut off most of its links with Belarus and did not have much leverage on Belarusian authorities. Also, Russia's

“neutrality” worked against the opposition, as Russian media, while refraining from promoting Lukashenka’s candidacy, toned down its criticism of Lukashenka and did not give much coverage to the opposition (Potocki 2002, 49). The post-election protest had moderate intensity, as “efforts to protest the vote-rigging attracted only a few thousand protesters and fizzled out in two days” (Silitski 2005, 90).

In 2006 Lukashenka again won the election with a large margin over united opposition candidate former Hronda Province deputy-governor Alyaksandr Milinkevich of the United Democratic Forces of Belarus (UDF) and a less popular opposition candidate former rector of Belarusian State University Kazulin of the Belarusian Social Democratic Party. The official turnout was 92.3% and Lukashenka won in the first round with 83% of the votes. Milinkevich and Kazulin were given 6.1% and 2.2 % of the votes. The announcement of the results was protested by at least twenty-thousand opposition supporters on the election night “despite KGB threats to charge protesters with terrorism and press for the death penalty” (Silitski 2006b, 145). The protest lasted for several days until the number of participants dropped to a few hundreds. On March 24 the riot police broke up the tent city and arrested all residents. The following day Kazulin led a march of about 10,000 people, which was violently dispersed (Bunce and Wolchik 2011). However, the duration and scale of the protests were unprecedented for Belarus, explained largely by the opposition’s active electoral campaign and the ties it established with the anti-regime constituency and civil society organizations (Silitski 2006b).

The 2010 presidential election was held in a very different political environment that sets it apart from previous presidential elections. Having recognized the ineffectiveness of its isolation policy with respect to Belarus after the 2006 election and reevaluated geopolitical strategies after the 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict, the EU started soft diplomacy with Belarus in

2008, establishing economic, political and societal ties with Belarus. The EU offered Belarus four billion U.S. dollars in financial support if the regime held a democratic election in 2010 (Nice 2011). As a result of the EU-Belarus dialogue, the regime initiated political liberalization and made some electoral improvements, which are reflected in its democracy indicators. For example, the Freedom House (FH) Nations in Transition (NIT) ratings show that from 2008 to 2010 Belarus experienced small improvements in its ratings of electoral process, civil society, independent media, and national democratic governance. These numeric improvements were accounted by incremental liberalization of the political climate, release of political prisoners in February and August 2008, the authorities' initiation of a dialogue with opposition and civil society activists, the authorities' abstaining from enacting the criminal provision on prosecuting unauthorized civil society activities, the authorities' abstaining from censoring the internet and relaxing the control over media, as well as some improvements in NGO and electoral legislation (FH NIT 2009-2011). Though often Belarus and Russia have been compared for the similarities in the preemptive attacks on the opposition employed by the regimes, this time the pre-election period in Belarus was contrasted to Russian elections, as in Belarus opposition candidates were freely permitted to register, were given access to state-controlled media, and participated in a televised presidential debate albeit without the incumbent, the requirement to obtain a permit for public meetings was lifted, etc. (Nice 2011).

However, the election and its violent aftermath scattered any hopes for a democratic election. Lukashenka was announced to have won the race with 80% of the votes with 90% nationwide turnout. None of the opposition candidates received more than 2.5% of the votes. About 30,000 people, led by all opposition candidates except for one who was severely beaten on his way to the protest square, led protests against electoral fraud on the election night. The

turnout in protest was much higher than expected and the opposition lacked a clear plan of action. Special forces used an attempt by a small group to break into the parliament building (most likely a provocation, Padhol and Marples 2011, 12) to start a violent crackdown on protestors. Thousands were severely attacked and about six hundred people were arrested, including seven presidential candidates on the election night, followed by more assaults and arrests of political and civil society activists in the aftermath (Padhol and Marples 2011, 12).

### 4.1.1 Repression

Political repression has been a major tool for Lukashenka to secure the survival of his regime. Repression under Lukashenka has seen many forms, from forced disappearance to politically motivated imprisonments, harassment of political and civil society activists, control over the economy and media, narrowing down the space for NGO activities and routinely repressing peaceful protestors. Most importantly, Lukashenka has used "preemptive" attacks rather than sporadic reactions to political challenges.[38] Distinguishing between tactical preemption (directed against the opponents and the infrastructure of the opposition and civil society), institutional preemption (directed towards tightening the fundamental rules of the political game) and cultural preemption (directed towards manipulating public consciousness and memory against democracy, democratic ideas and forces, and the idea of regime change), Silitski (2006a) shows how Lukashenka gradually mastered the policy of preemption to perfection.

Lukashenka secured his reelections largely by preventing the emergence of any popular politician. In 1999, several potential political contenders for the 2001 presidential election either died or disappeared, including former minister of interior Zacharanka, and former CEC Chairman Hanchar. Lukashenka next turned to imprisonments of political opponents as a major

[38] Preemption is defined as "a strategy to combat the democratic contagion that is pursued in anticipation of political challenge, even when there is no immediate danger of a regime change" (Silitski 2006a, 6).

form of repression (Nix 2008). The scope and the range of repression extended during the years leading up to the 2006 presidential election, as Lukashenka took new preemptive measures including further restrictions on the freedom of assembly, imprisonment and harassment of political and civil society activists that could bring large crowds to the streets, closing down around a hundred NGOs, imposition of self-censorship on print media, and control over the education system, in order to prevent any scenario of color revolution (Silitski 2005).

The pre-election period of the 2010 presidential election was marked by a "relatively relaxed atmosphere and a promise from authorities to avoid harsh measures against the opposition, particularly compared to the 2006 election" (Carnegie Moscow Center 17 March 2011). Most importantly, the perception of the cost of participation in protests dropped due to those temporal improvements: "the cost of demonstrating your disagreement with the status quo dropped substantially over a period of time" (Silitski 2011). As Belarusian political analyst and scholar Alexei Pikulik mentioned in an interview, the regime's unprecedented violent repression of widespread mass protest on the election night was absolutely unexpected for anyone. The temporary political opening in the pre-election period was the very reason for the regime's violent reprisal of the protest and as Silitski (2011) put it, Lukashenka "let a hundred flowers bloom… to cut them all with a lawn mower."

While in 2010 the widespread post-election protest was largely driven by the perception of reduced costs of protest, in 2006 the post-election protest was a backlash effect of very high levels of repression prior to and during the election campaign. Belarus had its worst NIT democracy score in a year prior to the 2006 election – 6.71 on 1 (consolidated democracy) to 7 (consolidated autocracy) scale. On the other hand, a year prior to the 2010 election its democracy score improved slightly – dropping to 6.5 – the best democracy score for Belarus for the past

seven years. “The impressive size and persistence of the demonstrations [in 2006] … are evidence that increasing repression has radicalized Belarusian democrats to the point where a committed few are ready to engage in seemingly hopeless and illogical protest actions” (Silitski 2006b, 147). In contrast in 2010 “[o]ne reason behind the large number of people in the square was the relatively liberal (by Belarusian standards) election campaign, which dispelled the fear of the authorities and the fear of being involved in unsanctioned protest actions… Back in 2006, those in the Square were ready for any consequences (they were even told they would be shot), whereas in 2010, almost no one expected a violent dispersal of the rally” (Melyantsou 2011).

In spite of his highly repressive regime, Lukashenka was rather popular and remains quite popular (interview with Bunce) with 30% approval rating (interview with Pikulik). He has lost his legitimacy abroad but domestically he has preserved an image of a democratically election president in part due to state repression: “His preemptive attacks have prevented the rise of a credible and visible democratic alternative, and his tight hold on the media has successfully kept most of the public in the dark—either unaware of the massive abuses, or convinced that the regime would win even a clean election” (Silitski 2005, 95). Among other factors to explain Lukashenka’s popularity one should consider the social-oriented distribution model in Belarus, where 70% of the GDP is from the public sector, and around 65 % of employees are in the public sector. In the context of the social contract in Belarus, where people supply their loyalty to the regime in exchange of the flow of economic goods and benefits, there is little room for democratic opposition (interview with Pikulik).

### 4.1.2 Opposition Cohesion

Belarus has a very weak party system and it is difficult to determine if opposition weakness is the consequence or a contributor to the repressive regime and its survival. On one

hand, opposition parties were stronger in the early years of independence in Belarus related to a lower level of state repression but the situation changed starting 1996 (interview with Pikulik). As IRI Eurasia Regional Director Stephen Nix explained in an interview, under Lukashenka opposition parties were left with little space within which to operate, no access to electronic media, negative opposition coverage in media, no ability under Belarusian law to raise money, no assets, etc. Thus, it is very difficult for the opposition to have any recognition among the public and to get its message out. Also, opposition leaders are basically banned from state employment, their family members may lose jobs and get expelled from universities, and the penalties for participating in opposition activities is very high and obvious.

On the other hand, opposition weakness may be of its own making. As expert on Belarusian and postcommunist transitions Valerie Bunce explained in an interview, unlike opposition in Serbia under Milosevic who developed creative ways to deal with a highly repressive regime, Belarusian opposition has not been particularly good at responding to the obstacles and constraints imposed by the regime. Also, Belarusian opposition is financed externally and has little incentive to maximize electoral support; instead they have tried to attract the 20% - 25% of the constituency against Lukashenka on their side. Rather than addressing the needs of a broader public and staying accountable to them, opposition parties have often turned to external donors for financial support and advice. They have a choice to maximize either money flows from donors or public support, and they choose the first option which as they claim is much needed for their survival under a highly repressive regime (interview with Pikulik).

Belarusian opposition united for the 2001 and 2006 presidential elections, both times with the assistance of external actors – the OSCE, EU and United States (Marples 2009). The opposition also participated in the 2004 parliamentary elections with two coalitions – Five Plus,

which served as a foundation for establishing a larger coalition with a united opposition candidate leading up to the 2006 presidential election, and Democratic Centrist Coalition.

The difference between the level of post-election protests in 2001 and 2006 can be related to the difference in the strength of opposition coalitions. In 2001 the opposition had a hard time uniting around a single presidential candidate. “Many of the opposition’s best and brightest had been “disappeared,” imprisoned or driven into exile by the regime. Opposition political parties were weak, divided, underfunded, and unpopular” (Potocki 2002, 147). Still, inspired by the success of Serbian revolution, the opposition managed to unite around a single candidate – the Chairman of the Belarusian Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU) Hancharyk, albeit less than three weeks before the Election Day. His candidacy had some advantages – the non-partisan nature of his candidacy was expected to attract wider public, especially pro-western youth, he led the largest organization in the country, and enjoyed the Kremlin’s approval. His weaknesses became obvious during the campaign and in the post-election period. In contrast, the 2006 opposition coalition was broader and stronger than the unity in 2001; “[t]he UDM had a broader base than the coalition that supported Hancharyk, including political parties as diverse as the Party of Communists and the Popular Front, as well as one wing of the Social Democrats, the United Civic Party, youth groups and informal associations such as Charter 97. The UDM was also widely backed by the EU and the United States” (Marples 2009, 762).

In sharp contrast to 2001 and 2006, the opposition went to the 2010 election very divided, with nine alternative candidates besides Lukashenka on the ballot. Some opposition leaders argued for a boycott rather than participation in unfair elections that would only give legitimacy to Lukashenka (Padhol and Marples 2011, 5). In spite of recognizing the importance of opposition unity for organizing widespread protest after the elections and demand for the second

round, the lack of cooperation among the opposition candidates in 2010 is explained as a rational choice behavior since the united candidate would take the whole burden of post-election protest, would be politically eliminated by the regime, thus paving a way for the alternative candidates; "[t]herefore, each and every candidate chooses a rational strategy of competing amongst each other, i.e. the pool of the candidates, but not against Lukashenka" (Pikulik 2010, 7). Also, the EU-Belarus evolving relations for two years prior to the 2010 election, as "a move away from the Belarusian opposition, which the EU had formerly courted" (Padhol and Marples 2011, 3), impaired opposition unity. In 2006 the United States and EU policy was united as they were supporting the opposition and promoting democratic change in Belarus and the opposition challenged the election with a united candidate. As the EU and the United States started soft projects in Belarus, the regime became stronger and the in the absence of centralized support from the EU and the United States, the opposition parties chose to campaign separately in 2010 (interview with Nix).[39]

### 4.1.3 International Election Monitors

International election observers have openly criticized Belarusian elections. The three parliamentary elections since the 1996 constitutional referendum have been criticized for the blocking of opposition parties and public organizations from registration and impairing their participation in every stage of the electoral process. OSCE/ODIHR found both the 2004 and 2008 parliamentary elections to fall short of the OSCE commitments for democratic elections. None of the three re-elections of Lukashenka have been accepted by international observers as a result of a democratic electoral process. The presidential election of 2001 was monitored by a

[39] It has been argued that only hard projects – training opposition leaders, and civil society activists, and providing then with support and training them to make democratic change – may work for Belarus (interview with Nix).

limited International Election Observation Mission (IEOM), who found the "fundamental flaws in the electoral process" (OSCE/ODIHR 2001, 1). The report attributed many problems to the political situation in Belarus, such as excessive executive power, lack of checks and balances, blocking of opposition, intimidation of political and civil activists, media and domestic and international observers, lack of independent election administration body and a reliable election process at all stages, and abuse of the early voting process. Similar problems persisted in the 2006 presidential election, with new forms of repression employed against the opposition and repression of post-election protestors, which was strongly condemned by international monitors (OSCE/ODIHR 2006). Notwithstanding minimal electoral improvements prior to 2010, international monitors condemned both the election and the violent aftermath, noting that "Belarus has a considerable way to go in meeting its OSCE commitments for democratic elections. There was a lack of independence and impartiality of the election administration, an uneven playing field and a restrictive media environment, as well as continuous lack of transparency at key stages of the electoral process" (OSCE/ODIHR 2011, 1).

Though critical assessment of elections by international observers may have encouraged post-election protests in Belarus, the real impact of these reports either on opposition strategies or the public is not definite. First, international election observers' assessment reports have played little role in informing the general public of the election quality (interview with Pikulik). Post-election opinion polls show that many trust the election results notwithstanding serious problems enumerated in the election assessment reports. For example, an Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) poll after the fraudulent 2006 presidential election and the violent dispersal of protests, which were strongly condemned by international elections monitors, showed that 60% of respondents believed the country was heading in a right

direction (Potocki 2011, 53). An IRI poll a few months after the fraudulent 2010 election and its violent aftermath, criticized as unprecedented even for Belarus, showed that 69% of respondents were satisfied with the election result (Potocki 2011, 56).[40] Secondly, the study of Belarusian post-election protests reveals a pattern when large crowds gather on the election night as preliminary results are revealed and are quickly dispersed even before international monitors announce their verdict on the election (as in 2010) or if tolerated for a few days by the regime the protest gradually loses its participants and a smaller protest is left to face the riot police (as in 2006).

Other international actors have also shaped Belarusian politics. Referring to Levitski and Way (2010), Potocki explains the survival of Lukashenka's regime through low linkages to the West, low leverage of the West, and high organizational power of the regime (2011, 50). Prior to the 2006 election the West had minimal political and economic linkages to Belarus and hence no leverage on Belarusian authorities. At the same time, the organizational power of the state remained high, with continuous economic growth until 2005, mostly related to the flow of cheap energy and other forms of investment from Russia as well as the absence of strong domestic opposition. With the emergence of strains in the Belarus-Russia relations since 2006,[41] Belarusian economy and the social contract started to crumble. Growing linkages of Belarus to the EU and United States leading up to the 2010 election did not give the West much leverage. On the contrary, the regime improved its organizational power due to its engagement with the West as "the rapprochement helped the regime to offset the economic consequences of the 2007

[40] According to polls Lukashenka's approval was high both during and after the 2010 elections. Though Lukashenka's victory in 2010 with 80 % of the votes is judged as clearly inflated, two independent polls showed above 50% support for Lukashenka (Potocki 2011, 55-56).

[41] Russia and Belarus enjoyed close ties in the 1990s. However, under Putin's presidency Belarus was no longer considered an equal partner and the relations became uneasy in 2002 and further deteriorated in 2006 in connection with raising the price for gas exports to Belarus to a market price (Padhol and Marples 2011).

energy shock and produce impressive economic results the following year" (Potocki 2011, 56-57).

Thus, the role of international election observers' assessments of elections is less definite in the study of Belarusian elections. International monitors have openly and strongly criticized every election after the first presidential and parliamentary elections. However, the impact of election assessment reports on opposition strategies and the public is not very clear. What is more obvious in the study of Belarusian elections is the importance of external support of Belarusian opposition and society. Coordinated U.S. and EU assistance of the Belarusian opposition was essential for the opposition strength and unity leading up to the 2006 presidential elections and the opposition's ability to gather a large crowd in protest of electoral fraud. In contrast, the EU engagement with Belarusian authorities impaired opposition unity leading up to the 2010 presidential elections.

Overall, compared to other highly repressive regimes in the region such as Russia and Azerbaijan, Belarusian opposition and society have shown more activeness during post-election protests. A factor that sets Belarus apart from those countries is the extensive external support that Belarusian opposition has received from its immediate neighbors – the Baltic States, Ukraine to a less extent, and certainly Poland, as well as the West – which has greatly encouraged them to protest. Thus, Belarus may be well ahead of Russia and Azerbaijan in terms of prospects for regime change and democracy promotion (interview with an IRI expert).

Table 6: Disputed national elections and post-election protests in Belarus, 2000-2010

| Election date | Post-election protest | Presidential race? | Repression* | Opposition cohesion | Election endorsed by IEMs | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10/15/2000 | No | No | High | No | No | The first election under the 1996 Constitution, it resulted in a puppet parliament, with a few dissenting voices who formed the Respublica parliamentary group against Lukashenka. |
| 09/09/2001 | Partial | Yes | High | Partial | No | Lukashenka won over a weak united opposition candidate, dispersed small protests and further consolidated his authoritarian rule. |
| 10/17/2004 | No [a] | No | High | Partial | No | The election was overshadowed by a parallel constitutional referendum on lifting the presidential term limit and the opposition won no seats in the parliament. |
| 03/19/2006 | Yes/widespread | Yes | (Very) High | Yes | No | Lukashenka won over a united opposition candidate. Western powers reevaluated their isolation policy towards Belarus after the 2006 widely protested election and started engaging the regime in 2007-2010 establishing new links and more leverage on the regime, concurrent with temporal improvement in its democracy score. |
| 09/28/2008 | No | No | High | No | No | The opposition gained no seats in the parliament. |
| 12/19/2010 | Yes/widespread | Yes | Moderate | No | No | Lukashenka won over multiple opposition candidates. Widespread protests were suppressed, followed by imprisonments of opposition leaders and other human rights violations. |

Note: The first presidential (1994) and parliamentary (1995) elections are excluded as they were considered relatively free and fair. The table does not included national referendums (1995, 1996, 2004). * The evaluation of the level of repression during the pre-election period is based on Gibney Political Terror Scale (PTS) a year prior to the election year, which is also used in the quantitative analysis in the previous chapter, the Freedom House Freedom in the World ratings, as well as information obtained during interviews and secondary research on the situation leading up to the election.
[a] The election was followed by a low-intensity protest but it was directed more against the results of the constitutional referendum on lifting the presidential term limit.

**4.2 Russia**

During Yeltsin's years of presidency (1991-2000), the Russian Federation suffered from a weak federal government, the main problems being inconsistent compliance with and noncompliance with federal laws in many regions, rapid empowerment of regional elites in the late 1990s, and financial dependence of the government on business oligarchs (Kynev 2011, 512). Under Putin's leadership, Russia has moved away from Yeltsin's more democratic and liberal Russia to "overmanaged democracy"[42] characterized by highly centralized state power in the executive, narrow space for competition in formal institutions of democracy, and frequent functional replacement of formal institutions of democracy by substitutes (Petrov et al 2010).

Since 2000 and more so since 2004, the Kremlin has "managed" elections by introducing such restrictive measures as raising the threshold of proportional race from 5% to 7% to enter the Duma, enhancing the control of the CEC, replacing direct elections for heads of regions by presidential appointees, outlawing regional parties, enhancing Kremlin control over party finance through informal control and state financing for parties, introducing a very strict party and election legislation, and discretionarily using this legislation in the registration phase of elections to filter unwanted candidates, introducing new restrictions on NGO activities, etc. For example, as a result of restrictive party legislation the number of parties in Russia fell from 44 in 2003 to 7 in 2011, having left no active liberal opposition party in the system and having regularly rejected registration of opposition parties. Other manipulations with electoral rules that have made

[42] It is characterized by "highly centralized state authority concentrated in the executive branch; formal institutions of democracy, including room for at least some candidates to oppose incumbent authorities on the ballot in elections to powerful posts; and the systematic gutting of these institutions and their frequent functional replacement by substitutions—often either outside the constitutional framework or in violation of the spirit of the constitution—that are created by and highly dependent on central authorities. What distinguishes overmanaged democracy from more run-of-the-mill "managed democracy" are its higher degree of centralization, its narrower space for genuine political competition, and the central role of substitution" (Hale et al. 2010, 3).

elections more “manageable” include removing the 50 % minimum voter turnout level for an election to be considered valid and thus making ineffective election boycott, eliminating the “against all” option on the ballot and thus disenfranchising supporters of non-registered candidates, using nonstandard voting procedures for vote falsification such as early voting and off-polling station voting, etc.

Since its independence, Russian has held five State Duma elections and four presidential elections, all manipulated by the regime, and though the quality of elections has gradually worsened, none of them have been challenged by post-election protests. Currently, there are only seven parties in Russia, four of them represented in the Duma. It would be fair to say that liberal opposition does not exist in Russia. As Russian scholar and expert at Golos election monitoring organization Alexander Kynev explained in an interview, among registered parties only Yabloko and Communists may be considered genuinely oppositional. However, Yabloko has been only a fictive party for many years. It is not represented in the Duma and participates only in regional elections with few candidates close to local election administration bodies. Communists have lost their power in the Duma and relatively good representation in the regions. Instead, the Kremlin has been a supporter of “loyal opposition” parties, such as Just Russia and Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), both represented in the Duma, and Right Cause. The registration of opposition parties has been repeatedly refused,[43] the latest example being the denial in registration of the People’s Freedom Party (PARNAS) in June 2011. In addition, parties in the system are heavily dependent on Kremlin. Because the system makes it virtually impossible for truly independent opposition parties to exist in the political playing field, people

[43] For the past four years about ten parties have been refused registration in Russia and recently the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the 2007 Russian Supreme Court decision, which cancelled the registration of the Republican Party of Russia – one of the founding members of PARNAS – is illegal.

have been “losing faith in the parties that are trying to comprise an opposition that still accepts the existing system” (Petrov et al 2010, 23).

The first multiparty elections in the Russian Federation were held in September 1993, amidst political and constitutional crisis, then president Yeltsin dissolved the old parliament and announced new parliamentary elections in less than three months. The elections resulted in a very diverse Duma, representing many parties and independents, with eight parties/blocs elected to the Duma through proportional elections rather accurately reflecting the political reality in the country. The same is true about the 1995 Duma, though only four parties passed the 5% threshold in the proportional race to enter the Duma (Kynev 2011, 422, 429). The Communist Party took the lead, winning 22.1% of the votes in the proportional race and in total 157 out of 450 seats. LDPR and pro-government Our Home-Russia followed with 11.2 % and 10.1 % of the votes and in total gained respectively 51 and 55 seats. Yabloko, representing the liberal opposition, passed the 5% threshold and gained in total 45 seats.

In 1996 Yeltsin was reelected in a very close race. In the first round Yeltsin gained 35.3 % of the votes vs. 32 % of the votes for Communist presidential candidate Zyuganov. Yeltsin won the runoff with 53.8% of the vote. Before the second round, Yeltsin gained the support of the voters for the third-place candidate in the first round – Lebed – by giving him a position in Kremlin. Also, two other candidates from the first round – Yavlinski and Zherenovski – contributed to Yeltsin’s victory by calling upon their supporters not to vote for the Communist candidate in the runoff (Kynev 2011). Zyuganov accepted Yeltsin’s victory. There were manipulations in favor of Yeltsin in the first round in several regions, but there were fewer problems in the second round which, according to expert analysis, could not have affected the election results. Manipulations were also performed in favor of Zyuganov (Kynev 2011, 354).

The political atmosphere changed rapidly leading up to the 1999 Duma elections. First, unlike the 1996 presidential election, which can be viewed as "a struggle of political leaders teamed against the "Communist threat", the 1999 election was "rather a struggle of personalities to guarantee their own presence on the political summit during the next four years" (OSCE/ODIHR 2000a, 9). Secondly, many analysts believed that the Duma election was a contest for the 2000 presidential election and the main competition evolved between two newly created pro-governmental movements – the pro-Kremlin Interregional Movement Unity (Medved), led by then Minister of Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu, and its main competitor Fatherland-All Russia Bloc (Otechestvo-Vsya Rosia), led by major of Moscow Luzhkov and former PM Primakov – rather than between the party of power and the opposition. The regime heavily relied on the rejection or annulment of registration of candidates to block opposition parties. A disqualification of a candidate in the top three positions of a party list resulted in a disqualification of the entire party list. For example, Zhirinovski's LDPR and the Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs were victims of this legislation.

Kremlin's power base Unity won 23.32% of the votes (73 seats), coming only second to the Communists who gained 24.29 % of the votes (113 seats). Fatherland-All Russia gained 13.33% of the vote (66 seats). The liberal opposition did not significantly improve its share of seats in the Duma. The newly established liberal opposition party Union of Right Forces (SPS) entered the Duma with 29 seats, and Yabloko reduced the number of its seats from 45 to 20.

The 1999 Duma election was primarily used by the Kremlin to eliminate potential presidential contenders – powerful Moscow mayor Luzhkov and former Prime Minister Primakov of the Fatherland-All Russia bloc – and to marginalize liberal opposition in order to secure the election of its hand-picked presidential successor Putin. Yeltsin appointed Putin Prime

Minister and announced him his chosen successor for president on the same day he announced the Duma elections. As another strategic move by the Kremlin, Yeltsin resigned on December 31, 1999, which made Putin the acting president until the presidential election with all the advantages of incumbency. It also pushed forward the date of the election from July 4 to March 26, 2000, leaving little time for other political forces to prepare for the campaign. These factors, together with high public approval for Putin's strong-hand handling of the Chechnya war at the end of 1999, made the election outcome predetermined. An IRI pre-presidential election report noted that political parties were so sure that Putin would win that they only ran minimal campaigns, if any (IRI 2000, 20).

Putin won in the first round with 52.94 % of the vote. Communist Zyuganov came in second with 29.2% of the vote. The liberal opposition was weak and suffered from internal disagreements, and failed to contest the presidential race with a united candidate. The most prominent leader of liberal opposition Yavlinsky received only 5.84% of the vote and SPS was highly divided on the choice of supporting a presidential candidate and in the end it officially supported Putin's candidacy. Though Putin's relative popularity to Zyuganov was clear in the pre-election public ratings, his victory in the first round with a narrow margin was questioned; nevertheless, there were no protests on the streets against allegations of vote falsifications.

Under Putin's presidency, the pro-presidential United Russia party was created in 2001 with the merger of Unity and Fatherland-All Russia, which replaced the Communist Party as the largest party in the Duma. At the same time, two other pro-presidential parties were created – People's Party and Rodian (Homland) bloc. Thus, leading up to the 2003 Duma election the pro-governmental parties had strengthened their stance, while the opposition was weak and divided. "The two liberal reformist opposition parties in the Duma - Yabloko and SPS – were facing a

decline in public support and the election became a crucial test of whether they would overcome the 5 % threshold (OSCE/ODIHR 2004a, 6).

Putin's United Russia came first gaining one less than a half of the seats in the Duma. Neither Yabloko nor SPS passed the 5% threshold in the national proportional elections and gained only respectively 4 and 3 seats from single-member constituencies, thus losing any meaningful presence in the Duma. The election was marked by several major problems. Besides the extensive abuse of administrative resources in favor of United Russia as well as biased media coverage, which were observed to different extents in all previous elections, new forms of manipulations were used in the 2003 campaign. A few weeks before the election, business tycoon Mikhail Khodofkovsky – a donor of several opposition parties and public associations, including Communists, Yabloko, and SPS – was arrested, which was a major attack on opposition. Also, the problem of non-registration or de-registration of popular candidates became pervasive in this election (Kynev 2011, 574).

The 2004 presidential election was marked by a very low-key campaign. After their defeat in the 2003 Duma election, opposition parties were largely "preoccupied with the consequences of a loss of a federal parliamentary presence or a weakened party machinery" (IEOM 2004, 1). Thus, the leaders of all leading political parties, other than the United Russia, refused to participate in the elections. Among six candidates on the ballot, including Putin, two were nominated by parties in the Duma but were not the leading candidates of those parties, and one was a candidate of a small extra-parliamentary party. SPS came very weak after the 2003 parliamentary elections and all its five co-chairmen resigned. Yabloko did not participate in the elections and refused to support any candidate (Kynev 2011, 672). Putin himself was registered as an independent candidate to maximize his margin of victory and did not actively participate in

the campaign. Instead, the government's task this time was to guarantee high turnout (Kynev 2011, 579-80).

Putin was reelected with 71.31% of the vote, which was a significant improvement compared to his victory in 2000 with 52.94% of the vote. The election results were marked by implausibly high turnout in several territories with implausibly high margins of victory for Putin (IEOM 2004, 28). For example, in several territories the turnout was 99.9% with 98.6% of the vote for Putin; in two North Caucasus republics the overall official turnout was 98.2% and 98%, with 96.2% and 96.5% of the vote for Putin. In addition, international election observers pointed to other serious electoral problems – lack of vibrant political discourse and meaningful political pluralism, biased and state-controlled media, hindering at least one candidate to campaign freely, new registration requirements favoring parliamentary parties and blocs, election day problems of open or group voting, followed by problems during vote count and tabulation (IEOM 2004).

The 2007 Duma election was held for the first time under fully proportional system, with an increased 7% threshold to enter the parliament. Also, President Putin participated in the election heading his United Russia party list without stepping down from his office. None of the parties representing liberal democratic opposition passed the 7% threshold to take seats in the Duma, while Putin's United Russia received an unprecedented 64.3% of the votes, which translated into 70% of the seats for United Russia. The local election monitoring organization Golos criticized the election for the "campaign of unprecedented pressure on the voters" and reported a receipt of over 3,000 complaints of election abuse (ABC News 3 December 2007). The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) also denounced the elections as "not fair." Besides persistence of familiar forms of election manipulation, some new and intensified tendencies, like widespread pressure on

people to participate in the election, use of police forces to hinder opposition campaign, and more massive vote falsifications marred the 2007 election (Kynev 2011, 582). According to statistical analysis, the effect of compulsory voting and vote falsifications made up 13.8 million votes or 8.7% increase in the margin of victory for United Russia which gave the party an additional 37 seats in the Duma and over two-thirds majority (Kynev 2011, 583).

The 2008 electoral campaign was the least competitive for presidential elections in Russia (Kynev 2011, 587). One of the main questions in the months preceding the 2008 election was whether Putin would run for a third term, until he officially chose Dmitry Medvedev as his successor. The elections were criticized even before the Election Day by Amnesty International for the lack of real political debate or viable opposition due to the government's repression of media and opposition. The opposition was prevented from freely contending the election, including through refusing registration of opposition candidates on different discretionary grounds or disqualifying registered candidates before the election. For example, the former World Chess Champion Garry Kasparov was refused a congress venue and did not meet the deadline for nomination due to restrictions on his ability to campaign. Opposition leader Boris Nemtsov (SPS) withdrew his candidacy in support of former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov's candidacy, who was disqualified and fell out of the race due to alleged problems with signatures collected for his candidacy (Bruce 2008, 3). Yavlinski of Yabloko supported the candidacy of Bukovsky, who in the end did not manage to meet the requirements for registration. In contrast, Kremlin allowed the registration of little known Andrey Bogdanov to campaign as a liberal opposition candidate and "breezed through the verification of his 2 million signatures, a quantity over twenty times the 89,780 votes his party got in the 2007 Duma elections" (Petrov et al 2010, 8).

The turnout was 69.8 % with 70.3% of the votes for Medvedev. According to statistical analysis, the effect of manipulations – pressures to participate in elections and direct vote falsifications in favor of Medvedev – was 14.8 million votes, which increased the turnout by 13.8% and the margin of victory by 7.3% (Kynev 2011, 589).

### 4.2.1 Lack of Protests

Electoral protests in Russia have a local character – they occur in connection with regional or municipal elections or when the rights of certain groups of people are violated. In general the lack of protests after national elections in Russia may be connected to the fact that elections do not determine who is in power. Political scientist Nikolay Petrov (Carnegie Moscow Center) argued in an interview that the State Duma and presidential elections are political shows and you do not expect protests after elections just like you do not expect protests after the Eurovision Song Contest. Golos Deputy Executive Director Grigory Melkonyants explained in an interview that people behave rationally and protest after meaningful elections. For example, there is often high political activism after mayoral elections when there is real competition. During recent mayoral elections in the city of Zhukovski in Moscow region, the opposition candidate won the election but the electoral commission gave the victory to another candidate. For a few months people protested the election results, though with little success. While federal elections are maximally controlled by the Kremlin, regional and municipal elections are more competitive, the candidates represent the local elite and are better organized, and it is logistically easier and less risky to hold protests locally (interview with Kynev).

The finding in the quantitative analysis that socioeconomic factors do not significantly impact the occurrence of post-election protests has been questioned by Russian scholars. However, socioeconomic factors have been important during *regional* elections and nation-wide

protests *outside* the electoral cycle and their effect is less obvious during national elections. For example, the protests after the March 2011 city of Berdsk elections were largely motivated with and emboldened by socioeconomic demands. In another instance, in 2005 the authorities announced about replacing free utilities and free transportation for pensioners with monetary payments. It was followed by mass protests in at least 80 of Russia's 89 regions, which made the authorities give serious concessions. According to Levada Center polls, about a quarter of Russians planned to join the protests (Petrov et al 2010). In response to authorities' handling of financial crisis, there were large-scale socioeconomic protests throughout Russia in 2009 and 2010. Kaliningrad protest of January 2010, triggered by proposed transportation tax hikes, was the largest with 10,000 participants, which is a great turnout for a city of only 400,000 people (Moscow Times 9 February 2010).

Russian scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center Nikolay Petrov explained in an interview that under Yeltsin there was a so called "social contract" when the authorities were not intervening in the private sphere and were allowing for the fast growth of personal income and well-being and citizens in exchange were not intervening in what was considered the internal matters of the authorities, including elections. Now this period of political apathy is over and political activism is growing, especially in regional elections, conditioned by socioeconomic hardships. Thus, authorities have become cautious about socioeconomic protests, and have shown willingness to meet their demands to prevent such discontent from developing into street protests. For example, authorities are monitoring social networks and if they observe a cause for social tensions they take steps to prevent the spillover of tensions "from on-line to off-line" (interview with Melkonyants). In addition, the Kremlin has been taking care of growing dissatisfaction with socioeconomic conditions by targeting two groups before and during

elections. First, retired pensioners are the main support base for the Kremlin and they actively participate in elections. In fact, the authorities are not interested in high turnout during elections as their basic support is connected with 30 % or 40 % or even lower turnout. Additional voters, especially young voters may be dangerous for the Kremlin. The government has raised retirement pensions even in during economic crises. During Moscow interviews, a retired university professor and scientist criticized the Kremlin's populist ways of raising and leveling pensions with little credit given to the level of education, years of work experience and level of position. The authorities also have used economic leverage on budgetary workers, who can be controlled by their immediate supervisors – teachers, health care workers, etc. For examples, teachers were the main target group in the process of early voting, which is no longer active but has been replaced by voting outside polling stations. For example, in recent regional elections in Tambov the share of those who voted outside polling stations was up to 30 %, and it is almost impossible to control this voting. In the 2009 Sochi mayoral elections the percentage of off-polling station voters was 37% (Petrov et al 2010).

Thus the Russian case study largely supports the finding against the relevance of socioeconomic conditions or the perception of those conditions for protests after national level elections and more importantly it helps explain why socioeconomic factors do not play a significant role during national level elections in a country where they do seem to matter outside the electoral cycle or during regional elections. One of the main explanations is that the Russian public prioritizes political and socioeconomic stability which the current regime has delivered and is averse to threats to the strength of the political regime (Matovski 2011). Secondly, in big cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg with abundance of opportunities people do not relate their wellbeing with election outcomes (interviews with Petrov and Melkonyants).

The lack of protests after national elections is also connected to weak civil society, which is “fragmentary and divided across both horizontal and vertical sections of the population” (Carnegie Moscow Center 26 May 2010) and weak links between political parties and civil society. For example, the 2005 nation-wide protests against removing free transportation privileges started as spontaneous and local street protests without any leadership from political parties, and it was only later on when political parties joined the protests (Pertov et al, 2010, 23).

The legislation on the right to assembly is another hindering factor for post-election protests in Russia. Protests need to be preapproved by local authorities. The authorities may approve the request for assembly if they do not see any direct threat. For example they approved the demonstration by PARNAS against refusal to get registration in June 2011 to be able to contest in the 2012 Duma elections. But closer to the elections, it gets very difficult to organize sanctioned demonstrations and almost impossible after elections (interview with Melkonyants).

### 4.2.2 Repression

Russian authorities have often used preemptive attacks on opposition identified in the Belarusian case. The study of Russian elections illustrates how high and consistent state repression has prevented the occurrence of post-election protests. Like Lukashenka’s regime, Putin has largely relied on repressive tactics directed towards preventing acts of protests. But unlike Belarus, the level of state repression has been consistent in Russia. The consistently high level of state repression in Russia is clearly captured in the PTS used in the quantitative analysis to measure state repression. For the period 1990-2009 (from the starting year of the quantitative analysis to the latest available score), Russia with an average 4 PTS score has had the highest level of state repression not only among all the former Soviet states but also compared to all the African and Latin American countries included in the mini-case studies in Chapter 6. Moreover,

the level of repression has been consistent in Russia with a stable 4 PTS score since 2001, indicating that political imprisonments have expanded to large numbers of the population, murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life, and that in spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas (Wood and Gibney 2010, 373).

The preemption of electoral protests in Russia has been mainly achieved by eliminating potential strong candidates from the political playing field, discrediting and marginalizing protest organizers, and by intimidating potential participants of protests (Petrov et al 2010, 12). Another major tactic has been intimidation of media and businessmen. For example, independent television channel NTV that used to support opposition candidates was intimidated through financial pressure and its nationwide broadcasting was threatened. Independent businessmen have been intimidated, sometimes through politically motivated criminal investigations, and prevented from offering unsanctioned support to the opposition (Kynev 2011).

### 4.2.3 Opposition Cohesion

One of the main features of Russian elections, in contrast to other former Soviet republics that underwent color revolutions, is the failure of a liberal opposition to coalesce before elections. Consistent with the finding of statistical analysis, it can be argued that one of the main reasons for the lack of post-election protests in Russia has been weak and divided liberal opposition. For example, both 1999 and 2000 elections represented a real chance for liberal opposition to contest the elections with a united candidate (OSCE/ODIHR 2000b, 32). But they failed to do so. In fact, SPS officially supported Putin claiming that it shared the program proposed by Putin, instead of supporting the candidacy of its leader Titov or uniting with Yabloko.

According to Russian political analysis, ideological differences among opposition parties play only a marginal role in their strategies not to cooperate, although it would be difficult for parties with extremely different political programs to cooperate as they would lose their electoral base (interviews with Petrov and Melkonyants). The lack of cooperation is better explained by the dependence of political parties on the Kremlin. Because of lack of separation between business and authorities in Russia, it is impossible for any political party to get financial support if the authorities do not allow businessmen to support them. To a certain extent the Kremlin orchestrates their activism, including their strategies not to cooperate. Under Kremlin's strong control, these parties have no incentive to cooperate against Kremlin's will unless they are ready to lose their financial support (interview with Petrov). Moreover, presidential elections in Russia have become merely a channel for political forces to demonstrate their political status. On one side, the Kremlin is interested in providing nominal competition by allowing certain candidates to run for the presidency; on the other hand, it is a unique opportunity for a political party to show its presence on the political stage (interview with Petrov).

The "Communist factor," especially in the 1990s and the fear of the Communist come-back, has also undermined possibilities of opposition cooperation. The main competition during the five presidential elections since 1991 has been between the Kremlin's and Communist party candidates. The runner-up in all five presidential elections has been the candidate of the Communist Party (Nikolai Ryzhkov in 1991, Gennady Zyuganov in 1996, 2000, and 2008, and Nikolay Kharitonov in 2004) and except for Alexander Lebed in 1996 other contestants received less than 10% of the votes. The Communist Party has also been the main contender during the past five parliamentary elections, gaining 35% of seats in 1995, and 25% of seats in 1999 and coming second to United Russia with 11.5% of seats in 2003 and 12.7% of seats in 2007. On one

hand, liberal opposition has been reluctant to unite with the Communist Party against the Kremlin's party or presidential candidate. On the other hand, the opposition has often taken the side of Kremlin's candidate to prevent the Communist come-back, as in 1996, characterized as a "struggle of political leaders teamed against the Communist threat" (OSCE/ODIHR 2000a, 9) or in 2000 when the Communist Party did not have a real chance to demand a second round as it would not get the support of the third-place candidate from liberal opposition party Yabloko, and the SPS leadership had given their support to Putin before the elections.

However, in practice cooperation among opposition parties is possible in Russia. A Yabloko - SPS coalition paid off in the 2005 Moscow municipal. Similar efforts of cooperation were made ahead of the 2007 parliamentary elections but without any success (RiaNovosti 16 December 2006). The latest effort of opposition cooperation is the creation of PARNAS by leaders of four political movements in Russia – Kasyanov-Nemtsov-Ryzhkov-Milov, with a purpose to represent liberal forces in the 2011 Duma and 2012 presidential elections. According to Levada Center polls, the party could win 20% of the votes in national elections. However, in June its application for registration was denied by the Russian Justice Ministry due to alleged problems with signatures collected for party registration.

### 4.2.4 International Elections Monitors

International monitors played an important role in reforming the electoral framework and administration in Russia in the 1990s when Russia was more open to reform and was more susceptible to conditionality mechanisms and financial assistance by international organizations. International election monitors were more inclined to give Russia "the benefit of doubt and to encourage the transition despite difficulties" and gave rather positive assessments of the elections in the 1990s and the 2000 presidential election (Kelley 2012, 319-20). In the 1990s, international

monitors were hesitant to criticize Russian elections partly because of the fear of the Communist come-back and their concerns were not groundless.[44]

IRI positively assessed both the 1993 Duma election, calling it a "significant, positive step forward in Russia's democratic transition that affirmed a commitment to the democratic process" (IRI 1994, 2) and the 1995 Duma election, having observed no "systematic or deliberate misconduct that would call into question the basic integrity of the process" (IRI 1996, 1). Similarly, international election monitors highly praised the 1999 Duma election, even noting that it "marked the conclusion of a transitional period forged by President Yeltsin since 1991" (OSCE/ODIHR 2000a, 1). International election monitors praised the 2000 presidential election, concluding that it marked "further progress for the consolidation of democratic elections in the Russian Federation" (IEOM 2000) and that it represented the will of people and was "free" but not "as fair as we would have liked to see it happen" (PACE 2000) notwithstanding serious problems mentioned in the election assessment reports.

International monitors became more critical in their assessments of Russian elections in the 2000s but had little leverage on either political forces or the public opinion. A major problem of international election monitoring has become disagreements in assessments by different observation missions. As the relationships between the OSCE and Russia have shown, problems may also arise within the same organization. For example, the OSCE/ODIHR faced attacks not only by Russian authorities but also from "certain sectors of … OSCE Parliamentary Assembly" (Bruce 2008, 2). Russian authorities have hindered election observation by ODIHR and have

[44] There were rumors about postponing or cancelling the 1996 presidential elections. Given the success of the Communists in the Duma election and Yeltsin's low ratings, it was highly likely for the Communist candidate to win the race in June 1996. In March 1996 Yeltsin considered closing down the CPRF, dissolving the Duma, and delaying the presidential elections for two years, but he was persuaded not to act unconstitutionally (Kynev 2011, 350). In April 1996 major bankers and businessmen, concerned with possible instability, tried to make a deal between Yeltsin and Zyuganov – to postpone the presidential election and instead appoint Zyuganov the Prime Minster. When deal failed they directed their efforts towards an aggressive campaign for Yeltsin (Kynev 2011).

worked through certain OSCE structures to impair the work of long-term election observation. For example, for the past years certain sessions of the OSCE PA have shown that it shares Russian authorities' goal to downgrade ODIHR's long-term election missions and to take the lead in OSCE election observation missions, which became obvious in 2007 when the OSCE PA "showed absolutely no solidarity with ODIHR and observed the elections independently" as ODIHR had to refuse election observation because of limitations imposed by Russian authorities that were not conducive to the organization's mission (Bruce 2008, p5). In 2008 OSCE PA joined ODIHR refusing to monitor the presidential election due to "restrictions" on their activities (Bruce 2008, 8; RT 7 February 2008). However, this time PACE accepted the invitation to monitor the election and concluded that though restrictions on registration of candidates put into question the degree of how free the elections was and that the unlevel playing field put into question the fairness of the election, "even if those concerns had been addressed, the outcome of the vote … would have been the same" (PACE 2008).

Overall, the Russian public has developed skepticism about the election assessment reports by international monitors (interview with Petrov). This attitude can be attributed to at least three factors – first, lenient assessments of bad elections in the 1990s, secondly, presence of different election observers and discrepancies in their reports, and thirdly, international monitors' reports lose their significance when the elections themselves are not considered meaningful by the public (interview with Petrov).

Table 7: National elections in Russia, 1993-2008

| Election date | Post-election protest | Presidential race? | Repression* | Opposition cohesion | Election endorsed by IEMs | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1993 | No | No | Moderate | No | Yes | The first multiparty election in the Russian Federation, it resulted in a diverse Duma, no change in the civil liberties and political rights conditions. |
| 1995 | No | No | Moderate | No | Yes | The Communists took the lead in a diverse State Duma, no change in the civil liberties and political rights conditions. |
| 1996 | No | Yes | Moderate | No | Yes | Yeltsin won a close race over the Communist candidate as the liberal opposition aligned with him after the first round against the Communist candidate, no change in the civil liberties and political rights conditions. |
| 1999 | No | No | High | No | Yes | Primarily a struggle between two pro-governmental parties, it served as a primary election for the 2000 presidential election, Kremlin's power base Unity came second to the Communists. The liberal opposition did not improve its power. Deterioration in political rights. |
| 2000 | No | Yes | High | No | Yes | Putin won in a narrow race in the first round amidst allegations of vote falsifications. Gradually narrowed down the political playing field, consolidated his power through concentration and centralization of power. |
| 2003 | No | No | High | No | No | The liberal opposition did not pass the national proportional race threshold to the State Duma. The Kremlin's United Russia consolidated its power, deteriorations in political rights followed. |
| 2004 | No | Yes | High | No | No | Putin was reelected virtually uncontested, further consolidated his authoritarian rule. |
| 2007 | No | No | High | No | No | The liberal opposition was left with no seats in the State Duma while the United Russia took 70% of the seats. |
| 2008 | No | yes | High | No | Partial | Putin's hand-picked successor Medvedev won the election, facing no meaningful competition. Intensification in the authoritarian nature of the regime. |

Note: * To evaluate the level of repression during the pre-election period, Gibney Political Terror Scale (PTS) a year prior to the election year, which is also used in the quantitative analysis in the previous chapter, Freedom House Freedom in the Word ratings, as well as information obtained during interviews and secondary research on the situation leading up to the election are used here.

### 4.3 Conclusion

The comparison of Belarusian and Russian elections is most interesting for the effect of state repression on the occurrence of post-election protests. The highly repressive regime in Russia, especially under Putin, has prevented electoral protests. The lack of protests in Russia can also be attributed to a lack of opposition cooperation and cohesion, lenient international election assessment reports in the 1990s and in 2000, more critical international assessment of elections after 2000 but a lack of trust by the populace in these organizations, and the public aversion to political and socioeconomic shocks.

Variations in the level of repression in Belarus have triggered some widespread protests. First, the level of repression increased gradually under Lukashenka and intensified leading up to the 2006 election with a new scope and a wider range of repression, which ultimately backfired and triggered widespread protests led by united opposition against the fraudulent election in 2006. The regime has remained highly repressive but for two years leading up to the 2010 election experienced temporary thawing which reduced the perception of the cost of participation in protests, and in its turn encouraged unprecedented widespread protest against the fraudulent election in 2010. All these nuances of the effect of repression on post-election protests reinforce the findings of the statistical analysis in the previous chapter. Belarusian elections also illustrate that opposition cohesion is an important but not a necessary factor for the occurrence of widespread post-election protests as experienced in 2010.

# CHAPTER FIVE

## Post-election Protests in Eurasia – Armenia and Georgia

The present chapter compares elections and post-election protests in Georgia and Armenia. Georgia is a very interesting case study of post-election protests for the comparison and contrast of its 2003 parliamentary election to the 2008 elections. In both years the opposition alleged electoral fraud and called for mass protests but the domestic and international political environment of those elections differed significantly. While in 2003 mass mobilization led to regime transition, similar attempts by an even larger crowd in 2008 failed.

Armenia is another useful study of post-election protests, with serious manipulations of every election to date except for the founding election, three of which have been challenged by widespread protests. Since its independence in September 1991 from the Soviet Union, Armenia has held four regular and one extraordinary presidential election (1991, 1996, 1998, 2003, 2008) and four regular parliamentary elections (1995, 1999, 2003, 2007). Unlike Georgia, Armenia never experienced a color revolution in spite of more widespread post-election protests. The two countries share many political, socioeconomic and cultural similarities, including a similar Soviet legacy, involvement in unresolved territorial conflicts, presidential system of government and personalist rule, moderate level of repression, weak opposition parties established around personalities rather than distinguishable political platform and ideology, popular mobilization after disputed elections primarily as an expression of popular discontent against the incumbents rather than strong support for the opposition, etc. The analysis of Armenian and Georgian elections helps to understand the effect of key explanatory variables on the occurrence of post-

election protests, especially opposition unity and international election monitors' assessment of elections, as well as to distinguish between the effect of those variables on the occurrence and the success of protests. Table 8 following the Armenian case study and Table 9 following the Georgian case study summarize disputed elections in each of those two countries, post-election protests, key explanatory variables, and the outcome of those elections/protests. Table 10 at the end of this chapter summarizes the main arguments pertaining to the effects of the protest's cost and likelihood of success, as well as the type of election on the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections in the four postcommunist case studies.

### 5.1 Armenia

In spite of a promising start of political reform in the early 1990s, Armenia deviated from its path to democracy and has experienced seriously flawed elections, except for the founding presidential election, and increasing authoritarian features of governance. The first presidential election in 1991 brought Levon Ter-Petrosyan of Armenian Pan-National Movement (ANM)[45] to power. The election was viewed as free and fair.

Local and international observers assessed the first parliamentary election in 1995 as "generally free, but not fair" (U.S. Department of State 1995). The main concerns included the dominance of the ruling party in electoral commissions, suspension of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) party a year prior to the elections, denial in registration of several opposition parties and many opposition candidates, lack of fair media coverage, outdated voter lists, occasional voter intimidation, poor ballot security as well as lack of transparency on

[45] ANM has its origins in the national independence movement of the late 1980s. In 1988 the Karabakh Committee was established by political dissidents to support the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh enclave in the Azerbaijani SSR with Armenia. The ANM was founded by the Karabakh Committee in June 1988 and in the May 1990 elections to the Congress of People's Deputies of Armenian SSR, many party members obtained seats (59 out of 259) as independents and the party became the main political force in Armenia (WRITENET 17 March 1997).

the Election Day and during vote count and tabulation. As a result of election manipulations, the ruling Republic bloc, dominated by ANM, won about 80% of the seats in the parliament (U.S. Department of State 1995). But no mass protests followed. As the leader of the main opposition party at the time National Democratic Union (NDU) Vazgen Manukyan[46] explained in an interview, the opposition was taken by surprise.

The second presidential election was held in 1996 in a very different political environment. Manukyan of NDU became the united opposition candidate against president Ter-Petrosyan seeking re-election.[47] There were some improvements in the registration process and electoral campaign, compared to the 1995 parliamentary election (U.S. Department of State 1995). The atmosphere leading up to the election was positive and opposition participation in the elections was not impaired by the authorities, which the opposition attributed to the incumbent's confidence in his victory in clear elections and the importance of legitimacy that clear elections would give him domestically and internationally. Only a few days before the election the opposition announced about its coalition around a united candidate, as a part of its strategy to hide its power until immediately before the election (interview with Manukyan).

Preliminary results gave the opposition candidate a lead but the CEC results announced the next morning showed the incumbent the winner of the election. According to official results, Ter-Petrosyan won in the first round with 51.75 % vs. Manukyan's 41.29% of the vote. The election was criticized by domestic and international actors as fraudulent. The results triggered mass demonstrations in Yerevan. On the third day of peaceful protests as opposition leaders saw

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[46] Vazgen Manukyan was the united opposition candidate in 1996 and has been a presidential candidate in every presidential election since then, one of the most prominent politicians in Armenia since before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Prime Minster of Armenia from 1991 to 1992 and the Defense Minster till 1994. Currently Mr. Manukyan is the President of Public Council of Armenia.

[47] Both politicians came from the Karabakh Committee. Manukyan was the chairman of the Committee. Due to disagreements, several prominent politicians of ANM left the party in the early 1990s and established their parties. Manukyan was the Head of Government from 1990-91 and the Defense Minister until 1993 under Ter-Petrosyan's Presidency. In December 1991 he left ANM and established the opposition National Democratic Union (NDU).

that they were losing the momentum and the protest was losing participants, they decided to take more aggressive steps – taking the Central Electoral Commission office and demanding nullification of the election results. As protestors marched to the Parliament Building, which was hosting the CEC office, and stormed the building, some participants turned violent and attacked members of parliament, including the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker. The government responded with a crackdown on protestors and arrests of political activists. About 200 people were detained on charges of participation in "mass disorder" of September 25 and several opposition parliamentarians were stripped of their immunity on charges of treason, terrorism and attempted seizure of power (WRITENET 17 March 1997). Opposition fell apart as several opposition leaders disassociated themselves from the September 25 events.

President Ter-Petrosyan lost much of his power after his reelection and resigned in February 1998 due to disagreements and splits among the ruling elite. Then Prime Minister Kocharyan became the acting President and the main contender in the presidential race in March 1998. He faced no united opposition candidate; instead each candidate was supported by several political forces. The popular candidate was Karen Demirchyan – former First Secretary of Soviet Armenia (1974-1988). The government predetermined the election outcome with a strategy to hold a two-round election, preventing Manukyan's presence in the runoff to avoid a recurrence of the 1996 events. Instead it was planned to let Demirchyan pass to the second round as they believed he would not protest the election results (interview with Manukyan).

According to official results, Kocharyan won in the runoff with 58.9 % of the vote vs. Demirchyan's 40.1 % of the vote. International election monitors criticized both rounds and concluded that the election did not meet international standards. Demirchyan was believed to have won the second round but accepted his defeat as he was against protest. His People's Party,

in a coalition with then Defense Minister Vazgen Sargsyan's Republican Party (the Unity block) won the 1999 parliamentary election and Demirchyan was elected the Speaker of the Parliament and Sargsyan the Prime Minister. However, the power balance changed dramatically after the October 27, 1999 parliament shootings in Armenia, which took the lives of Prime Minister Sargsyan, Speaker Demirchyan, Deputy Speakers and other high-level officials.

In 2003 Kocharyan competed for reelection against two popular opposition candidates – Stepan Demirchyan (the son of late K. Demirchyan) and Artashes Geghamyan. Initially, Kocharyan was announced to have won the presidential race in the first round and opposition protests followed. Protestors occupied the CEC office and demanded recount, which resulted in announcing the necessity of the second round. Both internal and external pressures were important for this decision. First, unlike the 1996 presidential elections when the second round would automatically lead to the defeat of the incumbent president, in 2003 the incumbent believed he would win in the second round with the help of some electoral manipulations as he faced Stepan Demirchyan – a well-respected but an inexperienced political newcomer.

The opposition started its rallies after the announcement of the first round preliminary results on February 20. The police did not interfere with the rallies but directed its efforts towards preventing the movement of people to the capital from other parts of the country and started administrative detentions to intimidate and weaken the opposition before the second round. Between the two rounds, at least 200 opposition activists were detained for alleged hooliganism and/or participation in unsanctioned public meetings and about 80 people received up to 15 days of jail sentence (OSCE/ODIHR 2003). Kocharyan was announced the winner of the second round with 67.45% of the votes, triggering another wave of mass protests. However,

the protest lost its momentum as the opposition leaders tried to seek legal remedies for the electoral fraud. Election-related protests resumed in April 2004 but were violently dispersed.

The main contenders of February 2008 presidential election were the first president Ter-Petrosyan, representing a union of opposition parties and organizations, against then Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan, whose candidacy was officially endorsed by the outgoing president, the Republican Party and its governing coalition partner Prosperous Armenia. The election campaign was marred by the abuse of administrative resources for Sargsyan, who retained his office of Prime Minster during the campaign. Civil servants were forced to participate in the campaign and could not exercise the right to free elections without a fear of retribution.

According to official results, Sargsyan won the race in the first round with 52.8% of the vote against 21.5 % of the vote for Ter-Petrosyan. Ter-Petrosyan's supporters claimed that Sargsyan's narrow margin of victory was a result of massive vote falsifications and held widespread peaceful protests from February 21 to March 1. Other presidential candidates questioned the election outcome but did not join the protest. In fact, amidst opposition protests, one of the presidential candidates made a political cooperation agreement with Sargsyan.

Protests were not officially authorized but the police showed restraint and tolerance for eight days of the protest until on the dawn of March 1, the authorities started a violent crackdown on peaceful protestors, causing deaths of at least 10 people, including two policemen, and serious injuries to hundreds of people. Many did not seek medical assistance due to legitimate fear of reprisal. Before the violent repression of the protest, the outgoing president expressed his intolerance of peaceful protests by warning that his response to such measures is going to be "determined and sharp." A state of emergency was declared a state of emergency on March 1, which in spite of international condemnation stayed in place until March 21, and inter alia

imposed a ban on demonstrations and de facto censorship. Many opposition activists and supporters were arrested and criminal cases were opened against over 100 people.

### 5.1.1 Repression

The study of Armenian elections illustrates the relationship between moderate state repression and post-election protests. Opposition freely contested the 1996 presidential election but administrative detentions started as a form of political repression in response to post-election protestors breaking into the Parliament Building and beating the speaker and several other parliamentarians. As the Human Rights Watch reported, over 200 opposition activists and supports were arrested in the aftermath of the September 25 events, accompanied by "forced closure of opposition parties, numerous police beatings, and army presence on the streets of the capital" (HRW 2003, 5). However, as a prominent politician mentioned in an interview, the authorities did not resort to use of force until peaceful protestors turned violent. But there were speculations of provocation staged by authorities (interview with an Armenian opposition politician and scholar).

Repression enlarged its scope, intensity and range under Kocharyan's presidency and became a part of the system, especially leading up to the 2003 presidential elections. Administrative detentions were used on a large scale in 2002 in response to protests against the removal of broadcasting rights from the independent A1+ television station (HRW 2003, 6) and repression was used more extensively during the 2003 elections, especially before the runoff. Between the two rounds at least 200 opposition activists were detained for alleged hooliganism and/or participation in unsanctioned public demonstrations (HRW 2009, 11). Electoral protests resumed in April 2004 but were violently dispersed. Political repressions further increased after the 2008 election as special forces violently dispersed protestors leaving at least ten people dead,

over 130 seriously wounded, and about 500 beaten. Arrests and politically motivated criminal cases against opposition activists followed.

Overall, though the level of repression has gradually increased over time in Armenia, it never reached high levels of repression – it never became repressive enough to prevent electoral protests in 1996, 2003-2004, or 2008. Using PTS ranging from 1 (the lowest) to 5 (the highest level of repression), the common repression score for Armenia is 2 or 2.5 and the highest level of state repression in Armenia for the past two decades was of the score 3 in 2002 and in 2008. However, state repression has doomed post-election protests to failure.

### 5.1.2 Opposition Cohesion

The analysis of Armenian elections shows the importance of opposition cohesion for the organization of mass protests after fraudulent elections. Every presidential election that has been followed by widespread protests (1996, 2003 and 2008) has had a popular opposition candidate around which most of the opposition forces united. But those have not been full-fledged opposition coalitions and the second most popular among the public opposition candidate has never joined the post-election protests or the unity candidate to demand a runoff. For example, many opposition forces united around Demirchyan's candidacy in 2003. The authorities feared opposition cohesion in which case it would be impossible to win the runoff. So, the authorities solved the problem by "buying" out the second most popular opposition candidate Geghamyan (interview with an Armenian opposition politician), who did not join the opposition protests before the second round and did not make a much anticipated announcement to his supporters to vote for opposition candidate Demirchyan.

A similar scenario repeated in 2008. Leading up to the 2008 presidential election many opposition parties and organizations united round Ter-Petrosyan's candidacy. This time the role

of Geghamyan was carried out by Artur Baghdasaryan, who came third in the first round of the 2008 presidential election. He refused to join the post-election protest and made a cooperation agreement with the authorities despite high expectations among the public of his cooperation with Ter-Petrosyan either before or after the first round and a joint demand for a second round.

In contrast to arguments for the importance of opposition cohesion, interviews with Armenian opposition politicians have raised concerns regarding the effect of opposition cohesion on protests in general. Opposition cooperation is a two-sided sword. On one hand, the opposition has a real incentive to cooperate to mobilize. On the other hand, opposition coalitions are susceptible to splits and the whole movement may lose its momentum and fall apart if some members of the opposition coalition default. Also, centralization of opposition power around a single candidate may mean that the course of the movement – including whether protests are organized or not – may very much depend on whether the leader favors protests. Recent Arab revolutions may indicate that when people were ready to protest, there was no concentration of power in the opposition to decide to disperse protests after the first conflicts with the authorities and people went all the way forward towards regime change. Nevertheless, rather than disputing the importance of opposition cohesion for protests, such concerns show that opposition unity should not be overrated when for example the opposition leader does not favor protests or when the coalition is weak, and can help explain deviant cases when fraudulent elections were not protested in spite of the presence of (fragile) opposition coalitions.

### 5.1.3 International Election Monitors

The role of international election monitors in Armenia has been moderate. They have played an important role in improving electoral legislation bringing it in line with international standards. Unlike Belarus or Russia, where party and electoral legislation is very bad to begin

with, the electoral code is good in Armenia. But they have accomplished little in terms of promoting democracy and administering free and fair elections in Armenia. As an OSCE officer concluded during an interview, overall the quality of elections in Armenia has not improved significantly and every election repeats the problems of the preceding election.

International monitors have criticized almost every election in Armenia since the 1995 parliamentary election but they have been more willing to give the government a pass than support the opposition. International monitors' preliminary reports for Armenia tend to be lenient and they "save" strong criticism for final reports which usually come months after the elections when the opposition movement is no longer at its peak. For example, though international monitors noted serious problems in the 1996 presidential elections, they did not reject the election outcome. In its preliminary statement, OSCE/ODIHR (1996a) assessed the election as an overall improvement in terms of electoral legislation and its administration compared to the 1995 elections. Though they mentioned "serious breaches in the law", they concluded that these breaches did not seem "to have materially affected the outcome of the election at this stage in the process." The final report (OSCE/ODIHR 1996b) was more critical of the election outcomes, concluding that the "discrepancies in the number of voters who signed and received ballot papers and the number of voter coupons in the official results, along with the breaches in the law … can only contribute to a lack of confidence in the integrity of the overall election process."

International monitors have been less willing to criticize the last parliamentary and presidential elections in Armenia. According to the OSCE/ODIHR (2007) final report, "[t]he elections for the National Assembly demonstrated improvement and were conducted largely in accordance with OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections." International election monitors' assessment was most inadequate after the 2008 presidential

election. Notwithstanding violations of the law in the election campaign, such as seriously biased media coverage and abuse of public resources for the governmental candidate, and many problems on the Election Day, such as attacks on opposition supporters and journalists, the preliminary election assessment by the IEOM stated that the election was “mostly in line” with international standards (IEOM 2008b). The final report, which came three months later, was more critical of the election but fell short of openly criticizing the government for serious election manipulations, though the report itself enumerated sufficient evidence of such manipulations. Among the public, many believed that the governments’ violent crackdown on the peaceful protestors on March 1, which cost the lives of at least 10 people, was largely encouraged by international monitors’ endorsement of this fraudulent election.

Overall, Armenian elections show that international criticism of elections is not a sufficient factor for post-election protests if the opposition is not ready or willing to protest the election results, exemplified by the 1998 presidential elections in Armenia and the aversion of the opposition candidate to protest. Secondly, Armenian elections show that international condemnation of election results is not a necessary factor for the occurrence of post-election protests, exemplified by widespread protests after the 2008 election which was initially endorsed by international election monitors. Thirdly, when international election monitors and international powers strongly criticized the Armenian elections, such as in 2003, their criticism did not have a large impact on post-election protests as international actors in general did not support the opposition candidate and did not envisage regime transition like they did in Georgia and in Ukraine during their color revolutions. For example, though international election monitors strongly criticized both rounds of the 2003 presidential election and the United States pressed for a second round, international actors did not support the opposition in either round.

Table 8: Disputed national elections and post-election protests in Armenia, 1995-2008

| Election date | Post-election protest | Presidential race? | Repression* | Opposition cohesion | Election endorsed by IEMs | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05/05/1995 | No | No | Low | No | No/ flawed, free but not fair | The ruling block gained 70% of the seats, deterioration in the political rights conditions. |
| 09/22/1996 | Yes/wide spread | Yes | Low | Yes | No/ flawed, serious breaches in the law | Ter-Petrosyan was reelected in a narrow race amidst widespread protests, but consequently lost his legitimacy and power and resigned under pressure by a part of the ruling elite. |
| 03/16/1998 | No | Yes | Moderate | No | No/ fraudulent | Former PM and acting President Kocharyan won over an opposition candidate who was largely believed to be winner of the race and who later made a coalition with then Defense Minister and won in the following parliamentary elections, resulting in reconfiguration of political power. |
| 02/19/2003 ** | Yes/wide spread | Yes | Moderate | Yes | No/ fell short of international standards | The first round was followed by political repressions and limitations of political rights. |
| 03/05/2003 ** | Yes/wide spread | Yes | Moderate | Yes | No/fell short of international standards | The incumbent president won over a united opposition candidate and further consolidated his authoritarian rule. Deterioration in political rights. Decline in free media. |
| 05/25/2003 | No | No | Moderate | Yes | No | Deterioration in political rights. Decline in free media. |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05/12/2007 | No | No | Moderate | Yes | Yes/ largely in accordance with international standards | The opposition was left with 7 out of 131 seats in the parliament. Deterioration in political rights. |
| 02/19/2008 | Yes/wide spread | Yes | Moderate | Yes | Yes/ mostly in line with international standards | Protracted efforts of dialogue between the regime and the opposition with no meaningful reform and only some political concessions on the part of the regime. |

Note: The 1999 parliamentary elections when the Unity block, composed of Defense Minister Vazgen Sargsyan's Republican Party and opposition People's Party led by Karen Demirchyan, won 62 out of 131 seats and formed the government is excluded from the table as the results were not disputed. The first presidential election in Armenia (1991) is also excluded as it was viewed free and fair.
*To evaluate the level of repression during the pre-election period, Gibney Political Terror Scale (PTS) a year prior to the election year, which is also used in the quantitative analysis in the previous chapter, as well as information obtained during interviews and secondary research on the situation leading up to the election are used here. PTS ranges from 1 to 5 representing the lowest to the highest degree of human insecurity.
** The second round runoff presidential election is listed separately from the first round.

## 5.2 Georgia

Political transition in Georgia in the early 1990s was impaired by civil war and secessionist ethnic wars of South Ossetia (1990-92) and Abkhazia (1992-93).[48] The political situation stabilized under Shevardnadze, who came to power in 1992 as the Chairman of the State Council after the forced resignation of the first president. Shevardnadze was elected to the newly restored post of the president in 1995 and reelected in 2000 with little competition. He also faced little challenge from the parliament, which was dominated by his Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG) until 2001 when the CUG started to disintegrate as the future leaders of the Rose Revolution left the bloc and established new opposition parties. There were no election-related protests in the first decade of Shevardnadze's rule. People were apathetic towards elections, especially parliamentary elections as real power was vested in presidency, and there was no good alternative to Shevardnadze (interview with a Georgian political analyst and election observer).

Shevardnadze's regime brought much needed stability to the country in the early 1990s but ultimately proved ineffective, corrupt and unable to deliver economic growth and benefits. Still, under Shevardnadze, Georgia had "real potential to become a democracy" as the country had characteristics conducive to democratic transition, such as separation of powers, pluralistic, diversified and independent business community, independent and pluralistic media with nationwide coverage, and strong civil society (Lanskoy and Areshidze 2008, 157). These features together with international factors made the 2003 Rose Revolution possible.

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[48] The government of Georgia lost control over both regions, and cease-fire agreements with Russia were made in 1992 and 1994 respectively, resulting in "frozen" conflicts. The five day war in August 2008 ended in another cease-fire brokered between Georgia and Russian on August 12, 2008. As a part of the agreement, the EU established Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to patrol the Georgian side of the border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the OSCE mission to monitor the 1992 cease-fire in South Ossetia and the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) monitoring the 1994 cease-fire agreement in Abkhazia expiring in 2008 and June 2009 respectively with no further extension. Multiparty talks on international peace keeping have been held regularly since October 2008. In August 2008 Russia recognized the independence of both breakaway regions. For more details see U.S. Department of State 2011a.

The main contenders of the 2003 parliamentary election were the newly established pro-presidential bloc For New Georgia (FNG), pro-Shevardnadze Revival and the opposition parties established based on factions from the CUG – Saakashvili's National Movement, and Burjanadze-Democrats bloc. The Election Day was disorderly and the official results announced after the election did not match the figures of the parallel vote tabulation,[49] which triggered mass protests led by Zhvania-Burjanadze-Saakashvili triumvirate. International monitors also strongly criticized the 2003 election for "widespread and systematic electoral fraud during and after the election day" (IEOM 2003, 1). The largest protest was held on November 22 on the first day of the newly election Parliament, when protestors occupied the Parliament building and the State Chancellery demanding change in power. Unlike widespread protests that led to color revolutions in Serbia and Ukraine, Georgia's Rose Revolution was accomplished with fewer protestors. The number of protestors varied from a few thousand to twenty thousand participants on different days (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 165). Shevardnadze resigned on November 23 and Parliamentary Speaker Burjanadze became interim president. On November 25 the Supreme Court annulled the results of the proportional race and the old parliament of 1999 reconvened.

An extraordinary presidential election was scheduled for January 4, 2004 and re-elections of 150 proportional seats in the parliament for March 28, 2004. Saakashvili won the presidential election with 96% of the vote in a largely uncontested race. Though there were five other presidential candidates on the ballot, no serious contender participated in the race partly because of the "new political environment and short timeframe" for elections (OSCE/ODIHR 2004b, 9). The United National Movement (UNM) – a coalition of Saakashvili's National Movement and

[49] According to International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy's parallel vote tabulation, Saakashvili's National Movement came first with 26.60% of the votes, FNG came second (18.92%), followed by Labour party. The CEC preliminary results on the other hand gave the FNG a lead, initially followed by the National Movement and as the official results from Adjaria were included which showed 97% turnout with 96.7% of the votes for Revival, the National Movement dropped to the third place. The final results were announced on November 20.

the parties of Zhvania and Burjanadze – won 135 out of 150 proportional seats through the parliamentary election. The only opposition bloc that passed the seven percent threshold – Rightist Opposition-Industrialists, Novas – gained only 15 out of 150 proportional seats (OSCE/ODIHR 2004c, 24).

The new leaders that came to power proved to be of the same caliber as their political predecessors, as they tried to slowly narrow the breathing space for the opposition (interview with an IFES specialist). Right after the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili pushed through several constitutional amendments, which increased the powers of the president vis-à-vis the parliament, heading the country towards a "superpresidential" system (Lanskoy and Areshidze 2008, 160). Over time both formal and informal powers gradually became centralized in the presidency. The country experienced depletion of independent media and vibrant civil society and the regime did not face any challenge from weak and fragmented opposition parties. Thus, the factors conducive to democracy before the Rose Revolution were largely reversed in its aftermath.

Ultimately, Saakashvili's regime failed to engage the opposition, which took to the streets in the Fall of 2007 against the government's plan to postpone parliamentary elections.[50] The protests were triggered by a televised interview with former Defense Minister Okruashvili who accused the government of a series of grave crimes. Instead of investigating the allegations, the government arrested Okruashvili, which "spurred a spontaneous large-scale protest action" (Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani 2009, 697). Protestors demanded the release of political prisoners, holding parliamentary elections in spring 2008 under revised electoral rules, Saakashvili's resignation and transformation of Georgia into a parliamentary system. The government tolerated the protest for six days. On November 7 the riot police dispersed protestors resorting to excessive

[50] Parliamentary elections originally were to be held in the spring of 2008 but the sitting parliament was extended by six months to reschedule the parliamentary and presidential election in the fall of 2008, explaining that holding elections in spring parallel with Russian presidential election would hinder and bias domestic politics in Georgia.

use of force, leaving over five hundred people injured (Lanskoy and Areshidze 2008). The property of independent Imedi TV station was damaged and its operations were disrupted. A state of emergency was introduced, which under domestic and international pressure, was lifted on November 16. Saakashvili resigned on November 25 and set early presidential elections to be held on January 5, 2008 – within the minimum notice allowed by law (45 days).

Saakashvili won the election with 53.45% of the votes against 25.68% of the votes for united opposition candidate Gachechiladze. Opposition candidates did not accept the election results and organized mass protests demanding a runoff. Mass protests started on the next day of the elections, with about five to eight thousand participants and several acts of protest were held in January, with about 35,000 protesting on January 13 and up to 80,000 protesting on the presidential inauguration day on January 21 (Irish Times 21 January 2008). [51]

As a Georgian domestic election observer mentioned in an interview, though the exact scale of electoral fraud was difficult to define, a second round would absolutely be necessary without election manipulations. The opposition claimed there was "just enough fraud to affect the outcome" given the narrow margin of victory (Lanskoy and Areshidze 2008, 164). Saakashvili gained his narrow margin to pass the threshold for victory in the first round due to "abnormally high turnout and abnormally large number of votes" cast for Saakashvili in very poor ethnic-minority areas, the close analysis of which suggests that without fraud he could not win in the first round (Fairbanks 2010, 146). Meanwhile, IEOM observers representing the OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE PA, PACE and the European Parliament (EP) endorsed the 2008 presidential election as "in essence consistent with most" international commitments and standards for democratic elections (IEOM 2008a, 1). OCSE was more critical in its final report

[51] According to Lanskoy and Areshidze (2008) there were two protests in January with 200,000 participants. The opposition also claimed it gathered 200,000 protestors in January but other sources mention no more than 80,000.

on the election raising concerns about widespread allegations of intimidation and pressure during the election campaign (some verified by the observers), abuse of advantages of incumbency during campaign, serious problems during vote count and tabulation such as tampering with voter lists, results and protocols, slow and often chaotic vote tabulation, inconsistencies between some protocols provided by the precinct and district electoral commissions, many incomplete precinct electoral commission protocols, unusually high level of turnout in the last three hours of voting reported in many precincts, considerably higher than national average turnout reported in several districts, as well as deficient post-election complaints and appeals process (OSCE/ODIHR 2008a).

The scheduled October 2008 parliamentary elections were pushed forward to May 21 following the results of a plebiscite held parallel with the January 5 presidential election. The electoral campaign was held in a highly polarized political environment. The 2008 parliamentary election retained the UNM in power with absolute majority of seats in the parliament.[52] The opposition did not accept the election results and called for protests and promised to boycott the parliament. The turnout in protests was less than what the opposition had expected, as about 4,000 gathered on the election night, "with many people opting to watch the Champions League final instead" (Independent 23 May 2008). On May 26, Georgia's Independence Day, thousands came to the opposition rally. But the protest movement did not gain momentum.

Both 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections were held in a politically polarized environment when the opposition was in a protest mode and, as several IRI public opinion polls showed, the public was losing interest in opposition protests as the opposition became

[52] Five parties passed the 3 % threshold to enter the parliament – the ruling UNM with 59.18 % of the votes, the Joint Opposition with 17.73%, Christian Democrats with 8.66%, Labor Party with 7.44% and Party of Republicans with 3.78% of the votes. UNM retained constitutional majority with 119 out of 150 seats in the parliament.

radicalized (interview with Nix). A Georgian analyst also noted a decline in public support of protests due to overwhelming “elements of radicalism” in opposition, which leads them to a “disadvantageous game” with plans to boycott the parliament and establish an alternative parliament: "First, the [parliamentary] election has shown that most of the public do not support such tough actions. In addition, it is obvious that the opposition has lost its supporters since the events in November [2007] and the [5 January 2008] presidential election" (BBC Worldwide Monitoring 13 June 2008).

Opposition protests declined in the aftermath of the 2008 parliamentary elections but did not die out. Protests sparked again in April – June of 2009, demanding Saakashvili’s resignation and early national elections. In September 2009, several opposition members who had boycotted the 2008 parliament were invited back but most of them did not return to their seats. In October 2010 the parliament approved amendments to the constitution to give more power to the prime minister and the parliament after the 2013 presidential elections and new legislation on media freedom, which the opposition criticized as window dressing. The opposition movement reinvigorated in 2011. The opposition protested on May 21, 2011 with about 10,000 demonstrators calling for Saakashvili’s resignation. At midnight on May 26 a peaceful protest of a few hundred participants was met with unprecedented violence. Many participants were detained, some are still missing, and many more were severely beaten. Within a few hours the streets were cleaned to hold the planned Independence Day military parade.

### 5.2.1 Repression

The level of repression was low leading up to the 2003 election, as opposition parties freely campaigned, the right to free speech and peaceful assembly was respected, media gave fairly pluralistic coverage of both governmental and opposition political parties, with two of the

three TV stations with nationwide coverage – Rustavi2 being clearly pro-opposition and Imedi TV being rather balanced. Though Georgia had never experienced post-election protests before, there was the example of successful youth protests in Tbilisi in 2001 against the government's attempt to close down the independent Rustavi2 TV station and later in 2003 against the government's resistance to reform electoral commissions (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 156). In addition, the major youth organization of the Rose Revolution Kmara had received valuable training from its Serbian counterpart on how to win the police on their side (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 161). In such a political environment, the perception of the cost of participation in post-election protests was rather low, which must have encouraged mass participation in opposition protests.

The political environment was very different leading up to the 2008 elections as political repressions increased in the Fall of 2007 and the November protest – the first mass protest after the Rose Revolution – was violently dispersed, thus attracting domestic and international criticism. The repressive environment continued throughout the presidential campaign. As international monitors observed the "campaign [for the January presidential election] was overshadowed by widespread allegations of intimidation and pressure, among others on public-sector employees. These included a number of confirmed cases of pressure on opposition supporters by the police and local officials to desist from campaigning, threats of arbitrary arrest or job dismissal and cases of landlords who were pressurized not to let premises for use as opposition campaign offices" (IEOM 2008a, 5). Though overall the May parliamentary election experienced some improvements in the electoral process compared to the presidential election, the political environment remained very tense and more polarized.

Given the increased cost of participation in protests after the November 2007 events, it may be surprising that people protested after the 2008 elections. In fact, there were more people on the streets in January 2008 than in November 2003. However, the turnout in protests in 2008 was lower than expected and less intense than the November 2007 protests, which at the peak gathered about 100,000 protestors (Belfast Telegraph 8 January 2008). On the other hand, the international community was closely watching the 2008 presidential election, which was a clear restraint for the regime. There were far fewer protestors after the 2008 parliamentary election and though increasing political repression cannot take the whole credit for this relative political passivity, it is consistent with the argument that repression suppresses participation in protests.

### 5.2.2 Opposition Cohesion

Political parties in Georgia has for the most party been characterized by a dominant ruling party and fragmented opposition. The most distinguishing feature of Georgian politics has been the lack of political competition until the 2008 elections. In Georgia at any given time you have one player who dominates the politics and others either are supporting or in disarray. Political transitions in Georgia can be described as one monopoly yielding to another monopoly (interview with Bunce). Interestingly, Georgia has not experienced a single turnover in the presidency via regular elections since its independence. The first president was ousted by a coup in 1992 and the second president resigned facing protest in the aftermath of the 2003 parliamentary elections, which led to the Rose Revolution. The third president – Saakashvili – has shown unwillingness to relinquish power raising concerns about a change in power through regular elections (Lanskoy and Areshidze 2008, 155).

Opposition parties campaigned separately for the 2003 parliamentary election but the Zhvania-Burjanadze-Saakashvili triumvirate, formed after the election,[53] proved effective to mobilize public discontent against the rigged election results and to carry out regime transition. Nevertheless, the unity of opposition forces after the 2003 election should not be overestimated, as during the Rose Revolution opposition parties were not popular either. The votes were divided among protesting parties and if Shevardnadze had not resigned, there would have been a parliament with more divided parties. People acted against Shevardnadze and sought to part with the old regime rather than in favor of a particular opposition party (interview with a Georgian political analyst and election observer). A cooperation that was more important for both participation in protests and especially for the success of protests, was the partnership among the parliamentary opposition, the NGO community (as well as international donors working through the NGO community), and Rustavi 2 independent television station with nationwide coverage (Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani 2009, 690).

In 2007 the opposition again coalesced as nine opposition parties formed the United National Council (UNC) opposition bloc during the November 2007 protests and campaigned with united opposition candidate Gachechiladze in the January 2008 presidential election, which was the first genuinely competitive presidential election in Georgia. Besides Saakashvili and Gachechiladze, there were five other candidates from different opposition forces but there was a general expectation that most of the votes for the opposition candidates would go to the leading opposition candidate if there was a second round (interview with a Georgian political analyst and election observer).

[53] Leading up the 2003 elections, new opposition parties were formed based on factions of CUG – the New Rights Party and Saakashvili's United National Movement in 2001, as well as Zurab Zhvania's United Democrats in 2002, which formed a coalition with parliamentary speaker Nino Burjanadze and Traditionalists in 2003.

### 5.2.3 International Elections Monitors

The study of Georgian elections shows the importance of condemnation of fraudulent elections by domestic and international monitors and the international community in general for the occurrence of mass protests against electoral fraud (as exemplified in 2003). At the same time, international criticism of fraudulent elections is not a necessary factor for mobilizing mass protests (as exemplified in 2008 when the number of protestors exceeded that in 2003), but it may play an important role in the success of those protests.

While international condemnation of the 2003 election was very strong, "encouraging the general public to defend its political rights" (Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani 2009, 684), there were some disagreements among international reactions towards the 2008 presidential election. Though OSCE/ODIHR rather critically assessed the 2008 presidential election in its final report, it gave only a moderately critical statement immediately after the election, "which greatly reduced the momentum present in Georgian society to struggle for fair results" (Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani 2009, 684). A joint statement of OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE PA, PACE and EP election monitors assessed the 2008 presidential election as "in essence consistent with most OSCE and Council of Europe (CoE) commitments and standards for democratic elections" notwithstanding "significant challenges" (IEOM 2008a, 1). Most notably, a tension sparked between OSCE/ODIHR long-term observers who gave the most critical assessment of the election in their separate final report of the election and an OSCE PA observer. Shortly after the presidential election, Mr. Hastings, the president emeritus of the OSCE PA, announced that the 2008 presidential election was "a triumphant step" on Georgia's path toward democracy and "a viable expression of free choice of the Georgian people." This statement was not "appreciated" by ODIHR observers (Irish Times 10 January 2008). In its final report OSCE/ODIHR concluded

that the "campaign was overshadowed by widespread allegations of intimidation and pressure, among others on public-sector employees and opposition activists … other aspects of the election process, notably vote count and tabulation procedures, as well as the post-election complaints and appeals process, further presented serious challenges to the fulfillment of some OSCE commitments" (OSCE/ODIHR 2008a, 1).

IRI found that the election "broadly met international standards." Likewise, Western powers – the EU, NATO, and the United States – congratulated the Georgian people on the elections (BBC Worldwide Monitoring 6 January 2008; International Herald Tribune 8 January 2008). The U.S. State Department stated that the presidential election was democratic and transparent and viewed the opposition protests as unfounded (BBC Worldwide Monitoring 6 January 2008). While international actors played a key role in the 2003-2004 regime transition in Georgia, effectively working through the opposition and civil society, after the Rose Revolution the role of international actors changed: "Despite the fact that a new wave of political protests during 2007–2008 provided another opportunity for Georgia to accomplish a democratic transition, foreign actors did not play the same role as they did before" explained with geopolitical considerations of Western powers as well as "weak personal, organizational and ideological links" between international donors and the new opposition movement (Muskhelishvili and Jorjoliani 2009, 682).

There was also a difference between the effect of domestic observers on protests in 2003 and in 2008. In 2003 domestic organizations played an important role providing evidence of electoral fraud, which triggered mass protests against the preliminary results announced by the CEC which did not match with the parallel vote tabulation results. In contrast, in 2008 domestic observers, some pro-governmental and some neutral, were reluctant to play any political role in

the elections. In addition, domestic observers encountered difficulties registering problems in the villages where most of the manipulations occurred and reporting them to a wide audience in the absence of independent media (interview with a Georgian election observer). Unlike in 2003 when independent media extensively covered the opposition and civil society efforts, in 2008 there was no independent media with nationwide coverage (Imedi was damaged after the 2007 attack) to provide a platform for domestic observers to inform the public about their registered electoral violations.

Table 9: Disputed national elections and post-election protests in Georgia, 1995-2008

| Election date | Post-election protest | Presidential race? | Repression* | Opposition cohesion | Election endorsed by IEMs | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11/5/1995 | No | Yes [a] | Moderate | No | Yes | Shevardnadze was elected president with little competition, brought political stability, improvement in civil liberties and political rights. |
| 10/31/1999 | No | No | Moderate | No | Yes | Shevardnadze's Union of Citizens of Georgia won the election. |
| 04/09/2000 | No | Yes | Moderate | No | No | Shevardnadze was reelected with little competition, Georgia's democracy score started to decline, political rights condition deteriorated. |
| 11/02/2003 | Yes/widespread | No | Moderate | No [b] | No | Protests forced Shevardnadze's resignation, followed by presidential and new legislative elections. Political rights and civil liberties improved. |
| 01/05/2008 | Yes/widespread | Yes | Moderate | Yes | Yes | Saakashvili won with a narrow margin over a united opposition candidate, made small political concessions and electoral reform before parliamentary elections, including cutting the election threshold from 7% to 5%. |
| 05/21/2008 | Yes/widespread | No | Moderate | Yes | Yes | Saakashvili's National Movement-Democrats won absolute majority in the parliament, the regime started a new wave of political reform including constitutional amendments for more powers of the parliament after the 2013 elections, which the opposition considers window dressing. |

Note: The table excludes the first presidential election in Georgia (1991), the 1992 simultaneous parliamentary and (uncontested) presidential elections, and the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections as they were generally considered free and fair. *To evaluate the level of repression during the pre-election period, Gibney Political Terror Scale (PTS) a year prior to the election year as well as information obtained during interviews and secondary research on the situation leading up to the election are used here.

[a] Simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections. [b] Opposition parties competed for the 2003 parliamentary elections separately but they were united after the election, led by the Zhvania-Burjanadze-Saakashvili triumvirate (Saakashvili's United National Movement and United Democrats-Burjanadze bloc).

## 5.3 Conclusion

The Armenian and Georgian case studies demonstrate how moderate levels of repression have allowed mass mobilization after disputed elections. Also, gradual increase in the level of repression in Georgia, together with moderately critical and divided international assessment of the 2008 presidential and parliamentary elections and fragmentations in the opposition unity have gradually led to public aversion to political activeness.

Most interestingly, Armenian and Georgian elections show that widespread protests are possible without the condemnation of elections by international election monitors. The comparison of 2003 and 2008 elections in Georgian shows that international election monitors' condemnation of disputed elections is an important but not a necessary factor for the occurrence of widespread protests but it may be essential for the success of protests.

Both Armenian and Georgia elections demonstrate the importance of opposition cohesion as every instance of widespread post-election protest has concurred with coalescence of opposition forces.

Table 10 at the end of this chapter summarizes the main arguments from all four postcommunist cast studies. The Armenia, Belarus, Georgia and Russia case studies reinforce the findings of the statistical analysis on the effect of state repression, opposition cohesion, international election monitors' assessments of elections, and the type of election on the occurrence of post-election protests. The analysis offers explanations on how these factors matter for the occurrence of post-election protests or the lack thereof.

### *Repression*

The analysis of elections in the four case studies illustrates the nonlinear relationship between repression and post-election protests. First, consistent with the findings of statistical

analysis, the study of Armenian elections and 2003 Georgian election shows how moderate level of repression in those cases has allowed mass mobilization after fraudulent elections.

Secondly, the 2008 Georgian elections show how gradually increasing state repression has discouraged mass mobilization. Political repression started to increase in Georgia in the Fall of 2007 and became very much established under Saakashvili's second term in office, compared to his early years in office and Shevardnadze's regime, with increasing use of political imprisonments, violent dispersals of peaceful protests, attacks on journalists and media premises, intimidation of political and civil society activists, economic reprisals, etc. This has ultimately resulted in popular passivity in acts of dissent especially since the "prosecution of opposition" in May 2011 (interview with a Georgian political analyst and election observer). Conversely, the 2010 Belarusian election shows how the perception of reduced cost of participation in protest allowed unprecedented widespread post-election mobilization.

Thirdly, the 2006 Belarusian election illustrates the backlash effect of extremely high repression on post-election protests. The analysis also shows that high level of state repression observed in Russia for the past decade is associated with lack of post-election protests. But high state repression has not back-fired in Russia as the Kremlin has managed to prevent post-election protests by refraining from election-day large-scale fraud and intimidations and instead has relied on pre-election manipulations and preemptive measures, especially filtering unwanted candidates, and controlling the election campaign.

### *Opposition Cohesion*

The analysis strongly supports the argument about the importance of opposition cooperation for the occurrence of post-election protests. For example, every election in Armenia that was challenged by widespread protest had a popular opposition presidential candidate

around which most opposition parties united. Both instances of widespread protests after the 2003 parliamentary election and the 2008 presidential election in Georgia concurred with relative unity in opposition. Belarusian elections also show that opposition unity is a very important (but not a necessary) factor for the occurrence of post-election protests. Except for the 2010 presidential election, all the instances of post-election protests in Belarus have occurred under united opposition. Opposition unity was very important for the 2006 presidential election in Belarus, followed by widespread protests that lasted for a few days. The opposition also united to some extent shortly before the 2001 presidential election, though around a much weaker candidate than the 2006 united opposition leader. In 2001 only a few thousand people gathered in protest of the election results but the protests did not gain any momentum.

Most interestingly, widespread protest on the night of the 2010 presidential election in Belarus showed that opposition unity is not a necessary factor. There is a caveat here – as many Belarusian analysts have noted, the 2010 protests engaged many politically unaffiliated people who gathered to express their discontent with the regime rather than support for a particular opposition candidate. The nine opposition candidates, who called upon their supporters to gather after the election in protest of (anticipated) fraud but did not expect the high turnout in protest and lacked a plan for action, could hardly be given much credit for the unprecedented widespread protest on the election night (Melyantsou 2011).

The analysis also shows how the lack of opposition cohesion during presidential and parliamentary elections in Russia has impaired the ability of opposition to campaign more effectively and to challenge electoral fraud. While in the 1990s, the “Communist factor” – the popularity of the Communist party and fear of its come-back – largely impaired chances for opposition unity, in the 2000s opposition parties have mostly failed to cooperate because of the

characteristics of the party system itself – parties in the system are heavily dependent on the Kremlin and independent parties have repeatedly been denied registration for the past years.

***International Election Monitors***

The analysis of Armenian and Georgian elections shows that international election monitors' condemnation of elections is an important but neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor for the occurrence of (widespread) post-election protests. For example, international election monitors strongly criticized both rounds of the 1998 presidential election in Armenia as fraudulent but no mass protests followed. The defeated candidate of the runoff election was in principle against protests fearing violence and accepted the outcome of the election though the general perception was that he had won the election. On the other hand, international election monitors initially endorsed the 2008 presidential election in Armenia calling it "mostly in line with international commitments" (IEOM 2008b) and "[s]imilar statements followed from European Union High Representative Javier Solana, European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU presidency, and the Council of Europe's envoy" (HRW 2009, 13). However, such statements did not discourage the Armenian opposition from holding widespread protests for eight continuous days after the election until violently dispersed.

Similarly, while the 2003 Georgian election clearly demonstrates the importance of international condemnation of fraudulent elections if the opposition wants to protest the election results, as their verdict on the election gives credibility to domestic allegations of electoral fraud and gives legitimacy to opposition protests, the 2008 Georgian elections show that the criticism of the election by international monitors and other actors is not a necessary factor for mobilizing post-election protests.

The importance of international election monitors' assessment of elections for the occurrence of post-election protests may vary across time and from election to election. First, with the increase in the number of international election monitors, the political agendas of monitoring organizations and foreign governments seems to have increased in recent years and as a consequence, it may be true that the impact of international monitors is different across time, perhaps less influential now because of disagreements in assessments by different organizations (interview with an OSCE official). The significance of international election monitors' assessment of elections may have also deteriorated over time due to lost credibility in the eyes of the electorates of these organizations following their endorsement of some blatantly fraudulent elections in the region for the past years, such as the 2008 and 2010 Azerbaijani elections. Nevertheless, when conducted in an impartial manner, the role of international monitors' assessments of elections is significant for the occurrence of post-election protests, especially when there is little reliable information on the quality of elections and international election monitors' assessment gives legitimacy to either the opposition or the government claims.

***Presidential vs. Parliamentary Elections***

The analysis of Armenian and Belarusian elections offers explanations on the prevalence of protests after presidential elections. In cases of strongly presidentialist systems where voters perceive that real political power lies with the president, people attach little importance to parliamentary elections and as rational beings they do not protests after elections that are not important. For example, largely because of the personalized character of politics in Armenia, strong power being vested in the presidency, and the fusion of economic and political power and its centralization in the hands of the president and a narrow political elite around him for the past decade, the public gives little importance to parliamentary elections and invests all its hope for

political and economic transformation in the presidential race. Opposition parties in their turn have not coordinated their efforts to contest parliamentary elections as much as they have done during presidential elections. Consequently, parliamentary elections have stayed low-key and have not attracted mass protests though in general they have been as bad as presidential elections.

This relationship is even more obvious in Belarus where the parliament has little constitutional power and the electorate is not interested in who is elected to the parliament (interview with Pikulik). Also, Belarus is marked with a very weak party system where political parties do not play an important role in parliamentary elections and most candidates are run as independents. Finally, Russian elections reinforce the argument that the fictive nature of elections discourages the occurrence of post-election protests.

While the Armenian and Belarusian case studies explain the preponderance of protests after presidential, the Georgian case study shows that post-election protests are also possible after parliamentary elections in the presence of other favorable conditions for protest – moderate repression, united opposition, and strong international criticism of the elections.

Table 10: Summary of main arguments from the analysis of postcommunist elections

| Case studies | *Repression* | *Opposition Cohesion* | *International Election Monitors* | *Presidential vs. Parliamentary Elections* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Armenia | (+)Moderate levels of repression allowed widespread protests after fraudulent elections. | (+)Every election that was challenged by widespread protest involved united opposition. | (-)International criticism of elections is neither necessary nor sufficient for the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections. | (+)Three presidential elections were challenged by widespread protests while no parliamentary election was protested. |
| Belarus | (+)Very high repression backfired in 2006 with widespread post-election protest. Perception of reduced cost of protest allowed unprecedented widespread protest after the 2010 election. | (partial)Opposition cohesion is an important but not a necessary factor for the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections. | The effect is not definite. | (+)Presidential elections are more likely than parliamentary elections to be protested. |
| Georgia | (+)Moderate level of repression allowed mass mobilization in 2003 but gradual increase in repression since 2007 has discouraged public participation in protests. | (+)Every election that was challenged by widespread protest involved united opposition. | (partial)International condemnation of elections is an important but not a necessary factor for the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections. | (partial)Parliamentary elections can trigger widespread protests and regime transition in the presence of other favorable conditions for protest. |
| Russia | (+)Consistently high level of repression has prevented the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections. | (+)Lack of opposition cooperation concurs with lack of protests after fraudulent elections. | (+)Lenient assessments of fraudulent elections in the 1990s and 2000 by international election monitors have impaired the value of international criticism of elections in the 2000s. | Neither presidential nor parliamentary elections were protested. |

Note: (+) denotes the case study strongly supports the finding in the quantitative analysis on the effect of the given explanatory variable on the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections, and (-) denotes the case study challenges the finding in the quantitative analysis on the effect of the given explanatory variable.

# CHAPTER SIX

## Post-Election Protests in Africa and Latin America

The present chapter analyzes post-election protests and the role of state repression, opposition cohesion, and international monitors' election assessments in mini-case studies of selected countries in Africa and Latin America. The main criterion for choosing countries is within-case variation of protest – at least one fraudulent or disputed election widely protested – to be able to single out the effect of the explanatory factors on the occurrence of protests controlling for other case-specific features such as general culture of protest or geopolitical issues that are little likely to change between two election cycles. The analysis also includes outliers to explain lack of protest or low participation in protests notwithstanding election manipulations. Four countries are selected from each region – Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria from Africa, and Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico and Peru from Latin America. These represent a rather diverse set of countries with different levels of economic and political development. Table 11 at the end of this chapter summarizes disputed elections in these eight countries, post-election protests, the key explanatory variables, and outcomes of those elections/protests.

These mini-case studies are based on research of scholarly articles and news releases, as well as eleven interviews conducted in the United States with country experts and international election monitors from those region – in September 2010 in Washington D.C. with International Republican Institute (IRI), International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), and Democracy International (DI) specialists, in January 2011 in Atlanta with the Carter Center

(TCC) specialists, and phone interviews through the course of my research with the Organization of American States (OAS) and TCC specialists and other country experts.

## 6.1 Africa

### 6.1.1 Ethiopia 2005, 2010

Ethiopia transitioned to multipartism during 1991-1994 after Mengistu's military regime was ousted by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) – a coalition of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and other ethnically based parties. Meles Zenawi of TPLF has been in power since 1991, first as interim president, elected Prime Minister in 1995, and reelected in 2000, 2005, and 2010. The opposition boycotted the 1994 Constituent Assembly and 1995 parliamentary elections and partially participated in the 2000 parliamentary election contesting only 20% of the seats due to lack of funds and poor organization.

The first truly multiparty parliamentary election was held in May 2005. The pre-election period was more competitive than ever before or after. The regime adopted electoral reform and leveled the playing field, improving the candidate nomination process, eliminating the requirement of 500 signatures for nominations, reducing the residence requirement for candidates from five to two years, making the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) more open and dynamic, giving opposition access to media, opening up debates among candidates, allowing peaceful rallies, and inviting international monitors. The main problems included opposition and civil society intimidation, hate speech, and severe restrictions on the types of domestic organizations that could observe elections (Carter Center 2005b).

The opposition contended the election with two coalitions – Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) composed of four parties and United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF)

composed of five parties. Other smaller parties contested the election. This was the first time for the opposition to built broad-based coalitions, but they suffered from poor organization and internal conflicts. The UEDF lacked cohesion, having brought together parties with contradictory positions on key issues of land and ethnicity, had little policy differences from EPRDF and campaigned for reconciliation transition government to include all political groups, including EPRDF. The CUD was formed by ideologically closer parties (including two former UEDF parties who had accused the forces abroad of affecting the coalition's strategies) and was better organized, but was criticized for its largely ethnic-based nature (Amhara) and service of its leaders in the former Mengistu regime (Arriola 2008). CUD – UEDF cooperation was limited at best both before and after the election (Harbeson 2005). The opposition was further weakened by internal conflicts after the election, e.g. CUD suffered from intra-coalition disagreements on whether to boycott the parliament and on the Somalia intervention issue.

The May 15 election was generally peaceful. Next day problems arose with vote count and tabulation, as well as intimidation and harassment. The election results would not be released until after three weeks to allow the votes of students to be returned to their home constituencies, viewed by EU observers as a risk of fraud (Harbeson 2005). As preliminary results from urban areas revealed a large lead by the opposition, both EPRDF and the opposition claimed victory. On May 16 a state of emergency was announced and the vote tallying was halted for a week. According to partial official results of May 27, the EPRDF gained majority. The opposition did not accept the election results. First, protests occurred in the capital, including June 6-8 student protests, and transportation strikes, which were met with excessive use of force by security forces, detentions and arrests of many opposition leaders and supporters. Negotiations between the ruling party and the opposition led to an agreement to establish ad hoc complaint resolution

mechanism to deal with over 300 complaints. As a result, elections were re-held on August 21 in 31 constituencies out of 178 investigated constituencies. The ruling party gained all contested seats as a result of the complaint resolution procedure, criticized by the Carter Center on the bases that the choice of the constituencies to have re-elections was not credible and re-elections suffered from the same problems of the May 15 election, including voting without checking ID cards or indelible ink on fingers, as well as pressuring opposition candidates to withdraw. Final results gave EPRDF 60 % and the opposition 31% of the seats, including CUD's 20% and victory for all 23 seats in the capital. Most opposition members (CUD) boycotted the Parliament. Mass protests broke out in November, responded by extreme violence. Nearly 200 civilians died, 800 were wounded, and tens of thousands of opposition supporters were detained (Wall Street Journal 1 June 2010).

The response of the international community to the political situation in Ethiopia has been mostly lenient as Meles' regime has been valued as a stable power in the troubled Horn of Africa (Harbeson 2005). The EU observers criticized the closing and counting procedures. TCC preliminary statement praised the competitive nature of the election, improvements in the electoral campaign, and a peaceful election day, and mentioned that "[m]any allegations were difficult to substantiate and at least some were exaggerations" (Carter Center 2005a). In its final statement the Carter Center concluded that "the majority of the constituency results based on the May 15 polling and tabulation are credible and reflect competitive conditions. However, a considerable number of the constituency results based on the CRB and CIP processes are problematic and lack credibility" (Carter Center 2005b, 10). Writing in September 2005, Harbeson (2005, 153-54) concluded that the post-election situation depended on the extent to which the opposition could provide its people and international community with clear evidence

of electoral fraud to counterforce the government's accusations of the opposition for post-election violence and EU observers for "allegedly releasing false information to the opposition, leading to the June 2005 violence and deaths in Addis Ababa." The EU information leakage certainly impaired the opposition's allegations of fraud and the international leverage on EPRDF, which repeatedly accused the EU for "contributing" to post-election violence (Africa News 29 August 2005).

The next national elections were held in May 2010, which virtually threw Ethiopia back to a single-party regime, with EPRDF and its affiliates winning all but two seats in the parliament. The main opposition contender was the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum (Medrek), which did not accept the election results and unsuccessfully challenged the NEBE decision in the court. Two days after the election, EPRDF held rallies celebrating its victory and protesting the Human Rights Watch critical report and the EU political agenda. The latter had strongly criticized the election but its report was not allowed to be presented in Ethiopia.

The lack of protest in 2010 can be explained by the increased level of repression, weaker opposition, and fewer international election observers. Relative political opening of 2005 was followed by deterioration in human rights conditions, and repression increased leading up to the 2010 elections, taking more subtle and insidious forms. The regime had learned the lesson of the 2005 election and took preemptive measures to win a peaceful election. The EPRDF enlarged its membership by over four times and increased the number of contested seats to 3.5 mln for the 2008 elections at kebele (village of several hundred households) and woreda (district) levels, and won 99.9% of them, meaning that on average every tenth resident (almost a member in each family) was both a kebele official and EPRDF member. It adopted repressive legislation in 2009 limiting human rights under the veil of increasing security. It constricted the political space and

widened its control over local administration, including introduction of sub-kebele level administration. It intimidated the opposition and created an atmosphere of fear. It constrained civil society evolvement in voter education and election observation allowing NGOs to engage in only one of these activities with NEBE licensing, and required NGOs to be mass-based to engage in democratization activities. It extended its control over media through restrictive legislation that imposed self-censorship as it criminalized writing about any organization the government labeled as terrorist and gave the government broad powers to initiate defamation suits, to impose financial penalties, and to deny licenses. It forced people to vote in its favor threatening to cut food assistance, jobs, and educational opportunities (HRW 2010).

Most importantly, the 2005 and 2010 elections differed in terms of opposition's chances for success, as many opposition supporters perceived the opposition unlikely to succeed in 2010 (Al-Jazeera 24 May 2009). The opposition was weak, poorly organized, and lacked coherent policy proposals (Guardian 26 May 2010). It had suffered from splits and emergence of new parties, as well as harassment and imprisonment of its leaders. It failed to challenge EPRDF having had "serious difficulties in coordinating its actions and establishing a powerful presence in all the regions" (EU EOM 2010, 9). Also, there were fewer international observers in 2010 and overall international criticism was weaker. It has been described as quiet diplomacy in face of Ethiopia's deteriorating human rights practices, conditioned by Ethiopia's role as a strategic partner in Africa for major donors though the 2010 election could have been denounced even before the votes were cast due to a repressive environment (HRW 2010). Unlike in 2005, the Carter Center did not observe the 2010 election due to late invitation. EU noted some improvements but concluded that deteriorations in the electoral framework application made the election fall short of international standards, particularly lack of transparency and a level playing

field (EU EOM 2010). The United States condemned the election, but its statements lacked rigor and were labeled “diplomatic understatement at its most impressive” that may only foster the regime (Wall Street Journal 1 June 2010).

Thus while the 2005 protests were made possible in an atmosphere of relative political opening and reduced state repression, and were encouraged by broad-based opposition coalitions, and partial condemnation of the election results by international monitors, the lack of protests in 2010 can be explained with less favorable conditions with respect to these three explanatory factors – high state repression, much weaker opposition cooperation, and involvement of fewer international monitors and soft international criticism of the elections.

### 6.1.2 Ghana 1992, 2008

Ghana, a democracy according to the Freedom House Freedom in the World ratings since 1996, is one of the success stories of political transition in Africa. Its political history has not been smooth always and as recently as in 2008 the country was on the edge of violence after very close elections. It enjoyed limited democratic experience between its independence in 1957 and 1964 when it became a one-party state, and it subsequently experienced four military coupes that interrupted failed attempts to transit to effective civilian rule. The last coup put Ghana on its path to constitutional democracy under Jerry John Rawlings’ leadership. In 1990 under both domestic and international pressure, the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) initiated transition to democracy and the April 1992 Constitutional referendum made Ghana a multi-party state. The PNDC reformed itself into a new party to compete in the upcoming elections.

On November 3, 1992 Jerry John Rawlings was elected president with 58.4 % of the vote. The opposition complained of unlevel playing field and alleged electoral fraud. Most problems were related to partisan electoral commission appointed by Rawlings, unreliable voter

registry and voter identification, underage voting, and inconsistencies in determining spoiled ballots (Lyons 1997). With a joint declaration the opposition demanded the Electoral Commission to withhold results until investigating all irregularities. Following protests in the capital and in other opposition strongholds, curfew was imposed for several days (Jeffries and Thomas 1993). Vigorous opposition protests pushed the country to "the precipice of civil conflict" (Carter Center 1992). There were four incidents of bomb detonation in the capital, arguably provocations to discredit the opposition. But the highly volatile environment was saved from collapsing into violence.

The opposition declared they would boycott the December parliamentary election if they were not supervised by an independent electoral commission with new voter registry and ID cards. Rawlings' National Democratic Congress (NDC) gained 189 out of 200 parliamentary seats in boycotted elections with 29% turnout. The opposition continued its struggle through rallies and conferences, and published its list of irregularities; "[r]ather than pursue their complaints through established legal channels that they considered biased, opposition parties made their allegations publicly and tried to undermine the new government's legitimacy. The NPP published The Stolen Verdict, a detailed list of its charges" (Lyons 1997, 70).

Arguably, international actors played a limited and indirect role in Ghana's political transition in the early 1990s (Gyimah-Boadi 1994). Of course, the fall of communism in Europe removed the Cold War era support for undemocratic leftist regimes like in Ghana and political opening in neighboring African countries contributed to the rise of Ghana's opposition Movement for Freedom and Justice, and compelled the ruling PNDC to restore the constitutional rule. The regime also started political opening to "preempt criticism" from international financial institutions who made development aid conditional on good governance and economic reform

(Gyimah-Boadi 1994). Finally international monitors were largely involved in 1992 elections but the PNDC used their presence to its advantage; "[f]or example, IFES's urgent plea for a new voters' register fell on deaf ears. And while international observers might have deterred blatant rigging on the day of the presidential elections, they could do nothing to ensure that the electoral playing field was level before that. In that event, their presence and endorsement served mainly to legitimize the dubious results of a dubious process" (Gyimah-Boadi 1994, 84). International observers accepted the election results and warned the opposition against the risks of taking their struggle to the streets. The Carter Center concluded that many irregularities could be attributed to "logistical problems" and there was no "systematic pattern" of electoral fraud (Carter Center 1992).

A major problem in 1992 was the lack of trust in electoral authorities as they were exclusively appointed by the ruling party. The independence of the Electoral Commission was enhanced by the 1993 Electoral Commission Act. Important electoral reform prior to the 1996 elections brought considerable improvements over the 1992 elections, and the 1996 elections were accepted by domestic and international actors. Interestingly the results of the 1996 presidential election remarkably resembled the 1992 results. NDC won a majority in the parliament, and Rawlings (NDC- Progressive Alliance) was reelected with 57.37% of the votes.

The electoral reform was a joint effort by the ruling party, the opposition, civil society, and international actors (Lyons 1997). In 1994 many political groups came together under the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) to discuss electoral reform. The Electoral Commission Chairman assured that concerns of all sides were heard and that the irregularities reported in The Stolen Verdict, though some lacking credibility, would not impair the 1996 election. International support was also significant, the United States encouraging participation in the

IPAC, and USAID and IFES providing financial and technical assistance for electoral reform. The Electoral Commission improved the voter registry that was the main problem in 1992, made the presidential and parliamentary simultaneous, and introduced transparent ballot boxes with numbered seals. Besides many international observers, party agents and civil society groups got actively engaged in elections.

Since 1996 elections have been credible and held orderly in Ghana. The 2000 election brought the first democratic presidential turnover. John Kufuor of New Patriotic Party (NPP) defeated John Evans Atta Mills of NDC in the runoff with 56.90 % vs. 43.10 % of the votes, and the NDC lost its majority in the parliament falling down to 92 vs. NPP's 99 seats (out of 200). In 2004 Kufuor was reelected and the NPP gained 128 out of 230 parliamentary seats.

Tensions strained during the 2008 close presidential election. The first round held on December 7, 2008 was peaceful, competitive, and transparent (EU EOM 2009; Carter Center 2008). The contenders were John Atta Mills (NDC) and Nana Akufo-Addo (NPP), plus six less significant candidates. NDC won plurality in the legislative election and a close second place in the presidential election. Tensions escalated leading up to the runoff, scheduled for December 28. The opposition did not exclude nonviolent means of protest – "Rawlings spearheaded the NDC's 'popular-resistance' movement. His campaign messages actually exhorted supporters to take up arms, and flanked by retired military commanders, he led emotionally charged rallies that climaxed with militaristic hymn 'Onward, Christian Soldiers'" (Gyimah-Boadi 2009, 143). Though the runoff was peaceful, there were instances of intimidation and violence, and the work of both party agents was impaired by the other side. A two-day delay in announcing the outcome exacerbated the situation. NDC protestors besieged the EC headquarters and demanded immediate announcement of their candidate as the winner. There was a parallel but smaller

protest by NPP supporters against alleged vote rigging in favor of NDC. The police and soldiers were stationed to restrain protestors. In a very tense atmosphere the opposition, the ruling party, and the security forces showed great restraint (Carter Center 2008).

As the election results were too close to call, the EC decided to hold elections on January 2, 2009 in Tain constituency that had not been able to vote due to logistical reasons. The NPP boycotted the January 2 election and did not send its party agents to the polls but it did not protests on the streets either. The final results showed John Atta Mills the winner with 40,586 vote difference or less than 0.5 % of the valid votes. The losing candidate immediately accepted his defeat, blaming his failure on "outgoing president's inadequate involvement in the campaign," low turnout of his supporters due to overconfidence in his victory, and allegations of vote rigging (Gyimah-Boadi 2009, 143-44). The EU and Carter Center observers endorsed the results.

Thus, the study of Ghana's elections supports the role of moderate repression in making protests after the 1992 allegedly fraudulent elections and the 2008 disputed elections possible. It challenges the role of international monitors with the example of the 1992 protests held in spite of international endorsement of the election results. In addition, the 2008 elections underscore the importance of credible domestic electoral institutions and civil society involvement in settling electoral disputes, when a highly volatile situation was rescued as the "highly-respected election commission announced the final results quickly and transparently, the winning candidate graciously accepted, and most importantly, the loser wasted no time in conceding the race and wishing his opponent well. Bloodshed was avoided and a new President was sworn in" (IFES 2009). Also, Ghana's vibrant civil society has greatly contributed to elections and the credibility of results, with over 7,000 domestic observers deployed in 2008 to observe polling and counting,

and eased post-election tensions by calling for peaceful elections and supporting the Electoral Commission's work. Parallel vote tabulation conducted by the Coalition of Domestic Observers provided transparency and credibility in the election results (EU EOM 2009) without which political tensions might have had a different course.

### 6.1.3 Kenya 1992, 1997, 2007

Between its independence in 1956 and political transition in early 1990s, Kenya for the most part was a single party state with Kenya African National Union (KANU) in power – de-facto during 1969-1982 and de jure during 1982-1991. In 1990 anti-regime social movements emerged and in 1991 under international pressure and donors' freeze on planned financial aid, President Moi conceded to limited political opening and multiparty elections. Leading up to the first multiparty election in December 1992, the opposition Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) reorganized into a political party, but split unable to choose a united presidential candidate, resulting in Matiba-led FORD-Asili and Odinga-led FORD-Kenya parties. Another major opposition candidate was former Vice-President and Health Minister Mwai Kibaki, who left the government and formed the Democratic Party (DP) (Brown 2001).

Daniel arap Moi of KANU won a fourth term with 37% of the votes in December 1992. KANU won 100 out of 188 elected parliamentary seats though it received only 30% of the votes (Brown 2001). The opposition rejected the election results but did not have a clear plan for protesting in the streets or boycotting the parliament. Under international pressure Moi had initiated minimal political opening by releasing political prisoners and dismantling one-party system, but as his regime survival was threatened he "orchestrated interethnic violence to divide the opposition along ethnic lines. The government refused to register millions of eligible voters in opposition strongholds, stacked the electoral commission with its supporters, and denied the

opposition access to the media and permits for rallies. Election day was fraught with problems, but voting was relatively calm" (Kelley 2012, 60). Domestic observers found the elections neither free nor fair but their reports came months after the election and received little attention (Brown 2001). Internationally the mere fact of holding multiparty elections was widely viewed as a hopeful step toward. IRI ambiguously concluded that although the election was not completely clean the result was not "altogether invalid" (Kelley 2012, 300). The Commonwealth observers endorsed the election announcing that "the evolution of the process to polling day and the subsequent count was increasingly positive to a degree that we believe that the results in many instances directly reflect, however, imperfectly, the expression of the will of the people" (Kelley 2012, 60). In retrospect, U.S. Ambassador Hempstone admitted that they should have called for the elections to be canceled given an unfair pre-election environment, or denounce the election results and support the opposition, which they failed to do due to fears of civil war (Brown 2001). As post-election violence erupted international monitors encouraged the opposition to pursue legal channels for their complaints.

KANU's victory in 1992 and lack of protests cab be attributed to divided opposition. But arguably FORD unity was not sufficient for opposition victory, and an all-encompassing FORD-DP unity was unlikely (Brown 2001). FORD unity would not necessarily mean a sum of the share of votes for presidential candidates Odinga and Matiba and would lead to alienation of some supporters. Only a completely unified opposition of Ford and DP could make opposition victory in 1992 possible, but "DP kept a certain distance from FORD and it never took a radical anti-KANU position [and] FORD would never let a man who had only recently left KANU lead their ground-breaking pro-democracy movement" (Brown 2001, 729).

Leading up to the 1997 elections, the regime negotiated with the opposition and made minimal concessions (Barkan and Ng'ethe 1998). Importantly, a culture of resistance and human rights mounted around constitutional reform (Brown 2001). Mass demonstrations under the leadership of National Convention Executive Council (NCEC) were on a rise demanding electoral reform. In response, state repression and tens of lives were lost during NCEC protests. Under international pressure and suspension of $400mln aid, the regime started negotiating with the opposition but made little concessions. Divisions within opposition served to the regime's benefit; the NCEC split, and moderates from both the opposition and KANU joined under the Inter-Parties' Parliamentary Group (IPPG) to discuss political reform. Donors backed IPPG but its agreements were not implemented as Moi suspended the parliament on November 10.

The December 1997 elections resembled the 1992 elections, particularly in terms of divided opposition, election fraud and results, and international election assessments. Moi was reelected with 40% of the vote. KANU secured only 87 out of the 200 parliamentary seats. The opposition unsuccessfully tried to unite around a compromise candidate – Charity Kaluki Ngilu of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). This highly improbable electoral alliance would probably have failed due to "credible allegation that KANU was prepared to use whatever means necessary to secure its victory" (Brown 2001, 730). First Odinga (NDP) and Kijana (FORD-Kenya) rejected the election results and demanded new elections, but later were convinced by Moi to cooperate with KANU, and only Kibaki (DP) unsuccessfully contested the results of the presidential election in the court (Brown 2001). International monitors accepted the results of the presidential election but questioned the legitimacy of the parliamentary election as the margins were very close. International monitors' and donors' assessments of the 1997 election were "too

generous" as again concerns about stability trumped democratization issues in Kenya (Brown 2001, 95).

The 2002 elections led to turnover. The opposition had united under the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and its candidate Kibaki was elected president. International monitors endorsed the election. President Kibaki recovered the economy, securing nearly 7% growth rate by 2007, rebuilt the agriculture and services sectors, and increased the flow if international aid. But Kibaki failed on his promise of constitutional reform, especially curtailing presidential powers and establishing a power sharing mechanism, and the ruling NARC disintegrated. Odinga and Musyoka left the coalition and formed the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) in opposition to Kibaki and his version of constitution, which was rejected in the 2005 national referendum (Gibson and Long 2009).

The 2007 elections were marked by high pre-election violence, relatively calm Election Day, mass post-election protests, violence, initial election endorsement by international monitors, but denouncement of the election as violence got out of control. Odinga led in preliminary results but with some delay the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) announced Kibaki the winner with 2% margin (46.4% vs. 44.1% of the votes), which caused unrest and violence. The main problems arose during vote count. IRI exit polls showed 6.2% less votes for Kibaki and 2% more votes for Odinga than reported by official results, thus indicating Odinga the winner with 46.1% vs. 40.2% of the votes. In addition, to win the presidential election a candidate had to win at least 25% of the votes in five out of eight provinces and the polls indicated more than 25% of the votes in only four for Kibaki and in six provinces for Odinga (Gibson and Long 2009). "The ECK's inability to maintain confidence in the vote produced widespread protest and violence. During December 2007–February 2008, Kenya experienced

shocking levels of post-election hostility: battles between government officers and ODM supporters; between members of both main political coalitions; and between various ethnic communities, particularly over long-standing land disputes. Crimes of opportunity also spread, adding to the intensity of disorder" (Gibson and Long 2009, 501). Until a power-sharing agreement was brokered by Kofi Annan in February 2008, post-election violence cost nearly 1200 lives, left 500,000 people displaced, and caused destruction of land and property.

The study of Kenya's elections supports the role of opposition cohesion and international monitors' criticism of elections for the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections. The lack of protests after the 1992 and 1997 fraudulent elections is best explained with a weak and fragmented opposition and international endorsement of the election results, while a united opposition and international condemnation of the election results facilitated mass mobilization against electoral fraud in 2007 even in a highly repressive and violent political environment. There is an alternative explanation that socioeconomic grievances caused the 2007 protests – a sense of exclusion by many ethnic groups would have eventually led to a political crisis and "the cauldron simply boiled over in 2007" (Githongo 2010, 2). However, this argument does not explain exactly why and how grievances materialized into mass mobilization in 2007.

### 6.1.4 Nigeria

Nigeria has had one of the most troubled political transitions in Africa. Between its independence in 1960 and its transfer to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria was governed by military rule for 29 years and experienced several military coups. Nigeria experienced a short transition to military rule under Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo who took power in 1976 and held multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections in 1979, which brought his National Party of Nigeria (NPN) to power, re-elected to power in the 1983 elections, marred by violence and allegations of

widespread electoral fraud. With charges of ineffective government, corruption, and incompetence, NPN was overthrown by a military coup in December 1983 and the Supreme Military Council was established to rule the country. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida took power in 1985 overthrowing his predecessor. Presidential elections were held on June 12 1993. The early results indicated that Yoruba businessman M.K.O. Abiola won the election but on June 23 Babangida annulled the election. Widespread protests followed, which were met with extreme repressions, leaving over 100 people dead. Under the pressure of protests, Babangida handed power to nonpartisan businessman Ernest Shonekan in August, overthrown in three months by then Defense Minister Abacha, who promised to return to civilian rule without announcing a timetable. The opposition boycotted the April 1998 elections held under military regime with all participating parties affiliated with the regime. Abubakar came to power after Abacha's death in June 1998 and held multiparty elections in 1999, ending 16 years of consecutive military rule.

The elections were contested by three geographical-ethnic based parties – People's Democratic Party (PDP), All (Nigerian) People's Party (ANPP), and the Alliance for Democracy (AD). ANPP/AD coalition ran with united presidential candidate Olu Falae. Obasanjo was announced the winner of the presidential election with 62.78 % of the votes and his PDP won 206 out of 360 seats in the parliament. Falae challenged the election results in the court. Post-election protests were limited as "major stakeholders in the elections – including political parties, candidates, and civil society – decided to sheath their swords, possibly appeased by the renewed promise of democracy. Because the election was meant essentially to disengage the military from politics, not much attention was paid to its credibility" (Omotola 2010). This explanation of lack of large protests against major fraud is shared in the International Crisis Group (ICG) and National Democratic Institute (NDI) reports (ICG 2007b; NDI 2007).

Both domestic and international monitors, including the Nigerian Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), Carter Center, NDI, IRI, and EU, strongly criticized the elections. “The registration process and all four rounds were marred, to varying degrees, by electoral irregularities, and sometimes, outright fraud” which in case of the legislative elections were widespread enough to question the elections’ outcome in certain electoral districts and in case of the presidential elections the disparity between the observed and reported number of voters made an accurate judgment about the outcome of the presidential elections impossible (NDI/Carter Center 1999, 10-12). Moreover, the elections were rigged grossly to avoid a need for coalition government (Omotola 2010). However, election observers did not reject the election outcome, fearing that the military would cling to power like after the 1983 elections; “none of the foreign observation teams, much less Nigerian observation efforts and civil society groups writ large, wanted to give the Nigerian military an excuse to scuttle the process and stay in power,” and the Carter Center/NDI concluded that  though the integrity of the election was affected by many irregularities, “no evidence indicating that the electoral abuses would have affected the overall outcome of the election” (Kew 2004, 142). Similar caution was expressed in domestic observers’ reports. As TMG was receiving evidence of “serious problems of electoral fraud and vote falsification” on the Election Day, it “faced a dilemma over how to respond to the high incidence of electoral abuses. While some TMG members felt that we needed to call for a cancellation of the vote, others urged caution, reasoning that a call to cancel the election could furnish the military government with an excuse to hang on to power. In the end, the TMG decided not to reject the results of the vote but to call attention to the electoral abuses in its report” (Nwankwo 1999, 163).

Similar problems impaired the parliamentary, presidential, governorship and state senate elections in April-May 2003. The elections were held in an environment of violence and intimidation with impunity. Hundreds of people were killed in violent pre-election clashes. In April-May at least one hundred people were killed during elections, violence being perpetrated mostly by PDP supporters. In many locations the vote did not take place due to intimidation and attacks on political parties, their supporters and the polling sites (HRW 2004). Obasanjo was reelected and his PDP retained parliamentary majority. Buhari (ANPP) came second in the presidential race, unsuccessfully challenged the results in the court, and called for mass protests on the presidential inauguration day, but ANPP governors refused to support Buhari's calls for protest and the inauguration day "passed fairly quietly" (Kew 2004, 164).

Domestic and western observers strongly criticized the 2003 elections. EU and NDI gave the most critical reports while the Commonwealth (CoW) and African Union (AU) reports praised the elections and were used by the government to legitimize the results. Most regrettably, important western countries endorsed the elections; "EU diplomats hailed President Obasanjo on his victory. The U.S. State Department raised some concerns about electoral irregularities, couched within a message of overall approval. The British foreign secretary noted that he was "disturbed" by reports of fraud, but his government lauded Obasanjo's 'clear mandate'" (Kew 2004, 163). International support for Obasanjo could be attributed to his key role in promoting regional cooperation, peacekeeping, as well as Nigeria's size and oil resources (HRW 2004, 44).

Leading up to the 2007 elections, the Independent National Electoral Commission tried to build trust in the election process through electoral reform. However, the 2007 pre-election missions of domestic and international organizations identified many problems that would affect the integrity of elections (NDI 2007). In the end, the 2007 elections turned out the worst in

Nigeria. The elections were characterized as a “do or die” matter for outgoing president Obasanjo and PDP, were held in an atmosphere of extreme violence, the results were massively rigged and denounced by domestic and international observers, as well as by some PDP members, the elected president had less legitimacy than any previously elected president in Nigeria, and overall the country moved closer to being a single party regime (ICG 2007b).

The pre-election environment was marked by violence and impunity. Threats against candidates and voters, armed attacks against rallies and polling sites, and assassinations of candidates were committed by party supporters against rival factions or rival parties. Security forces failed to suppress violence and became complacent with their inaction. About 280 people died in pre-election violence. The situation further deteriorated as Obasanjo declared the election “a matter of life and death” (NDI 2007, 25-26). His intention to stay in power was clear and must have added to the atmosphere of fear and violence as it was clear nothing would stop Obasanjo from realizing his plan (ICG 2007a). After the parliament defeated his effort to pass a constitutional amendment to allow his third presidential term, Obasanjo tried to delay the elections and install an interim government, then started eliminating strong presidential candidates and tried to disqualify the candidacy of then vice-president Abubakar. Finally he chose a weak successor to continue exercising real power beyond his term in office.

The main presidential contenders were Obasanjo’s hand-picked successor Yar’Adua, Muhammadu Buhari of ANPP, and Atiku Ababakar of Action Congress (AC). Yar’Adua was announced was announced the winner with 69.8% of the votes and PDP won 263 out of 360 parliamentary seats. Both local and international observers denounced the election results. TMG demanded the annulment of the election and re-run. The West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF), CoW, EU, IRI, and NDI all criticized the election as falling short of even Nigerian

standards and questioned the credibility of the results (ICG 2007b). Many problems were related to INEC incompetence and bias. For example, disqualifying Abubakar's candidacy, overruled by the Supreme Court on April 16, created a situation when 65 million ballots were to be re-printed in South Africa and distributed to constituencies for only four days before the April 21 presidential election. As a result the election started with a two hour delay and in many polling sites the ballots arrived later or never arrived (NDI 2007). The Election Day was marred with intimidations of voters and observers, under-age voting, ballot stuffing, theft of ballot boxes, announcement of result without elections in those constituencies, etc. (ICG 2007b). The Electoral Commission started announcing the results on April 22 though in many areas elections were delayed for a day. Moreover, the Commission announced Yar'Adua the winner with 70% of the presidential vote having received results from only 13 out of 36 states and without state-by-state breakdown of the results, thus in violation of the constitution which requires the winner to gain not only a majority of the votes, but also at least one-quarter of the votes in each of at least two-thirds of all states.

The opposition did not protest the results partly due to lack of cohesion and linkages to civil society (ICG 2007b). Spontaneous post-election protests were held against governorship elections, which were effectively suppressed and did not evolve into well-organized large protests. The opposition was divided and did not have a coherent message either before or after the elections. "Given the vigour of the initial condemnation of the vote by both foreign observers and local monitors, it might well have been possible to reject the results, if the opposition had reacted promptly with a definite plan for mass action towards that goal. But it was too divided, incoherent and slow" (ICG 2007b, 8). Later the opposition united under the Coalition of Presidential Candidates and demanded establishment of Interim National Government and new

elections, which was unconstitutional and was disapproved by the public as they still had bad memories of the 1993 ING followed by Abacha's dictatorship. Secondly, the opposition was detached from civil society, e.g. the Nigerian Labor Congress detached its May 1 Labor Day rally from electoral protests and refused to support them. Finally, a lack of alternative among the opposition to the regime may explain why the West accepted Yar'Adua's[54] victory (ICG 2007b).

The study of Nigeria's fraudulent elections and lack of post-election protests largely supports the findings in the quantitative analysis on the role of repression, opposition cohesion, and international assessment of elections. These factors impaired widespread protests after major fraud in 2007. First, the opposition was divided, incoherent, slow, and lacked connections with civil society groups, and its proposal to establish ING with a view to hold new elections was unconstitutional and unpopular. Secondly, the cost of protest was high given the environment of violence and impunity. Finally international monitors denounced the elections but major international powers supported the winners as they believed there could be no credible opposition challenge to the results. The same line of explanation may apply to the 1999 and 2003 elections.

## 6.2 Latin America

### 6.2.1 Dominican Republic 1990, 1994

Before the 1978 political transformation, the Dominican Republic was a hegemonic party rule for twelve years under Joaquin Balaguer (1960-62, 1966-78, 1986-96), who dominated

[54] Due to Yar'Adua's poor health and subsequent death in 2010, presidency was transferred to then Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, who was elected president in April 2011. PDP retained its majority position after governorship and parliamentary elections. Violence erupted in northern constituencies which supported opposition candidate Buhari of the Congress for Progressive Change. "While imperfect, the elections were considered Nigeria's most successful since its return to multiparty democracy in 1999" (U.S. Department of State 2011d).

presidential politics and used electoral manipulation to stay in power. After more competitive elections under pressure from the United States in 1978, elections became "crisis ridden," characterized by an atmosphere of distrust, allegations of fraud, violence and weak electoral authorities, as Balaguer once again attained power after the 1986 elections (Hartyln 1998). The 1990 and 1994 elections are described in a "two-step process: First, ballots cast were more or less counted; second, political transactions and negotiations based on these 'preliminary' results determined the final outcome" (Hartlyn 1998, 227). Under Balaguer repression was low and the military stayed neutral, but in the 1990s protection of political rights eroded as Balaguer tried to stay in power.

During 1986-1990 societal and political opposition were divided and Balaguer employed "strategies of co-optation, intimidation, and division against the opposition" (Hartlyn 1998, 200). Juan Bosch of Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) was the main opposition contender in 1990. PLD came strong after the 1986 elections, but overconfident of its victory in 1990 made strategic mistakes, including refusing to ally with other parties, entering into a conflict with the church, and favoring privatization of sugar mills (Hartlyn 1998). The Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) was weak and intraparty conflicts intensified between followers of Pena Gomez and Majluta in 1986-87. Eventually Majluta split and formed the Independent Revolutionary Party (PRI). In contrast, PRSC was strong; Balaguer had defeated internal challengers, effectively used opposition inter- and intraparty conflicts to his advantage, and allied with smaller parties, which gave him a narrow victory over Bosch – 35.5% vs. 33.8% of the votes (Hartlyn 1998).

PLD and PRD alleged that electoral manipulations in favor of Balaguer occurred but only PLD argued that the irregularities were of sufficient magnitude to change the election results and threatened to hold mass protests. It took two months after the elections for the Central Electoral

Board (JCE) to declare Balaguer the winner with 1.2% margin fueling allegations of fraud. The PLD responded by announcing a two-day “civic morning” on the inauguration day, asking people to stay home as a sign of protest. Eventually the 1990 elections were not protested; Bosch was against violence-prone protests and did not call his supporters to the streets.

In the absence of clear evidence of fraud, international monitors did not denounce the election results and declared that they did not have enough time and resources to make a definite statement on the fairness of the elections (Graham manuscript). Small NDI/Carter Center and OAS missions concluded that “the allegations of fraud were not substantiated” and discouraged on-street protests (Carter Center 1990, 7). Later evidence surfaced on purchasing of identity cards to prevent people from voting, military voting, multiple voting, etc. (Hartlyn 1998).

There was significant social protest in the 1980s and early 1990s against the stabilization program that Balaguer timed to implement after his 1990 reelection. Protests by popular movement associations increased starting the late 1980s, with many urban movements protesting against the consequences of Balaguer’s heavy construction programs and economic policies. Professional unions and organizations protested. Socioeconomic protests increased during 1991-1992 in response to Balaguer’s stabilization program. In June 1990 the Collective of Popular Organizations went to a two-day strike against the economic policies, PLD protested Balaguer’s inauguration on August 16, there was a major strike in November 1990, national strikes in 1991 against IMF agreement, a four-month long teachers’ strike in 1991, and many marches and demonstrations in 1992. Sixteen people died in July 1991 national strikes. A leading human rights activist disappeared in 1992. However, the political and societal opposition lacked a common goal and became more divided in response to Balaguer’s false promise to resign early.

Before the 1994 elections, the government accepted international expertise and financial assistance (USAID, IFES) to reform the electoral system, albeit with little commitment. In the beginning there were hopes that the situation could improve before the 1994 elections, and fraud was not anticipated. However, minimal reform was accomplished, and as enumerated in the Final Report of the Technical Assistance Project (March 1993-July 1994), major problems persisted that made transparent and credible elections virtually impossible (Graham manuscript).

The main opposition contender in 1994 was Gomez (PRD). His attempt to ally with Majluta failed but he allied with five smaller parties, former PLD members, and included PRSC's Fernando Alvarez Bogaert in the ticket as the vice-presidential candidate. PLD came divided after the 1990 election experience over building coalition strategies and collaborating with Balaguer, split in 1992, and a group of former PLD members eventually supported Gomez in 1994. PLD sought allies and formed the Patriotic Election Front. But PLD and PRD never tried to unite; "Bosch had retained a deep animosity against Pena Gomez since 1973, when the latter stayed with the PRD rather than accompany Bosch to the PLD. This animosity intensified in 1990 when Pena Gomez did not side with Bosch in the days following the elections. The PLD also did not consider an alliance with Majluta due to Bosch's firm refusal" (Hartlyn 1998, 239).

The main problem on the Election Day was the voter lists. Many people, predominantly PRD supporters, were not able to vote as their names were not included in the JCE voter lists. JCE extended the polling hours to allow voting by observed ballot, but its decision came after polling stations had closed, some polls did not reopen, and many disenfranchised people did not return. Among about 17,000 retuned voters, 75% voted for PRD and 14% for PRSC.

Unlike in 1990, the 1994 elections benefited from the presence of domestic ad hoc observer group Commission to Observe the Pact of Civility and larger international observer

missions (OAS, Carter Center, NDI, IFES) who denounced the results given “persuasive evidence” that “electoral fraud exceeded the PRSC’s alleged margin of victory” (Graham manuscript, 1). While the margin was 22,281 votes, it was estimated that about 45,000 people, mostly PRD supporters, were disenfranchised because of the voter lists. OAS threatened with sanctions and application of Resolution 1080. Also, the 1994 opposition leader – Gomez – was a more acceptable alternative for the United States than Bosch, who had created a Marxist party and then shifted to the center, still leaving some level of distrust. The United States did not accept Balanguer’s legitimacy but Dominicans were not fully sympathetic of the United States and Balanguer’s supporters rumored that Gomez and the United States intended to solve the Haitian problem with a unification of the two countries.

PRD demanded fresh elections. Like in 1990, the opposition was divided in the aftermath of the 1994 election. PLD did not join PRD in its protests, instead it considered cooperation with Balaguer more beneficial and the Pact for Democracy signed on August 10 more closely represented PRSC-PLD agreements, included Balaguer’s reduced term, new elections in eighteen months, two-round presidential elections, constitutional reform on the Electoral Board composition, possibility of voting by Dominicans abroad, and no immediate presidential reelection. Gomez had to make a strategic choice in 1994 – either to lead protests with potential violence, or show restraint and save the country from a potential civil stifle. Eventually, he chose peaceful protests though he mentioned repeatedly that he would not be able to always control his supporters. Protests started in the capital in May, and in July spread into different regions paralyzing business, transportation and education. But protests never became large-scale.

The JCE ignored its Verification Commission’s conclusion on possible deliberate irregularities with voter lists and officially announced Balaguer the winner on August 2

triggering a new wave of protests. A PRD supporter was shot in the back. Hundreds of students protested at the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo. The police fired tear gas. In August Gomez entered into direct negotiations with Balanguer, albeit presenting an inflexible position, and in mid August he signed a plan on constitutional reforms and new elections in eighteen months. Protests did not stop as some popular organizations refused to respect the outcome of the negotiations which they labeled “a bogus reward and a license for the leader to continue ruling the country” and called for a general strike on his inauguration day (BBC 12 August 1994).

Domestic pressure, and international mediation and pressure were important for the concessions made by Balanguer after the 1994 election (Hartlyn 1998). The 1996 elections marked democratic elections and transfer of power to PLD. Gomez led the first round but lost it to Leonel Fernandez of PLD in the second round (48.7% to 51.3%). Fernandez was supported by Balaguer in the runoff. Subsequent elections led to takeover by PRD in 2000, two presidential terms won by PLD in 2004 and 2008, and increasing marginalization of PRSC. Election results have been accepted domestically and internationally; yet significant problems remain with campaign financing and abuse of state resources by incumbents (Hartlyn 2008).

Thus, the study of elections in the Dominican Republic in the 1990s underscores the role of international election monitors’ condemnation of the election results for the occurrence of post-election protests. The case study partially supports the role of moderate repression in allowing moderate protests in 1994 in the presence of other factors conducive to protest, including clear evidence of fraud and international denouncement of the election results. It also partially supports the importance of opposition cohesion as its failure to cooperate after the 1990 allegedly fraudulent election impaired chances for post-election protests.

### 6.2.2 Haiti 2010-11

For the past 25 years Haiti has struggled in its transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. Popular uprising and a bloodless coup in 1986, both covertly supported by the United States, ousted repressive and corrupt dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier (Carey 1998). Provisional governments ruled Haiti until the first democratic elections in 1990, won with 67% of the votes by former Catholic priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In September 1991 Aristide was ousted by a military coup and stayed in exile until 1994 when he was reinstalled back as president with an intervention of a multinational force under UN mandate and U.S. leadership. Aristide's Lavalas Political Organization (OPL) in collation with smaller parties won the June 1995 parliamentary elections, endorsed by the U.S. government but strongly criticized by IRI and the Carter Center (Carey 1998). As the Haitian constitution bans successive presidential reelection, Aristide's first Prime Minister Rene Preval was nominated by Lavalas and won the December 1995 presidential election with 88% of votes, almost uncontested as most opposition parties boycotted the election and at below 25% turnout. This marked the first transfer of power between two democratically elected presidents. Later in 1996 Aristide left OPL and created a new political party Lavalas Family (FL), and OPL was renamed Struggling People's Organization.

The August 2000 parliamentary elections were highly criticized by the opposition and international donors and monitors, which led to the opposition united under Democratic Convergence to boycott the November presidential and senate elections. At estimated 5% turnout, Aristide was elected to a second term, starting a period marked by political violence and tensions between the government and the opposition that led to political stalemate (U.S.

Department of State 2011c). Armed rebellion, corruption and drug trafficking accusations, and lack of international support led to Aristide's resignation in February 2004 (Taft-Morales 2011).

Preval won the February 2006 election amidst disputes on vote calculation. The elections were considered "generally free, fair, transparent, and democratic by national and international observers" (U.S. Department of State 2011c). According to preliminary results, he gained less than majority, which triggered protests by his supporters, but after the Electoral Council decided not to count blank ballots Preval was announced the winner in the first round with 51.15% of the votes. In parliamentary elections FL gained plurality. Preval introduced political stability and economic growth. The 2008 increases in food and fuel prices triggered civil unrest and change in government in April, and the situation deteriorated after the August and September tropical storms and hurricanes which took many lives and exacerbated the level of poverty. Devastating earthquake struck on 12 January 2010.

In 2010-11 Haiti held elections for president, all of the Chamber Deputies, and one third of Senator. The first round of presidential and parliamentary elections was held on November 28, 2010. Nineteen candidates ran in the presidential race. Public opinion polls, which have not been very reliable in Haiti, rated former first lady and law professor Mirlande Manigat, Preval's chosen successor Jude Célestin, and famous Haitian musician Michel Martelly top candidates (Taft-Morales 2011). Lavalas was left out of the elections as its three rival factions were denied registration due to lack of Aristide's signature, and the party did not file a presidential candidate.

There was distrust in electoral authorities and anticipation of fraud that created a toxic environment detrimental to the conduct of elections (OAS 2010). The level of violence was high leading up to the elections and allegedly "during the first round of voting candidates and supporters of the ruling Inite party distributed weapons" (Taft-Morales 2011, 10). The election

day was marred by serious irregularities, including late opening of polling stations, many disenfranchised voters due to problems to finding the right polling station or their names on the registers, repeat voting facilitated by complicit poll workers and unidentified party agents, ballot stuffing in favor of the pro-governmental candidate, as well as deliberate acts of violence and intimidation. Radio stations aired complaints of thousands of such incidents and demonstrations by frustrated voters led to early closing of many polling stations. Flaring protests by thousands of opposition supporters were held in the capital. A few hours into the election, 12 out of 18 presidential candidates withdrew from the race alleging electoral fraud and demanded new elections. These included front-runners Mirlande Manigat and Michel Martelly, who reversed their statements next day and announced they were in the race, having realized a chance to win (BBC 1 December 2010). OAS criticized the withdrawal of opposition candidates, referring to the Electoral Law provision that "the interruption of the vote for whatever the cause and wherever cannot be considered a reason to cancel the elections" (OAS 2010).

The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) announced preliminary results on December 7. The turnout was 22.8%. Top three contestants – Mirlande Manigat, Jude Celestine, and Michel Martelly received 31.37%, 22.48%, and 21.84% of the votes. Close margins between the second and third candidates fueled tensions on who should continue to the second round or whether the election results should be annulled. Three days of violent protests by Martelly supporters followed the announcement of preliminary results.

The international reaction has also been a matter of criticism. The head of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti first called the process "going well" and later expressed his "serious concerns" (BBC 1 December 2010). In spite of enumerating serious irregularities in their report, OAS/Caricom concluded that those did not necessarily invalidate the election results

(OAS 2010). The mission has been criticized for an anti-governmental bias and its recommendation to annul the election results without full recount (Taft-Morales 2011).

Amidst political tensions, the government asked for OAS expert assistance to verify the first round results. The OAS team conducted statistical analysis of a national random sample of the vote count, which revealed a positive correlation between the level of turnout and the probability of serious irregularities at the level of polling stations, and reviewed results sheets from high turnout polling places. They recommended to exclude the votes from some of those high turnout polling places based on criteria in Haitian electoral law and to exclude some votes from all the candidates because of irregularities (Taft-Morales 2011). As a result of those recommendations Jude Celestin would fall to the third place. However, the Preval Administration first showed resistance to these recommendations and the OAS methodology was criticized by domestic and international organizations.

For example, the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) concluded that the "[m]ission's analysis does not provide any basis – statistical or otherwise – for changing the results of the first round of the presidential election" (Weisbrot and Johnston 2011, 4) and argued strongly for new elections based on "the exclusion of the country's most popular political party [among exclusion of around a dozen other smaller parties]; the exclusion of 12.2 percent of tally sheets; the 8.4 percent of irregular votes; the extremely low participation rate [27% of registered and 22.9% counted votes] and the disenfranchisement of hundreds of thousands of displaced people, they should reject this result and start over with a free and fair election, even if that takes more time to organize (Johnston and Weisbrot 2011, 2). However, OAS argued that the irregularities mostly affected the top three candidates and did not warrant a new election which would only involve more competition. Under international pressure, including revoking Haitian

official's U.S. visas, warnings by the United States on halting aid to Haiti, and U.S. Secretary of State Clinton's visit to Haiti, the Preval administration accepted the OAS recommendations. Upon reviewing the election results, the CEP announced the final results on February 17 sending Mirlande Manigat and Michel Martelly to a runoff on March 20.

The risk of outbreak of violence was high before the runoff, especially after an incident involving violent murder of three Manigat supporters. Before the second round Jean-Claude Duvalier (now charged with corruption and human rights abuses) and Aristide both returned from exile, against warnings by the United States and other international donors of a destabilizing effect that the latter might have on the elections, but these actors have been criticized for continued interference in Haiti's sovereignty (Weisbrot and Johnston 2011). Overall the second round was assessed as an improvement on the first round and as more peaceful and better organized (OAS 2011).

Martelly won the runoff with 67.5% of the votes. There were protests against the results of the second round parliamentary elections as the Inite party was announced to have won a majority in the Senate and plurality in the Chamber of Deputies. The post-election outrage was particularly directed against the National Bureau for Electoral Complaints and Challenges (BCEN) reversal of positions of nineteen congressional candidates, mostly benefiting Inite, this time in contradiction to OAS recommendations to return to preliminary results. The controversy led to a CEP Counselor's resignation and intimidation against media (OAS 2011). At least two people died in post-election violence (Taft-Morales 2011).

Haiti has not had large political protests. As Haiti country expert and political science professor Henry Carey explained in an interview, Haiti has flat civil society, largely explained by extreme poverty and the legacies of slavery and the U.S. occupation. The 2010-11 post-election

protests were not typical for Haiti but those were not large-scale protests, and relative political activeness can be attributed to Martelly's highly financed and well organized campaign, and international support for him to continue to the second round. Also, Haiti is a weak state with little advantages of incumbency or repressive capacity particularly due to the destructive earthquake and the UN peace keeping mission having effectively kept the state from developing into a repressive apparatus like it was historically thirty years ago.

### 6.2.3 Mexico 2006

Mexico experienced a gradual transition as a series of electoral reforms between the 1988 fraudulent elections and the 1997 legislative elections set the stage for the first alternation of presidential power in 2000. Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had held hegemonic political power in Mexico for 71 years, since it came to power in 1929, and for the first time lost governorship in 1989, its majority in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997, and presidency in 2000. PRI stayed in power without banning opposition parties or using systemic repression; rather its survival was based on authoritarian electoral institutions, its massive electoral support, and relative immunity to elite splits – though comprising ideologically heterogeneous political forces, the PRI created rules of the game that gave politicians more incentives to compete under PRI label rather than against it (Magaloni 2005). A series of electoral reforms between 1990 and 1997 were key for Mexico's protracted democratic transition. Nevertheless, the 2006 presidential election questioned the credibility of electoral institutions and the losing candidate, framing the election in the context of Mexico's history of fraudulent elections and relying on the past practice of concertacesións, mobilized hundreds of thousands of supporters against the election results.

The challenge against PRI hegemonic power came from within the party as in 1987 Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and his allies broke off and contested the 1988 elections under the Democratic Front – a left wing coalition led by Cardenistas – not only due to ideological disagreements but also due to little chance to advance within PRI as the president nominated the next party presidential candidate. The extent of electoral fraud in 1988 was not clear; the PRI may have needed to manipulate the election to win it, or it may have manipulated it to win with a larger margin and gain parliamentary majority. Losing candidate Cárdenas did not accept the results but he did not have the support of many opposition forces behind his campaign who instead chose to fight only for their parliamentary seats, and the National Action Party (PAN) accepted the results, having made a deal with PRI (Magaloni 2005).

The new administration invested tremendous resources in building credibility in elections through a series of reforms between 1990 and 1997. The first phase of electoral reforms between 1990 and 1994 focused on creating accurate voter registry, fraud-proof picture identification cards, the Federal Electoral Institution (IFE) to administer elections which gradually gained more independence, and the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary (TEPJF) to settle election disputes which through series of reforms extended its autonomy and gained final jurisdiction over electoral disputes, the Office of the Public Prosecutor for Electoral Offences (FEPADE) to bring electoral offenders to responsibility. Two months before the 1994 election the IFE was depoliticized as six citizen councilors were appointed by consensus by the three major parties, and they came to control decision-making in the Council over four party councilors with voting rights (two PRI and two opposition congressmen) and the president. As a result, the 1994 elections were more transparent and credible. Also, the quick count by domestic groups in the Alianza Civica confirming the PRI victory was essential for public acceptance of the results.

However, the playing field was unlevel as the ruling party enjoyed tremendous advantages in terms of access to media and money to spend on campaign (interview with Director of Americas Program at the Carter Center and political science professor Jennifer McCoy).

The 1996 reform made the competition more fair with improvements in campaign finance and access to media. It prohibited private finance and increased public finance with a mechanism of fair distribution of the funds among parties and allowed the IFE to purchase advertising slots to distribute among all parties. Previously headed by the Interior Minister, IFE became a permanent independent organ headed by a citizen chosen by consensus and approved by two-thirds of the Chamber of Deputies and the voting right in the Council was limited to eight citizen councilors. The reform made it difficult for any party to gain parliamentary majority – it kept the 300/200 division of seats in the Chamber of Deputies contested in single-member plurality and proportional  races but introduced 8% ceiling for the number of seats gained by a party above the percentage of votes it received in proportional vote. Direct elections for Mexico City mayor were introduced, as well as a possibility for Mexicans to vote from abroad (Carter Center 1997).

The electoral reform was a rational choice at the time for the regime given a change in the balance of forces in the society and increasing opposition power (Magaloni 2005).  PRI conceded to electoral reform before 1994 being confident of its victory in clean elections and at the same time facing growing opposition that could mount a serious challenge to the regime. Moreover, the atmosphere of political tensions and violence created by the revolutionary leftist Zapatista uprising in January 1994 and the assassination of PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in March increased the risk of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) joining the movement in protest of regime legitimacy in case the elections were not credible, and pushed PRI to hold more open elections (Magaloni 2005). However, there are more factors that

together pushed for the electoral reform (interview with McCoy). First, the movement against the hegemonic power of PRI started from within the regime with Cardenas breaking off in 1987 and with civil society pushing for electoral reform in response to what many believed a stolen election in 1988. Secondly, the international context was conducive to democratic transition – including the end of Cold War, a new drive for international democracy promotion, most of Latin America making a move to democracy, and the ambition of the Salinas government (1988-1994) to make Mexico a first world country for which they needed political legitimacy in the international arena. Thirdly, the Carter Center and other INGOs played a key role in training domestic nascent civil society groups that developed into Alianza Cívica to monitor elections, giving expert advice to electoral authorities, as well as publicizing the process of reform and making recommendations. Thus, there was the push from growing civil society for electoral reform, the regime's incentives for international legitimacy, and INGOs facilitating the process of electoral reform.

PRI had been steadily losing electoral support for several decades of its hegemonic political power, its image of an effective manager of economy suffered due to the 1995-1996 economic crises. PRI lost parliamentary majority in 1997 midterm elections and presidency in 2000. There is evidence that in 2000 voters set aside their ideological preferences prioritizing political change and strategically voted for the opposition party more likely to win. Though the opposition failed to create an all-encompassing alliance, the electorate coordinated their votes in favor of Vincente Fox of PAN - Alianza para el Camnio (Magaloni and Poire 2004). No party gained parliamentary majority. The elections were characterized "fully democratic" referring to independent electoral institutions, growing media independence, improved organization of citizens' groups, and the maturity of parties (Carter Center 2000).

The July 2006 elections questioned the credibility of electoral institutions, which have been key in Mexico's protracted democratization through elections (Klesner 2007). The elections were considered "free and fair" by most domestic and international observers, including the UN Development Program and the EU. But it lacked an important element of procedural democracy – "loser consent" (Eisenstadt 2007, 39). The main presidential candidates were congressman and former secretary of energy Calderon (PAN), Mexico City mayor Lopez Obrdor (coalition For the Good of All lead by PRD), and former governor of Tabasco Roberto Madrazo (PRI). Obrador led in pre-election polls, but overconfident of his lead, skipped the first debate losing his momentum, and at the end of the campaign the polls gave very close results (Klesner 2007a). The PAN- PRD campaign represented a choice between socially conservative and socially liberal political policies. Obrador campaigned with a populist message supporting economic aid to elderly and poor, and criticizing the PRI and PAN for their neoliberal policies. PAN got most of its support from industrial north and mostly Catholic west, while PRD received its support mostly from the poor south and the center. Calderon campaigned for economic continuity and stability. Controversially, President Fox got involved in campaigning for stability vs. change with a slogan "we have to change the rider but not the horse" (Moreno 2007, 16). In spite of economic stagnation in the first three years of Fox's presidency, Mexico managed economic stability and growth since mid 2003, largely explained by high oil prices, and many were worried about economic instability that Obrador could bring to the country and hence voted for continuity and for Calderon in 2006 (Moreno 2007).

In the evening of July 2 vote the IFE announced that the quick-count results were too close to call. The quick-count shows the trends of vote based on statistical analysis (robust, classic and Bayesian) of a random sample of polling stations, with 0.3% margin of error.

However, next day under PAN pressure it released the results, and the Bayesian test showed Calderon's narrow lead. The Preliminary Electoral Results Program (PREP), which gives quick information on the election outcome but does not decide the winner, showed an early lead by Obrador, but Calderon overtook him with a narrow margin. On July 4 Obrador revealed an exclusion of 3 million votes from the PREP results, which affected IFE credibility and fueled mass protests; "[t]he hitherto respected electoral authority found itself the target of mistrust by a left that considered the 3-million-sized "oversight" part of an establishment plot to cheat it of the victory it had earned. And in politics … perception becomes reality. The ghost of the 1988 fraud reappeared, and weapons began to be polished for the battle" (Aguayo 6 July 2006).

The official count started on July 5. Obrador led in the beginning, explained by initial accumulation of votes from predominantly PRD strongholds, and as more votes came from northern states, Calderon took a lead. On July 6 the official results were announced – Calderon defeated Obrador with 0.58% margin (the difference of votes was 233,831 votes out of 41.5 mln votes). Obrador demanded nation-wide recount of presidential votes. As a result of recount of 9% of the submitted ballot boxes, the TEPJF concluded that "discrepancies found during the re-count process were the result of unintentional human error, did not reveal any pattern that might raise suspicions of fraud" (EU EOM 2006, 3). On September 5 the Tribunal validated the electoral process and Calderon's victory with 0.56% margin.

PRD had started questioning the IFE impartiality months before the election on the ground that in contrast to the previous practice of choosing IFE citizen councilors by consensus, in 2003 they were chosen without PRD support (Eisenstadt 2007). PAN-PRD tensions have intensified since the former took power in 2000. In 2005, PAN and PRI legislators tried to impeach then Mexico City mayor Obrador on the ground of using private land to build a road to

a public hospital. Under domestic and international pressure the Fox administration dropped all charges allowing Obrador to participate in the 2006 race. Interparty tensions intensified in mid 2006 with smear campaign against Obrador in national television. PRD also complained of unlevel playing field, vote buying, smear campaign, and the incumbent's involvement in campaign which is illegal in Mexico, as well as Election Day problems of ballots found in trash, and illegal opening of ballot boxes by IFE. Though there were suspiciously few reports of vote buying incidents, allegedly the problem was widespread, especially targeting recipients of social benefits. Alianza Civica research showed that "significant percentage of social program beneficiaries have been approached by persons who would condition receipt of program benefits upon election outcomes" (Global Exchange 2006, 12).

Lopez Obrador led mass protests against the election results, at their peak gathering hundreds of thousands and a million supporters according to different sources. Protests continued well after the TEPJF validation of the election results, with 16 September and 20 November gatherings of "public assemblies of his supporters" where Obrador proclaimed himself the "legitimate president" of parallel government (EU EOM 2006, 1). Obrador framed his challenge in the context of Mexico's history of electoral manipulations against the gains by the left, and especially the fraudulent 1988 election. He also relied on the history of *concertacesión* between PRI and PAN in the 1980s and 1990s – second round negotiations to adjust election results employed before the creation of credible formal institutions for resolving electoral disputes. The prevalence of these talks was driven by the flexibility that they gave to negotiating parties as well as a lack of confidence in formal electoral and judicial institutions. For example, elected PRI gubernators would step down upon for an opposition candidate (mainly PAN) to take the office

after disputed local elections. However, coming to power in 2000 PAN signaled that the era of *concertacesión* was over (Eisenstadt 2007, 2004).

This was the "muddiest" election and "one third of Mexicans remain dissatisfied with the integrity of the election" (Aguayo 6 July 2006). At the same time it has been argued a misconception that the society was deeply divided – the post-election crisis was "the product of elite machinations, rather than of mass preferences" and there was more polarization among the elites than among their constituencies (Lawson 2007, 46). In any case, radicalization by Obrador cost him the support of many PRD leaders, and he gradually lost political relevance.

Thus, the study of the 2006 elections in Mexico seriously challenges the findings in the quantitative analysis on the role of opposition cohesion and international election monitors' criticism of elections for the occurrence of protests. Rather, mass mobilization after the 2006 highly disputed election was fueled by a lack of trust in domestic electoral institutions and vote count procedures, a very close margin of victory in favor of the governmental candidate, the charisma and popularity of the leading opposition candidate especially in the capital, and the framing of the election in the historic context of fraudulent elections in Mexico.

### 6.2.4 Peru 2000

Fujimori came to power in 1990, as a political outsider of Japanese descent and "antiestablishment leader… with an antipolitics, antiinstitutional discourse and practice" (Tanaka 2005, 262). After the 1978-1980 transition from military rule to democracy, Peru held regular elections that largely met democratic standards. Also, in spite of economic crises and political violence of the 1980s, Peru had a well developed and strong political party system, as well as vibrant and organized civil society with good links to political parties.

Fujimori's electoral victory in 1990 – unexpected second place finish in the first round and victory with 37.6% of the votes in the second round – can be explained by intraparty conflicts and strategic mistakes by political parties during elections. In the late 1980s the left was believed to have chances to come to power in Peru with its candidate Alfonso Barrantes but the United Left suffered from splits between reformists and revolutionarists. In 1989 and early 1990 rightist Mario Vargas Llosa of the Democratic Front (FREDEMO) was leading in the opinion polls, running with a free-market libertarian platform against the incumbent's unpopular nationalization policies. Vargas led the first round with 32.6% of the vote but lost the runoff, partly due to campaign errors made because of his overconfidence in victory. American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) candidate Luis Alva Castro did not have much chance to win because of intraparty conflicts and lack of the support by incumbent president Garcia who eventually endorsed Fujimori during the elections (Calderón 2001; Tanaka 2005).

Without a strong party base, president Fujimori largely relied on personalistic rule: "He has made no attempt to establish an institutionalized relationship to his mass base, relying instead on personalistic appeals and periodic spending projects. Rather than building a political party, he has created "disposable parties" – minimalist organizations that are created for a single election and then discarded" - Change '90 in 1990, New Majority in 1995, and Let's Go Neighbors in 1998 (Levitski 1999, 82) and finally Peru 2000. As the first serious step towards consolidation of his rule, on April 1992 Fujimori suspended the 1979 Constitution, dissolved the parliament, dismissed the judiciary, arrested many opposition leaders, put temporary military control over media and introduced rule by decree. The autogolpe was supported by 80% of the population, explained by Fujimori's success in stabilizing the economy in time and defeating the guerilla (Calderón 2001; Tanaka 2005). Though many believed that such steps were necessary to

fight against terrorism, to end the executive-legislative deadlock, and to stop economic downfall, there is evidence that the congress supported Fujimori's economic policies and had planned to reform the judiciary and counterinsurgency efforts. The reason behind the autogolpe was to strike on the parliamentary opposition and independent judiciary with plans to extend the executive power and personalistic rule (Cameron 1998, 127).

In November 1992 the Democratic Constituent Congress was elected and Fujimori's New Movement – Cambio 90 gained 44 out of 80 congressional seats. The new constitution was approved by 52.3% of the vote in the November 1993 referendum, amidst allegations of fraud and protested by united opposition under 'No' Campaign Command. The constitution replaced the limitation of immediate presidential reelection with a two-term limit, allowing Fujimori's reelection in 1995. Fujimori recovered the economy and defeated terrorist organizations, gaining high public approval. He also was supported by multilateral institutions and the United States, as an effective partner against drug trafficking. But his party base remained weak and many candidates supported by the regime lost in the 1993 municipal elections (Tanaka 2005).

In 1995 Fujimori was reelected in "free and fair" elections with 64% of the vote in the first round and his movement won 52% of the votes in parliamentary elections. In spite of opposition unity in 1993 against the constitutional referendum, the opposition went to the 1995 elections divided, together receiving only 6.3% of the presidential vote and 14.8% of the congressional vote (Tanaka 2005). Thus the opposition lost legislative power election after election, while Fujimori consolidated his personalistic rule and his movement gained legislative majority. After Fujimori's 1995 reelection, the regime became increasingly authoritarian and initiated new tactics to stay in power. Facing a weak opposition that was unable "to surmount their collective action problems," in 1996 Fujimori pushed through the legislature "Law of

Authentic Interpretation" according to which his first term under the new constitution started with his 1995 re-election and thus he could run for reelection in 2000. This caused political tensions but eventually the opposition failed in its attempt in 1997 to initiate a referendum against Fujimori's eligibility to run in 2000 (Tanaka 2005; Calderón 2001). Leading up to 2000 elections, Fujimori recovered his public approval, which had declined in 1996-98.

In 2000 the opposition lacked a common strategy and a clear message, having mostly developed a negative message and lacking a clear alternative to the regime (Tanaka 2005). A divided opposition fought for the second place in the first round as they believed Fujimori would not win majority in the first round. There were several opposition candidates with high popularity months before the election, including Lima Mayor Alberto Andrade, but closer to the election independent Alejandro Toledo became the main opposition candidate.

The pre-election statements by NDI/Carter Center[55] identified many problems that impaired public confidence in elections, including lack of opposition's access to media, media bias, smear campaign against opposition, intimidation of opposition leaders and their supporters by the national tax agency, harassment of opposition leaders by the state security agencies, abuse of state resources, and impunity for perpetrators of electoral irregularities (NDI/Carter Center 2000).

The April 9 election was peaceful but the process of vote count raised suspicions of fraud. Common problems on the Election Day were illegal propaganda, intimidation of party agents by the police, ballots pre-marked for Peru 2000 or missing Toledo's Peru Possible. The main problems started with the vote tabulation and count and the National Electoral Processes

[55] Peruvians had requested the presence of President Carter. Neither the Carter Center nor the NDI had been involved in previous Peruvian elections. OAS had been present and had built a reputation of a more politicized organization because of its member-state structure and whitewashing earlier congressional elections that involved fraud. Headed by the former Dominican Foreign Minister Latorre, OAS was key role in these elections (interview with McConnell).

Office (ONPE) computer system. Exit polls by three organizations showed either a tie or a lead by Toledo over Fujimori. Quick count by well-respected Transparencia gave Fujimori a lead. None of those counts gave Fujimori more than 48.8% (NDI/Carter Center 2000). Disagreements among different counts, delays in vote tabulation and lack of transparency in the ONPE computer systems caused suspicions of vote manipulations and as Fujimori's votes were getting closer to 50% people marched with Toledo to the government palace in protest of fraud. Though Toledo's capacity to organize protests was lower because he did not come from an organized political party, his own actions and features of a leader mobilized people - his indigenous looks and his background of coming from an indigenous poor family, his image of a man of people, his credibility as a leader, his decision to march with people in protest of fraud in spite of odds of violent pushback from the regime, etc. As the march was aired by the cable station, people with access to cable station – mostly the upper middle class – saw a leader in Toledo and saw the government trying to use dirty tricks to stop the peaceful protest, which fueled their suspicions of government's manipulating the vote count (interview with former Associate Director of Americas Program at the Carter Center and professor of government Shelley McConnell).

As international monitors and Transparencia PVT showed a lead by Fujimori but not a victory in the first round, the JNE announced the runoff scheduled for May 28. But the authorities did little to improve the electoral process before the runoff and rejected OAS recommendation to delay the runoff date. Fujimori was not particularly concerned about the international community as he did not have a legitimacy problem domestically and relied on "plausible deniability" to face international monitors' criticism (interview with McConnell). On May 18 Toledo announced about his boycott of the runoff. Subsequently, international monitors decided not to observe the runoff, which Fujimori won unopposed with 51% of the votes.

Mass protest was held on July 28 against Fujimori's inauguration. In spite of preventive measured and atmosphere of intimidation, including hindering travel of people from different regions to Lima, deployment of 30,000 troops and 30 tanks in Lima, about 100,000 opposition supporters marched in Lima. "Peruvian security forces in many instances treated demonstrators with a disproportionate amount of force, including heavy use of tear gas and numerous arrests and detentions of peaceful protesters" (NDI/Carter Center 2000). About 100 people were wounded and at least five people died in government buildings burned to ground (Militant 21 August 2000). Protests continued months after the election but they did not cause Fujimori's resignation: "[i]t was no longer possible, as it had been in the 1980s, to build real power on the basis of popular mobilization" and the 2000 protests were "spontaneous and unorganized and had little capacity to disrupt production or the provision of essential services" (Tanaka 2005, 285).

Rather, the regime collapsed shortly after Fujimori's second reelection, triggered by a scandal of Fujimori's intelligence adviser Vladimiro Montesinos' bribing congressmen to defect to Fujimori's political alliance. Though it has been argued that the exposure of the government's involvement in arms sale with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia was key for a change in U.S. support of Fujimori and consequentially his resignation (Donno 2008), international election monitors have downplayed the international side of the explanation, arguing that the corruption scandal was so detrimental for Fujimori's domestic support that he could no longer rely on the army or seek international legitimacy, and had to step down (interviews with Carter Center experts). The first corruption videotape was aired on September 14 and in two days Fujimori announced about holding new elections, which he did not contest and resigned in November. Many Peruvians, especially the upper middle class, were supportive

of Fujimori in spite of his authoritarianism which was believed necessary to fight the terrorists and guerilla and to recover the economy. But his image of a great uncorrupt administrator was shattered by the corruption scandal and his rule "expired like a balloon that was not punctured but simply deflated, flying around aimlessly with a *pfft* after its protective knot came loose. Fujimori fell because forces from within his own ranks tore aside the veil to let people peep into the rotten world of corruption inside. Public indignation did the rest" (Calderón 2001, 47).

Thus on one hand, neither post-election protests nor international monitors' criticism of elections had enough weight to end Fujimori's rule. But had there been clear uncontested elections and no criticism by international monitors, would the congressman who released the initial corruption videotape have had the courage to do so? Also, if Fujimori's reputation had suffered during elections, he might have succeeded in his attempt to apart himself from the scandal, though corruption of that magnitude would be unbelievable without the knowledge of the head of the state. So, the reaction to the electoral fraud may have been a necessary but insufficient condition for Fujimori's resignation (interview with McConnell).

In 2001 Peru had peaceful and democratic elections won by Alejandro Toledo, endorsed by domestic and international election observers. In their preliminary statement after the runoff NDI/Carter Center called the 2001 election "an extraordinary accomplishment in the process of returning Peru to the world community of democracies" (NDI/Carter Center 2001, 1).

The study of the 2000 elections in Peru strongly supports the findings in the quantitative analysis on the effect of state repression and international monitors' assessment of elections on the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections. As the vote count raised speculations of election manipulation, the leading opposition candidate (albeit in the absence of opposition cooperation but possessing strong credibility and authenticity as a leader) mobilized mass

protests against the election results facilitated by international election monitors' criticism of the election and their refusal to monitor the second round, as well as moderate level of state repression.

Table 11: Protests after disputed elections in selected African and Latin American countries

| | Post-election protests | Presidential race | Repression* | Opposition cohesion | Endorsement of elections by IEMs | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethiopia 2005 | Yes/ violent | No | High/relatively open playing field | Partial | Partial | No improvements in civil liberties and political rights. The regime consolidated its power before the next elections. |
| Ethiopia 2010 | No | No | High | Yes/ but weak, poorly organized | No/fewer monitors | The country slid back to a single-party rule. |
| Ghana 1992 | Yes | Yes | Moderate | No | Yes | Electoral reform including credible domestic election institution, improvement in political rights and civil liberties. |
| Ghana 2008 | No | Yes | Moderate | No | Yes | The election outcome was not disputed but there were tensions after the first round as both the incumbent and the opposition alleged irregularities but the situation was resolved by the credible electoral institution. |
| Kenya 1992 | No | Yes | High | No | Partial | Deterioration in political rights and civil liberties. |
| Kenya 1997 | No | Yes | High | No | Yes | The regime started negotiating with the opposition leading up to the election but made minimal concessions before the election and no meaningful reform after the election. |
| Kenya 2007 | Yes | Yes | High | Yes | No | Power-sharing agreement was brokered between the regime and the opposition after violent political crisis. |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nigeria 1999 | No | Yes | High | Partial [a] | Yes | No electoral reform, deterioration in civil liberties. |
| Nigeria 2003 | No | Yes | High | No | Partial | No political/elecoral reform. |
| Nigeria 2007 | Yes/ sporadic | Yes | High | No | No | The attempts of electoral reform before the election failed, the quality of elections deteriorated, the country moved closer to a single-party rule, deterioration in political rights. |
| DR 1990 | No | Yes | Low/ moderate | No | Yes | No immediate reform, engagement with international experts and donors to make electoral reform leading up to the 1994 election but with little commitment. Deterioration in political rights. |
| DR 1994 | Yes/ moderate | Yes | Low/ moderate | No | No | Under domestic and international pressure the regime made concessions, including new elections in 18 months, two-round presidential elections, and constitutional reform on the electoral board composition. |
| Haiti 2010-11 | Yes/ low scale | Yes | Low | No | No | Following OAS recommendations and protests after the first round of the presidential race two opposition candidates moved to the runoff leaving the incumbent candidate the third place. |
| Mexico 2006 | Yes/ widespread | Yes | Moderate | No | Yes | No electoral reform |
| Peru 2000 | Yes/ widespread | Yes | Moderate | No | No | Though the protests and IEMs' criticism of the elections did not oust the incumbent, they paved a way for his resignation and announcement of new elections following a corruption scandal a few months after the election. |

Note: *State repression is assessed using Gibney/Dalton Political Terror Score used in quantitative analysis as well as accounts from international election monitors reports, scholarly articles and news.
[a] There was a joint APP/AD opposition candidate for presidency but these opposition parties contested the parliamentary and local elections separately
.

## 6.3 Conclusion

Notwithstanding a few challenges, the mini-case studies of selected African and Latin American elections strongly support the findings in the quantitative analysis on the effect of protest's cost and likelihood of success on the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections. The mini-case studies put the effect of these variables in a context and illustrate the ways in which they either facilitate or impair mass mobilization after fraudulent elections. Table 12 at the end of this chapter summarizes the main arguments pertaining to the effects of state repression, opposition cohesion, international monitors' assessment of elections, and the type of election on the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections in the African and Latin American mini-case studies. Rather than repeating the arguments summarized in the table, below I add nuances to those arguments as well as other key features of electoral politics from the mini-case studies.

The comparison of Ethiopian elections in 2005 and 2010 provides an example of a country slightly opening up the political arena under domestic and/or international pressure, but as the incumbents were not ready to give up power, they stole the 2005 election, repressed the opposition, and slid back into a de facto single-party regime after the 2010 election. It supports the findings in the quantitative analysis on the effect of state repression, opposition cohesion and international monitors' criticism of elections on the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections. While reduced state repression and relative political opening before the 2005 election made post-election protests possible, high state repression best explains lack of protests after the 2010 election. Also, protests in 2005 were facilitated by opposition coalition CUD – the better organized and more coherent of the two coalitions – which led transportation strikes in the capital disrupting business and held the largest campaign rallies and post-election protests, as

well as by international criticism of the elections (EU), though the outcome was not denounced in the absence of clear evidence of fraud (Carter Center).

Ghana and Mexico highlight the importance of developing independent and impartial electoral institutions and the role of domestic observers for the integrity of elections and acceptance of the results. The latest presidential elections in Mexico (2006) and Ghana (2008), both close, controversial, and highly protested, show different ways in which electoral authorities that have been key for democratization in those countries handled the election disputes amidst post-election tensions, leaving a third of the population questioning the integrity of the electoral process in one country and facilitating peaceful turnover in the other. Ghana's political transition since the 1990s has unfolded very differently from other countries in the region, with credible elections since 1996 and two democratic turnovers. Its success underscores the importance of political moderation and incrementalism for democracy and nation building (Gyimah-Boadi 2009); the opposition disappointed with the rigged elections in 1992 exercised restraint and opted for peaceful boycott of parliamentary elections and documented electoral irregularities, the ruling party on its turn conceded to the opposition and international donors' demands for electoral reform, and resisted the temptation to violate the two-term limit of presidency, and the losing governmental candidates have shown readiness to accept defeat at polls.

But importantly, Ghana being a relatively small country, has not been affected by big group divisions like in Nigeria or ethnic-based parties like Kenya, and has avoided electoral violence (interview with an international election monitor). Also, unlike Kenya and Nigeria, moderate level of repression in Ghana has allowed mass protests after the 1992 allegedly fraudulent election and the 2008 disputed election.

Kenya and Nigeria are comparable for their fraudulent elections, but unlike in Kenya, Nigeria has not experienced much political protest. Unlike in Kenya, the populace in Nigeria has never really expected the elections to be fair and their emotions have not been greatly involved to outburst in electoral protests, and even strong condemnation of elections by international monitors has not led to protests. Unlike in Nigeria (2007), Kenya experienced relatively peaceful turnover in 2002, several factors having been conducive to this transition (absent in Nigeria) – the ruling party's concessions under domestic and international pressure to relatively open up the political playing field before elections, a united opposition, splits within the ruling party, high expectations of opposition supporters to succeed at the polls, strong public pressure to announce the winner and hold inauguration even before the official results were announced, and strong presence of a domestic observer group and international monitors. Disappointment with the new administration's failure to carry out political reform added up to the tensions in the next electoral cycle and led to large protests against electoral fraud in 2007, confirming the importance of opposition unity and international condemnation of elections for the occurrence of protest after fraudulent elections. Also, Kenyan elections in the 1990s show how (western) monitors may endorse highly fraudulent elections fearing escalation of violence in the country. This readiness to accept a certain level of fraud (more by western governments than by monitors) for the sake of security, fear of a military takeover and geopolitical interests is even more typical for Nigeria.

Dominican Republic and Haiti have not experienced large-scale electoral protests in spite of history of fraudulent elections. Dominican leaderships in 1990 and 1994 did not favor street protests with potentially violent consequences and detrimental effects on the economy and foreign tourism, and international actors and especially the U.S. discouraged violence. Also few widespread electoral protests in Latin America in general may be related to the fact that

opposition parties are better organized and see higher risks of protest. Moderate protests in Dominican Republic in 1994 highlight the importance of organized opposition, clear evidence of electoral fraud, and international condemnation of the elections, all in contrast to the 1990 elections that were not protested and lacked these factors. Relative political activeness in demonstrations after the 2010 presidential election in Haiti was facilitated by Martelly's strong and well financed campaign and international support for him to continue to the runoff. Interestingly, in Haiti the level of protest against elections (and the anticipated outcome) may be better expressed in low turnouts in elections, e.g. the turnout was 28% in 2010 and below 5% in 2009 Senate elections, partly due to the exclusion of Lavalas (interview with an international election monitor).

Peru 2000 is one of the examples of widespread post-election protests in the region. The personality and leadership characteristics of the front running opposition candidate proved important for mobilizing supporters as the vote count problems after a very close race raised suspicions of electoral fraud, and international monitors criticized the electoral process and refused to monitor the second round without safeguards of an improved process. Though neither domestic protests nor international monitors' condemnation made the regime step down, they were important conditions for Fujimori's resignation once the corruption scandal blasted his regime.

Table 12: Summary of main arguments from the analysis of African and Latin American mini-case studies

| Case studies | *Repression* | *Opposition Cohesion* | *International Election Monitors* | *Presidential vs. Parliamentary Elections* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethiopia | (+)While reduced state repression and relative political opening before the 2005 election made post-election protests possible, high state repression best explains lack of protests after the 2010 election. | (+)Opposition cooperation encouraged post-election protests in 2005 and much weaker opposition cooperation in 2010 resulted in no protests. | (+)The opposition mobilized protests in 2005 with partial condemnation of the election results by international monitors and failed to mobilize protests in 2010 with less international monitors present on the ground, local ban on the release of the EU assessment report, and overall soft international criticism. | No variation in the type of the elections - Ethiopia holds direct parliamentary and indirect presidential elections.<br>Widespread protests are possible after parliamentary elections in parliamentary systems. |
| Ghana | (+)Moderate state repression made protests after the 1992 allegedly fraudulent election and the 2008 disputed election possible. | (+)Opposition cooperation after the 1992 elections facilitated post-election protests. | (-)International condemnation of elections is not a necessary factor for the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections. In 1992 the opposition protested in spite of international endorsement of the election results. | (+)Presidential elections are more prone to electoral protests and disputes. |
| Kenya | (partial) High repression suppressed acts of protest in the 1990s but it did not prevent mass mobilization in 2007. | (+)Fragmented opposition - lack of protests in the 1990s; opposition cohesion facilitated mass mobilization after the 2007 election. | (+)Lack of protests in the 1990s goes with lenient international assessments of elections; protests in 2007 were encouraged by international condemnation of the elections. | (+)Presidential elections are more prone to protests and conflicts. |
| Nigeria | (+)High state repression and violence have prevented protests after fraudulent elections. | (+)Weak and fragmented opposition has impaired mass mobilization after fraudulent elections. | (-)International condemnation of elections is not a sufficient factor for the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections. | Neither presidential nor parliamentary elections were protested. |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dominican Republic | (partial)Moderate state repression allowed moderate protests after the 1994 elections with a clear evidence of electoral fraud and international condemnation of the election results. | (partial)Opposition's failure to cooperate impaired mass mobilization after the 1990 allegedly fraudulent elections. | (+)International monitors' denouncement of election results in 1994 given clear evidence of election fraud encouraged moderate protests while international endorsement of the 1990 allegedly fraudulent elections impaired mass mobilization. | (+)Presidential elections are more prone to protests. |
| Haiti | (+)Low state capacity for repression allowed protests (low-intensity) after the 2010 presidential election. | (+)Well organized and financed campaign of an opposition candidate facilitated low mobilization against the results of the first round elections in 2010; lack of opposition cohesion may explain lack of moderate or widespread protests in Haiti. | (+)OAS recommendations on the revision of the first round results in favor of an opposition candidate may have encouraged low protests for that candidate after the first round. | (+) Presidential elections are more prone to protests. |
| Mexico | (+)Moderate state repression allowed widespread protest after the disputed 2006 election. | (-)A united opposition is not a necessary factor for the occurrence of widespread protests after disputed elections. | (-)International election monitors' denouncement of the election results is not a necessary factor for the occurrence of widespread protests after disputed elections. | (+) Presidential elections are more prone to protests. |
| Peru | (+)Moderate repression allowed widespread protests against the 2000 election results. | (-)Opposition unity is not a necessary factor for the occurrence of widespread protests after fraudulent elections. | (+)International monitors criticism of the election results encouraged widespread protests. | (+)Presidential elections are more prone to protests. |

Note: (+) denotes the case study strongly supports the finding in the quantitative analysis on the effect of the given explanatory variable on the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections, and (-) denotes the case study challenges the finding in the quantitative analysis on the effect of the given explanatory variable.

# CHAPTER SEVEN

## Conclusion: The Implications of This Research and Thoughts for Future Research

> "Among the 400 arrested: a one-armed man charged with taking part in the clapping protests and mute person accused of shouting antigovernment slogans."
> *Christian Science Monitor, 8 July 2011.*

The above is an extract from a news article describing indiscriminate arrests of protestors in Belarus in July 2011. Indeed, an officially registered disabled man with only one arm was arrested while passing by clapping protests and trying to take a picture with his cell phone, was convicted of applauding in public, and was fined $200 – twice as much as his monthly pension. Another disabled man – deaf and mute – was arrested with charges of shouting antigovernment slogans. And these are only two examples of the absurdness of Lukashenka's repressive regime. What is really puzzling is the readiness of people to protest in such repressive regimes with unlimited arbitrary powers.

And if one arm can clap and a mute can shout, then it is not surprising that popular protests can oust dictators, some stronger and some weaker than Lukashenka. As most of these regimes hold regular elections seeking domestic and international legitimacy but manipulate the electoral process and the outcomes to guarantee regime survival, popular protests against electoral fraud have become important agents of regime transition and democratization. Unfortunately in over half of the cases fraudulent elections are not protested. Notwithstanding a growing interest among democratization scholars in the electoralist path to democracy and the role of electoral protests in the successful diffusion of this model, protests after fraudulent elections have largely remained understudied and undertheorized in the existing literature.

The present research refines the collective action theory of electoral protests, conducts up-to-date the most systematic analysis of the effects of the cost, benefit, and likelihood of success of protests on the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections in a large-N quantitative analysis, examines the effect of key explanatory factors identified in quantitative analysis in more details in case studies of selected countries from different regions, and uses a set of extensive interviews conducted with politicians as well as domestic and international election experts to test the validity of these findings and to identify other key but overlooked factors.

The quantitative analysis shows that the odds of protest after fraudulent elections are greater when the level of state repression is moderate (especially producing moderate protest) with a possible backlash effect of very high repression (especially leading to widespread protest), when the opposition is united (especially leading to widespread protest), when international monitors denounce election results, and when there is a race for presidency involved. The benefit of protest argument is only partially supported by the analysis. While fraudulent elections are protested more often than relatively clean elections, the level of fraud does not explain the occurrence of protests in the sample of fraudulent elections.

As an important contribution to the literature, the research addresses conflicting arguments about the relevance of cost-benefit calculations for participation in protests. With respect to the effect of state repression on protests, the research finds that no protest or low protests are more likely than moderate protests when the level or repression is either low or high, and hence an inverse U-shape relationship between repression and protest. In fact, this finding is consistent with the political opportunity theory of social movements discussed in the theoretical chapter. It holds that on one hand non-repressive/inclusive state strategies to deal with challengers preempt protest, and on the other hand repressive state strategies prevent or suppress

mobilization. And as the theory suggests and the present research confirms, the effect of repressive strategies on the occurrence of protests is less definite as repressive strategies may also radicalize the challengers and have backlash effect on protests. The research further clarifies that very high repression increases the odds of moderate protests to escalate into widespread protests.

The case studies largely support the findings in the quantitative analysis on the effect of state repression on protests. For example, moderate repression in Armenia and Georgia created opportunities for widespread protests after fraudulent elections. The lack of post-election protests in Russia is primarily associated with high state repression, especially under Putin. And unlike in Belarus where the level of repression further increased leading up to the 2006 election and triggered unprecedented widespread protests against electoral fraud, consistently high state repression in Russia has not back-fired as the Kremlin has managed to prevent post-election protests by refraining from election-day large-scale fraud and intimidations, and instead has relied on pre-election manipulations and preemptive measures, especially filtering unwanted candidates, and controlling the election campaign.

It should be noted that the predictive power of state repression for the occurrence of protests is not strong. On one hand, a move towards either end of the continuum of state repression (low or high) may have the same effect on protests (no or low protest), and it is not easy to delineate among low, moderate, and high levels of repression especially in cross-country comparisons. It is easier to notice a movement along the continuum of state repression looking at one country across time. For example, relative and temporary thaw of regime leading up to 2005 elections in Ethiopia and to 2010 elections in Belarus (falsely) reduced the perception of the cost of participation in protests and triggered mass protests against electoral fraud. On the other hand,

high state repression can have radically different effects on protest, and it is difficult to determine when repression becomes too high for people to bear even in a single case study analysis.

With respect to the effect of opposition cohesion, quantitative analysis finds that the presence of united opposition helps overcome the collective action problems of protests and helps to advance from no protest and/or low protest to moderate and/or widespread levels of protest. A united opposition has this effect on protest mobilization primarily by offering a more coherent and positive message to the public, as well as a viable alternative to the regime. However, uniting their forces may involve certain risks for the opposition, as it may alienate some opposition supporters if the coalition encompasses ideologically and/or otherwise very different opposition forces, and a defection by a coalition member in a critical moment may kill the mobilization momentum and doom the opposition movement to failure, as argued by a prominent opposition politician in Armenia during an interview. Moreover, another leading Armenian opposition politician and scholar has argued on the example of popular uprisings in the Middle East in 2010-2011 that diffusion rather than centralization of opposition forces around a single leader may be more conducive to protests when people are ready for popular uprising as some opposition leaders do not favor protests and may hold back the popular opposition movement. It would be an interesting issue for future research to examine under what conditions cohesion or diffusion of opposition powers become conducive to popular protests.

The role of international monitors' assessment of elections in the occurrence of post-election protests is consistently supported in the quantitative analysis and is confirmed in case studies. International election monitors carry this power by providing two interrelated functions during elections. First, as impartial and neutral actors, they provide credible information about the quality of elections and secondly, by doing so, they legitimize the claims of either the

opposition or the regime. But it is difficult to discern which function is more important for the occurrence of protests. If it is the former, the development of credible domestic electoral institutions should take over at least some of the power of international monitors.

For example, protracted democratization through electoral reform in Mexico and in Ghana underscores the primary role of domestic electoral institutions and domestic election observers for credible elections and for settling electoral disputes. But at the same time, the development of highly professional domestic observers in some countries has not reduced the importance of international election monitors. There is a potential for tensions between international and domestic observers as international missions attract most of media attention and absorb a lot of money that is available for election observation from donor organizations. However, notwithstanding these tensions domestic observers themselves have underscored the importance of the presence of international monitors. Domestic observers often do an incredible job collecting information on the quality of elections and do accurate quick count but in the words of domestic observers, “they can identify problems and raise issues but they cannot make it stick” (interview with McConnell). Thus, when election results are disputed, international monitors can bring credibility and legitimacy to the claims of either side not necessarily because international actors are better prepared or more credible than domestic counterparts, but primarily because they are unbiased and have less at stake. However, as Democracy International Director Eric Bjornlund argued in an interview, “outcome oriented” assessments are not uncommon among international monitors’ reports, and the studies that confirm the important role of international monitors in political developments in host countries underscore the responsibility that comes (or should come) with international election monitoring.

An interesting question about international election monitoring overlooked in this research is the effect of international monitors' refusal to monitor certain elections due to different considerations. For example, while in Ethiopia in 2005 the opposition might have been encouraged by international criticism of the elections and held mass protests, there were fewer international monitors present in 2010 and pro-regime protests celebrating victory silenced dissatisfaction with the elections. The quantitative analysis shows the importance of international monitors' assessment of elections for the occurrence of post-election protests but it does not study the effect of international organizations' refusal to accept invitations to observe elections either for anticipated fraud or late invitations as in Ethiopia 2010 and in Russia 2007 and 2008 which may also indicate plans for election manipulation by these regimes. An interesting question for future research is whether international monitors' refusal to go to a country has the same effect as their condemnation of elections on the occurrence of post-election protests. Alternatively, absence of international monitors on the ground may impair the chances of protest as the opposition may feel more insecure and vulnerable.

Finally, the case studies of selected countries in Eurasia, Africa and Latin America present some challenges to the effect of opposition cohesion and international monitors' assessment of elections on post-election protests. A few examples suggest that those variables are neither sufficient nor necessary for the occurrence of protests after fraudulent election. For example, widespread protests were held in Armenia and Georgia in 2008 notwithstanding international monitors' overall endorsement of the election outcomes, and widespread protests were held in Belarus in 2010 notwithstanding a lack of opposition unity. However, these examples do not altogether refute the findings in the quantitative analysis on the effect of those variables as the case studies also clearly illustrate how mass mobilization is facilitated after

fraudulent elections when the opposition does cooperate and the international monitors do condemn election results.

In addition to the findings of the qualitative analysis, the case studies highlight a possible interaction effect of the key explanatory variables on the occurrence and intensity of protests after fraudulent elections, particularly an interactive effect of the cost of protest participation with opposition cohesion, and an interactive effect of the cost of protest participation with international monitors' criticism of elections. While opposition cohesion helps overcome the collective action problems of protests and advance from no and/or low level of protest to moderate and/or widespread levels of protest, the evidence from case studies shows that its effect on the occurrence of protest is most pronounced when the level of repression is moderate.

For example in Armenia united opposition, albeit lacking full-fledged cooperation, has managed to mobilize large protests after every disputed presidential election in the country, except for an extraordinary presidential election which followed a different logic, even in the absence of strong international criticism of the election results like during the last presidential elections. In Georgia, united opposition mobilized large protests against parliamentary elections in 2003 and against presidential elections in 2008 under moderate levels of repression, the first time benefiting from strong international support for the protestors and the second time without the international support, but as the regime started using more indiscriminate and disproportional force against demonstrators, the united opposition gradually lost its mobilizing potential and even radicalized largely resulting in public aversion towards political activeness.

Similarly in Ethiopia united opposition raised a large wave of protests after the 2005 parliamentary elections which were held under circumstances of relative political opening and moderate repression, even when the reaction of international monitors was split between a

moderately critical assessment of the elections by the Carter Center which did not denounce the election outcome and a much more critical assessment by the EU mission which questioned the credibility of the election outcome as well as very strong criticism by other western organizations like the Human Rights Watch. As the regime narrowed the political playing field and showed its high repressive capacity leading up to the 2010 parliamentary elections, the opposition coalition – weaker than the 2005 opposition – failed to mobilize people against electoral fraud in 2010.

Conversely, preemptive attacks against dissenting voices have impaired chances of opposition cooperation in Russia. And more importantly, consistently high level of state repression has effectively prevented mass mobilization around attempts of opposition cooperation. For example, a rejection in registration of opposition coalition PARNAS in June 2011, thus blocking the participation of any liberal opposition in the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2011 and presidential elections in 2012, led to only a few small protests by the coalition supporters as the coalition failed to mobilize public support to rally against infringements of the freedom of association and the right to representation.

The quantitative analysis rejects the arguments about the importance of socioeconomic grievances for the occurrence of post-election protests. Neither objective socioeconomic conditions nor subjective perceptions of those conditions explain the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections. Among measures of potential benefits of protests, only the level of civil liberties protection is found marginally and negatively related to the occurrence of protests – the worse the civil liberties conditions, the bigger the potential benefit of protest, and hence the more likely post-election protests.

Interestingly, Tucker argues in a research paper in progress that protests that were not repressed and succeeded to bring regime turnover may impair the likelihood of protest in the

future in those countries if they fall back into authoritarian practices. This paradox arises as people reevaluate the benefit gained from the past protest and update their cost-benefit calculations. However, the present research shows that the expected benefit of protests does not explain the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections (no effect of socioeconomic grievances and marginal effect of the level of civil liberties protection), and the evidence of attempts of second “color revolutions” in Georgia in 2008 and Kyrgyzstan in 2010 refutes his argument.

Though socioeconomic factors may appear to play a role in Russia and Belarus, the quantitative analysis shows that they do not produce post-election protests and the case studies support this finding. In Russia socioeconomic grievances have triggered protests *outside* the electoral cycle and in the regions. But the socioeconomic grievances have not materialized into mass mobilization after the State Duma or presidential elections as the Russian state has effectively prevented the rise of strong dissenting voices, impaired opposition chances of cooperation and prevented acts of protest after national elections. The Belarusian state has managed to suppress popular support for electoral protests by successfully capitalizing on public preferences for political and economic stability and continuity and by controlling the votes of certain target groups. The widespread protests after the 2006 and the 2010 Belarusian elections are best explained with the variations in the levels of repression - backlash effect in the first examples and perception of reduced costs of protest participation in the second example.

A final thought about the effect of the level of fraud on the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections is warranted. The quantitative analysis finds no effect of the level of fraud on protests in the sample of fraudulent elections. However, when the margin of victory is narrow, as in Dominican Republic in 1990 and 1994, Peru 2000, Mexico 2006, Georgia 2008, Armenia

2008, Haiti 2010, etc., major fraud is not always required to affect the election outcome, and small manipulations during vote tabulation and count may affect the election outcome. What appears important for protest mobilization is the popular sense that they were deprived of a victory and the election was stolen, which the regime can accomplish either with major or minor electoral manipulations depending on how close the race is. Future research may test if an interaction variable of the extent of electoral problems and the margin of victory might have any explanatory value for the occurrence of protests after fraudulent elections.

Beyond theoretical contributions to the scholarly debate on the relevance of cost-benefit calculations for electoral protests, on the effect of repression, and the role of likelihood of success, as well as showing the usefulness of marrying social movement and democratization theories, the present research has practical implications. It shows to international actors that elections represent a good opportunity to promote political change by overcoming factors that may bias their reports and by denouncing manipulated elections. It calls upon the opposition to unite their efforts, especially during presidential elections, in order to overcome collective action problems of protests. Unfortunately regimes also learn from the past experience of electoral protests and may choose strategies against their challengers to prevent or hinder protest mobilization after fraudulent elections.

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# APPENDIX

## Supporting Tables for Quantitative Analysis

Table A1: Variables and sources

| *Variable* | *Values* | *Sources* |
|---|---|---|
| ***Dependent Variable*** | | |
| Post-election protest | 0 (no protest)<br>1 (low participation: single location, less than 1000 people)<br>2 (moderate participation: multiple locations with under 1000 people, single location with more than 1000 people)<br>3 (widespread participation: multiple locations with over 1000 people) | Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP) *potestpart*<br>http://www2.binghamton.edu/political-science/institutions-and-elections-project.html |
| ***Independent Variables*** | | |
| *Cost of Protest* | | |
| Political repression, lagged a year | 1 (least repressive) to 5 (most repressive) | Gibney/Dalton Political Terror Scale (PTS). It captures the extent of political repression, based on the Amnesty International and State Department reports.<br>http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/index.php |
| *Benefit of protest* | | |
| Civil liberties protection, lagged a year | 0 (no government respect for these rights) to 10 (full government respect for these rights) | CIRI Human Rights Data Project modified *Empowerment Rights Index* (Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Workers' Rights, and Freedom of Religion indicators, excluding Political Participation indicator, plus Assembly/ Association Right).<br>http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Socioeconomic conditions, lagged a year | 0 (bad conditions) to 12 (good conditions) | International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) *Socioeconomic Conditions* "This is an assessment of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction" (ICRG 2006). It combines measures on unemployment, consumer confidence, and poverty. http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx |
| Perception of life conditions | 0 (dissatisfied) to 100 (very satisfied) | World Values Survey (WVS) *Life Satisfaction.* It captures the average response to the question: "All things considered, how satisfied are you with life as a whole these days?" http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp |
| *Likelihood of success* | | |
| Opposition cohesion | 0 (divided opposition) or 1(most opposition parties united around a single candidate in presidential elections or pre-election coalition in legislative elections) | My coding based on the following sources (among others): Election Watch section in Journal of Democracy, IFES Election Guide (http://www.electionguide.org/), the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/), African Elections Database (http://africanelections.tripod.com/index.html), news reports from LexisNexis Academic, Countries of the World – 16 Years of CIA fact books (http://www.theodora.com/wfb/abc_world_fact_book.html), etc. |
| Opposition legislative power, lagged a year | 0 to 100% | World Bank Database of Political Institutions (WB-DPI). This is the % of seats held by opposition parties in the legislature, calculated by dividing the number of opposition seats by total (government plus opposition plus non-aligned) seats. http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40 |
| International monitors' criticism of elections | 0 (acceptable, no problems) to 5 (unacceptable, major problems) | Kelley's Project on International Election Monitoring. Data on International Elections Monitoring (DIEM) *overall assessment* of election results by international monitors based on only the executive summaries of their reports, combining two variables: *overall election quality* and *extent of problems.* http://www.duke.edu/web/diem/data.html |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | *overall election quality*: 0 (acceptable), 0.5 (ambiguous), 1 (unacceptable)<br><br>*extent of problems*: 0 (good, no problems), 1 (low, minor problems only), 2 (moderate problems only), 3 (high, major problems) |
| ***Controls*** | | |
| Level of fraud | 0 (good, no problems)<br>1 (low, minor problems)<br>2 (moderate problems)<br>3 (high, major problems) | Kelley's Project on International Election Monitoring. Quality of Elections Data (QED) *sa2 (extent of problems)*. "This is a combined assessment that considers problems in the legal framework, political and administrative problems in the pre-election period, and then the integrity of the election day itself." http://www.duke.edu/web/diem/data.html |
| Culture of protest, average of the past 5 years | continuous | Banks' Cross-National Time-Series Data. Modified *Weighted Conflict Index* (including *general strike*, *riots*, and *antigovernment demonstrations*, and omitting *assassinations*, *guerrilla warfare*, and *rebellion*). |
| Democracy, lagged a year | -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic) | Polity IV *polity2* |
| Economic development, lagged a year | continuous | World Bank World Development Indicators (WB-WDI) *GDP PC PPP* (current international $) |

Table A2: Summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables, clean and fraudulent elections

| *Variable* | *Observations* | *Mean* | *Std. Dev.* | *Min* | *Max* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| country (121) | 610 | | | | |
| year | 610 | 1997.244 | 4.173 | 1990 | 2004 |
| protest | 550 | 0.322 | 0.787 | 0 | 3 |
| repression | 593 | 2.715 | 1.005 | 1 | 5 |
| moderate repression | 598 | 0.443 | 0.497 | 0 | 1 |
| civil liberties | 569 | 6.248 | 2.781 | 0 | 10 |
| socioeconomic conditions | 467 | 5.039 | 1.736 | 1 | 10.167 |
| life satisfaction | 605 | 43.665 | 19.025 | 0 | 82.617 |
| opposition cohesion | 500 | 0.194 | 0.396 | 0 | 1 |
| opposition seats | 605 | 27.607 | 22.619 | 0 | 92.647 |
| monitors' criticism | 269 | 2.171 | 1.345 | 0 | 5 |
| fraud (extent of problems) | 534 | 1.552 | 0.935 | 0 | 3 |
| presidential election | 610 | 0.300 | 0.459 | 0 | 1 |
| legislative election | 610 | 0.570 | 0.495 | 0 | 1 |
| simultaneous presidential/legislative elections | 610 | 0.130 | 0.336 | 0 | 1 |
| culture of protest | 588 | 22.178 | 37.771 | 0 | 345 |
| democracy | 589 | 2.869 | 5.975 | -9 | 10 |
| gdp pc ppp | 576 | 4531.121 | 4655.834 | 132.950 | 33136.650 |

Table A3: Protest after fraudulent elections

| | *Generalized Ordered Logit* | | | *Multinomial Logit* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No Protest v. Protest | No/Low Protest v. Moderate/ Widespread Protest | No-Moderate Protest v. Widespread Protest | No Protest v. Low Protest | No Protest v. Moderate Protest | No Protest v. Widespread Protest | Low Protest v. Moderate Protest | Low Protest v. Widespread Protest | Moderate Protest v. Widespread Protest |
| Repression [a] | -0.160<br>(0.145) | -0.148<br>(0.179) | 0.468<br>(0.296) | -0.197<br>(0.301) | **-0.673** [b]<br>**(0.410)** | 0.201<br>(0.330) | -0.476<br>(0.500) | 0.398<br>(0.436) | **0.874 ***<br>**(0.500)** |
| Socioecon conditions [a] | 0.093<br>(0.105) | 0.124<br>(0.123) | **0.236 ***<br>**(0.135)** | 0.006<br>(0.164) | 0.064<br>(0.236) | **0.400 ***<br>**(0.222)** | 0.058<br>(0.252) | 0.394<br>(0.268) | 0.336<br>(0.31) |
| Life satisfaction | 0.016<br>(0.010) | 0.016<br>(0.010) | 0.016<br>(0.010) | 0.011<br>(0.021) | 0.007<br>(0.027) | 0.019<br>(0.022) | -0.004<br>(0.036) | 0.007<br>(0.029) | 0.012<br>(0.036) |
| Civil liberties | **-0.126 ***<br>**(0.075)** | **-0.126 ***<br>**(0.075)** | **-0.126***<br>**(0.075)** | -0.03<br>(0.116) | 0.035<br>(0.153) | **-0.304****<br>**(0.150)** | 0.066<br>(0.176) | -0.274<br>(0.190) | **-0.339 ***<br>**(0.189)** |
| Opposition cohesion [a] | 0.180<br>(0.324) | **0.828 ***<br>**(0.474)** | 0.901<br>(0.620) | -0.519<br>(0.576) | **0.861** [c]<br>**(0.650)** | 1.004<br>(0.881) | **1.380** [d]<br>**(0.844)** | 1.523<br>(1.003) | 0.143<br>(0.998) |
| Opposition seats | -0.003<br>(0.007) | -0.003<br>(0.007) | -0.003<br>(0.007) | -0.007<br>(0.012) | -0.007<br>(0.018) | -0.002<br>(0.013) | 0.000<br>(0.021) | 0.005<br>(0.016) | 0.005<br>(0.019) |
| Monitors' criticism | **0.609*****<br>**(0.161)** | **0.609*****<br>**(0.161)** | **0.609*****<br>**(0.161)** | 0.349<br>(0.287) | **0.475***<br>**(0.285)** | **1.076*****<br>**(0.284)** | 0.126<br>(0.288) | **0.727***<br>**(0.376)** | 0.600<br>(0.372) |
| Fraud | -0.413<br>(0.351) | -0.413<br>(0.351) | -0.413<br>(0.351) | -0.203<br>(0.635) | -0.215<br>(0.690) | -0.793<br>(0.755) | -0.011<br>(0.816) | -0.589<br>(0.960) | -0.578<br>(0.962) |
| Executive election [a] | **0.700*****<br>**(0.264)** | **1.145*****<br>**(0.377)** | **1.307*****<br>**(0.463)** | 0.296<br>(0.394) | 0.011<br>(0.711) | **1.773*****<br>**(0.605)** | -0.285<br>(0.770) | **1.477****<br>**(0.628)** | **1.762****<br>**(0.864)** |
| Exec/leg election [a] | **1.303*****<br>**(0.412)** | 0.706<br>(0.544) | 0.726<br>(0.635) | **1.594****<br>**(0.615)** | 0.939<br>(1.016) | **1.922***<br>**(0.961)** | -0.655<br>(1.104) | 0.329<br>(1.011) | 0.984<br>(1.247) |
| Democracy | **0.104*****<br>**(0.036)** | **0.104*****<br>**(0.036)** | **0.104*****<br>**(0.036)** | 0.065<br>(0.054) | 0.035<br>(0.095) | **0.184*****<br>**(0.069)** | -0.030<br>(0.106) | 0.119<br>(0.082) | 0.149<br>(0.111) |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GDP pc ppp | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) |
| Culture of protest | -0.005<br>(0.004) | -0.005<br>(0.004) | -0.005<br>(0.004) | | | | | | |
| Asia | -0.557<br>(0.426) | -0.557<br>(0.426) | -0.557<br>(0.426) | -0.251<br>(0.679) | 0.091<br>(0.762) | -1.318<br>(0.865) | 0.342<br>(0.942) | -1.066<br>(0.889) | -1.409<br>(1.057) |
| East Europe | -0.564<br>(0.490) | -0.564<br>(0.490) | -0.564<br>(0.490) | -1.331<br>(0.938) | 0.180<br>(0.970) | -0.766<br>(0.803) | 1.510<br>(1.177) | 0.565<br>(1.042) | -0.945<br>(1.184) |
| Latin America | **-1.56*****<br>**(0.550)** | **-1.56*****<br>**(0.550)** | **-1.56*****<br>**(0.550)** | -0.765<br>(1.010) | -0.993<br>(1.189) | **-3.617****<br>**(1.811)** | -0.228<br>(1.571) | -2.852<br>(2.023) | -2.624<br>(2.234) |
| Constant | -1.499<br>(1.065) | -2.825<br>(1.191) | -6.019<br>(1.608) | -0.954<br>(2.310) | -1.234<br>(2.595) | -7.051<br>(2.947) | -0.28<br>(3.081) | -6.097<br>(3.781) | -5.817<br>(3.871) |
| # observations | 332 | | | 332 | | | | | |
| # clusters | 93 | | | 93 | | | | | |
| Count $R^2$ | | | | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 |

Note: The regression analysis uses multiple imputation via chained equations using Stata 9.2 and Royston's ICE package.
The table reports the slope coefficients and (cluster robust standard errors). Coefficients for year dummies are omitted. Africa is used as the reference category. Statistically significant estimates are marked bold. *: p < .10; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01.
[a] Brant tests show that these variables violate the parallel regression assumption imposed by the ordered logit model. Thus, the parallel regression assumption was relaxed with respect to these variables in the partial proportional odds model.
[b] p=0.101; in a model without the regional and year dummies the same coefficient is statistically significant at p=0.029 level, and in a model with regional dummies only the coefficient is statistically significant at p=0.043 level.
[c] p=0.185; in a model without the regional and year dummies the same coefficient is statistically significant at p=0.033 level, and in a model with regional dummies only the coefficient is statistically significant at p=0.048 level.
[d] p=0.102; in models either without dummies or the regional dummies only the same coefficient is statistically significant at p=0.067 level.

Table A4: Moderate repression and protest after fraudulent elections

| | *Generalized Ordered Logit* | | | *Multinomial Logit* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No Protest v. Protest | No/Low Protest v. Moderate/ Widespread Protest | No-Moderate Protest v. Widespread Protest | No Protest v. Low Protest | No Protest v. Moderate Protest | No Protest v. Widespread Protest | Low Protest v. Moderate Protest | Low Protest v. Widespread Protest | Moderate Protest v. Widespread Protest |
| Moderate repression [a] | 0.227<br>(0.248) | **0.888*****<br>**(0.238)** | -0.389<br>(0.711) | -0.437<br>(0.520) | **1.814****<br>**(0.900)** | -0.022<br>(0.598) | **2.251****<br>**(0.952)** | 0.415<br>(0.632) | **-1.836***<br>**(1.049)** |
| Socioecon conditions [a] | 0.078<br>(0.093) | 0.102<br>(0.125) | 0.411<br>(0.272) | 0.056<br>(0.159) | 0.061<br>(0.258) | 0.379<br>(0.234) | 0.005<br>(0.267) | 0.322<br>(0.275) | 0.318<br>(0.341) |
| Life satisfaction | **0.017****<br>**(0.007)** | **0.017****<br>**(0.007)** | **0.017****<br>**(0.007)** | 0.005<br>(0.020) | 0.009<br>(0.031) | 0.021<br>(0.021) | 0.004<br>(0.039) | 0.016<br>(0.027) | 0.012<br>(0.039) |
| Civil liberties [a] | **-0.110***<br>**(0.060)** | **-0.138***<br>**(0.073)** | -0.155<br>(0.136) | -0.021<br>(0.113) | 0.123<br>(0.152) | **-0.310****<br>**(0.147)** | 0.144<br>(0.178) | -0.288<br>(0.184) | **-0.433****<br>**(0.192)** |
| Opposition cohesion [a] | 0.123<br>(0.293) | 0.669<br>(0.453) | 0.936<br>(0.668) | -0.437<br>(0.561) | 0.802<br>(0.672) | 0.958<br>(0.885) | 1.239<br>(0.831) | 1.395<br>(0.970) | 0.156<br>(0.962) |
| Opposition seats | -0.003<br>(0.006) | -0.003<br>(0.006) | -0.003<br>(0.006) | -0.004<br>(0.011) | -0.003<br>(0.020) | -0.002<br>(0.013) | 0.001<br>(0.022) | 0.002<br>(0.015) | 0.001<br>(0.021) |
| Monitors' criticism | **0.577*****<br>**(0.188)** | **0.675*****<br>**(0.147)** | **0.873*****<br>**(0.328)** | 0.375<br>(0.281) | **0.469***<br>**(0.245)** | **1.074*****<br>**(0.283)** | 0.094<br>(0.29) | **0.699***<br>**(0.376)** | **0.605***<br>**(0.350)** |
| Fraud | -0.416<br>(0.293) | -0.416<br>(0.293) | -0.416<br>(0.293) | -0.278<br>(0.635) | -0.379<br>(0.712) | -0.752<br>(0.767) | -0.101<br>(0.900) | -0.474<br>(0.984) | -0.374<br>(0.960) |
| Executive election [a] | **0.647*****<br>**(0.218)** | **1.258*****<br>**(0.325)** | **1.368*****<br>**(0.622)** | 0.300<br>(0.392) | -0.099<br>(0.714) | **1.730*****<br>**(0.610)** | -0.399<br>(0.765) | **1.43****<br>**(0.640)** | **1.829****<br>**(0.852)** |
| Exec/leg election [a] | **1.236*****<br>**(0.327)** | 0.766<br>(0.492) | **1.484****<br>**(0.673)** | **1.637*****<br>**(0.612)** | 0.690<br>(0.959) | **1.929***<br>**(0.974)** | -0.947<br>(1.062) | 0.292<br>(1.018) | 1.239<br>(1.269) |
| Democracy | **0.105*****<br>**(0.029)** | **0.105*****<br>**(0.029)** | **0.105*****<br>**(0.029)** | 0.053<br>(0.055) | 0.028<br>(0.109) | **0.183*****<br>**(0.068)** | -0.025<br>(0.118) | 0.129<br>(0.08) | 0.155<br>(0.123) |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GDP pc ppp | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) | 0.000<br>(0.000) |
| Culture of protest | -0.005<br>(0.003) | -0.005<br>(0.003) | -0.005<br>(0.003) | | | | | | |
| Asia | **-0.663***<br>**(0.362)** | **-0.663***<br>**(0.362)** | **-0.663***<br>**(0.362)** | -0.201<br>(0.672) | -0.311<br>(0.762) | -1.292<br>(0.836) | -0.110<br>(0.966) | -1.091<br>(0.853) | -0.981<br>(1.088) |
| East Europe | **-0.664***<br>**(0.387)** | **-0.664***<br>**(0.387)** | **-0.664***<br>**(0.387)** | -1.208<br>(0.935) | -0.161<br>(0.868) | -0.698<br>(0.755) | 1.047<br>(1.204) | 0.510<br>(1.031) | -0.537<br>(1.151) |
| Latin America | **-1.76*****<br>**(0.473)** | **-1.76*****<br>**(0.473)** | **-1.76*****<br>**(0.473)** | -0.602<br>(1.018) | -2.166<br>(1.514) | **-3.512****<br>**(1.769)** | -1.564<br>(1.917) | -2.910<br>(2.007) | -1.346<br>(2.420) |
| Constant | -2.030<br>(0.796) | -3.938<br>(0.805) | -6.083<br>(2.532) | -1.322<br>(2.144) | -4.614<br>(1.945) | -6.367<br>(2.515) | -3.292<br>(2.763) | -5.045<br>(3.231) | -1.753<br>(3.191) |
| # observations | 332 | 332 | 332 | 332 | 332 | 332 | 332 | 332 | 332 |
| # clusters | 93 | 93 | 93 | 93 | 93 | 93 | 93 | 93 | 93 |
| Count $R^2$ | | | | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 |

Note: The regression analysis uses multiple imputation via chained equations using Stata 9.2 and Royston's ICE package.
The table reports the slope coefficients and (cluster robust standard errors). Coefficients for year dummies are omitted. Africa is used as the reference category. Statistically significant estimates are marked bold. *: p < .10; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01.
[a] Brant tests show that these variables violate the parallel regression assumption imposed by the ordered logit model. Thus, the parallel regression assumption was relaxed with respect to these variables in the partial proportional odds model.