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DEFEATING AUTHORITARIAN STATE STRUCTURES IN SEMI-DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES: LESSONS FROM TURKEY'S JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY

by

GULCAN SAGLAM

Under the Direction of Dr. Michael F. Herb

ABSTRACT

Political success in semi-democratic countries has two aspects: shifting the balance of power in one's favor and maintaining it. This thesis seeks to examine how the AKP has succeeded in shifting the balance of power in its favor while its predecessor the Welfare Party did not. Focusing on electoral success, existing research primarily lists center-periphery conflict, moderation, class struggle, party organization, and failures of others as the main determinants. Yet the significance of reining in the power of the Kemalist state structure has been mostly disregarded. Therefore, with a comparison of the AKP (2002-2007) and the Welfare Party (1996-1997) governments, this study tests one assertion using most-similar systems research design that in semi-democratic political settings with strong authoritarian actors, political parties that build broad coalitions via group specific policy promises will be more likely to shift the balance of power in favor of themselves than actors that lack such connections.

INDEX WORDS: Justice and Development Party, Joel Migdal, State-in-society, Clientelism, Group specific policy promises, Welfare Party, Authoritarian state structure

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GULCAN SAGLAM

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in the College of Arts and Sciences

Georgia State University

2012

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1. INTRODUCTION

"The others are all collaborators," decried Necmettin Erbakan in his 1994 local election speech, "they are all imitators of the West, the Zionists. Vote for Refah (Welfare Party), and let us spoil their game!" Based on a pragmatic mixture of capitalism, communism and Islam, Just Order was presented as the only solution to the chronic problems of Turkey.

The ongoing economic crisis, reported as the most damaging one in the history of the Republic, was on the top of that obstinate list. "In the first quarter of 1994, the Turkish Lira (TL) was devalued more than 50% against the US dollar, the Central Bank lost half of its reserves, interest rates skyrocketed (with 400%), and the inflation rate reached three digit levels."[1] A stabilization program, later supported by an IMF Stand-By was launched on April 5th, 1994, but the structural adjustment measures only deepened the crisis. First, real wages fell sharply: "average nominal wage increases of 65 percent were about 20 percent below the rate of consumer price inflation.[2]" Later, due to rapid privatization of public enterprises, the slowdown in government spending, and a sharp loss in business confidence, almost half a million lost their jobs.[3]

Nevertheless, it is possible to speculate that society might have overlooked the economic hardship –or at least tolerated it more quietly- if had not the monetary scandals of high-rank state officials –and even Prime Minister Tansu Ciller herself- broke out one after another during the same time period. It was quiet obvious that the burden of the economic crisis and the structural adjustment program was not shared by each segment of the society equally. As a result, the

[1] http://www.econturk.org/Turkisheconomy/kriz.pdf
[2] http://sinestezi.wordpress.com/2009/04/04/turkiye-de-ekonomik-krizler-1994-1998-1999-ve-2001-krizleri/
[3] http://sinestezi.wordpress.com/2009/04/04/turkiye-de-ekonomik-krizler-1994-1998-1999-ve-2001-krizleri/

popular frustration ascended day by day as a reaction to the corruption, mismanagement of the crisis, and incompetence of the government.

Even worse, every path for channeling that frustration peacefully was either entirely blocked or limited by an imperious military authority. The ongoing fighting in the east between separatist Kurdish guerillas and Turkish army was getting more intense every day, half of the country was under the state of emergency, and the military was strengthening its position not only on the battle ground but also in the political sphere. As the country was going through "those days that unity and solidarity of the nation were of critical importance," "whining" about democracy or economic situation was intolerable. As a result, torture, death under custody, disappearance (mostly under custody), murders whose perpetrators were unknown became the norm due to the security centric state ideology.

Sauced with a heavy Islamist rhetoric, Just Order was perceived as the light at the end of the tunnel in this atmosphere. The Party promised that there would be neither the oppressor nor the oppressed in the new system. The Kurdish problem, the privatization problem, the economic problems, the corruption problem, and even the traffic problem could be solved via Islamist way of governing. This call found a broad audience from the frustrated and oppressed lower class as much as the new conservative middle class, and the Welfare Party increased its vote share from 9.8% (1989) to 19.10% (1994 local elections) in 5 years. At its peak, Welfare Party got 21.37% in the 1995 general elections, and for the first time in the history of Turkey, political Islam became the partner of a ruling coalition.

Despite its electoral success and popular support, the ruling of the Welfare Party lasted only for a year. First the military forced the WP out of power only six months after it came to power, and then Constitutional Court shut down the Party completely due to its hidden

"reactionary" agenda. Along with the marginalization of the Welfare Party, a strict de-Islamization process swept the society. Known as 28 February process[4], this upgraded Turkish McCarthyism turned into a total witch-hunt against practicing Muslims in the public sphere.

Therefore, the landslide victory of the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) in 2002 general elections shocked the country. Not only because the Party "had been established merely 15 months before the elections and [its] president had been in jail some time ago for publicly reciting a poem," but also because its cadre mostly consisted of former Welfare Party members (Isik & Pinarcioglu, 2010, p.161).

Contrary to the expectations of some and fears of others, the AKP has not only been able to survive three general and two local elections, but also to increase its vote shares in each and every election[5]. Yet, in a country accustomed to military and/or judiciary interferences to government, the AKP was not exempt from assaults of the Kemalist state structure. During its ten-year rule, AKP fought against the very same state structure that had dismissed the Welfare Party and many other governments while trying to convince the domestic and international forces that the Party was not a threat to secularism per se. When the tension reached its peak with an online military memorandum on April 27, 2007, the AKP was unexpectedly able to repulse the military, announce early elections, and consolidate its rule with another election victory shortly after the memorandum. This was a historic moment for Turkish politics since it was the first time that a government resisted the ultimatum of the military, and managed to hold on to power despite it.

---

[4] Regarding 28 February 1995 National Security Council decisions that are considered to be the basis of a post-modern coup d'etat.

[5] , 2009 local elections is an exception with 8 % decrease in Party's vote share.
34% in 2002 general elections, 42% in 2004 local elections, 46.66% in 2007 general elections, 38.99% in 2009 local elections, 49.83% in 2011 general elections.

This victory quickly revived a huge scholarly and intellectual debate on the determinants of election victory of the AKP, and the resurgence of the political Islam in Turkey. Not surprisingly, the memoirs of the Welfare government revisited, and the AKP's survival possibility as a ruling party – and as a political party in general- became the subject of conversation all over the country.

Why did not AKP share the same destiny with the Welfare Party although high rank generals were implying such an end? How has the AKP managed to appease the Kemalist state structure and shift the balance of power in favor of itself while its predecessor the Welfare Party did not?

This puzzle is of more than passing historical interest of Turkish politics. Defeating authoritarian regimes -transition to democracy- has long been debated among scholars of democratization.

The sharp -yet smooth- balance of power change in Turkish politics in recent years might shed light on the path for other illiberal democracies that have a powerful authoritarian actor besides democratic institutions, or those that have a limited democratic setting. In a region with bourgeoning electoral success of Islamist parties with the fall of authoritarian leaders one after another, the AKP experience could also be used as a reference point. Optimists can show that the political agenda of the Islamist parties could be shaped, contained, and transformed by the broad social coalition they depend to survive, which eventually helps them weaken the authoritarian structures that are strongly rooted in these countries. Islamist parties, on the other hand, may find guidelines to be able to rein in the power of the authoritarian actors and establish their own domination.

Hence, it is no surprise that the case of the AKP has attracted a huge scholarly interest from political science, sociology, and history for over a decade. Yet, overwhelmed by the sensational election victories of the AKP, the literature has –unfortunately- focused its attention solely on this phenomena, and come up with different answers;

1. ***Center-periphery conflict:*** Top-down modernization –especially secularization- promoted the polarization of the Turkish society, and spurred a struggle between the center –the Kemalist elites- and the periphery –the Muslim population. As the periphery got stronger economically and ideologically after the acceptance of neo-liberalism in 1980s, its political influence began to ascend as well. The AKP's success, therefore, was just a reflection of this resurgence of the periphery that changed the balance of power between the Kemalist elites and the Islamic masses.
2. ***Political Learning/moderation:*** The political learning process that the leaders of the Party have been through has played an important role in moderation of its political agenda and rhetoric. As a result of this moderation, the Party managed to appeal to a broader constituency.
3. ***Class struggle:*** The point of convergence for the scholars of political economy has largely been the emergence of a new conservative bourgeoisie as a product of the economic and political liberalization of 1980s and 1990s. In consonance with this view, scholars have contended that there is a class struggle between the traditional upper-middle class and the new conservative middle classes in Turkey since 1980s, and the AKP owes its success to this conflict.
4. ***Party organization/mobilization:*** Studies addressing the link between electorate mobilization and the AKP's success have primarily placed stress on party organization.

Accordingly, the AKP's unparalleled focus on grassroots voter mobilization, its systemness and autonomy has cleared the path for election victories and given rise to the Party.

5. ***Failures of others:*** In spite of the large literature studying the dynamics behind the AKP's landslide victory at five consecutive elections, a number of scholars contend that it is not the success of the AKP per se but the failure of the major parties of the center-right and center-left especially on economic policies. Following the economic voting theory, the decline of the center-right is mostly attributed to their poor economic performance along with systematic corruption during their incumbency

What has been mostly overlooked by the literature is the fact that electoral success in-and-of itself may not be sufficient for explaining the survival of the AKP vis-à-vis the Kemalist state structure, since the predecessor of the AKP –the Welfare Party- was dismissed by the very same structure *in spite of* its 1994 and 1995 election victories.

Therefore, we believe that the puzzle cannot be analyzed properly without changing our perspective on what we understand from "success." Our perspective suggests that success, especially in semi-democratic contexts has two aspects to it: first reining in the power of the authoritarian actor(s) and shifting the balance of power in the political sphere in favor of oneself, and second maintaining/consolidating the new power balance. In other words, "success", as it is used in this study, encapsulates both the political survival and the actual dominance of the party.

First of all, such a perspective offers a more demanding standard than sole electoral success, since in limited democratic settings elections can be used for a variety of reasons other than determining the actual ruler of the country. In fact, scholars argue that authoritarian actors use elections for systematic practical reasons such as gaining legitimacy in international arena

(Schwedler & Chomiak, 2006) or appeasing the challengers from both within the ruling elite (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Gandhi&Przeworski, 2007) and the society (Gandhi&Prezeworski, 2007; Lust-Okar, 2004; Schwedler, 1998; Brumberg, 2002). It has been also argued that moderating radical opposition groups could be another motive for holding elections in authoritarian regimes (Schwedler, 1998; Brumberg, 2002; Gandhi&Przeworski, 2007; Berman, 2008).

Despite their different intentions with regards to holding elections, it is important to note that these semi-democratic political settings strongly differ from façade or pseudo democracies by offering four arenas to challenge the regime: "the electoral, the legislature, the media and the judicial." In other words, elections provide a front for challenging the existing balance of power in these countries, but one needs to take into account other fronts as well. Winning elections is necessary but not sufficient for winning the battle.

Second, this new perspective takes into account the existence of various power centers in the Turkish society, and builds on their struggle over social control while analyzing the shift of power balance in the political sphere. This conflict, based on each groups' value sets, preferences or interests, played an underappreciated role in changing the balance of power that dominates the Turkish society.

We argue that in this environment of struggle, the broad coalition of democracy seeking groups –each for its own sake- has managed to weaken the authoritarian state structure comprised of military, judiciary and bureaucracy. However, this coalition was not an ipso facto aggregation of different groups for a "greater good." Rather, it was the product of a deliberate AKP strategy that aimed to attain the political power essential for the appeasement of the

Kemalist state structure and the establishment of its own domination. That strategy was winning over different power centers in the society via particularistic policy promises.

Deriving explanations from a larger literature on group specific politics, and the seminal study of Joel Migdal's state-in-society approach, this study suggest that AKP's strategy of providing group specific policy promises can be one of the underappreciated aspects that may have promoted the success of the Party –not only in terms of being able to win elections per se, but also in terms of being able to shift the balance of power in the political sphere in favor of itself.

After presenting the literature on the rise of the AKP/Islamists in Turkish politics, we offer particularistic politics as an alternative explanation and draw the boundaries of the term as it is used in this study by providing a brief summary of the discussions on particularistic vs. universalistic politics in Chapter 2. Later, we contend that Joel Migdal's state-in-society approach, which delineates state as a web of multiple power loci struggling for social domination, presents a proper context for the viability and acceptability of such an explanation. We argue that in a context in which multiple power centers struggle with one another for social control, actors using group specific policy promises will be more likely to succeed changing the balance of power than actors that lack such connections. Relating this general hypothesis to our research question, we assert that that *the AKP has been successful in appeasing the Kemalist state structure and shifting the balance of power in favor of itself; because it was able to build a broad coalition consisting of various power centers in the society via providing group specific policy promises to each. On the other hand, the Welfare Party lacked such connections.*

In Chapter 3, we clarify the contends of the Kemalist state structure, and reveal our research design for analyzing the correlation –if any- between the AKP's group specific policy

promises (IV) and its success in shifting the balance of power in favor of itself (DV). Chapter 4 tests our hypothesis with a most-similar research design with the AKP and the Welfare Party at its focus.

2. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

2.1. CENTER – PERIPHERY CONFLICT

There is a tendency for most scholars studying Turkish politics to believe that the modernization process, which dates back to Tanzimat reforms (1839) of Ottoman Empire, and takes a more radical and transformative stance with the founding of the Turkish Republic, is the primary factor that shapes the Turkish society, and Turkish politics (Onis, 1997; Ozbudun, 1981; Kalaycioglu, 1994; Isik & Pinarcioglu, 2010). More than any other scholar, Serif Mardin in his 1973 book *Center and Periphery: A Key to Turkish Politics?* makes the case that Turkish society has a center and a periphery, and claims that even though there were two very loosely related worlds at play in the traditional Ottoman era long before the modernization, the two worlds had interacted essentially through religion (Mardin, 1973). Modernization, on the other hand, cut that connection between central elites and peripheral forces: "The confrontation between center and periphery is the most important social cleavage underlying Turkish politics and one that seemed to have survived more than a century of modernization," observes Mardin (1973, p.170).

Accordingly, such a top-down democratization process, which perceives Islam as the sole inhibitor of development and modernization of the state, had a traumatic effect for state-society relations as "the members of the bureaucratic class under the Republic had little notion of identifying themselves with the peasantry," and therefore, "the Republican elite bodied in the

"Republican People's Party –the single party through which Republican policies were channeled- was unable to establish contact with the rural masses." (Mardin, 1973, p.183).

Moreover, the strict secularization process accompanied with harsh punishments "subordinated religion to the political realm, and alienated society from the state." In other words, the authoritarian secularism per se "promoted the polarization of Islam and the struggle between Kemalists and Muslims for control of the state," (Yavuz, 1997, p.64) – a struggle which usually resulted with the triumph of the Kemalist elites due to the power centered at their hands.

Yet, Ramin Ahmadow (2008) argues that the social and political structure of Turkey, namely this center-periphery tension between Kemalists and Islamists, has dramatically changed after the 1980s (Ahmadov, 2008). The role of the 1980 military was decisive in this transformation, since "the leaders of the military coup, ironically, depended on Islamic institutions and symbols for legitimization. Fusing Islamic ideas with national goals, they hoped to create a more homogenous and less political Islamic community," (Yavuz, 1997, p.67). "In this transformation process," contends Ahmadov, "though the macro structure of society was preserved and the center and periphery continued to co-exist, the power balance between the two has changed," (Ahmadov, 2008, p.18). As a result, "the periphery recovered, produced its own world with its own market and financial networks, grew its elite, and re-defined its worldview with respect to its central beliefs and traditions," (Ahmadov, 2008, p.18) - a transformation which left Turkish center no option but to defend the status-quo at any cost, even if it meant supporting military coups. Islamists, on the other hand, demanded more and more liberalism in order to extend the sphere of influence of the peripheral masses they are representing. In final analysis, "these developments set the stage for a paradoxical switching of roles: progressive Islamists versus reactionary Kemalists," (Gunter & Yavuz, 2007, p.290)

In addition to the change in balance of power between center and periphery, the 1980s, via the introduction of the neoliberal economy policies, contributed to the change of the battlefield as well. Isik and Pinarcioglu (2010) claim that "the well-known center-periphery tension has now been transferred to urban areas in the guise of a new tension between the well-educated rich and the less-educated poor," (p.178), and Islamist parties –taking over the heritage of the once powerful center-right- have become the showcase for this new peripheral areas.

Depending either on the traditional "the secular and West-oriented center and religious and traditional periphery or the modern urban-rural conflicts", this tension is still "the most salient axis of political divisions in Turkey." (Isik & Pinarcioglu, 2010, p.178). That's why the election victory of AKP –the last representative of the periphery- was correctly announced as the "Anatolian[6] revolution[7]" initiating the "Second Republic.[8]" by the mainstream media organs.

Even if we accept that this dichotomy presents useful insights for explaining the electoral success of the Islamist parties in Turkish politics, it is hardly that useful for addressing the distinction between the Welfare Party and the AKP with regards to the origins of their strengths and weaknesses as well as their political agenda. In short, the center-periphery arguments fail to answer why the Welfare Party used a heavy Islamic rhetoric while AKP refrained from it, and emphasized the importance of democratization.

In addition to that, the center-periphery dichotomy also overlooks the disparate between the ruling experiences of these two peripheral parties vis-à-vis the center –or namely the Kemalist state structure. Contrary to the "representative of the same periphery" thesis, the characteristic and the life span of the Islamist governments completely diverged from one another – while Welfare Party was forced out of power with a post-modern military coup –aka

[6] Aside from its geographical meaning, "Anatolia" represents the periphery in Turkish society.
[7] http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2002/11/04/ 04/17/2012
[8] http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2002/11/24/ 04/17/2012

28 February process, AKP has been able to stay in power with an increasing strength albeit the efforts of the Kemalist state structure, and even managed to survive the 27 April Military Memorandum. Why would that be the case if the same constituency against the same enemy supported both?

2.2. POLITICAL LEARNING / MODERATION

Being aware of the limitations of the center-periphery conflict in explaining the AKP's success and the Welfare's failure vis-à-vis Kemalists, a group of scholars emphasized the obvious difference between the two parties' party program, policy goals, rhetoric, and – as a consequence of all these- constituency support. In fact, they argued, AKP has been successful because the Party refrained from making references to religion – a sharp contrast with the previous Islamist parties (Welfare Party and Virtue Party) (Cavdar, 2006). Thereby, "despite the Party's Islamist heritage, AKP targeted a broad constituency, cutting cross class, gender, and ethnic lines, and gained the support of those who previously had voted for central-right and Islamist parties," (Cavdar, 2006, p.479).

This moderation, on the other hand, was not necessarily a sudden invention of the AKP, but a process of "political learning" which is deeply rooted in the experiences of its party leaders in the Islamist movement, and the unpleasant end of its predecessors – especially Welfare Party.

Scholars define political learning as "a process through which people modify their political beliefs and tactics or as a result of severe crises, frustrations, and dramatic changes in environment" (Bermeo, 1992, p. 274) which is usually forced by a structural constrains (Bermeo, 1992). It has been also emphasized "stick" policy would work better for the moderation of radical actors, if coupled with a "carrot" policy. Above all, regime accommodations such as democratic openings, even a very limited one, have been essential to induce radical opposition

leaders for moderating their political agendas in order to exploit the opportunity of inclusion to the system (Bermeo, 1992; Wickham, 2004; Yilmaz, 2008, Somer, 2007).

Hammered by the previous experiences of Islamist movement vis-à-vis these structural constrains –namely the authoritarian Kemalist state structure and the unique position of European Union regarding democratization-, "the top [AK] Party leadership came to acknowledge that any attempt to increase the influence of Islam in Turkish politics, let alone any radical changes in domestic or foreign policy, were bound to be blocked" (Cavdar, 2006, p.481), and therefore, a radical transformation of the state was impossible in Turkish context. Instead, "what was desirable and feasible, they believed, was to seek greater religious freedoms within the parameters of a secular and democratic political system," (Cavdar, 2006, p.481). Moreover, moderation would also help them broaden their constituency support as they became cognizant confrontation with the secular state structure is not welcomed by Turkish population (Cavdar, 2007). In short, following the Welfare legacy was a political suicide in every means.

Such a shift from Islamism to post-Islamism[9] - and even to non-Islamism[10]- has put moderation at the heart of the AKP's political posture and practices: respect to Ataturk and secularism was constantly emphasized by Party members, female candidates were chosen from among those who did not wear headscarves, the EU membership was listed as one of the

[9] Post-Islamism: "A form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives…[which] provides political responses to today's societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rests on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition," (Denoeux, 2002, p.61) cited in (Yilmaz, 2008, p.45).

[10] "From the beginning, the AKP claimed that their party is not Islamist; they even rejected the use of the label "Muslim democrats" as an analogy to the Christian democrats in Western Europe. In rejecting the label "Muslim democrat", Erdogan stated that: 'These attributions are not correct, not because we are not Muslims or democrats; but because these two [identities] should be considered on different planes'. Rather, the AKP based its policies on the "conservative democracy" program. Instead of emphasizing their Muslim identity, they preferred to ground their moral and religious values within the confines of 'conservatism'." (Ayata & Tutuncu, 2008, p. 367).

priorities, headscarf, and IHL[11] problems, the core demands of the conservative electoral base[12], were postponed to an indefinite future. And consequently, this unprecedented de-Islamisation of the Party –a virtue the Welfare Party obviously lacked- promoted its success vis-à-vis the secular state structure. After all, "for Kemalists, radical Islam [has been] easier to vilify and to justify restricting within democracy" as "moderate Islam's zeal to embrace modern lifestyles and its rejection of revolutionary methods make it hard to justify restricting it within a democratic system," (Somer, 2007, p.1277).

Nevertheless, even if we overlook the similarities of the AKP and the Welfare Party on gender, and foreign policy practices, and accept that moderation argument does account for the different destinies of these parties, the failure of other moderate Islamists that were not nearly as successful as the AKP still begs an explanation.

After the Welfare Party ousted from power, the renewalists that were going to found AKP in upcoming years were not the only fraction to realize that avoiding open confrontation with the Kemalist state structure was the only way to succeed (Yilmaz, 2008). The Virtue Party, which were founded by traditionalist Welfare cadres after they realized that the closure of the Welfare Party became imminent, also refrained from using religious rhetoric to an extent that "the VP's discourse regarding political Islam and Islam in the public sphere was similar to that of a center-right economically liberal and socially conservative party," (Yilmaz, 2008, p.54). The Virtue Party also "advocated pluralism and the democratization of everyday values in order to democratize politics, abandoning the nationalist and state-oriented model of economy preached by Erbakan for decades, in favor of free-market economy with an emphasis on social justice. The

[11] Imam Hatip schools – Vocational schools that pursue an Islamic curriculum in addition to the national one containing arts and sciences.
[12] Hayrettin Karaman, Iktidarin Uc Mesele ile Imtihani Yeni Safak Newspaper http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2005/eylul/09/hkaraman.html 05/20/12

VP also renounced categorical anti-Westernism and embraced European Union membership, previously thought to be a Jewish conspiracy," by the Welfare Party and its Islamist predecessors (Yildiz, 2003, p.198).

In short, even though the Virtue Party went through the same political learning process with the AKP, and became a liberal-conservative party with a powerful social state inclination and strong interest in nationalism, this moderation did not carry the Party to the rule, nor did it prevent the Constitutional Court from banning it for violating the Kemalist articles of the Constitution in 2001.

2.3. CLASS STRUGGLE

Deviating from the analysis based on traditional "center-periphery" conflict, some scholars contend that class struggle lies at the heart of the ideological and cultural tensions in Turkey in general, and the rise of the AKP in particular. According to these scholars, what is disguised as an Islamist-Kemalist conflict is nothing more than a struggle between Anatolian bourgeoisie (embodied in Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association – MUSIAD) and Istanbul's large businesses (embodied in Turkish Industry and Business Association – TUSIAD) to get larger shares from the expanding economic pie (Onis, 1997; Meyer, 1999; Gulalp, 1999; Cavdar, 2006; Alam, 2009; Baskan, 2010; Sen, 2010). Consequently, each class supports the political parties that could be a perfect spokesperson for their own economic interests.

After all, the scholars argue, ideology matters only to an extent in an environment in which there are alternative players that could represent the same ideology. Therefore, the Anatolian bourgeoisie has not been inclined to support the Islamist parties only because of their ideological proximity. Endowed with genuine entrepreneurial spirit as much as religious and

national values, MUSIAD's homo-Islamicus also believed that he was "excluded from the economic life controlled by big business groups supported by Kemalist state, [since this Kemalist state] allocated investment funds and other privileges largely to Kemalists and Westernized big business groups –the Istanbul bourgeoisies- [that are] state-protected, monopolistic, and rent-seeking," (Sen, 2010, p.74). Accordingly, what gave rise to the AKP was "the articulation between neoliberalism and Turkish Islamism," which converges with the interests of the new business elite.

However, this argument is problematic in several aspects. First, the AKP was not the first Islamist party to enjoy this support. During the 1980's, the Welfare Party as well voiced the interests of bourgeoning Anatolian bourgeoisie who wished to receive state support and protection like their Istanbul counterparts (Gulalp, 2001; Meyer, 1999; Baskan, 2010). "The rise of the Welfare Party reflects," argued Ziya Onis, "the growing aspirations of the rising Islamic bourgeoisie to consolidate their position in society, to achieve elite status also and, in purely economic terms, to obtain a greater share of public resources, both at the central and local levels, in competition with other segments of private business in Turkey," (Onis, p.760). Yet, the support of the Anatolian bourgeoisie did not prevent the fall of the Welfare Party. Quite the contrary, the conservative entrepreneurs themselves got harmed by being labeled as "unfavorable" and "reactionary" during 28 February process (Yavuz, 1997).

Second, TUSIAD, the very same organization that is claimed to be clashing with MUSIAD- and consequentially the AKP, has been one of the most eager supporters of the AKP. In this regard, Mehmet Ugur and Dilek Yankaya observe that "[the] awareness of the significance of credible commitments to reform and the explicit linkage between the reform process and EU conditionality (…) brought TUSIAD into close cooperation with the Justice and

Development Party," (2008, p. 590). In fact, "TUSIAD [itself] tended to describe the AKP government as an opportunity for economic and political stability and for economic and social transformation that the country had been longing for," (Ugur & Yankaya, 2008, p.593).

2.4. PARTY ORGANIZATION / MOBILIZATION

Studies addressing the links between electorate mobilization and the AKP's success have primarily placed stress on party organization. Some scholars argue that forming grassroots organizations that build direct bridges with the large segments of society –especially those adversely affected by the outcomes of the globalization- is the main reason behind the Party's landslide victory (Tugal, 2009). On the other hand, others emphasized the role of "the party's character as an organization, its internal power structure, its electoral roots, strategy, and leadership in the context of [the Party's] organizational environment –including its constitution, major veto players as well as international actors," in determining not only the electoral success but also the survival possibility of the AKP (Boyraz, 2010, p.287; Kumbaracibasi, 2009).

After all, parties do not act in a vacuum, the argument follows, the interaction between internal life of a party (its systemness) and its organizational environment (its autonomy) is of significant importance (Kumbaracibasi, 2009). Accordingly, "the survival [of the AKP] as a major political force" will depend on "balancing the AKP's roots in Islamic parties and movements against its claims to be a moderate party far from radicalism and fundamentalism," (Kumbaracibasi, 2009, p.4).

However, such explanations overlook the fact that the Welfare Party's rapid ascent in 1990's was also considered to be due to "its populist platforms and aggressive recruitment campaign … [as well as] the Party's unique internal discipline and impressive organizational strengths," (Kamrava, 1998, p.292). In other words, the Welfare Party stood out as a party with

unprecedented cohesion, unity, and a well developed administrative organization (Yavuz, 1997). And yet, its organizational capabilities and mobilization successes did not translate into the ability to govern for the Welfare Party.

2.5. FAILURES OF OTHERS

In spite of the large literature studying the dynamics behind the AKP's landslide victory at five consecutive elections, a number of scholars contend that it is not the success of the AKP per se but the failures of the major parties of the center-right and center-left that could explain "the first stage of a structural transformation in center politics" (Cosar & Ozman, 2004, p.57, Carkoglu, 2002).

Integrating nationalist, conservative, liberal and social democratic tendencies, and aiming to transcend ideological stances, scholars argue that it is the center-right politics in particular that attracts the AKP leadership (Cosar &Ozman, 2004; Taskin, 2008; Alam, 2009). In this vein, the AKP's self-identification with the concept of "conservative democracy" and distancing itself from the Islamist legacy in Turkey, as well as its distinctive effort for finalizing Turkey's long process of accession to the European Union are not natural consequences of "political learning" process, bur rather "a part of a deliberate strategy of filling the void on the center-right…. in responding to the ontological crisis deepened by the destabilizing effects of globalization, civil war, and unregulated urbanization," (Taskin, 2008, p.53-54).

But how did center-right politics, which represented no less than 50%[13] of the Turkish electorates during 1990's, fail in Turkey? Taskin (2008) argues that systematic corruption combined with the failure of two center-right parties (the Motherland and the True Path Party) "to perpetuate the longstanding center-right tradition of integrating the ascending counter-elites,

[13] http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/GenelSecimler.html 04/24/12

who were now distinguished by their Muslim identities." had failed to reproduce the tradition of conservative modernization that promises to benefit from the material gains of modernization while refraining moral decay (p.59). In addition, ascending cooperation with the military and the secular establishment further distanced these two parties from their populist claim of authentic representation of the masses (Cosar & Ozman, 2004; Alam, 2009).

On the other hand, others have argued that economic factors rival, if not surpass, the political or ideological ones in explaining the decline of the center-right politics in Turkey. For example, Kalaycioglu observes that since "there is more than one political party that occupies a certain ideological position of the left-right spectrum, the voter needs to make a further choice between ideological similarity of identical parties," (Kalaycioglu, 2010, p.31). Similarly, Baslevent et. al (2005), provides evidence in support of economic voting hypothesis[14], which basically argues that incumbent parties will be in a disadvantaged position at this point, since voters hold the incumbent party responsible for economic indicators such as inflation, unemployment and GNP per capita –real or perceived- , and punish the government in elections. Likewise, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier contend that "..among the issues on the typical voter's agenda, none is more consistently present, nor generally has a stronger impact, than the economy. Citizen dissatisfaction with economic performance substantially increases the probability of a vote against the incumbent. In a sense, it is even more important than long-term factors such as partisan identification, because of its greater volatility," (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000, p.211).

[14] For a comprehensive literature review on economic voting theory, please look at Monroe, K. R. 1984. *Presidential Popularity and the Economy*. New York: Praeger; Kiewit, D. R. & Rivers, D. 1985. A retrospective on retrospective voting. *In Economic Conditions and Electoral Autcomes: The United States and Western Europ*e, ed. H Eulau, MS Lewis-Beck, pp. 207-301; Nannestad, P. & Paldam, M. 1994. The VP Function: a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after 25 years. *Public Choice*, 79, p.213-245. Norporth, H. 1996. The economy. In *Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective,* ed. L Leduc, RG Niemi, P. Norris, p.299-318. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Lewis-Beck, M. S. & Stegmaier, M. 2000. Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes. *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci*, 3, p.183-129.

Thus, the fall of a government seems to be more likely to come from a shift in economic evaluations than from shifts in ideological or political attachments according to economic voting behavior literature (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000). Even though, this effect has been considered asymmetrical, with mostly punishment and little reward (Radcliff, 1994), Kalaycioglu (2010) finds out that "partisan affiliations followed by the voter satisfaction with the performance of the economy played the biggest role in determining the voter preferences in Turkey in 2007 elections," (p.29).

Either symmetrical or asymmetrical, there is a consensus in the literature that the performance of the economy has a direct impact on the failure or the success of a government. The dimension and the nature of the impact, on the other hand, are quite controversial. Nevertheless, what is not controversial is that "incumbents pay the price for short-term economic setbacks but deeper crises may be translated into broader political shifts," especially in developing countries (Remmer, 1991). Accordingly, some scholars argue that these "broader political shifts" mean the breakdowns of democratic or semi-democratic regimes (O'Donnell, 1973; Linz, 1978; Collier, 1979; Gasirowski, 1995), while others contend that economic setbacks have a catalyst effect in triggering transitions to democracy (O'Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1986; Bermeo, 1990; Przeworski, 1986).

Either way, it can be derived from the literature that the worse the economy fails, the more radical the political change will be. By weakening the old actors and/or giving rise to new ones, economic crises create a chaotic atmosphere in the system. Thus, the argument indicates that economic parameters that hindered the power of the incumbent parties enabled the electoral victory of the AKP.

What is more interesting about this argument is that whether we could tie the consecutive electoral victories of the AKP to the miracles that has been happening in Turkish economy under the AKP government. Is it possible that the political success of the Party is just a reflection of its electoral success?

Putting aside the debates on the symmetrical and asymmetrical effects of the economic parameters on voting behavior, and the uneven distribution of wealth under the AKP rule, it should be kept in mind that governments do not necessarily come and –especially- go with elections in semi-democratic political settings such as Turkey's. Therefore, the economic success might not tell us much about the containment of Kemalist elites, which consistently intervenes the democratic processes on ideological rather than economic grounds. After all, the military has never addressed the poor economic performance of governments as a legitimizing factor for its interruptions.

3. GROUP SPECIFIC POLICIES

Despite the valuable contributions they make to the literature on the rise of the AKP, existing explanations suffer from two major weaknesses. First, most scholars take election victory as the ultimate indicator of success. Even though it might be a useful proxy in fully democratic political settings, where the elected government becomes the actual ruler of the country, in semi-democratic states such as Turkey elections do not necessarily determine who dominates the society. Deeply rooted in the state structure, strong authoritarian actors in these political settings do not refrain from interfering with democratic institutions whenever they feel the need for the reproduction of their authority. Therefore, elections become an insufficient

platform for the challenger that wishes to dominate the society according to its own political agenda. Establishing its rule prerequisites changing the status quo first.

But if not for determining the actual ruler of the country, what are elections in these limited democratic settings used for? Scholars argue that authoritarian actors use elections for systematic practical reasons which can be summarized in two categories: external and internal factors:

- External factors: Modernity suggests that in order to be a respectful member of the international community, the virtues of equality, the rule of low, human rights and freedoms as well as the liberal economy are supposed to be internalized by the states. The countries that have problems in at least one of these are imposed, encouraged and even forced to reconsider their attitude (Huntington, 1991). Moreover, to get financial aid from IMF, World Bank, the United States or the European Union, responding to foreign pressure and gaining legitimacy in international arena has become crucial for the autocracies. Some scholars also argue that; if autocrats manage to reflect this international pressure to domestic opposition, there is a high probability that these opposition groups will turn in to moderate actors[15] (Schwedler & Chomiak, 2006; Berman, 2008).
- Internal factors: The internal reasons to have electoral institutions are as important as the external ones. Since the strength of an autocrat is not limitless, even the cruelest one cannot repress or kill every single opponent to his power. Thus, autocratic regimes should compromise one way or another to the challengers from both within the ruling elite and the society.

[15] For example Hamas after 2006 elections.

The solution to the challenges coming from other ruling elites or noble family members could be conciliated by redistribution of the state patronage. The most effective way for an autocrat to decide who should be spoiled more is holding elections to see who is more popular (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Gandhi&Przeworski, 2007).

The other challenge to the authoritarian regimes comes from the opposition groups in the society. When autocrats need to neutralize these threats and "solicit the cooperation of outsiders", they usually use democratic institutions such as elections (Gandhi&Prezeworski, 2007, p. 1279). Since they can set the rules for competition, decide inclusiveness and exclusiveness of the system (Lust-Okar, 2004), and influence electoral outcomes with direct and indirect ways (Schwedler, 1998); autocrats rely on democratic institutions to maintain their interests. It is a fact that "divide and rule" is a historically famous method in politics, and autocracies use it very often to maximize their room for maneuver (Brumberg, 2002).

Moderating radical opposition could be another motive to hold elections in authoritarian regimes. It is possible to make opposition condemn violence, act openly and respect the government rules in order to participate in the elections. To survive in the pluralist system, radicals will have to compromise from some ideological extremism and become more moderate. In return, they will be allowed to pursue their political agendas on low politic issues (Schwedler, 1998; Brumberg, 2002; Gandhi&Przeworski, 2007).

Clearly then, "political success" in semi democratic settings have another meaning, that is the ability for the elected governments to actually govern the society without any interference. Huntington (1968) draws attention to the same point with his famous *Political Order in Changing Societies* by observing "the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government," (p.1). Similarly, Francis

Fukuyama notes that a key feature of many developing countries is the gap between the formal claims of the state authority, and its actual capacity to govern (Fukuyama, 2004). This capacity has two aspects to it: first reining in the power of the existing authoritarian actor, which will lead to a shift in the balance of power, and then maintaining/consolidating the new balance of power, favoring one's own political agenda. Thus, we argue that the real success of the AKP lies not in the Party's landslide electoral victories, since they were not unprecedented, but its ability to appease the Kemalist state structure, and shift the balance of power in favor of itself – a process that eventually lead to the actual rule of the Party.

The second weakness of the literature is its attempt to analyze Turkish society in superficial dichotomies such as "center vs. periphery", "state vs. society" or "Kemalists vs. Islamists." In fact, revolving around a Weberian type of state definition, the literature fails to account for the various power centers in Turkish society that cut across class, religious, or ideological lines. However, in Turkish society neither center (state) nor the periphery (society) can be portrayed as a homogenous block pursuing the same political agenda. Within and across the center and the periphery, there are multiple power centers, big and small, competing with each other for the fulfillment of their own political agendas.

Joel Migdal addresses this patched characteristic of the society with a new definition of state in his state-in-society approach. He contends "the society is a web or mélange, rather than a pyramidal structure with the state's rule-making mechanisms at the apex," (2001, p.36). This web, according to Migdal, consists of "multiple rule-making loci, and the hidden and open conflict among these multiple centers seeking to exercise domination," (Migdal, 2001, p.36). These power centers do not necessarily represent a single class, religion, or an ethnic group.

Rather, they are comprised of individuals who share similar value sets, and compete for the domination of their own values.

We believe that this depiction of the state is more accurate, and a much closer fit to the Turkish case. Due to its historical, ideological and political backgrounds various power centers, such as the military, the Constitutional Court, the President, the Parliament, the Kurds, Alewits, Sunnis, Kemalists etc, are all at a constant struggle with each other for domination of their own sets of values and beliefs in Turkish society. Thus, putting the state-in-society approach at the center of its analysis, this study aims to evaluate the determinants of the AKP's success in appeasing the power of the Kemalist state structure - a virtue that we contend is what differentiates the Party from its predecessors.

The central question this study aims to answer is "How has the AKP managed to appease the Kemalist state structure and shift the balance of power in favor of itself, while its predecessor the Welfare Party did not?" We argue that the use of particularistic policy promises as a coalition building strategy can provide part of the answer. There is no doubt that a broad support base will be useful for winning elections. But more importantly, we argue that the diversity of the coalition members will provide the Party with the necessary means for changing the balance of power at different levels in different arenas such as the media, the judiciary, the discourse of the political sphere etc. For example, a coalition partner that has a TV channel, a radio station or a newspaper will enable the Party to confront the Kemalist state structure in the media as well. Or a partner with strong foreign connections will provide the foreign support that can be vital and determinant in these countries. In short, the diversity of coalition members opens new fronts that can be used to either target the status quo seekers or defend oneself vis-à-vis them.

3.1. PARTICULARISTIC POLITICS IN THE "STATE OF NATURE"

Different historical and institutional circumstances may make different strategies politically more or less viable and socially more or less acceptable. Therefore, before examining how group specific policy promises can be used as a coalition building strategy for political survival and domination, we will provide a brief summary of Joel Migdal's state-in-society approach as a fertile context for particularistic politics.

"Many of the existing approaches to understanding social and political change in the Third World either have downplayed conflict altogether (e.g., much of "modernization" theory), or have missed these particular sorts of conflicts, which only on occasion are class based (e.g., much of the Marxist literature), or have skipped the important dynamics within domestic society altogether (e.g., dependency and world system theories)," observes Joel Migdal in his seminal work *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Constitute One Another* (2001, p.65). This incompetency, according to Migdal, derives from a misunderstanding of Weber's classical state definition (see Figure 1), which describes state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory," (Migdal, 2001, p.13). Migdal accepts that this "omnipotent given" is one of the two components of the actual state; an image, a perception of the state as "the chief and appropriate rule maker within its territorial boundaries", which is "fairly autonomous, unified and centralized," (Migdal, 2001, p.16).



Figure 1: Weberian State

Yet, what other scholars overlook, he continues, is the second component; the actual practices of multiple parts of the state, which may bolster the image of the state, or batter it. Therefore, according to Migdal, in order to understand the political change or inertia one should look at the accommodations between multiple parts in society, which he describes as "a web or mélange, rather than a pyramidal structure with the state's rule making mechanism at the apex," (Migdal, 2001, p.16). In other words, moving away from a perspective that simply puts state against society, Migdal offers a state which is a player among many multiple power centers in the society that are constantly at hidden and open conflict over social control (Migdal, 2001) (See Figure II).

Moreover, he delineates the state as neither a unified nor a coherent actor in its struggle with societal forces as its image suggests. On the contrary, Migdal contends that the parts of the state are also at conflict with one another, and do not refrain from building coalitions with other

formal or informal organizations to develop practices contradicting the official laws and regulations of the state (Migdal, 2001).



Figure 2: Migdal's State

He further notes that the struggle for domination takes place in multiple arenas, and is not limited to the question of who controls the top leadership position of the state (Migdal, 2001). As a matter of fact, as we mentioned earlier, pseudo governments do not tell us much about the actual ruler of the society. Whose laws prevail? Who controls the society? We cannot answer these questions by just simply looking at the top leadership position of a country unless we know the "degree" of government, whether it is autonomous from any influence, or whether it actually controls the society. Hence, we cannot limit the scope of the power struggle to a single arena.

There are various arenas that can be used for confrontation or accommodation by multiple power loci such as the media, the judiciary, the legislature, the discourse of the society, and elections are but one of them.

If this social struggle is not simply for controlling the top leadership position of the state, then what is it for? "Social control is the currency for which social organizations compete," answers Migdal (Migdal, 2001, p.51) for the supremacy of a group's rules or value system requires social control. In addition, it is necessary for the enhancement of the strength and autonomy of the ruler, and reflected by compliance, participation, and legitimacy (Migdal, 2001).

Migdal presents two paths for sustaining social control. The first one is political mobilization of masses, which entails "conveying to people that the routines, symbols, and ways of behaving represented [by that power center] are essential to their well-being, and involves providing them with channels to express their support," (Migdal, 2001, p. 71). The second one is the strategies of survival, which becomes a necessity due to the lack of broad political support. While broad political mobilization solves the problem of social control by lessening the centrifugal forces, lack thereof "makes the position of state leaders precarious, especially in the face of any other significant concentration of power in the society, which ultimately might be used against them," (Migdal, 2001, p.71). Therefore, such narrower bases of popular support necessitate the application of survival strategies that aim to "weakening any group in society that seems to be building extensive mobilization strength, even the agencies of the state itself," (Migdal, 2001, p.72).

Migdal goes in detail explaining the strategies of survival while he pays little attention to strategies of social mobilization and suggests building coalition and a domestic power balance as

one of the effective survival strategies. However, in his argument, this coalition building is limited to "those agencies and organization whose services and products are of direct benefit to a regime that cannot bring them under central control," –namely "state-owned enterprises, local capital, multinational firms, and other important state agencies (including the military)," (Migdal, 2001, p.82). On the other hand, we believe that this strategy could be expanded to the societal level: Coalitions could be built up with various power centers in the society along with or independent from the coalitions built on the institutional level.

Why do different powers centers choose to be a part of a coalition, or otherwise? What conveys to people that the routines, symbols, and ways of behaving represented by coalition builder are essential to their well-being? How do these people come to believe that their fate/future lies in with that actor's? At this point, we offer group specific policy promises of political parties or governments as one of the mobilization strategies that could have such an effect on people from different power centers.

The Demand Side (The Society): As we already discussed, society consists of multiple power centers, and each power center has its own value set, beliefs, and policy preferences. In addition, these power centers are at a constant conflict with one another for the fulfillment of their own interests, and political agendas. In this "state of nature", obviously some actors are powerful while others not, some are more influential while others are peripheral, and some benefit from the reproduction of the existing balance of power while others are not comfortable with it, and seek an opportunity to change the status quo.

Democratic institutions, especially elections, in a fully democratic political setting, may very well present this opportunity. Yet, in countries where election victories do not necessarily change the existing balance of power, these democratic institutions lose their efficacy as

channels of expression for the unsatisfied actors in the system. In fact, authoritarian actors in these semi-democratic states do not refrain from interfering, interrupting, and even suspending democratic processes, which might upset existing balance of power that reproduces authoritarian domination. Therefore, the challengers need to acquire, aggrandize, and maintain political power to challenge this rule, and set a new balance of power favoring their own utility functions – be it a political agenda, belief system or an economic interest.

However, not each of these change seekers has the strength, opportunity or capability to control and dominate the society by its own. Therefore, they need to increase the capability of influence via aligning with other power centers, which are willing to incorporate their partners' political agendas into theirs. In a rational choice exchange model, power centers exchange their resources, and get into a coalition for political influence in an effort to maximize their own utility. In return, they provide compliance, participation and legitimacy to their partners through different channels.

The Supply Side (The Political Party): Being one of the power centers in the society, a political party also represents a certain way of thinking, ideology and utility function. And just like any other power center that is not happy with the status quo, some of them want to change the existing balance of power. Their advantage is that these parties have the potential to actually change the status quo and have social control over society, if they could sustain political mobilization of the masses or apply strategies of survival, according to Migdal.

Since it is a semi-democratic political setting, there are channels that are open to every power center in the society. Even though authoritarian actors abuse these channels from time to time, they exist. Elections, media, NGOs, referendums, demonstrations of support or opposition, strikes, universities, economic forums, the courts, the Parliament etc, all can be used -to a lesser

or a greater degree- as channels for expressing political support, compliance, legitimacy or there lack of.

However, in order to take advantage of the support channeled through various platforms, the party needs to appeal to people from different power centers on different grounds. Moreover, the party should know and respond to the demands and longings of a particular power center to an extent that the people in that power center would believe the routines, symbols, and ways of behaving represented by the party are essential to their own well-being. In other words, the strength of the bond between a power center and a party will depend on the sense of urgency between members of this symbiotic relation about dangers of upsetting the coalition. We argue that in a society in which there are multiple power centers with their own utility functions one of the strategies for creating this kind of attachment is through particularistic politics.

First of all, such a strategy gives the political party the flexibility to determine the partners of this relationship via including or excluding any power center of its choice according to the value of the resources or degree of support provided by that power center. This flexibility gives a dynamic characteristic to the coalition, meaning that the party or a coalition member may prefer to defect their relationship at any time during the process of challenging the status quo for any reason. Likewise, the party may create new symbiotic relations with new power centers on the course of the struggle. In short, particularistic politics provides the party with the necessary means to regulate the size and the composite of the coalition[16].

[16] How big or how small this coalition will or should be is whole another story. Where additional members tend to raise the costs without adding benefits to the coalition, the coalition leader will be inclined to create a minimum winning coalition, the smallest possible coalition that will be enough for winning the majority of votes – size principle (Riker, 1962; Koehler, 1972; Shepsle, 1974; Uslaner, 1975; Koford, 1982; Denzau and Munger, 1986; Baron and Ferejohn, 1989). As rational as it may sound in theory, political scientist have found that minimum

Considering that 1- our context does not provide a robust institutional environment where the rules of the game are clear, agreed and established, and framed in terms of game theory, 2- the spoil of the victory – which is changing the existing balance of power in our case- is a collective good benefiting all members of the coalition, 3- the coalition builder can never be sure about the minimum power that is going to be necessary for shifting the balance of power as it is a process rather than a single election victory; we argue that oversized coalitions will give a better chance of success for the political parties in our cases. As a mobilization strategy, coalition building via group specific politics will aim to attain as much support as it can via oversized coalitions that will be of great help for the survival of the coalition builder vis-à-vis the threatening power centers.

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winning coalition does not hold empirically, and oversized coalitions are more common in politics (Ferejohn, 1974; Arnold, 1979; Wilson, 1986; Collie, 1988, Carubba & Volden, 2000). Why? First of all, size principle depends on the particular aim or goal of the coalition. If it is not a zero-sum game, meaning that the spoils of the victory do not have to be divided amongst the coalition members, then there is no need to strict the size of the members. Second, even Riker himself accepts that there is an uncertainty problem with regards to the probability of winning the battle: "Since the members of the coalition may not be certain about whether or not it is winning, they may in their uncertainty create a coalition larger than the actual minimum winning size (Riker, 1962, p.48). Likewise, when there is an uncertainty about the reliability of the coalition partners, or when the incentive to defect is high, oversized coalitions will be more probable (Carubba & Volden, 2000). Moreover, when the status quo policy is ideologically extreme and the coalition builder wants to change it, an oversized coalition will arise (Baron & Diermeir, 2001). Last but not least, oversized coalitions may develop if partners are not only concerned about holding government office, but also influencing policy (Strom, 1990). Another argument is that oversized coalitions arise when there is a need to reduce the conflict of interest among different parties via including more centrist groups to the coalition (Axelrod, 1970).

Second, group specific policy promises as a coalition building strategy enables the party to build a broad coalition without an effort to sustain harmony among its members as each power center in the coalition will be connected directly to the party and not necessarily to each other. The relationship between the party and a coalition member will be a vertical one in the sense that the party will provide the policy preferences of the coalition member in exchange for its support, and other coalition members will have nothing to do with this bargain as their preference sets are different. Hence, we believe that the structure of the coalition created by group specific policy promises will be more like Figure 3 than Figure 4.



Figure 3: Vertical, bilateral ties

The patron-client type of relationship between the party and the power center shown in Figure 3 resembles what political scientist call as "contemporary clientelism." Piattoni (2001) describes contemporary clientelism in a nut shell as a "strategy for the acquisition, maintenance, and aggrandizement of political power, on the part of the patrons, and strategies for the protection and promotion of their interest, on the part of the clients, and that their deployment is driven by given sets of incentives and disincentives," (p.2). In this vein then, contemporary clientelism can be increasingly used as "a means to pursue the delivery of collective as opposed to individual goods," which means that "political clienteles are less likely to assume the form of loose clusters of independently negotiated dyads than organizations, communities or even whole regions that fashion relationships or reach understanding with politicians, public officials and administrations," (Gay, 1998, p.14).



Figure 4: Web of relations

We believe that the relationship created by the group specific policies of the party resembles "contemporary clientelism", because these scholars interpret clientelism strictly as exchange relations – a non-universalistic quid pro quo relation- ruled by cost-benefit analysis of both patrons and clients. The argument is that "what matters [in clientelistic relations] to both patron and client is the advantage that can be drawn from the exchange," (Piattoni, 2011, p.13). Such an economic approach allows subsuming under the concept of clientelism group level and individual level relations, and therefore it is argues that "whether politics will revolve around classes, functional groups, local communities, or individuals will depend on the level at which interests are aggregated, and ideologies will be fashioned according to justify the chosen level of aggregation," (Piattoni, 2001, p.15). As a result, clientelism transforms into a relationship that has "less to do with the exchange of votes for favors, than with the exchange of votes for what political actors would like to present as favors but the least privileged elements of the population demand or claim as rights," (Gay, 1998, p.14-15).

According to these depictions of clientelism, our coalition then can be described as an abstract collection of bilateral symbiotic relations between different power centers in the society and the political party. Considering the symbiotic, bilateral character of this relationship, we can contend that the party will focus on strengthening its bilateral ties with each member of the coalition rather than trying to sustain the coherence of the coalition itself - which brings us back to the first benefit of the particularistic politics: the flexibility of regulating the size and the composite of the coalition.

To sum up, the supply side of this symbiotic, bilateral relation (political party) offers group specific policies as coalition building strategy for acquisition, maintenance, and aggrandizement of political power that is necessary to rein in the power of the authoritarian

actor, and shift the balance of power in favor of itself, while the demand side (power centers in the society) prefers to get into this kind of relationship for the protection and promotion of their own interests. More importantly, both sides are aware that they need to struggle with the existing authoritarian power in different arenas.

After establishing its coalition with different power centers in the society, the party begins to challenge the status quo, the existing balance of power in different arenas (such as the legislature, the judiciary, the media, the elections) via supporting or opposing controversial issues. These actions of the party create the reaction of the opposing powers – namely the authoritarian actors such as the military or the bureaucracy- as well as the support of the coalition partners. Lead by the party itself, coalition partners of the party develop a common language and change the discourse of the debate. Through every possible channel, coalition members begin to determine what is acceptable and what is not by redefining concepts, laws, and issues and expressing their compliance and support to the party. Apparently, as the coalition or collection of power centers gets broader, the discursive change will be more widespread across different conflict areas. Moreover, a broader coalition will provide a broader support base that is ready to mobilize. This clash of different priorities, different discourses will culminate in the withdrawal of either the status quo powers or the party. The more the status-quo powers withdraw, the stronger the party gets. Considering that this game will be repeated several times on different grounds, eventually a shift in the balance of power towards the party will occur, and without doubt -as the balance of power mandates- the broader the coalition gets, the higher the chance of survival for the political party will be vis-à-vis threatening power centers.

If this is true, we expect to find that *in semi-democratic political settings with strong authoritarian actors, political parties that build broad coalitions consisting of various power*

centers in the society via group specific policy promises will be more likely to shift the balance of power in favor of themselves than actors that lack such connections. Consequently, we contend that the AKP is the first Islamist political party in Turkey that pursued this strategy, and it was these group specific policy promises that eventually helped the Party to repel the Kemalist state structure back, and shift the balance of power in favor of itself.

4. RESEARCH DESIGN

Our claim that "*In semi democratic Turkish political setting, political parties that build broad coalitions consisting of various power centers in the society via group specific policy promises will be more likely to shift the balance of power in favor of themselves than actors that lack such connections*" will be evaluated with a comparison of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Welfare Party. The analysis will evaluate group specific policy promises, or there lack of, and the success of the party in terms of shifting the balance of power in favor of itself in each case, We aim to assess the correlation, if any, that have linked the variables together.

This analysis makes use of a most-similar-systems research design. Such an approach makes it possible to vary the coalition building strategies of both parties while controlling for potentially intervening factors effectively. While these intervening factors might be originating from intrinsic characteristics of the parties - such as their identity, ideology, or electoral victories, they can also be related to the contextual factors such as the performance of the economy, the Turkish party system, electoral environment, and the legal framework (especially law on Political Parties and the Deputy Electoral Law).

Nevertheless, all these intervening factors might be controlled for considering the fact that the AKP is the heir of the Welfare Party. First of all, they share similar ideologies, namely Islamism or conservatism. Second, they both had sensational electoral victories – the Welfare Party in 1994 (local), and 1995 elections, and the AKP in 2002, 2004 (local), 2007, 2009 (local), and 2011 elections. Third, they were both subjects to the same party system, legal code, and electoral environment. Last but not least, both parties competed in a neoliberal economic setting. In addition, 1994 economic crisis for the Welfare Party, and 2001 economic crisis for the AKP played an important role for the failures of the alternatives on the right - left spectrum.

Both parties and their strategies are examined till just after they met a military memorandum. Thereby, we expect to analyze how they reacted to the military demands, and what the role of their strategies was in these reactions. Therefore, the AKP government, which is still in power in 2012, will be examined until the late 2007 so that we can assess the relation between its coalition strategy and reaction to the military memorandum on 27th April 2007. Nevertheless, such limitation in the scope of the study is considered to be appropriate in the sense that the Party is seems to be changing its coalition strategy after repulsing the military in 2007. Sticking with the first two terms of the AKP, we will reveal the initial coalition building strategy that helped the party to overcome the iron feast of the military.

Before revealing the specific methods for assessing the correlation between the group specific policy promises –or there lack of- and the success of the parties in changing the balance of power, we will first clarify what we mean by the Kemalist state structure.

4.1. KEMALIST (NATIONALIST) STATE STRUCTURE

4.1.1. THE MILITARY

In the 19th century, Ottoman Empire was far from its glorious days. The defeats against Western powers followed one another, and Ottoman military was the first scapegoat to blame. Sultan II. Mahmut realized that it was the backwardness of the traditional Janissaries vis-à-vis the modern armies of the Europe. Therefore, in order to be able to compete with the latest technology of the Western powers, the Empire has dismissed the Janissary army, and established a Western style military school, Mekteb-i Harbiye. However, students of Mekteb-i Harbiye were not only taught the latest war techniques but also were espoused to Western ideas and ideologies at school. Being educated according to Western standards, these military officials played an important role in modernization of the Ottoman Empire. And when it became obvious that the "ill man" of the Europe would die soon due to the secret agreements between the allies, they did not hesitate to start an independence war against occupying powers and the Istanbul government. In other words, young military officials were the pioneers at the foundation of the Turkish Republic.

After the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk –the leader of the Independence War- prohibited the political activities of officers in active service with the Military Penal Code numbered 1632 and dated 22 May 1930. However, The Turkish military has always perceived itself as the guardian of Kemalist ideology - modernization of Turkey especially via secularism.

Thus, the Turkish military never refrained from intervening politics, especially when they perceived a threat from the "reactionary forces." They grounded their interferences on the Inner Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces, which was established after the 1960 coup by the

National Unity Committee. In subsequent coup d'états and coup d'état attempts, they show reasons to justify their political activities especially with the Article 35[17] of this act.

The military had a record of intervening in politics, removing elected governments four times in the past. It made coups d'état in 1960 (27 May Coup) -and did not hesitate to executed the first democratically elected Prime Minister Adnan Menderes- , in 1971 (12 March Coup), and in 1980 (12 September Coup). It also maneuvered the removal of an Islamic-oriented government party – the Welfare Party- with a post-modern coup in 1997 (28 February Process), and attempted to remove another –the AKP- in 2007 (27 April) with an online memorandum.

4.1.2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

The Constitutional Court of Turkey was established on April 25, 1962, according to the provisions of the Constitution of 1961. Prior to that date, absolute superiority of the parliament was adopted as a constitutional principle. However, Republican People's Party opposition, RPP aligned intellectuals, and the military junta that came into power by 1960 military coup promoted the idea that the limitation and control of the parliamentary power was needed as democratically elected governments might abuse their power. In other words, Kemalist state structure believed that the sovereignty should not belong directly to the nation. Contrary to the Article 3 of the 1924 Constitution emphasizing that "sovereignty belongs to the nation without any restrictions or provisions" (Earle, 1925), Kemalist elites believed that nation's sovereignty should be filtered through bureaucratic agencies that were determined to fulfill the Constitution -1961 Constitution. On the other hand, it was the military junta, not the parliament, who wrote the Constitution.

[17] http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/1044.html 17/05/2012

Although the constitution of 1961 was annulled by the military regime that came into the power with the 1980 military coup, the court continued its operations according to the 1982 Constitution, which was also written by the military junta.

The Court has participated in many party closure cases contending that these parties were acting against the Constitution –especially Article 2, which guarantees the Kemalist character of the state, and Article 3, which protects Turkish state's territorial and national integrity[18]. Accordingly, the Court decided to close the democracy Party (DEP) (Decision no. 1994/2, dated 16.06.1994), and Democratic Society Party (HADEP) (Decision dated 2009), both pro Kurdish parties, on the grounds that they were violating the principle of territorial/national integrity and indivisibility. The Court also banned the Islamist Parties The Welfare Party (Decision no. 1998/1, dated 16.01.1998) and the Virtue Party (Decision no. 2001/2, dated 21.06.2001) on the grounds that they were violating the principle of secularism.

In addition to party closures, the Court, in response to then President Kenan Evren's application for annulment of a law made by the parliament, decided that wearing headscarves in universities is unconstitutional (Decision no. 1989/12, dated 07.03.1989).

The Constitutional Court also made an attempt to ban the AKP in 2008 on the grounds that it became a "focal point" for reactionary activities. Yet, the attempt was unsuccessful.

4.1.3. THE PRESIDENT

The President of Turkey is the head of state. Even though, the Presidency is largely a ceremonial office, it has some important functions that exceed the duties of a normal presidency office in a parliamentary system. In this capacity he represents the Republic of Turkey, and the

[18] http://www.constitution.org/cons/turkey/turk_cons.htm 17/05/2012

unity of the Turkish nation; he ensures the implementation of the Turkish Constitution, and the organized and harmonious functioning of the organs of state.

There are two legislative functions that are particularly give strength to the President over the Parliament. The first one is the President's right to return the laws to the Parliament to be reconsidered. And the second is to appeal to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of certain provisions or the entirety of laws, decrees having the force of law, and the Rules of Procedure of the parliament on the grounds that they are unconstitutional in form or in content. Such powers could, and did, block the functioning of the Parliament when there is an ideological gap between the President and the government.

4.1.4. THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (CHP) AND CHP ALIGNED INTELLECTUALS

Established in 1919 as a union of resistance groups against the invasion of Anatolia by Mustafa Kemal, the CHP has defined itself as the founding party of the modern Turkey – Ataturk's party. After officially declaring itself as a political organization on September 9, 1923, and announced the establishment of the Turkish Republic on October 29, 1923, the "People's Party" renamed itself to "Republican People's Party" (CHP) on November 10, 1924 as Turkey was moving into a single-party period that would last for over 20 years. In addition, during 1930s, the Kemalist ideology, which is summarized by the six principles of republicanism, nationalism, statism, populism, secularism (laicite), and revolutionalism, was chosen as the guideline of the Party policies.

During the single party period, the CHP worked as an instrument for the top-down modernization and Westernization of Turkish society. However, this top-down process lead to the great discontent of the masses, which by various occasions did not hesitate to show the

leaders of the CHP how fragile their rule was[19]. It was that discontent that obstructed any CHP led government ever since Turkey's transition to multiparty democracy.

During the interim "multi-party periods" in between the military coups of 1960, 1971, and 1980, CHP is regarded as being social-democratic (member of the Socialist International), state nationalistic and secularist. However, the Party could not offer a solution to the working class, and lower classes of the society suffering under the malign effects of globalization/neoliberalism during 1980s. And as a result, the CHP moved further away from its "leftist" stance and depend solely on to the Kemalist/nationalist character of the party.

The Republican People's Party is currently a centre-leftist political party with traditional ties to the middle and upper-middle classes such as white-collar workers, retired generals, government bureaucrats, academics, college students, left-leaning intellectuals (which means secular intellectuals in Turkish context) and some labor unions such as DİSK.

4.2. COALITION BUILDING PHASE

Since the parties will not be able to actually govern the country and implement their own political agenda until they shift the balance of power in favor of themselves, the party programs, urgent action plans, election speeches, legal arrangements as well as the statements of party leaders might not explicitly reveal the *coalition building* strategies of the AKP and the Welfare Party. Yet, as the balance of power slowly shifts towards the Party, the discourse and the actions of the party will be expressed more explicitly, and the party will take bolder steps. Since shifting the balance of power in the political sphere will take some time, we believe that the process should be analyzed as a whole. Therefore, we will use content analysis on various documents such as election speeches, laws, executive orders, constitutional amendments, commission

[19] See the multi-party experience in 1924, Ertem, B. Liberal Republican Party as a Political Opposition Experiment http://sobiad.odu.edu.tr/cilt1/cil1sayi2_pdf/ertem_baris.pdf 05/17/2012

reports, and comments/statement of party leaders for evaluating both the independent and the dependent variable.

In short, asking the questions of *"who says what, to whom, why, to what extent and with what effect?"* will enable us to analyze the coalition building strategy of the party on the one hand, and how this coalition is used by the party to shift the balance of power in the political sphere on the other hand. Thereby, we will first try to understand the coalition building strategies of the parties – group specific policy promises in the AKP case, and there lack of in the Welfare Party case. Second, via studying the discourse of different power centers in different arenas, we will reveal the level of compliance, support and legitimacy these power centers provide for the party. And third, we will try to find a correlation –if any- between the support of the coalition members and the party's success in shifting the balance of power in favor of itself, or there lack of.

4.2.1. IV: GROUP SPECIFIC POLICY PROMISES AS A COALITION BUILDING STRATEGY

Studying all these documents will give away a pattern or a mindset that is unique to each party. We believe that this pattern can be used to study the coalition building strategies of the AKP and the Welfare Party. While tracing for correlations, the aforementioned texts will be evaluated with reference to a set of questions for each case:

- Is the party targeting a specific group or is it taking into account large segments of the society?? Who benefits from the new regulation?
- Do the party leaders mention or imply any specific group with regards to the new regulation while giving statements or making comments?

- Is there a pattern in the statements or actions of the parties towards a specific group or a subject? For example, are they only interested in Kurdish problem as opposed to the general improvement of minority rights?
- Do parties ever imply that they are fulfilling their promises to a specific group?

4.2.2. DV: SHIFTING THE BALANCE OF POWER

Besides giving hints about coalition building strategies of the parties, we argue that these documents/statements are also important in terms of starting a discussion across the country, in which the reaction of different power centers to these documents will shed light on the power struggle in the society. In other words, these reactions are important in terms of showcasing who is aligning with the party, who is opposing it, and on what grounds – which is basically what we call the power struggle.

- Who are supporting the party? Who are opposing it? With what means?
- Are the groups consistent with their support/opposition across the issues to an extent that we can call them "coalition partners" or "clashing powers?"
- Is this discursive change –created both by the action of the government and the reactions of other power centers to it- help changing the balance of power at all? Who withdraws after all the dust settles down?
- Do power centers ever mention promises made by the party to them?

5. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: THE COALITIONS WITH THE POWER CENTERS IN THE TURKISH SOCIETY

5.1. KURDS

In 1923, with the aim of establishing a secular, Westernized nation state, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk began to implement his modernization policy in which he desired to create a new regime based upon concepts of cultural unity, rationalism, secularism and a liberal economy. In this respect, all former Ottoman subjects living in Anatolia were accepted as members of the new Turkish nation. As Mustafa Kemal's cultural togetherness policy was based upon the assimilation and/or elimination of ethnic elements other than Turks, when any ethic group, such as Kurds, demanded to maintain local cultural traditions, the central government saw these demands as threats to territorial integrity and political unity. As a result, the policy of cultural unity pursued by the Kemalists gave rise to the emergence of Kurdish uprisings against the central government ever since 1925. By describing these uprisings as ethnic separatist movements regardless of their genuine origin, state authorities automatically have implemented military measures to suppress these rebellions.

Especially after the 1980 military coup, hard-core Turkish nationalism towards the Kurds fueled Kurdish nationalism and increased the number of Kurdish separatist/rebellious movements. Accordngly, 1990's witnessed more military operations, more casualties, and more aggression on both sides. On the one hand, there was state ideology dictating that Turkey did not have a "Kurdish problem" -since there was no such thing as "Kurds," and these people were simply "mountain Turks"- but a "terror problem" that could only be solved via military measures. On the other hand, Kurdish resistance to Turkification was snowballing via both a

peaceful political struggle to obtain basic civil rights for Kurds within Turkey, and a violent armed struggle to obtain a separate Kurdish state.

The dimensions of the resistance to the state ideology as well as the size of the Kurdish population (18% according to the CIA World Factbook, and 7.07 % according to the Turkish Statistical Institute) led to a perception of Kurds as the only minority that could pose a threat to Turkish national unity. Therefore, Kurds and Kurdish issue have been on the agenda of each and every government in Turkish politics – including interval (military) governments, especially when the armed struggle got more and more violent on both sides.

To find a solution to the problem -or in order to define the problem in their own terms- more than 70 reports have been published between 1920 and 2010, intensifying in two periods: 1- One Party Period (CHP) and 2- After 1990s. While the reports during the one party period were simply a repetition of the official state ideology, and therefore defined the problem as a "public order" issue, being products of objective research done by NGOs and political parties, the reports written after 1990 referred the problem as an identity and democracy problem that worsens with the democracy and human rights violations of the Turkish state (Yayman, 2011). After all, one did not need to be a genius to realize that it would take more than military measures to solve the problem of Kurdish people living in a region, which was under the state of emergency for 51 years, from 1925 to 1950 and from 1978 to 2002.

Yet for a very long time, even though the identity problem was recognized by most of the political parties, the governments were not able to step back from the official state ideology with regards to the Kurdish problem.

5.1.1. THE WELFARE'S RELATION WITH KURDS:

Being marginalized by the Kemalist state structure itself, Islamist movements in Turkey have always been sympathetic to the sufferings of Kurds, and vice versa. Additionally, Islam has been another potential factor that could bring these two groups together as most of the Kurdish population in the east and southeast Turkey are practicing Muslims who belong to a Sufi order. Yet, it was not until 1991 that the Welfare Party prepared a report on the Kurdish problem that had both the origin of the problem and policy recommendations for the Party leadership. Rather than being a genuine effort of the Party to end the sufferings of the Kurds, the report was more of a guideline on "how to win the Kurdish voters," a constituency base that was alienated by the alliance of the Welfare Party and ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party in 1991 elections.

The report was prepared by the order of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then a young and respected member of the Welfare Party who would become the popular leader of the AKP in the upcoming years. Erdogan was against the election coalition with an ultra nationalist party due to the fear that it would alienate the traditional Islamist Kurdish voter base in the Southeast[20]. Yet, Necmettin Erbakan approved the coalition, which won 16.90% of votes in the 1991 election, and opened the doors of the National Assembly to the Welfare Party with 40 MPs[21].

The report was written with the aim of regaining traditional Islamic Kurdish votes after the 1991 election, and consisted of two parts –which at the time being were quite radical: 1-The Problem and 2- Proposals. "The report's proposals, which are still sharply inconsistent with traditional opinions among military elites and state bureaucrats, for the first time accepted the existence of a Kurdish question," (Efegil, 2011, p.30).

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[20] http://dunyabulteni.net/index.php?aType=haberArchive&ArticleID=30433
[21] http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=erdoganin-kurt-raporunda-ne-yaziyordu-2109101200

According to the report, "Turkey had a "Kurdish" question, and Southeastern Anatolia was historically called Kurdistan. The Turkish language is different from Turkish. The Kurdish people suffer from both military operations and the PKK terrorist attacks. Contrary to the common perception, except for some marginal Kurdish groups, most Kurdish people did not demand independence from Turkey; they desired only freely to practice their cultural traditions and use their mother tongue."[22] In other words, for Kurds, the acceptance of their identity and culture by the state authorities was much more important than independence.

The report indicated the following concrete suggestions for the party leadership: "the end of punitive measures upon local people, ensuring regional and economic development, the usage of the word "Kurd" more often, the improvement of human rights, development of the Kurdish culture, the establishment of a Kurdish institute, the free publication of Kurdish newspapers and journals, the formation of local parliaments, decreasing the central government's powers and allowing the free use of the mother tongue.[23]"

The report stressed the need to find a solution within the framework of full democratic, cultural pluralism and noted the reasons for the problem were denial, assimilation, and the suppressive policies of the central government. Consequently, "it supported the establishment of a new legal state, which would be prescriptive to equal political, social and cultural rights for all people," (Efegil, 2011). In other words, when Islam based Just Order replaced the Kemalist system, there would hardly be problems on ethnic or racial grounds as all Muslims, regardless of their ethnicity, would be considered brothers.

Thus, even though Erbakan took the report seriously and established a Southeastern Study Group, it seems that he did not fully grasp the essence of it. According to Erbakan, both

[22] http://dunyabulteni.net/index.php?aType=haberArchive&ArticleID=30433
[23] http://dunyabulteni.net/index.php?aType=haberArchive&ArticleID=30433

Turkish and Kurdish nationalism were at fault, and the only solution was Islam. In a parliament speech, he underlined this fact by stating that "Above anything, we are Muslims. We are brothers and sisters.[24]" In fact, Erbakan was not recognizing the just and equal togetherness of the Turkish and Kurdish nationalities as different ethnic groups, but rather replacing the century old "nation" with "umma" via underrating the ethnicity factor. According to Erbakan, "When the system is just, would it make any difference whether someone is a Kurd or a Turk? Or when the system obeys the Zionists, and exploits its own people, does it make any difference for the exploited whether he is a Turk or a Kurd?[25]"

However, focusing on the common religion factor, which referred to the Sunni interpretation of Islam, the Welfare Party itself made a distinction between Kurdish population, and alienated the group with other sectarian beliefs.

Nevertheless, the report shaped the discourse of the Welfare Party for a while, which eventually rekindled Kurdish support for the Party. The 4th Congress of the Welfare Party, held in October 10th, 1993, was particularly important in underlying the Party's position regarding the Kurdish question. It was announced one again that the armed conflict in the East and Southeast was a conflict between the Kurdish and Turkish nationalism; which were both wrong as they were prioritizing ethnicity instead of brotherhood of all Muslims (Gulalp, 2003). Just Order based on Islamic principles was presented as an alternative to the oppressive Kemalist ideology that could solve the problems created by its assimilative strategies, including the Kurdish question. Remaining loyal to the proposals of the 1991 report, the Party once again stated that the Kurdish identity should be recognized, and full cultural rights of the Kurds – including the rights related to the use of Kurdish- should be given by the state (Gulalp, 2003).

[24] www.youtube.com/watch?v=1F7_Hk08WpQ&feature=related
[25] www.youtube.com/watch?v=1F7_Hk08WpQ&feature=related

Yet, the Kurdish problem did not remain the same during 1991-1995. "This period had witnessed the rise of 'the military solution' which manifested itself in closing down two Kurdish nationalist parties, the HEP and the DEP and in imprisoning their deputies by the ruling coalition of TPP and the Republican People's Party (CHP). The election booklet did not make any references to these important developments in Turkish political life," (Duran, 1998).

In Kurdish city Bingol in 1994, Erbakan gave his much contentious statements regarding the issue and the Kemalist state: "For centuries, children of this country started their education at school with the name of Allah every day. You abolished this tradition, and replaced it with what? With 'I am a Turk, honest and hardworking.' If you say that, a Muslim brother from a Kurdish origin will have the right to say 'Oh, is that so? Then, I am a Kurd, more honest, and more hardworking.' By doing so, you estranged the children of this country to each other. Tomorrow, that parliament will be at the hands of the believers, and all those rights will be granted without spilling blood.[26]" Later in 10 March 2000, Erbakan was found guilty of "provoking the nation for hate and enmity via emphasizing the ethnic and religious differences – the famous Article 312 of the TCK," and sentenced one year prison by the Diyarbakir State Security Court[27].

Even though, Erbakan announced any "ethnicity" would be irrelevant in the new system (Just Order), and the most important thing would be the common religious beliefs of people. Mentioning "Kurds" as a separate ethnic group and demanding cultural rights for them helped the Party to win over the Kurdish voters in Kurdish cities and the big cities that had a large Kurdish immigrant population. In 1994 and 1995 elections, this win-over translated into a serious increase of Kurdish based votes for the Party (Calmuk, 2005).

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[26] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3IeJTIzDR8s
[27] http://www.belgenet.com/belge/erbakan_01.html , http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/15680.asp

Yet, when the Welfare entered the parliament as the big coalition partner, its attitude and actions towards the Kurdish question were a total disappointment for not only Kurds but also liberal elites. "Taking into consideration the inflexibility of the Turkish political system, the strength of Turkish nationalism and unwillingness of its coalition partner, the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi), and the military to change the status-quo related to the Kurdish identity and cultural rights, the WP rearranged its priorities on the issue. Not unexpectedly, it shifted its emphasis to the economic side of the problem while identity and cultural rights dimension had to wait for some time," (Duran, 1998). "Furthermore, the WP's reluctance in giving priority to democratization of the political system in power and its insistence on keeping anti-regime political symbols resulted in a crisis of regime. This crisis inherently narrowed the political space in which the WP would introduce some political reforms for the recognition of Kurdish identity and language," (Duran, 1998).

First of all, on 23rd July (only one month after coming to power as the big coalition partner), Erbakan 'visited' the General Staff of the Republic of Turkey, and 'asked' the opinions of the soldiers on OHAL (state of emergency in the eastern and southeastern Turkey), and reactionary movements. On July 30th, OHAL, which had been considered responsible for the systematic human rights violations and the oppression of Kurds, was extended by the Welfare led parliament.

Second, during an interview in his Libya visit (Oct. 5th, 1996) –as a reply to the accusations of Muammer Kaddafi on the sufferings of Kurds in Turkey- Erbakan argued that "Turkey is a democracy. Turkish legal system does not discriminate against any race or ethnicity; each and every citizen has equal rights. Thus, Turkey does not have either a race or a gender problem. The only problem of Turkey is the problem of terrorism [referring to the

Kurdish separatist movements-namely PKK], and this problem is rooted outside the Turkish borders. The West is trying to tear apart the territorial integrity of Turkey, and therefore using Kurds via provoking them for this reason. They accuse Turkey of oppressing and torturing Kurds. This claim has nothing to do with the reality. Turkey does not have a Kurdish problem. Turkey has a terrorism problem.[28]" Despite this word by word recitation of the state ideology, opposition parties and the media accused Erbakan of remaining passive against the humiliations of a 'desert bedouin.'

On 16th of October, there was an interpellation against the Welfare-led government concerning the choice of its foreign visits. During the interpellation, State Minister Abdullah Gul claimed that the interpellation was based on false accusations of the media, which obviously was determined to defame the Welfare Party[29].

Third, while fully fledged military operations against the PKK camps continued during the rule of the Welfare Party, nothing was done regarding the constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity, or improvement of Kurdish culture and language. Instead, Erbakan offered "ummah" as an abstract alternative to the "nation," and Islam as an alternative to "nationalism." Even though the Party established a Southeast Study Group, the focus of the group mostly focused on the economic problems of the region.

Consequently, contrary to its early discourse and the warnings of the Kurdish reports, the Welfare Party could hardly step outside of the official state ideology regarding the Kurdish problem. In addition to the political and social pressure –or because of it-, it could be argued that

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[28] Turkish National Assembly Archive http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/td_v2.goruntule?sayfa_no_ilk=66&sayfa_no_son=69&sayfa_no=93&v_mecli s=1&v_donem=20&v_yasama_yili=&v_cilt=12&v_birlesim=008

[29] For an example of the fabricated news, see http://fotogaleri.haber7.com/inner/261120120301020408601.jpg which reads "The Storm of Lies" referring to the Prime Minister's state of the nation address broadcasted the previous day according to the newspaper, whereas Erbakan had to postpone the speech due to a national football game.

Erbakan did not fully grasp the ethnic dimension of the problem, as he did not hesitate to talk about "Armenians with Kurdish origin[30]," which shows his confusion about the issue.

Considering the ebbs and flows in the relations between the Welfare Party and Kurds, it could be argued that their limited coalition –if any- broke down at a very early stage, soon after the election victory of the Welfare Party in 1995.

5.1.2. THE AKP'S RELATION WITH KURDS:

It is possible to start the AKP-Kurdish relations with the 1991 Kurdish report of the Welfare Party as the person who came up with that report was no other than Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself, the leader and the founder of the AKP. Being aware of the origin of the problem and possible solutions to it, Erdogan and the AKP leadership based their Kurdish policy on the full recognition of the Kurdish identity as a different ethnic group, granting full cultural and social rights to Kurds, and narrowing the economic gap between the undeveloped east and industrialized west of the country – the very same demands Kurdish were longing for a century. Besides, struggle with the PKK was presented as another pillar of the strategy, parallel to the improvement of Kurdish rights. In other words, the Party made a distinction between the separatist PKK terrorists and innocent civilians, and guaranteed carrot to the Kurds as long as they stay loyal to the state and do not get involved in terrorist acts.

Accordingly, starting from the establishment of the Party, the AKP used various channels to explain their group specific strategy to Kurds, change the discourse of the Turkish public, and fulfill its promises.

[30] www.youtube.com/watch?v=1F_Hk08WpQ&feature=related

Early Period Policy Promises:

Right after its establishment in 2001, the AKP devoted a special section of its Party Program to the Kurdish problem with the title of 'The East and The Southeast.[31]" As a sign of particularistic politics, this section dealt with the specific policies that would be pursued when the Party came to power, even though the document had many sections underlying the democratic stance of the Party such as 'Fundamental Rights and Freedoms,' 'Law and Justice,' and 'Democratization and Civil Society."

First of all, the Program states that "The event, which some of us call the Southeastern, others call the Kurdish or the Terror problem, is unfortunately a reality in Turkey. In cognizance of the negative issues caused by this problem in our social life, [the AKP] shall follow a policy guarding the happiness, welfare, rights and freedoms of the regional population.[32]" It is remarkable that the Party uses all terms, including the ones used by the Kemalist state structure, that are related to the problem at the very beginning. By doing so, it chooses a more moderate discourse that could be felt less of a threat by the Kemalist state structure.

Second, after noting that "The cultural diversity in this region is considered richness by [the Party]," the Program lists a bunch of preconditions for the blossom of this richness: " in a manner not to create a weakness in a sustainable policy which goes beyond the identification of the reality the prevention of the terror threatening the region, the integrity of Turkey, as well as the unitary State structure; a sustainable policy which goes beyond the identification of the reality respectful to the sensitivities of the entire society."

Most importantly, the Program makes a distinction between terrorists and innocent civilians, and argues that the posture towards each of them should be different: "Our Party aims

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[31] For the full text, see http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum

[32] http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum

at putting an end to certain practices which are resorted to as a reaction to terror but, which go beyond their original purpose, and which disturb the region's population. It also aims at abolishing entirely the State of Emergency practices, which have been maintained for many years. We believe that our State must display a deterrent posture towards criminals and a protective posture towards innocents and must treat innocent people with affection." Therefore, the Party Program promises to put an end to the injustice, and human rights violations in the region, which were earlier legitimized using the fight with terror by the Kemalist state structure. Contrary to earlier practices, the Party argues that "terror and [state] oppression respectively feed one another. Any approach, which ignores that terror is a consequence, turns to producing solutions with only oppression. Consequently, this only promotes terror," and instead offers a three-pillar approach for fighting terrorism: respect for basic rights and freedoms of the Kurds, sustaining economic development, and providing security in the region[33].

Eliminating, or at least minimizing, the difference in development between regions was presented as an important aspect of the solution, even though economic improvements in and of themselves were not considered to be sufficient to end the Kurdish problem. Hence, the Program presented economic measures as the third pillar of the solution along with providing cultural rights and fighting with terrorism, since "lack of public services, unemployment, poverty and oppression [were] situations where terror [could] flourish most conveniently." Improving trade, especially border trade with neighboring countries, were offered as a viable solution to the low economic activity in the region[34].

Consequently, the Program believes that a perception of a bureaucratic and authoritarian State relying solely on the concept of security will exacerbate the problems even further in the

[33] http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum_

[34] http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum_

long term. Therefore, for reinforcing the unity and integrity of our nation in the long term, it suggests that a perception based on democracy and pluralism should be used" although the Program admits that such a perception may be met with concern initially35.

This Party Program constituted the basis of the AKP discourse and activities for a very long time. For example, during the propaganda period of 2002 elections, Erdogan made several references to the Party Program with regards to the Kurdish problem and the Party's solution to it. In 2002, in his Hakkari and Diyarbakir speeches, which were his first election speeches as the leader of the AKP, Erdogan stressed the existence of different ethnic groups in Turkey, and promised that there will be no religious, ethnic or regional discrimination when the AKP came to power[36]. In Cizre, he added that the villagers that were forced to leave their villages due to terrorism would be able to return their homes with a rehabilitation project[37].

During this period, Erdogan met the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Jalal Talabani in his office. In this meeting, Erdogan stated that "the information he got about Iraq and Kurdistan made him happy, and he wished that the relations would be closer in the future.[38]" Yet, these two sentences were enough to start a fire in the media and amongst the opposition parties and the AKP needed to clarify that Erdogan used Kurdistan for the limited geographic region on the north of Iraq, which at the same time happens to be the name of Jalal Talabani's party[39].

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[35] http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum_

[36] "We do not discriminate against anyone, whether he is a Kurds, a Turk, a Laz, a Caucasian, or an Abkhaz. When we rule, there will be no discrimination between Alawites and Sunnis, nor will there be any between Muslims, Christians and Jews. There will also be no nationalism based on race. Because, no race is superior to the other. We are all human beings. Likewise, there will be no nationalism based on region. Neither the East nor the West will be superior to one another. " http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/ak-parti-lideri-erdogan-ilk-secim-mitingini-hakkaride-yapti/4242

[37] http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/ak-parti-lideri-erdogan-cizrede-halkla-bulustu/4174

[38] http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haber/4041/ak-parti-genel-baskani-kurdistan-yurtseverler-birligi-lideri-celal-talabani

[39] http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haber/4041/ak-parti-genel-baskani-kurdistan-yurtseverler-birligi-lideri-celal-talabani

Consequently, these early period policy promises, and emphasis on pluralism and democracy -with the help of the 10% national threshold that prevented DEHAP[40] from entering the parliament despite having a 6,2% national vote share- earned the AKP 32,2% of votes in Eastern and 26,5% in Southeastern Anatolia[41]. In other words, the AKP was either the first or the second party in twelve Kurdish cities[42], even though on average it gained less than half of the electoral support that DEHAP obtained in East and Southeastern provinces (Carkoglu, 2002).

European Union Alignment Packages and Kurdish culture:

With the adoption of the "National Program" in the Turkey Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on 19 March 2001, the issue of constitutional change landed on top of the political agenda. With this document, Turkey promised to fulfill certain reforms before becoming eligible for full membership of the EU. In accordance with the short-term and mid-term goals in the National Program, the Government consisting of Democratic Left Party (DSP), Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) gave priority to the preparation of a new constitutional amendment package within the framework of the EU standards. Among these standards lied the expansion of fundamental rights and freedoms, the abolition of death penalty, obstruction of party closure by presenting a gradual punishment system for those that indulge in unconstitutional activities, legalization of broadcasting and publishing in local languages "that has been prohibited by law"-even though such prohibition did not exist since 1991-, and incorporation of fair trial to the Constitution.

However, these amendments did not change the century old mentality of Turkish Kemalists. In 2000, in a meeting with Socialists Group in the European Parliament, Prime

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[40] Democratic People's Party – a regional leftist political party representing Kurdish ethnicity in the country

[41] Ali Bulac, Kurt Secmenin Oylari, 28.07.2007 http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=569630

[42] 1.Agri 2.Batman 3.Bingol 4. Bitlis 5.Diyarbakir 6.Hakkari 7.Mardin 8.Mus 9.Siirt 10.Sirnak 11.Tunceli 12.Van

Minister Bulent Ecevit, the leader of the coalition partner DSP, announced that "Kurdish is not a language.[43]" In 2002, after the amendments, the coalition was still discussing broadcasting in Kurdish in terms of national security,[44] and was contending that "Education in Kurdish is impossible[45]." In fact, national unity and territorial integrity of the country were considered to be at risk due to such EU demands[46], and therefore a possible EU membership was a first step towards the dissolution of Turkish Republic[47].

In this atmosphere, "party leaders of the AKP began to state repeatedly that the Copenhagen Criteria should be considered as 'Ankara criteria' that would be met in full-with or without EU membership," (Ugur & Yankaya, 2008, p. 591). After the elections in November 2002, the AKP government issued a program and an action plan that stressed the EU reforms as a basis for constitutional/legal reforms. Despite all the controversy, EU membership was a Kemalist project beginning in 1960s, and the AKP chose to use their weapons against them to legitimize its political agenda.

One of the first actions of the AKP government was to put an end to the state of emergency that affected the Kurdish areas[48]. Then, the AKP government adopted five reform packages from 2002 to 2007. These reform packages abolished Article 8 of Anti-Terror Law and allowed for broadcasting in languages and dialects other than Turkish. In addition, opening of private courses, naming children, and propagating in elections in local languages other than Turkish were also enabled with EU reform packages[49].

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[43] yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2000/mart/28/p2.html
[44] http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/44055.asp
[45] /haber.php?habernoo=29391
[46] Sevr Paranoia-the belief that the West is waiting for the right time to apply the Sevr Threaty, which intended to break Turkey into its pieces after the WW1
[47] http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2004/10/29/yazar/pulur.html
[48] http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=112742
[49] http://egemenbagis.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/tsr.pdf

The first Kurdish private course was opened in Batman on April 2nd, 2004 after a huge bureaucratic controversy[50]. On the other hand, people had to wait for 2009 to watch the first full time broadcasting in Kurdish in Turkish Radio and Television (TRT)[51]-with a 7 year delay again due to bureaucratic obstacles.

During this 5 year-reform period, the AKP government supported the reform packages with discursive changes as well. For example, in October 2004, the Human Rights Commission, responsible to the office of Prime Minister, published a minority report. The report basically contended that the usage of race based "Turk" as a supra-identity created many problems for Turkish society as "Turk" happened to be the name of one of the sub-identities in the society which lived under the supra-nationality of "Ottoman" for centuries without any problems[52]. The suggestion of the Commission was to find another supra-nationality that is territory based and inclusive, like "Turkiyeli[53]."

There is no need to say that these suggestions created a storm in Turkish politics, and even the AKP government had to announce, "the Report had been prepared without the knowledge or permission of the government[54]."

Nevertheless, the words were out there, and after a year, Erdogan began to talk with the language of the report. In 2005 during a meeting in Kurdish city Siirt, he announced, "every ethnic group in Turkey will be called in the name of its ethnicity. They are all sub-nationalities. And the supra nationality uniting all will be the citizenship of Turkish Republic[55]." In a historic speech in Diyarbakir, he pointed out that he had been, and still was, against any regional and

[50] http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/264131.asp
[51] http://www.baskinoran.com/2011/Paris-Kurtce-16-04-2011.pdf
[52] http://baskinoran.com/makale/Birikim-IHDKRaporununOykusu.pdf
[53] Sbd from Turkey
[54] http://baskinoran.com/makale/Birikim-IHDKRaporununOykusu.pdf
[55] http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2005/ekim/10/p01.html
For other examples, see www.milliyet.com.tr/2005/11/22/son/sonsiy10.html, www.milliyet.com.tr/2005/11/27/siyaset/axsiy02.html

ethnic separatist movements while he approved cultural pluralism. According to Erdogan, there was a "Kurdish problem" in the country, and it was not confined to a limited group of people. It was the problem of all[56]. He also recited a famous poem demanding "an end to the fight between brothers[57]."

The government also tried to take a step towards decentralization of power, in the same lines with the suggestions of all Kurdish reports published in 1990s and later. According to the proposal of the reform, most of the authority was being transferred from national government to local administrations, and thereby, strengthening the participation of the local people in their governance[58]. Yet, due to the controversy it created, the proposal was drawn back.

5.2. TUSIAD

Starting from the Jon Turk movements in the late Ottoman Empire era, replacing the existing, non-Muslim, "comprador" bourgeoisie with a national bourgeoisie was on top of the political agenda of Turkish nationalists. National bourgeoisie was considered to be the path to an economically independent nation state. Therefore, after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the Kemalist state dedicated itself to create this national bourgeoisie with government subsidies, tax reductions, concessions, credits and laws that protected entrepreneurs. In order to get larger shares from such privileges, enterprises articulated high rank bureaucrats and politicians to their bodies.

In addition to the economic policies of the Kemalist state, Turkish bourgeoisie benefited from the rising racism in Europe during 1930's. Most of the non-Muslim entrepreneurs either forced out of country due to increasing anonymous assaults, or had to pay higher and extra taxes.

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[56] arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/08/12/siy94.html
[57] bianet.org/bianet/print/65194-erdogan-kurt-sorunu-hepimizin-sorunu
[58] http://haber.php?haberno=94207

Moreover, until 1980, the Kemalist state refrained from liberalism and applied import substitution industrialization (ISI) policies, which increased the dependence of the national bourgeoisie to state for import/export privileges and policies.

Such dependence of the Turkish bourgeoisie to the Kemalist state led to an organic, clientelist relation between the upper middle classes and the Kemalist state structure not only economically but also ideologically. In other words, Turkish bourgeoisie has been the most enthusiastic supporter of the Kemalist ideals, and the state structure for decades.

Founded in 1971, Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) represents the national bourgeoisie, which -after all- was a Kemalist project. The Association composed of the CEOs and Executives of the major industrial and service companies in Turkey, including those that are among global Fortune 500 companies. Concentrated mainly in Istanbul, TUSIAD is an independent, West-oriented, non-governmental organization that supports research and policy discussion on important social and economic issues in Turkey (Gunter & Yavuz, 2007).

In the early 1990s, TÜSIAD campaigned for legal and institutional reforms aimed at enhancing the institutional quality of Turkey's economy. "However, its reforms vision was limited to economic governance and optimal size of the state. This vision underwent a significant expansion with the conclusion of the EU–Turkey customs union (CU) in 1995," (Ugur & Yankaya, 2008, p.588). After 1995, TÜSIAD began to campaign for extensive democratization and protection of the individual vis-à-vis the state (Onis, 1997). "An important reason for this change was the perception that the CU could constitute a stepping stone toward EU membership as it would enable Turkey to '. . . achieve the necessary economic and political maturity to be a full member of the EU' (TÜSIAD 1996, 5; 1997a, 4)," (Ugur & Yankaya, 2008, p.588).

In short, TUSIAD had the perception that the prospect of EU membership provided "a sense of legitimacy" that would reduce resistance to comprehensive reforms, and therefore from 1997 onward, TUSIAD published highly controversial and influential reports on EU membership of Turkey.

5.2.1. THE WELFARE'S RELATION WITH TUSIAD:

The cornerstone of the Welfare Party platform was the Just Order. The Just Order was a guiding ideological prism that mainly concentrated on economic matters, and presented prescriptions for Turkey's economic diseases.

First of all, the Party stressed that the Just Order should not be confused with either capitalism or communism. According to the Just Order, capitalism had 'five microbes' and caused 'sixteen diseases.' The microbes included "interests, unfair taxes, the mint, the banking system, and the exchange system. The most awful of the diseases, meanwhile, [were] hunger, poverty, high prices, inflation, the mafia, corruption, moral decay, backwardness, wars, and exploitation," (Kamrava, 1998, p. 287). Communism, on the other hand, was a bankrupt ideology, and a twin brother of capitalism: "both were the systems of oppressors and oppressed. The only difference between them was that the oppressor force was political power in communism and capital power in capitalism.

Instead, the Welfare Party offered Just Economic Order, in which the economic system would be under the complete control of market forces, and the state would not engage in any economic activities other than preventing monopolies (Kamrava, 1998).

As for the foreign policy, the Just Order was based on classic dependency arguments. In his own words, Erbakan described the West as "imperialist, Zionists that [were] dedicated to the

explotation of the Islamic countries[59]." Erbakan also claimed that the West was trying to divide Turkey by "manipulating Kurds and playing Muslim brethren to each other[60]."

Therefore, even if we ignore the contradiction between the heavy Islamic rhetoric of the Welfare and the Kemalist character of the TUSIAD, the two were completely on different pages with regards to their economy and foreign policy expectations.

5.2.2. THE AKP'S RELATION WITH TUSIAD:

The Party Program of the AKP was almost perfect for reassuring the TUSIAD that their economic and political agenda would be fulfilled. In the Program, it was explicitly stated that "[the Party] favors market economy operating with all its institutions and rules," and recognized the function of the state in the economy as a regulator and controller[61]." Moreover, under the title of "Our Concept of the Economy," the AKP announced that "our relations with the European Union, World Bank, IMF and other international institutions [shall] be maintained along the lines of the requirements of our economy and our national interests.[62]"

Meanwhile, TUSIAD was publishing reports after reports, and calling on the government, the opposition parties, and the relevant ministries and committees to maintain the reform momentum. Yet, "the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government from 1998-2002 tended to distance itself from the reform agenda. TUSIAD criticized the government for this reluctance, and also related the twin crises of November 2000 and February 2001 to the government's lack of political determination and its economic/financial mismanagement," (Ugur & Yankaya, 2008, p.590).

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[59] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zWG7DGmLhqk
[60] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zWG7DGmLhqk
[61] http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum
[62] http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum

In this atmosphere, the AKP incorporated the EU policy conditions on its own agenda, and declared that the Party was committed to fulfilling Copenhagen criteria as "the democratization reforms required under EU conditionality were long-overdue policies that would benefit the Turkish society at large –and not as EU interference in Turkey's domestic affairs," (Ugur & Yankaya, 2008, p.590). The AKP also rejected the prejudice that the EU conditionality will destroy the territorial integrity and national unity of the Turkish state, and with several occasions stressed that the problems could only be solved with more democracy.

As a result of this attitude of the AKP, "the cooperation between TUSIAD and Recep Tayyip Erdogan had begun even before the foundation of the AKP on August 14, 2001," (Ugur & Yankaya, 2008, p.590). In private and official meetings, Erdogan assured TUSIAD authorities that he had abandoned Islamic fundamentalism, that he was in favor of a secular system, and that he supported the goal of the EU[63] (Cakir &Calmuk, 2001).

Before the November 2002 elections, Erdogan took a face-to-face diplomacy stance with EU leaders, and assured them of his personal commitment as well as AKP's determination to maintain EU perspective. After the elections, the AKP government issued a program and an action plan that underlined EU norms as a basis for legal reforms, and announced that the EU membership was a top priority of the government. The government also repeatedly stated that "its main objective was to pave the way for a Council decision to start accession negotiations in 2004," and "even though the sought date came with a delay of one year in 2005, the AKP government remained committed to the reform agenda until the end of 2004," (Ugur & Baskaya, 2008, p.591). Besides working as a catalyst for policy reforms on democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the EU conditionality provided the AKP with the necessary means to restrict the

[63] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=akp-leader-erdogan-to-meet-with-tusiad-2002-07-08

military's ability to intervene in politics. With the help of the reform packages, military representatives in civilian bodies were replaced with civilian, and the National Security Council – "an organ that had enabled the Turkish Armed Forces to play a significant and often dictating role in the determination of the government policies"- was reduced to an advisory board responsible to the Prime Minister (Ugur &Yankaya, 2008, p.591).

Due to the political and economical commitments of the AKP to the EU process, TUSIAD described the AKP government as an opportunity for economic and political stability and for economic and social transformation that the country had been longing for (TUSIAD, 2003). "Even before the election of November 2002, TUSIAD backed the Party's active engagement with the EU and declared its support both in Turkey and in European capitals. Thereby, it lent the AKP government the crucial support it needed against veto players such as the military and the judiciary," (Ugur & Yankaya, 2008, p.593).

5.3. MUSIAD

Established in 1990 by five industrialists and businessmen, Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD), is a non-governmental, non-profit, and voluntary-based, businessmen's association that is based on the small and medium size enterprises of traditional Anatolian cities.

MUSIAD have emerged in a historical period characterized by major changes in the domestic economic and political arena as well as by certain new developments in global patterns of production and trade. "In Turkey, was a period during which the role of the state economy was subject to substantial change as an inevitable result of neoliberal economic policies, which encouraged the private against the public sector, the growth of exports against the protectionist trade regime, and discredited import substitution for the sake of export-oriented industrialization

strategy. On the international level, it was a period characterized by the rise of small and medium size enterprises associated with the downsizing of large firms and the decentralization of vertically integrated enterprises," (Sen, 2010, p.72).

Depending on neo-liberal economy policies, MUSIAD grew independent of any protection from the state. Unable to benefit from the state's preferential treatment, MUSIAD mostly supported collective rights and social justice as opposed to individual rights. Moreover, unlike TUSIAD, MUSIAD has been a more Eastern oriented association that is heavily influenced by the successful cases of East and Southeast Asia (Onis, 1997).

In addition to neoliberal economy policies, there were other factors that helped the emergence and rapid growth of this group. Following the Naqshi Sufi tradition himself, Turgut Ozal, the former Prime Minister of Turkey (1983–1989) and former President of Turkey (1989–1993), "generously favored Islamist groups in the economic, cultural, and political arena and played a crucial role in the emergence of a new business class, affiliated with the organized religious groups," (Sen, 2010, p.72). International Islamic banks and financial institutions, made their appearance in Turkey in the 1980's, were the third factor that helped the rise of the Islamic bourgeoisie in Anatolia. These institutions also helped some local enterprises "to establish economic links with the Middle Eastern countries, especially in construction, oil, trade, and transportation," (Sen, 2010, p.72).

In fact, these small and medium size enterprises had no other option other than turning their face to the East, since the West –European Common Market- was already tied up to TUSIAD. With the help of the state protection, and a Western oriented foreign and economy policy, TUSIAD was able to make connections with the European countries. Therefore, the new middle class, represented by MUSIAD, depended on the fruits of globalization, and created

personal connections with Middle Eastern countries for their exports. In fact, MUSIAD worked hard to improve the cooperation and trade between Islamic countries under the leadership of Ali Bayramoglu.

Economically, MUSIAD demanded the promotion of small and medium-sized firms and the mobilization of public resources and the financial system. Politically, A strong rejection of the Customs Union with Europe and a corresponding emphasis on the need to reorient the country's economic relationship and foreign policy stance towards a closer union with the Islamic world and the neighbors of Turkey have been recurring themes in the MUSIAD perspective[64] (Onis, 1997; Bayramoglu, 2008).

5.3.1. THE WELFARE'S RELATION WITH MUSIAD:

There is a consensus on the literature that "the transformation of the Welfare Party from a marginal force to a significant political movement is a parallel phenomenon to and a reflection of the growing power of Islamic business in the Turkish economy and society in the context of the 1990s," (Onis, 1997, p.760; Gulalp, 1999). Considering the role of the state as the allocator of rents in major economic areas, it is not surprising that the rising Islamic bourgeoisie needed, and supported Islamic movements at the political level to obtain a greater share of public resources as well as to consolidate their position in society (Onis, 1997).

As part of its anti-Western orientation, the Welfare's principal goal was also to build a closer union between Turkey and the rest of the Islamic world. Erbakan specially emphasized the importance of strengthening relations with countries of the Middle East, the emerging states of post-Soviet Central Asia and the rising states of Southeast Asia, which include key countries with largely Islamic populations such as Malaysia and Indonesia.

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[64] See the key report, Pamuk Birligi, Istanbul; MUSIAD, 1996.

At one level, the Welfare's approach was transnationalist in the sense that the Party emphasized the brotherhood of and cooperation among Islamic countries. Yet, at the same time, there was a strong nationalistic flavor to its foreign-policy approach since Turkey was presented as the natural candidate for the leadership of this union (Onis, 1997). In its 1995 Election Manifesto, the Welfare Party declared that its foreign policy goal was "Turkey as a leader country, not a satellite state. And for the fulfillment of this goal, Turkey should be in the union of World Islamic Countries, not a Christian club that was founded with the command of the Papa Pio the XII.

Therefore, it is no coincidence that the Welfare Party was extremely critical of any future union with Europe, and promised to "dismantle the Customs Union agreement signed in 1995, which came into effect from the beginning of 1996," as it was a betrayal to the history, the civilization, the culture and most importantly the independence of Turkey[65].

In accordance with this political stance, the first few countries the Welfare visited after coming to power with the 1995 election were Iran, Egypt and, Libya. However, these visits and the overall East-oriented foreign policy of the Welfare Party led to a huge opposition from the military as well as the parties of center-right, and social left. The opposition was in favor of the traditional Turkish foreign policy, and argued that "Turkey has a long tradition of aligning with the West. What is the benefit of building relations with countries that are under the embargo of the whole world - other than impairing the relations with the West?" Because Kemalism was based on the premise that the West represented progress, modernity –everything Turkey longed for- and the East represented backwardness –everything Turkey escaped from.

Nevertheless, even though the Welfare Party remained loyal to the Customs Union agreement, and Turkey's memberships in the international institutions, it did not stop

[65] See the 1995 Election Manifesto of the Welfare Party.

emphasizing the importance of having an "Islamic NATO" or an "Islamic Customs Union" throughout its rule.

5.3.2. THE AKP'S RELATION WITH MUSIAD:

Contrary to the Welfare Party, in its Party Program the AKP announced that "our relations with the European Union, World Bank, IMF and other international institutions must be maintained along the lines of the requirements of our economy and our national interests[66]." In addition, the Program assured the opposition and the West that the relations with the European Union, NATO, and the USA shall not only be maintained, but also be intensified.

After stating that Turkey would remain loyal to current axes of Turkish foreign policy, the Party presented the end of the Cold War, and the demise of blocks as an opportunity to create alternative cooperation areas, and pursue a multifaceted foreign policy by stating that "the dynamic circumstances brought about by the post Cold War period have created a suitable environment for developing a foreign policy with several alternatives. The particularity of military alliances and blocks to become the determinant elements of international relations has been greatly reduced, and cooperation projects have become a common tool of relations between States. In this new environment Turkey must also rearrange and create its relations with centers of power with alternatives, flexibly and with many axes."

These "centers of power" consisted of regional countries (neighbors and the Middle Eastern countries), Turkic Republics of Central Asia, former Eastern Bloc countries in the Black Sea, China, Russia, Balkans, Caucasus, and specifically Islamic countries. The Program notes that "the Party attributes a special importance to Turkey's relation with Islamic countries. Thus, it shall make efforts for the increase of our bilateral cooperation with these nations on the one

[66] http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum_

hand, while continuing attempts on the other for the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to have a more respectable place in the international arena and to have a dynamic structure able to take initiatives. Again in this conjunction, it shall try to impart more substance to the work of the standing committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of OIC (Comcec) which is chaired by the President of the Republic of Turkey."

In other words, the AKP rephrased and rekindled Welfare's foreign policy. After various attempts resulting with rejection and humiliation to be a part of the "Europe", the AKP argues that "Turkey did not Europe, and instead, Europe needed Turkey." Party leadership consistently emphasized the unique character of Turkey as "a bridge between the Muslim East and the Christian West." At a time when Huntington's Clash of Civilizations thesis was influential, the AKP co-created the initiative of "Alliance of Civilization" under UN umbrella.

Thereby, instead of demonizing the West, and using Islam as the reference for Turkish foreign policy, the Party chose to give assurances that it was committed to the traditional foreign policy stance of Turkey, but need to utilize other cooperation opportunities created with other power centers. The policy was named "Zero Problems with Neighbors" and applauded by every segments of the society. More interestingly, the policy was based on a apothegm of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk: Peace at home, peace in the world! Accordingly, Ankara improved its relations with Greece, Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, Syria, Iran, Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan and even tried a rapprochement with Armenia, which regrettably failed.

Aside from foreign policy, the AKP voiced the economic demands of MUSIAD as well. In its Party Program, the AKP underlined the importance of artisans and small and medium scale enterprises for Turkish economy, and stated, "making important contributions for the creation of production, employment and added value in our country, small and medium scale enterprises are

the backbone of our economic and social structure.[67]" In addition, the Party suggested "a plan including, among other measures, financing support based on projects, tax incentives and a plan including the reduction of bureaucratic obstacles." Moreover, protection from unfair competition promised to be extended to tradesmen, artisans and Small and Medium Scale Enterprises against large corporations. For this purpose, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organization, found in 1990, was used more actively and effectively. Not only the supported sectors[68] but also the budget[69] of the organization expanded between 2002 and 2007.

5.4. CONSERVATIVES

Turkey's modernization process dates back to Tanzimat reforms (1839) of Ottoman Empire, and takes a more radical and transformative stance with the founding of the Turkish Republic. Educated in European capitals, and therefore influenced by their ideologies, Young Turks believed that the Empire needed fundamental reforms to be able to compete with its European counterparts, both militarily and economically. Moreover, the ideals of French Revolution were spreading throughout the continent, and Ottomans were not exempt from their influence. However, these modernization efforts never denied the importance of Islam for the society. In other words, Islam was not an obstacle before modernization according to Young Turks. Hence, Ziya Gokalp, one of the prominent Young Turk leaders, did not hesitate to declare the ideals of Young Turks as "Turkification, Islamization, Modernization."

Nevertheless, this attitude towards religion changed under the leadership of late era Ottoman intellectuals, among whom Ataturk was a prominent actor. According to these nationalists, religion was the reason why Ottoman Empire missed the modernization train.

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[67] http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum_
[68] See the list of the sectors at http://kosgeb.gov.tr/Pages/UI/b.aspx?ref=44
[69] See the Graphs 2 and 3 at http://www.sp.gov.tr/documents/planlar/KOSGEBSP0812.pdf

Therefore, even though most of the Anatolian villagers fought in the Independence War were made to believe that they were defending the caliph, one of the first deeds of Mustafa Kemal was erasing the religion from public sphere after the founding of Turkish Republic. Laicism was accepted as one of the six principles of Kemalims, and from the two different types of laicism – the Anglo-Saxon and the French versions- the French version was chosen as the appropriate one. Accordingly, the secular character of the state in Turkey did not lead to the state's dissociation from religious affairs; rather it has been heavily involved in defining the role of religion (Cavdar, 2006).

Accordingly, he abolished the sultanate (1922), and the caliphate (1924); issued Tevhid-i Tedrisat law which ordered the ban on every school and curriculum (religious schools and those belonged to minorities) except the official state schools and curriculum (1924); banned the use of fez, and issued a law on hat usage and appropriate dressing (1925); banned Sufi orders, and dervish lodges (1925); accepted a new civil law, and abolished the old shariah based one (1926); started the use of Latin alphabet instead of the Arab alphabet that used to be the official alphabet of the Ottoman empire (1928); removed the phrase "The religion of the Turkish Republic is Islam." from the 1924 Constitution (1928). In addition to these reforms strengthening the secular character of the state, Mustafa Kemal issued an order that prohibited the Arabic version of the call to the prayer, and insisted on the Turkish version (1932) – which continued to be effective until the election failure of CHP in 1950.

From the early years of the Republic, laicism has been accepted as the most important character of the state, and guarded by the military, and Kemalist elites. In a country in which 99% of the population is Muslim, the top-down secular reforms of Kemalist regime spurred a

perception of “us” and “them” in the society. The Muslim population felt more and more oppressed and marginalized as years passed.

The 1980 military coup was a milestone in state policy as the new military regime used religion as a legitimizing tool for promoting political stability, and “without changing the state’s promise of secularism, a notion called Turkish-Islamic synthesis was adopted by the military,” (Cavdar, 2006, p.487). During this period, the state founded the Presidency of Religious Affairs, incorporated mandatory religion classes to national curriculum, opened vocational schools, and broadcasted increased number of religious programs on state-owned television. Yet, with the constant emphasis on laicism, the perception of being oppressed and marginalized by the Kemalist state structure did not disappear among the Muslim population.

In 1990’s, in addition to economic crises, three digit inflation numbers, and skyrocketed unemployment rates, scandals of high-rank state officials –and even Prime Minister Tansu Ciller herself- broke out one after another. However, contrary to the expectation of leftist intellectuals, lower classes living in the newly established suburbs of big cities responded these developments by redefining their identity and demands in Islamic terms instead of gaining class based consciousness, and initiating a “proletarian revolution.” The prevalent perception was that Muslims have been oppressed and marginalized not only culturally, but also economically. The three symbols of this oppression were the ban on headscarf in public spaces, the marginalization of vocational schools after 28 February process, and religion education.

5.4.1. THE WELFARE’S RELATION WITH CONSERVATIVES:

During his 1994 and 1995 election speeches, Erbakan constantly emphasized the discrepancy between the Muslim majority and Kemalist elites. According to Erbakan, there were only two political parties in Turkey: The Welfare Party with its Just Order Program, and others

who are collaborators, imitators of the West, and willingly or unwillingly servants of the Zionist interests. Therefore, he contended that the Welfare Party had “believers” whereas others had “voters.” He also added in a party group meeting that the Welfare Party would definitely rule Turkey, and establish Just Order. The question was whether the transition would be with or without blood[70].

According to the leadership of the WP, there were three spheres of confrontation in Turkish society: “ideological (left versus right and Islamist versus both Marxist and capitalist), ethnic (Turk versus Kurd), and religious (different sects of Islam such as Sunni versus Alawite),” (Yavuz, 1997). The leadership insisted the solution of all these confrontations lied in state-centric Islam. Accordingly, WP redefined the principles of Kemalism as rationalism, independence, indigenous development, industrialization and reaching the level of modern civilization and reinterpreted secularism as the freedom of religion to Sunni Muslims (Duran, 1998).

Before elections, the Party was focused its discourse on the exploitative relationship between the West and the Muslim world, and delineate the Kemalist elites as an offshoot of that imperialist West. Yet, after coming to power, the actions and the discourse of the WP were moderated. For example, contrary to its early discourse, the Party signed a military agreement with Israel, and remained loyal to the Customs Union Agreement with EU.

As a result of this change in its actions and discourse, the WP felt the need to appease and appeal to its conservative constituency via number of events. These events included “the WP's insistence on building a mosque at Taksim with the claim to recapture Istanbul; the 10 November 1996 speech of the WP's Kayseri Mayor, Sukru Karatepe, in which he urged Muslims to 'nurse and preserve the hatred and vengefulness they felt inside until their day come'; the iftar dinner, to

[70] "Erbakan 'kanli' konustu," Milliyet, April 14, 1994, p. 1.

which Prime Minister Erbakan had invited the leaders of the religious orders; and lastly the 'Jerusalem Night' celebration in the township of Sincan near Ankara. At this rally, under the posters of the leaders of Hamas and Hizbullah, Sincan Mayor Bekir Yildiz and the Iranian Ambassador to Ankara, Mohammad Baghari, delivered messages that irritated some sections of Turkish public opinion," (Yavuz, 1997).

5.4.2. THE AKP'S RELATION WITH CONSERVATIVES:

Contrary to the WP, the AKP refrained from making direct references to Islam in their discourse and party documents. First of all, the AKP was declared to be neither a religious nor an Islamic party. In addition, Erdogan refused any resemblance to the "Christian democrats" of Europe and stated that the AKP was rather a conservative democratic party.

Second, the Party leadership redefined "secularism" in accordance with the Anglo-Saxon usage of the term. According to Erdogan, the source of the oppression of the freedom of religion and consciousness in Turkey was the application of French type secularism. Instead of a secular state that considers controlling the religion as one of its main duties, Erdogan offered a secularism definition that guarantees the freedom of all religions as well as non believers[71]. Moreover, secularism was a feature of states, and therefore only states could be secular, not real persons.

Third, in its Party Program under the "Fundamental Rights and Freedoms" section, the AKP explicitly stated its stance towards religion with three Articles, and denounced the state ideology that uses secularism as a tool for oppression against pious citizens:

- "Our party considers religion as one of the most important institutions of humanity, and secularism as a pre-requisite of democracy, and an assurance of the freedom of religion

[71] From an interview with faith Altayli in his TV program "Teke Tek", 2002.
Also see http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haber/6273/erdogan-biz-siyasetin-riskini-goze-aldik

and conscience. It also rejects the interpretation and distortion of secularism as enmity against religion.

- Basically, secularism is a principle which allows people of all religions, and beliefs to comfortably practice their religions, to be able to express their religious convictions and live accordingly, but which also allows people without beliefs to organize their lives along these lines. From this point of view, secularism is a principle of freedom and social peace.
- Our Party refuses to take advantage of sacred religious values and ethnicity and to use them for political purposes. It considers the attitudes and practices which disturb pious people, and which discriminate them due to their religious lives and preferences, as anti-democratic and in contradiction to human rights and freedoms. On the other hand, it is also unacceptable to make use of religion for political, economic and other interests, or to put pressure on people who think and live differently by using religion.

Fourth, during his 2002 election campaign in conservative cities such as Gaziantep, Karaman, and Konya, in reply to questions concerning the headscarf issue, Erdogan assured the people in the meeting arena that the country would become "a land of freedoms," after they came to power, but conservatives should be patient[72]. He also added that the Party would equally fight with groups that exploit religion for their own interests and the groups which oppress pious people in the name of fighting against the exploitation of religion[73].

And last, but not least, the AKP emphasized "social convention" for the solution of secularism problem in Turkey. Contrary to the WP's revolutionary discourse that seemed to be

[72] http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/erdogan-gantepte-halkla-bulustu/4285
[73] http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/erdogan-karamanda-hakla-bulustu-laikligi-her-inancin-guvencisi-olarak-goruy/4173

dedicated to changing the regime, the AKP chose to remove each and every obstacle with the help of "social convention" of different groups in society. In other words, the AKP was trying to let sleeping dogs lie after what had happened to the WP and its Islamic discourse.

After its 2002 election victory, the AKP was totally silent in the three symbol demands of conservatives, and the main emphasis was given to the strengthening the "democratic" character of the Turkish state. It is quite possible that the Party was willing to solve the problems through the EU.

However, that door also closed for the AKP after a serious of "wrong" decisions on the EU side. First, the European Court of Human Rights approved the closure of the Welfare Party. Next, the EU strongly rejected the AKP's insistence on accepting adultery as a crime. Consequently, a decision by European Court of Human Rights in 2005 sealed the deal for the headscarf issue, and puzzled the AKP on its stance towards the EU membership. In a case against the Turkish state, the Court found the Turkish state not guilty for banning the headscarf in public spaces (especially in universities), and declared that secularism was essential for maintaining democratic system in Turkey[74]. This decision unsurprisingly disappointed the leadership of the AKP. Bulent Arinc, a prominent party leader and then the President of National Assembly, was sure that the next president of Turkey will allow headscarf in Cankaya[75] (the city of residence for Presidents), while Abdullah Gul, another prominent figure in the AKP as former PM, opposed the decision stating that "Prohibitions honors no one.[76]" However, the AKP continued to play its "patience" card with the conservative constituency regarding the headscarf, and vocational schools problems.

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[74] http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=237352
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=169646
[75] http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=169646
[76] http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=169646

It was not until the repulse of the military with an election victory in 2007 that the Party leadership changed their stance towards these issues, and admitted during the controversial Constitution amendments of 2008 that they had been patient for the last five years regarding the headscarf issue, and now the time arrived since there was a convention between institutions in addition to the societal convention[77].

5.5. LIBERALS

There has always been a group of liberals from both right and left side of the spectrum that –despite the iron fist of the state- constantly denounced the violation of human rights by Turkish state, and demanded immediate change in state's attitude emphasizing that torture, death under custody, missing people (mostly under custody), murders whose perpetrators are unknown had become a common practice throughout 1980s and 1990s. These liberals mostly consisted of university students, academicians, journalists, intellectuals, human right NGOSs, artists, relatives of the victims, etc.

Providing a voter base that is not affiliated with any existing systemic party, the liberals longed for a competent government that would punish the perpetrators of atrocities, expand democratic rights, respect the rule of law and human rights, and transform the garrison state of 1980s and 1990s in to a modern democracy.

5.5.1. THE WELFARE'S RELATION WITH LIBERALS:

The WP was hardly appropriate for challenging the security based state ideology, and filling that human rights and democracy gap. First of all, the Party was dedicated to demonizing the West and all Western institutions, including human rights and democracy. One of his party

[77] "Erdogan: Turban icin 5 yil sabrettim." http://haber.gazetevatan.com/Turban_icin_5_yil_sabrettim_162536_9/162536/9/Haber

group speeches, Erbakan even contended that The West was trying to tear apart the territorial integrity of Turkey by provoking the imperialist agenda under the disguise of democracy and human rights[78].

Second, the WP supported this discourse with its policies towards the people who demanded more democracy, and human rights as well as punishment of the perpetrators of past atrocities. In fact, the Party maintained the old security centric state ideology after coming to power. For example, influenced by the mothers of the Plaza del Mayo, in the mids of 1995 mothers of disappeared started a civil disobedience initiative that entailed convening in Galatasaray Square (Istanbul) every Saturday. Their main objective was to create a public opinion and opposition against the disappearances under custody and murders whose perpetrators are unknown, learn about the faith of their children, and ask for the punishment of perpetrators. The group received a large support from journalists, some sensible MPs, students, academicians, etc. (Kocali, 2004). Yet, starting from the summer of 1996, which happened to be the period of WP and True Path Party coalition government, the police started using force against the Saturday mothers. Arrests, interrogations, police brutality, etc. used to prevent the group from convening in Galatasaray square (Kocali, 2004).

Another example of the WP's contempt and ridicule against the demands of liberals showed itself during the protests of November 1996. In a car accident in the small city of Susurluk, Balikesir, one of the biggest scandals of Turkey was surfaced. The victims of the accident included the deputy chief of the Istanbul police, a parliament deputy who led a powerful Kurdish clan, and the leader of the Grey Wolves (who was a contract killer on Interpol's red list).

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[78] Turkish National Assembly Archive
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/td_v2.goruntule?sayfa_no_ilk=66&sayfa_no_son=69&sayfa_no=93&v_mecli s=1&v_donem=20&v_yasama_yili=&v_cilt=12&v_birlesim=008

In other words, the accident revealed that most of the murders in the Kurdish regions as well as the drug trafficking had taken place with the hands of the state itself.

Not surprisingly, several demonstrations were organized in protest against the corruption and illegal activities uncovered by the investigations. A popular nation-wide event, known as "Sürekli Aydınlık İçin Bir Dakika Karanlık" ("One minute's darkness for the sake of perpetual light"), was organized to protest the state-mafia relations. Participants all around the country turned off the lights for a minute every night at 9pm. Later, this protest evolved into a protest against the Welfare Party and its reactionary agenda. Nevertheless, instead of investigating the incident properly, and punishing people who were involved, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, of the Welfare Party, called them "parasites and conspirators...who have nothing to do apart from intrigue." Minister of Justice, Sevket Kazan, even implied that these protestors were playing sexual games, including incest relations[79].

5.5.2. THE AKP'S RELATION WITH LIBERALS:

In its Party Program, the AKP gave assurances to the liberals seeking democracy and respect for human rights with a number of objectives[80], some of which are:

- The fundamental human rights and freedoms are acquisitions obtained by humanity after struggles lasting for centuries. The level of these freedoms is an indicator of being a civilized society. It is also the expectation of our society to see Turkey, which is part of the civilized world, to be brought in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms to a position which it deserves. Therefore, steps must be taken because our people deserve these rights and freedoms, rather than because international institutions want them to be taken.

[79] http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=329370
[80] http://www.akparti.org.tr/english/akparti/parti-programme#bolum_

- Standards in the area of human rights contained in the international agreements to which Turkey is a party, especially in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, Paris Charter and Helsinki Final Act shall be put into force.
- Practices such as torture, death under custody, missing people, murders whose perpetrators are unknown, which are unacceptable in a democracy. State of law shall be seriously prosecuted, transparency shall be ensured. Complaints of all citizens in this subject shall be considered, the necessary arrangements shall be made to provide deterrence, and those responsible shall not go without punishment.

In addition, the Party's policies/promises towards the Kurdish issue, the freedom of religion and consciousness, the EU and the Copenhagen criteria that institutionalized human rights and the rule of law as well as its constant emphasis on democracy, societal convention, secularism as a guarantee rather than an obstacle for all religions, and the role of the military in politics appealed to the democrat group seeking change.

6. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: THE STRUGGLE

6.1. THE WELFARE PARTY AND THE FEBRUARY 28 PROCESS

6 March 1996 Even though Erbakan's Welfare Party won the 1995 election with a 21.7% vote share, President Suleyman Demirel spoiled the tradition, and gave the duty of government formation to Mesut Yilmaz, the leader of ANAVATAN which was the second party in 1995 elections with 19.65% vote share. Yilmaz managed to convince his biggest rival and almost enemy Tansu Ciller, the leader of the True Path Party to form a coalition (ANAYOL) so that the rule of the Welfare could be prevented.

March-April 1996 The Welfare Party asked for a parliament interrogation for Tansu Ciller, claiming that she had indulged in improprieties during the privatization of TOFAS and TEDAS, and asked for a resolution on her assets.

14 May 1996 Due to the claims of the Welfare Party that the vote of confidence for ANAYOL coalition was against the relevant provisions of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court annulled the ANAYOL government.

25 May 1996 Erbakan warned Mesut Yilmaz through the media that if Yilmaz did not return the unearned PM chair, they would have to force him out of power by force.

June 1996 Erbakan announced, "anyone who gets into a coalition with the WP will become as innocent as a baby," and guaranteed Ciller that all accusations would be dropped in that case.

29 June 1996 Ciller's DYP got into a coalition with Erbakan's WP, and formed 54th Government of Turkish Republic.

- Hurriyet news: Muslims in Power
- President Suleyman Demirel: Nobody can play with the state. I will never ever let it happen[81].
- Emin Colasan, a prominent columnist in Hurriyet newspaper: We feel sick. The farce comedy begins. (Referring to the rule of the WP in his articles)

6 October 1996 Erbakan pays his last visit to Libya in a tour including Iran, Nigeria, and Egypt.

- Hurriyet: What an impudence!
- Sabah (newspaper): Scandal in Cairo!

[81] http://www.demokratakademi.com/component/content/article/44-manet/268-kapsaml-bir-28-ubat-analizibin-yla-bedel-guenler.html

- Hurriyet: The millet (society) will bring you to account!
- Bulent Ecevit (former leader of the CHP and the leader of the Democratic Leftist Party – DSP): This trip of shame shall not be recorded in official state archives.
- Tansu Ciller: Qaddafi once again made a historical mistake. In response to the statements of a desert Bedouin, we would bang our fist on the table.
- Deniz Baykal (the leader of the CHP): In these past 70 years, Turkish Republic has had 53 prime ministers. And none of them have been insulted as Erbakan did in his Libya visit. It did not happen. It could not, cannot and must not happen!

3 **November 1996** Susurluk scandal

- Ciller**:** He who shoots, and he who gets shot for this country are equally honorable. (Defending the mafia-state relations)

Late 1996 The headlines were all about Mehmet Gunduz, the leader of Aczmendiler (a Sufi order), and the sex scandals he got involved claiming that Gunduz took advantage of his position and forced a 24 year-old disciple into a sexual relationship. (Only after years, the disciple accepted that everything was a part of a theatre which designed to harm the Welfare Party by showing the true character of the Sufi orders it was closely connected to.)

- Deniz Baykal (CHP): These people take heart from the WP government.

1-28 February 1997 "Sürekli Aydınlık İçin Bir Dakika Karanlık" ("One minute's darkness for the sake of perpetual light" protests aroused all over the country, which started as a protest against the covering of Susurluk scandals and evolved into a secular protest against the WP.

- Erbakan**:** These protestors are nothing but "parasites and conspirators...who have nothing to do apart from intrigue."

Early 1997 Erbakan pronounced that an ostentatious mosque would be built at the heart of the Taksim Square

- Erbakan (regarding the debates and opposition on the issue): When we ask a villager in an Anatolian city his opinion about the mosque project, he would only say "may God bless you!" So then, who are you to oppose?

9 January 1997 The Government issued a regulation, and granted the military officials the right to intervene in political processes in provinces and municipalities, and accordingly military representatives were assigned to civil institutions such as the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK), The Council of Higher Education (YOK), and The Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT).

11 January 1997 Erbakan hosted an iftar dinner in the official Prime Minister's housing in Cankaya. The guest conmprised of the leaders of the Sufi orders (Tariqah) in Turkey. It was the first time in the history of the Republic that the very Sufi leaders that the state declared war in 1923 were hosted in an official state building by the head of the Turkish government.

- Hurriyet: The Sultane of the Tariqahs
- Bulent Ecevit (the leader of the DSP and former leader of the CHP): In a period in which the legitimacy of some tariqahs, this iftar gave the impression that the state itself has been protecting them.

22 January 1997 High rank military officials hold a summit in Golcuk, and discussed the threat of irtica (reactionary movements) governing the country.

30 January 1997 Sincan mayor, a member of the WP, organized the Jerusalem Night celebrations. At this rally, under the posters of the leaders of Hamas and Hizbullah, Sincan Mayor Bekir Yildiz and the Iranian Ambassador to Ankara, Mohammad Baghari, warned some

powers in Turkish society about the anger of Muslims. After this event, Sincan mayor bekir Yildiz was put in prison.

- Bulent Ecevit (the leader of the DSP and former leader of the CHP): We are getting closer to a threat called “the Welfare Party” each day.
- A high rank military official: Sincan incident is a shame, a disgrace. Turkey is no Iran. The Turkish state is strictly attached to secularism. I condemn this incident with hatred and curse.
- Necmettin Erbakan: Turkey is a secular country. Nobody has a problem with that. The problem is that some people want to apply secularism as the enemy of religion. To ring the alarm bells for the regime just because some people by mistake went somewhere and hanged a picture is just ridiculous.

31 January 1997 Erbakan granted extraordinary rights to the Secretary of the NSC. By virtue of these rights, the “Western Study Group[82]” was formed by the Turkish military under the auspices of the Office of Chief of Staff in order to "monitor Islamist sympathizers in the civil service and other sate organs." Composed of "intelligence experts," the group reportedly has numerous "sub-departments" that investigate "fundamentalists' activities and potential threats from radical Islamists throughout the country and abroad," including various levels of government, the local administration of provinces and towns, the military, "pro-Islamist media outlets," and "pro-Islamist persons-controlled schools, and universities[83]"

As part of its activities, the Western Working Group also monitored the Turkish press and there is "evidence that the highest levels of the Turkish military have exerted pressure on

[82] Also referred to as Western Working Group, or in Turkish Bati Calisma grubu (BCG).
[83] http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3df4beb518.html

editors concerning content and employment of certain journalists with suspected Islamist sympathies[84]"

- Necmettin Erbakan: They are trying to show our military as an enemy of the religion. Never. You will never achieve this goal.
- Minister of National Security (A member of the Tansu Ciller's DYP): There is distrust towards the Welfare Party with regards to its stance towards the main principles of the Republic. I must admit that I do not trust them either.

Early February 1997 The military initiated a series of briefings on the threat of reactionary movements, and invited secular mainstream media, judges, prosecutors, and governors.

Early February 1997 A series of video-tape scandals, which was serviced to the media by some unknown, mystery hands, shocked the country for months. One of the early video-tapes belonged to Sukru Karatepe, a member of the WP and the mayor of Kayseri (a conservative city in central Anatolia): Do not look at my modern outfit and come to the conclusion that I am a secular person. We as PMs, MP, or mayors have some obligations. Yet, you, ordinary Muslims, nurse and preserve the hatred and vengefulness they feel inside until our day come. This system will surely be changed.

Sevki Yilmaz (A prominent member of the Welfare Party, and a member of the parliament): If you love Allah, if you love Prophet Mohammad, do not follow the demons of Selanik (referring to Ataturk as Selanik was his birth place). ….If you attempt to close the vocational school during the rule of the WP, blood would spill. Turkey would be worse than Algeria.

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[84] http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3df4beb518.html

Hasan Huseyin Ceylan (a prominent member of the WP): Kemalism becomes an incredible injustice wheel. They state that "We would prefer your being a PKK militant instead of involving in reactionary movements." You cannot solve the problem with this mentality. Do you want a solution? It is in Shariah.

4 February 1997 People living in Sincan woke up in the middle of the night to the noise of 20 tanks and 15 armored cars, passing across the Sincan streets.

- Turkish army: The tanks were transferring through Sincan for exercise.
- Tansu Ciller (the leader of DYP and coalition partner): Tactlessness. We cannot overlook what has happened in Sincan. Nor can we ignore what has happened there. If anyone is willing to harm the character of this state (referring to democracy), we will show him his place.
- Cevik Bir (Vice Chairman of Turkish Staff): During a press meeting in Washington, he announced that the army did alignment and balancing to Turkish democracy in Sincan.

5 February 1997 President Suleyman Demirel sent PM Necmettin Erbakan a letter asking "immediate investigation on the reactionary elements in municipalities."

9 February 1997 Ismail Hakki Karadayi (The Chief of Staff): Turkish army has all the determination and decisiveness in the course of protecting the indivisible integrity of the secular and democratic Turkish Republic.

9 February 1997 Suleyman Demirel (President): Taking advantage of sacred religious values and to use them for political purposes is both a sin and a crime.

11 February 1997 Women marched against the Shariah in Ankara.

14 February 1997 Minister of Justice Sevket Kazan paid a visit to the former Sincan Mayor who was in prison. This visit instigated the opposition to the WP even more as it gave the

impression that the government approved what had happened in Sincan even though they claimed otherwise.

17 February 1997 In a party meeting, Tansu Ciller (DYP) announced that she was not happy with her the latest actions of the WP, and added that she would warn Erbakan on that.

24 February 1997 Guven Erkaya (First Commander of the Marine Corps and a prominent member of the NSC): Political reaction is a more dangerous threat than PKK.

28 February 1997 The National Security Council was assembled. The military wing of the NSC demanded, even though the NSC was an advisory organ, the issuing of a NSC decision consisted of 18 articles, some of which stated that:

1. "Compulsory education will be immediately extended to 8 years. [The measure was aimed to abolishing the secondary part of the vocational schools (IHLs)].
2. All Quran courses will be linked to the Presidency of Religious Affairs. [The measure was aimed to prevent the religious education in early ages.]
3. All activities of Sufi orders (Tariqahs) will be terminated.
4. The dressing code will be applied without any concessions. [Referring to the headscarf issue]
5. Restrictions will be imposed on green capital. [Referring to MUSIAD members][85]"

Although Erbakan refrained from open confrontation with the military officials during the meeting, and therefore behaved in a more comprised manner, he refused to sign the final document, and asked for further discussion on the stated issues. And more interestingly, although Erbakan did not sign the document, the final draft of the 28 February NSC was passed out to major media organs by the military.

[85] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SBHbFSFV8rU&feature=related

- Milliyet (a mainstream secular newspaper): Fine-tuning to the regime
- Cumhuriyet (a mainstream secular newspaper close to CHP): The WP makes difficulties
- Tansu Ciller: Nobody should expect democracy to be interrupted. Turkish military is the guardian of our democracy, and we are the warranty of secularism. The WP should not take advantage of religious values and use them for political purposes.
- The Secretariat of the NSC: Sanctions will be imposed if the measures are not implemented.

Erbakan, on the other hand, visited other party leaders during this period and sought for support regarding the NSC decisions. His efforts were fruitless.

- Mesut Yilmaz (The leader of the ANAVATAN): I told Erbakan that the interlocutor of your concerns was the NSC, not ANAVATAN party. If you were not happy with the final decisions, you should have told so during the NSC meeting.
- Bulent Ecevit: If you cannot accept this state with its fundamental principles such as secularism and democracy at this time, you will have to accept the risk of being apart from the government for a while.
- The Secretary General of the NSC: We are not in accordance with Erbakan.
- Erbakan: The media is making up stories regarding the relationship between the WP and the military.
- A number of NGOs (including the workers' unions) gave their support to the NSC decisions.
- Tansu Ciller: The measures will surely be implemented.

5 March 1997 Erbakan finally signed the NSC decisions of 28 February.

March-April-June 1997 The military briefings on political reaction increased.

21 May 1997 The Attorney-general of the Supreme Court of Appeals commenced a closure case against the Welfare Party claiming that the Party became the focus of the reactionary movements. The Attorney General described the members of the WP as "blood sucking vampires" and "malign tumours," and used the statements of Sukru Karatepe, Sevki Yilmaz, and Hasan Huseyin Ceylan as evidence. It was the first closure case commenced against the governing party.

7 June 1997 The General Staff put an embargo on the firms that were accused by the military of being involved in reactionary movements.

10 June 1997 It was announced during a briefing to the journalists that "Turkish army [was] determined to prevent any domestic or foreign enemy by military force based on its duties on the Article 35 of the Inner Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces." This briefing was hosting the judges and prosecutors of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeals, and the Council of State.

18 June 1997 Due to the several resignations from his coalition partner DYP, Erbakan had to resign.While announcing his resignation, Erbakan emphasized that his motive for this declaration was to convey the PM chair to Tansu Ciller, his coalition partner.

19 June 1997 Instead of fulfilling the wishes of Erbakan, President Suleyman Demirel asked Mesut Yilmaz, who did not have a parliamentary majority, to form the new government.

30 June 1997 Yilmaz formed the ANASOL-D government with Bulent Ecevit's DSP, Husamettin Ozkan's DTP (Democratic Turkey Party).

16 Ocak 1998 the Constitutional Court closed The Welfare Party. In addition, the leader cadre of the WP was banned from politics for 5 years.

6.2. THE AKP AND THE 27 APRIL MILITARY MEMORANDUM

22 April 1998 Tayyip Erdogan was given a ten month prison sentence (of which he served six months) for reciting a poem in Siirt in December 1997, which, under article 312/2 of the Turkish penal code was regarded as an incitement to commit an offense and incitement to religious or racial hatred. It included verses translated as "The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers...." The conviction also stipulated a political ban, which prevented him from participating in parliamentary elections.

14 August 2001 The Justice and Development Party was established by the reformist wing of the former Welfare cadres.

June 2002 Bulent Ecevit (PM of the coalition government of DSP-MHP-ANAP): Early elections could create a regime problem.

12 November 2002 Bulent Eecevit: A future government of the AKP will cause problems for the secular, democratic regime.

12 May 2002 An interrogation was initiated on the assets of Erdogan.

23 October 2002 The Attorney-General of the Supreme Court of Appeals commenced a closure case against the AKP on the basis that “Due to his political ban, Erdogan could not be the leader of the AKP.”

- Erdogan: Turkish democracy was hurt once more.

22 November 2002 The AKP won a landslide victory in 2002 general elections with 34.28% vote share.

- TUSIAD: The AKP is an opportunity for economic and political stability and for economic and social transformation that the country had been longing for.

25 June 2003 Deniz Baykal stated that the AKP might have other motives under the EU membership veil.

19 July 2003 The sixth reform package, which abolished article 8 of Anti-Terror Law and allowed for broadcasting in languages and dialects other than Turkish, was introduced.

- Hilmi Ozkok (The Chief of Staff): We have some concerns. The package should be discussed at NSC first. Broadcasting in languages other than Turkish is separatism, and abolishment of article 8 of Anti-Terror Law will encourage terrorists.
- An anonymous military official to Hurriyet: The time of watching the government is over. We are extremely uncomfortable.
- Cumhuriyet (newspaper): Young military officials are uncomfortable. (Referring to a well known phrase of 27 May 1960 military coup)
- 22 May 2003 Milliyet (newspaper): Contending that Ataturk and Ataturkizm (Kemalizm) is an obstacle to Turkey's EU membership means that independent, democratic, secular, and unitary Turkey is an obstacle to EU membership.
- Dengir Mir Mehmet Firat (Vice president of the AKP group in the parliament): I do not believe that the Secretary of the NSC has authority to warn the government. (Referring to the earlier demands of the military to discuss the issue in the NSC)
- After the completion of reform package, the Government sent it to the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer for approval. The President instead returned the package to the Parliament for further discussion, and had to sign it after the second round.

7 August 2003 The seventh reform package was put into effect. The package brought about significant changes concerning the role of the NSC. "As a result of this reform, the NSC

became an advisory board responsible to the prime minister and its secretary-general was divested of his executive and supervisory powers," (Ugur & Yankaya, 2008, p.591).

3 November 2003 The government finished working on a resolution which granted more autonomy to local administration via dispersing the authority of the central government[86]. Before presenting the resolution to the Parliament, the AKP government asked for the opinion of the military and the President on the reform. The resolution was brought to the Parliament only after the changes they asked for incorporated into the text.

- The CHP: Demanded the immediate withdrawal of the resolution, which they claimed, were degrading the fundamental principles of the Republic[87].

5 November 2003 The European Commission published its regular progress report on Turkey's performance regarding the Copenhagen criteria. The Commission welcomed the reforms, but also highlighted the weaknesses in the implementation.

28 March 2004 The AKP increased its vote share from 34.28% to 41.67%, and declared another victory after the 2004 local elections.

24 April 2004 After Rauf Denktas, the President of Northern Cyprus, was finally convinced to agree, the Cyprus referendum based on Annan Plan took place. The referendum resulted in the majority Greek Cypriot population voting down the UN Plan (75.38% against), whereas the minority Turkish Cypriot population (including the settlers from Turkey who outnumbered them) voted for the Plan (64.91% in favour). The controversy about the Annan Plan and the future of the Cyprus issue was the topic of conversation all over Turkey.

[86] Radikal, 3.11.2003
[87] Hurriyet, 15.01.2004

- Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Insisting on a deadlock is not a solution. (referring to the official state policy of Turkey and Northern Cyprus, that applies "no solution – preserving the status quo" as the solution to the Cyprus problem."
- Deniz Baykal (the leader of the CHP): Cyprus no more. If the plan becomes effective, the Turkish side of the island will become Greek in 20 years. Who in the world is Erdogan trying to make up to?
- Hilmi Ozkok (The Chief of Staff): Cyprus is not only about Turkish Cypriots. Turkey's security is at stake.
- Tuncay Ozilhan (The President of TUSIAD): The solution of the Cyprus problem should be based on Annan plan.
- Ali Bayramoglu (The President of MUSIAD): Annan Plan is not right for the Northern Cyprus. Turkey is using Anna Plan to be able to get into the EU.

7 May 2004 The AKP government responded with additional reforms, which addressed a number of issues such as "human rights, annulment of remaining death penalty provisions, strengthening the gender equality, broadening the freedom of press, abolishment of the State Security Courts, and establishment the supremacy of international agreements over national legislation in the area of fundamental freedoms," (Ugur & Yankaya, 2008, p.592).

14 July 2004 The AKP government introduced the eight-reform package, which replaced the military representatives in civilian bodies such as the RTUK, YOK, and TRT with civilians.

- Pekin Baran (Vice President of TUSIAD): AKP had demonstrated an astonishing performance. Contrary to common expectations, they did not take any wrong steps informed either by their Islamic identity or by their economic preferences.

September 2004 During the discussions of reform in the Turkish Penalty Code, the AKP government included a clause in the draft bill to criminalize adultery, which only to be pulled back after drawing heavy oppositions.

- Erdogan: The bill is necessary for gender equity, and it is meant to protect wives from cheating husbands.
- Günter Verheugen, (European commissioner for enlargement): This bill will tarnish Turkey's image.
- Domestic media repeatedly reported the foreign reactions.
- Hurriyet: The course of the incidents is becoming scary[88].
- Deniz Baykal: The clause will absolutely harm the unity of the family. What will happen to those who living in Anatolia with a religious marriage?
- CHP: Even if the gender equity is sustained in this clause, accepting adultery as a criminal act means going backwards. For Turkey abolished such clauses from its codes 8 years ago.
- TUSIAD: Adultery is a moral problem, not a criminal one.
- MUSIAD: Adultery must be a crime.

22 October 2004 The Human Rights Commission, responsible to the office of Prime Minister, published a minority report, and offered "Turkiyeli (from Turkey)" as an alternative supra nationality to "Turk."

- Deniz Baykal: Initiating a discussion on the borders of Turkey that were drawn with the Lausanne Agreement, and creating artificial minorities are fruitless attempts[89].

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[88] http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2004/09/13/521200.asp
[89] Radikal, 29.11.2004

- The Deputy Chief of Staff: Initiating a discussion on the unitary of Turkish state cannot be accepted by the Turkish army[90].
- President Ahmet Necdet Sezer: In a unitary state, nation, country, and sovereignty cannot be divided. The founding element of Turkish republic is single, and it is Turks[91].
- The AKP: An intellectual provocation[92]. The government did not ask for such a report.

7 December 2004 The Municipality Law 5272 entered into force. The law granted the municipalities with the authority to aggregate alcohol serving restaurant in a district outside the public sphere. In order to clear away the confusion, Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a circular, and confirmed the Law 5272 on 17 December 2005.

- Deniz Baykal: Prohibiting alcohol is the first step towards the Taliban or the Saudi regime[93].
- Hurriyet: Alcohol Ghetto[94]
- Erdogan: There is no such thing as alcohol prohibition. We consider the issue in terms of public health.

12 August 2005 In a historical meeting in Diyarbakir, Erdogan announced that there is a "Kurdish problem" in the country, and the only solution of this problem is more democracy. It is not confined to a limited group of people. It is the problem of all.[95]

27 November 2005 During a meeting in Siirt, Erdogan stated that Turkey is a mosaic, which consists of different parts. In a country full of sub-nationalities, Turkish citizenship is the supra nationality of all.

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[90] Milliyet, 03.11.2004
[91] Radikal, 29.10.2004
[92] Radikal, 19.11.2004
[93] http://haber.mynet.com/baykaldan-icki-yasagi-tepkisi-152353-politika/
[94] http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/3493506_p.asp
[95] Sabah, 12.08.2005

- Deniz Baykal: You must have your peace with the phrase "Turkish nation." You must not be ashamed of using the word Turk.

Early May 2006 Cumhuriyet (which literally means "the Republic") newspaper launched a campaign for the upcoming presidential elections on 16 May 2007. The campaign consisted of multiple short videos, and newspaper ads on the "threat" Turkey faced. Some of the campaign slogans were "Are you aware of the danger?" "On 16 May, clocks will be put 100 years back," "Women of Republic are being destroyed," and at the end of each video, the newspaper demanded from to society to protect their Republic[96].

5 and 11 May 2006 Bomb attacks to Cumhuriyet newspaper, which is known for its secular stance and closeness to the CHP.

17 May 2006 There was an armed attack to the Council of State, which was famous for its decisions on headscarf issue. It was reported that during the attack, the aggressor screamed "Allah is great! (Allahuekber)," and warned that more attacks would follow[97].

- On May 18th, a group marched to Anitkabir (The mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk). The group consisted of members of the Constitutional Court, Council of State, Supreme Court of Appeals, Chamber of Accounts, Courts of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and Supreme Administrative Court for the Armed Forces as well as representatives of Turkish Bar Association, prosecutors, university rectors, and academicians. The slogan of the group was "Turkey is secular, and will remain so."
- President Ahmet Necdet Sezer: The attack is a black mark in Turkish history. These attackers against the values and institutions, which are guarantees of an independent, free, and modern lifestyle, will never reach their goals[98].

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[96] http://en.vidivodo.com/video/cumhuriyetinize-sahip-cikin/280789
[97] Hurriyet, 17.05.2006

- The AKP: It is obviously a provocation.
- Erdogan: I curse the attack. It was aimed at the institutions of the Republic as a whole.
- Deniz Baykal: It is not an individual payoff. Our constitution was at target. The responsibility of the government is absolute.
- Hilmi Ozkok (The Chief of Staff): I, as a representative of the military forces, condemn this nefarious attack.

Early April 2007 It was announced that the birthday of Prophet Mohammad (Kutlu Dogum) (which is accepted as a sacred day by Muslims) would be celebrated on April 23rd, which happens to be National Sovereignty and Children's Day, the day when the Turkish National Great Assembly was founded.

- Cumhuriyet: The AKP government ordered the presidents (of Ministry of National Education) to be at present at Kutlu Dogum celebrations [99]. (Later, a conservative newspaper –Yenisafak- proved that Cumhuriyet changed the original document, and published the fake one[100].)
- Hurriyet: April 23rd Provocations. A Quran recitement competition will be held at the very same gymnasium that has been used for the April 23rd celebrations for years[101].
- Cumhuriyet: Kutlu Dogum week, which has been celebrated since 1989, has been turned into a show[102].

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[98] http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/373524.asp
[99] Cumhuriyet, 17.05.2007
[100] Yenisafak, 30 April 2007
[101] Hurriyet, 19 April 2007
[102] Cumhuriyet, 24 April 2007

- Hurriyet: Kutlu Dogum is purposely being celebrated on April 23rd. The purpose is to make small children and students to efface the terms such as national sovereignty, patriotism, and Turkishness, and rather learn religious concepts[103].

11 April 2007 Deniz Baykal: I believe that the Prime Minister Erdogan will break the good news that he is not going to stand as a candidate in the presidential elections.

12 April 2007 The Chief of Staff Yasar Buyukanit shared his opinions on the upcoming presidential election, and stated that "After the elections, I hope a president who is loyal to the fundamental principles of the republic, the unitary, secular and democratic structure of the state not only in discourse but also in heart.

14 April 2007 President Ahmet Necdet Sezer (during his speech in military academy): The threat that Islamic fundamentalism poses to the country is higher than ever

14 April 2007 -13 May 2007 "Society became polarized regarding the issue, and meetings were held in major cities with the participation of hundreds of thousands, mostly claiming to protect secular political structure," (Warhola & Bezci, 2010) .

18 April 2007 Arzuhan Yalcindag (The president of TUSIAD): I feel that Erdoğan will not stand as a candidate in the presidential election.

24 April 2007 Erdogan announced in a group meeting that AKP's candidate for presidential elections was Abdullah Gul[104]. Gul's wife was wearing a headscarf, and this fact spurred a huge debate. Headscarf in Cankaya was just unacceptable[105].

27 April 2007 The AKP failed to achieve a quorum of 367, and Gül's candidacy failed at the first round despite a majority of those present voting in favor (361 votes). A

[103] Hurriyet, 29 April 2007
[104] http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/417188.asp
[105] Hurriyet, 29 April 2007

quorum of 397, on the other hand, was not constitutional[106]. Yet, the CHP insisted on the 367, and applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the first round of presidential election. The Court was to reach a decision during the weekend.

27 April 2007 Later in the evening, Turkish Armed Forces released a statement in its website warning that "...The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent situation. ... the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in those arguments, and absolute defender of secularism..."

28 April 2007 Cemil Cicek (The spoekesperson of the AKP): "It is unthinkable that in a state governed by rule of law, the Turkish General Staff (TGS) as an institution under the Prime Minister would speak against the government. The TGS is an institution under civilian governmental command, and its duties and responsibilities are defined by the constitution. According to our constitution, the Chief of Staff is responsible to Prime Minister because of the Chief of Staff's stated duties and authorities" (Warhola & Bezci, 2010).

- Mustafa Ozyurek (The spokesperson of the CHP): this is surely a military memorandum. The government should act accordingly.
- Onur Oymen (Vice President of the CHP): We 100% share the military's views. We will not surrender Turkey to the enemies of Ataturk.
- Onder Sav (The Secretary of the CHP): It is time to be happy for us! It is time to be happy for Turkey!
- Arzuhan Yalcindag (The President of TUSIAD): General elections must be held immediately in order to protect secularism and democracy.

[106] See the statements of professors studying constitutional law at Zaman, 28 April 2007

- Liberals: Done right before the presidential election, statements of Turkish General Staff is not innocent.
- MUSIAD was one of the first groups to oppose the e-memorandum[107].
- **28 April 2007** Caglayan Republic protest was held.
- Cumhuriyet: This is civil memorandum[108].
- Vatan: And this is the civil memorandum[109].
- Hurriyet: The military has fulfilled the first stage of its duties. Initiating the 27 April process comforted millions[110].
- Hurriyet: Those who want to have a modern and civilized lifestyle are trying to block those who want to return back to Dark Ages[111].
- Hurriyet: It was the duty of Turkish General Staff to say "no!" to what was happening[112].
- Zaman (a prominent conservative newspaper): It is apparently a democracy quiz for Turkey.

29 April 2007 There will be clashes if the Constitutional Court decides the unconstitutionality of the quorum 367.

1 May 2007 The Constitutional Court announced its decision on the quorum of 367, and supported the CHP stance.

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[107] http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CHMQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.birgun.net%2Factuels_index.php%3Fnews_code%3D1335691369%26day%3D29%26month%3D04%26year%3D2012&ei=M5UOUOHWHsbd0QHQ-4GQCw&usg=AFQjCNHjrzXv0fUjDqiogs87PVLJVNZSYg&sig2=PWtA8KndGN7r7JVJt6I4xQ
[108] Cumhuriyet, 28 April 2007
[109] Vatan, 28 April 2007
[110] Hurriyet, 28 April 2007
[111] Hurriyet, 28 April 2007
[112] Hurriyet, 30 April 2007

1 May 2007 The AKP government announced that early elections will be held immediately.

11 May 2007 The Constitutional amendment that cleared the path for electing the president via referendum was accepted at the Parliament.

- Deniz Baykal: The amendment is an example of absolute irresponsibility.
- Tayyip Erdogan: How can those who see the election of the Turkish president by popular vote as a problem for the regime ask votes from the people?

22 July 2007 The early elections, which had a turnout of 84.24%, resulted with yet another land slide victory of the AKP. The vote share of the Party in the Kurdish region also increased from 32.2% to 54.6%[113].

- Abdullah Gul: the election results are obviously a message regarding the presidential elections.

28 August 2007 In the third round of the election, Abdullah Gul was elected president by the Parliament with 337 votes.

7. CONCLUSION

While contemporary research on the political success in semi-democratic countries focuses primarily on the election victories of the political parties, the findings of this study indicates that election success may change governments, but it does not necessarily change the existing power structure. Therefore, with a focus on the governments of Welfare Party and the Justice and Development Party of Turkey, this study argues that in addition to election victories,

[113] Ali Bulac, Kurt Secmenin Oylari http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=569630

shifting the balance of power in one's favor is also a significant aspect of the process, namely reining in the power of the authoritarian structures.

The findings of this study indicate that discourse plays an important role. In the same line with the studies of Bermeo (1992) in general, and Cavdar (2006) in Turkish case; our findings suggest the usage of a more moderate, inclusive, and compromiser language helps political parties to appeal different segments of the society. On the other hand, exclusive, and radical discourses estrange some of the groups in the society, and create a perception of threat among those that do not share the same values with the political party. For example, Welfare Party's insistence on Islam as the sole reference point to its political agenda, and demonizing the West as a block hindered its relationship with some of the most powerful power centers in the Turkish society, such as TUSIAD. At the same time, such attitude towards the West and secularism created a perception of threat to the regime among not only in Kemalist state structure but also among ordinary, moderate citizens.

On the other hand, the findings also suggest that appealing to a group with a moderate agenda is not sufficient in and of itself. Joel Migdal (2001) study "State in Society", which served as a basis for the context of this study, explains this phenomenon via different utility functions of different power centers. As we argued in the above, political party, which aims to appeal a power center, should pay attention to its utility function, and try to convince the center that it will be incorporated into the utility function of the party. The AKP's group specific policy strategy is a good example of this coalition building. The Party offered identity recognition and cultural rights to Kurds, EU membership and a stable economy to TUSIAD, promotion of small and medium-sized firms and closer economic and political relations with alternate power centers in global politics to MUSIAD, a solution to the oppression towards Muslim population to

conservatives, and a more democratic, human rights oriented country to the liberals. This coalition, in turn, played a significant role in critical junctures when the tension between the Party and Kemalist state structure increased. The power centers in the coalition showed their support for the AKP through ballot boxes, media, and their statements. The Welfare Party on the other hand, depending solely on conservatives, and MUSIAD, lacked the necessary support, and had to fight with the Kemalist structure alone.

Third, the findings suggest that a source of legitimacy –either domestic or foreign- that is accepted by most of the society is important for institutionalization of the change in the balance of power. In Turkish case, this was the EU membership, or specifically the EU conditionality. Initiated by the Kemalist elites back in 1960s, the EU process granted the AKP with the necessary means to find a scapegoat for radical reforms, which eventually led to limiting the authority of Turkish military on civil institutions. The WP, on the other hand, wanted to make use of Islam, which has been one of the most (perceived) threatening enemies of the Kemalist state besides separatism. In other words, the reference point of the Welfare Party was a threat to the Kemalist state, and any policy that refers back to that reference point was an opportunity to damage the government, even though the policy was in accordance with the state interests.

As for the limitations of our findings, it should be noted that electronic archives are of limited availability in Turkey, which obstructs reaching the data. A field study on this interesting question might reveal different aspects of the phenomenon which has been the subject of this study.

Finally, the findings of this study have direct implications outside of Turkey. Defeating authoritarian regimes -transition to democracy- have long been debated among scholars of democratization. The sharp -yet smooth- balance of power change in Turkish politics in recent

years might shed light on the path for other illiberal democracies that have a powerful authoritarian actor besides democratic institutions, or those that have a limited democratic setting. In a region with bourgeoning electoral success of Islamist parties with the fall of authoritarian leaders one after another, the AKP experience could also be used as a reference point by the optimists to show that the political agenda of the Islamist parties could be shaped, contained, and transformed by the broad social coalition they depend to survive, which eventually helps them weaken the authoritarian structures that are strongly rooted in these countries.

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