Finance Dissertations

Leverage and Liquidity: Evidence from the Closed-End Fund Industry

Yuehua Tang — Mon, 22 Apr 2013 11:35:35 PDT

This paper uses the February 2008 auction rate security (ARS) market freeze to examine the spillover effects of an exogenous funding liquidity shock on the underlying asset markets. Consistent with theory, I find that the stocks held by closed-end funds (CEFs) that borrow from the ARS market experience larger declines in market liquidity and lower returns than other stocks after the ARS market freeze. These effects are more pronounced when (i) these ARS-levered CEFs hold a larger fraction of shares outstanding, (ii) the borrowing level from the ARS market is higher, and (iii) the stocks are less liquid before the ARS market freeze. The spillover effects of the ARS market freeze are temporary and diminish during the next 12 months. Further investigation shows that the spillover effects are indeed associated with the heavy selling behavior of the ARS-levered CEFs after experiencing the ARS market shock. Overall, this study provides evidence that a funding liquidity shock to financial institutions can cause a decline in both market liquidity and the prices of the underlying assets.

Two Essays on the Board's Uncertainty About the Contracting Environment and CEO Compensation Contracts

Bunyamin Onal — Tue, 17 Jul 2012 04:52:45 PDT

Essay 1: To delegate or not to delegate to stock markets: The case of boards with related industry expertise

Abstract: I examine the extent to which boards with expertise in related product markets, i.e., downstream (customer) or upstream (supplier) industries, delegate their monitoring and advisory functions to stock markets. Directors from related industries (DRIs) are argued to have greater access to information about the input and output product markets of the firm. This, in turn, is predicted to reduce the reliance on stock-based compensation, a costly mechanism, particularly for firms that depend more on information about product markets and whose stock prices are not very informative about product markets. The evidence documented in this paper is largely consistent with these predictions. A number of additional tests suggest that this evidence is not likely to be explained by the potential conflict of interests between the firm’s stockholders and DRIs. Hence, I conclude that boards with related industry expertise delegate to stock markets to an optimally lesser extent due to their informational advantages.

Essay 2: Stock-based CEO compensation following conglomerate acquisitions

Abstract: I examine how stock-based incentive compensation for the CEO is designed following corporate acquisitions conditional on the economic nature of the acquisition. Large acquisitions represent significant changes in the economic environment of the firm. Furthermore, these changes are more likely to occur with conglomerate acquisitions. Accordingly, implications of the two mainstream theories of incentive compensation, i.e., efficient contracting theory and agency theory, are tested separately for conglomerate acquisitions. The empirical tests generally show that stock-based compensation is employed more intensely after conglomerate acquisitions than otherwise. Overall, the results documented in this paper seem consistent with the notion that greater economic uncertainties that are likely to follow conglomerate acquisitions induce the board to rely more heavily on stock-based incentives, an external monitoring mechanism.

Vertical Firm Boundaries: Supplier-Customer Contracts and Vertical Integration

Ryan M. Williams — Thu, 26 Apr 2012 11:13:34 PDT

I empirically examine the choice of a firm’s vertical boundaries—specifically, the decision to use supplier-customer contracts instead of either using markets or vertical integration. I examine the determinants of supplier-customer contracts using data on a customer’s contractual purchase obligations with its suppliers. Contracting propensity is positively related to supplier relationship-specific investments (RSI), the supplier’s relative bargaining power, and vertical integration costs, and negatively related to contracting costs, alternative sources of information about the customer, and the percentage of a customer’s input traded on financial markets. I also find that customer firms which have product market contracts with their suppliers have better relative performance. These performance effects are enhanced by relationship-specific investments and are robust to corrections for endogeneity. Additionally, I examine the choice between vertical integration versus supplier-customer contracts and find that the choice is predicted by the type of RSI. Consistent with theory, RSI measured using tangible (intangible) assets are positively related to integration (contracts). Further, positive (negative) shocks to industry-level intangible investment are related to increases in a firm’s contracting activity and decreases (increases) in the level of vertical integration, while positive (negative) shocks to industry-level tangible investment are related to decreases in contracting activity and increases (decreases) in the level of vertical integration. My results suggest that market frictions play an important role in shaping supplier-customer contracting activity and firm boundaries.

Agency Problems in Target-Date Funds

Vallapuzha Sandhya — Thu, 08 Dec 2011 04:38:35 PST

Target-Date Funds (TDFs) facilitate retirement planning by varying asset allocation over time with the goal of reducing portfolio risk. We explore potential agency problems in TDFs by examining their return performance and flow-performance relation. We find that TDFs under-perform balanced funds (BFs) which are also approved as a default option along with TDFs in 401(k) plans with automatic enrollment. We show that the under-performance is driven by TDFs that have a fund-of-fund structure and constituent funds with high expense ratios or poor performance within the fund family. Additionally, we discover an absence of flow-performance relation in TDFs while BFs exhibit the convex flow-performance relation shown for mutual funds. Our evidence suggests the presence of agency problems in TDFs arising from investor inertia, weak incentives for fund managers to outperform peers, and opportunities for fund families to gain private benefits.

An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Project Finance: Cash Flow Volatility and Correlation

Zinat S. Alam — Thu, 05 Aug 2010 13:26:48 PDT

This paper investigates the effect of correlation and volatilities of firm and project cash flows on the choice of project finance. I use a pure-play approach to measure unobservable project cash flows for a sample of 440 US and non-US firms that invested in 577 projects from 1990 to 2008 and find evidence that the probability of project finance is increasing in cash flow volatility difference between firm and project cash flows. The likelihood of the project finance is greater when volatilities are different and the correlation between firm and project cash flows is high. I also find that firms are likely to choose corporate finance for low correlation and low and similar volatilities between firm and project cash flows. This empirical work is consistent with the theoretical predictions in Leland (2007) that provides a potential explanation for the existence of project finance based on financial synergies.

Transparency, Risk, and Managerial Actions

Gwendolyn Pennywell — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:04:06 PST

I investigate the relation between firm risk and firm transparency over the period 1992-2006 and find that the level of firm transparency and the level of firm risk are negatively related. I also find that higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity (delta) works to mitigate this inverse relationship. This result is consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) who suggest that managers reduce risk to protect their pay and performance evaluations under higher levels of firm transparency. I further find that firms in high technology industries are more likely to increase risk relative to firms in other industries when transparency is high. Finally, I develop an additional proxy for transparency based on the Standard and Poor’s Transparency and Disclosure Score. Results using this proxy are generally consistent with my findings that there is an inverse relationship between risk and transparency and that CEO pay-performance sensitivity lessens this relationship.

Essay 1: 'An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical Takeovers' Essay 2: 'Determinants of Firm Vertical Boundaries and Implications for Internal Capital Markets'

Jaideep Ranjal Shenoy — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:04:05 PST

Essay 1: An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical Takeovers We investigate the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion rationales for vertical integration using a large sample of vertical takeovers. The efficiency rationale posits that vertical integration prevents future holdup between non-integrated suppliers and customers. In contrast, the foreclosure and collusion rationales suggest that vertical integration harms competition. To distinguish between these hypotheses, we examine the wealth effects of the merging firms, acquirer rivals, target rivals, and corporate customers on announcement of vertical takeovers. Our univariate and cross-sectional results suggest that firms alter their vertical boundaries in a manner that is consistent with the efficiency rationale. Our tests do not find evidence supportive of the anti-competitive rationales for vertical integration. Essay 2: Determinants of Firm Vertical Boundaries and Implications for Internal Capital Markets In this paper, we investigate the determinants of vertical relatedness between business segments of multi-segment firms and how vertical relatedness affects the internal allocation of capital. Consistent with theory, we observe a higher degree of vertical relatedness between segments in environments likely to involve contracting problems. Further, there is a greater tendency for investments to flow towards segments with better investment opportunities as the degree of vertical relatedness between business segments in the firm increases. This indicates that internal capital markets function better in the presence of significant vertical relatedness between segments. This finding supports the Stein (1997) model, which suggests that the headquarters is able to do a better job of “winner-picking” when firms operate in related lines of businesses.

CEO Risk Taking and Firm Policies: Evidence from CEO Employment History

Lingling Wang — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:04:04 PST

I propose that CEO employment history is an observable characteristic that reveals the CEO’s unobservable risk-taking preferences. I hypothesize that CEOs that change employers more frequently (mobile CEOs) have a propensity to bear risk and implement riskier firm policies. Using a sample of S&P 1500 CEOs, I find that firms are more likely to hire mobile CEOs when the firm’s prior risk is high, firm-specific human capital is less important, the prior CEO turnover is forced, the prior CEO has a shorter tenure and the board is smaller and has fewer insiders. Mobile CEOs increase financial leverage, invest more in advertising and less in capital expenditures, and increase firm-specific risk. Mobile CEOs invest more (less) in R&D in homogenous (heterogeneous) industries where firm-specific knowledge is less (more) important in making investment decisions. Shareholders react positively to appointments of CEOs who change employers more frequently. I find no difference in long-run accounting performance for CEOs with different employment histories. Firms’ annual stock returns and sales growth are higher for CEOs who change employers more frequently. The cost of debt increases after the firm appoints a mobile CEO. These findings suggest that lower CEO risk aversion and the potential risk-shifting from shareholders to bondholders are sources of shareholder value increases. In sum, my findings provide evidence that CEO employment history is an observable characteristic that reveals the risk-taking preference of the CEO.

Managerial Incentives and the Choice between Public and Private Debt

Costanza Meneghetti — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:04:03 PST

This paper proposes that managerial incentive compensation affects the firm choice between public and bank debt. To motivate the case I analyze a simple model with complete and perfect information that implies a positive relation between managers’ incentive compensation and preference toward bank debt. Using firm-level data over the period 1992-2005, I empirically examine the relation between managerial incentives and financing decisions. Specifically, I examine whether managers whose compensation is tied to firm performance choose bank over public debt as a commitment mechanism to reduce the cost of debt. Consistent with a monitoring role of banks, I find that the probability of choosing bank over public debt is positively related to the level of incentive compensation. Further, I find that public lenders price the incentive alignment between manager and shareholders by increasing the cost of debt, while the overall cost of bank loan does not depend on the manager’s incentive compensation. Finally, I find that banks are more likely to include a collateral provision in the debt contract if the manager’s compensation is tied to firm performance.

Two Essays on Managerial Behaviors in the Mutual Fund Industry Essay 1: A Life-Cycle Analysis of Performance and Growth in U.S. Mutual Funds Essay 2: Can Mutual Fund Window-Dressing Promote Fund Flows?

Leng Ling — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:04:03 PST

ABSTRACT TWO ESSAYS ON MANAGERIAL BEHAVIORS IN THE MUTUAL FUND INDUSTRY LENG LING ESSAY 1: DOES MUTUAL FUND WINDOW-DRESSING PROMOTE FUND FLOWS? I investigate the effectiveness of window-dressing as a potential strategy to be used by mutual fund managers to promote fund flows. Using a rank gap measure as a proxy for the likelihood that window-dressing has occurred, I find that fund investors as whole punish those managers who are suspected to have engaged in window-dressing. That is, I find a negative relation between the window-dressing measure and net fund flows in subsequent quarters after controlling for fund performance, size, expense ratio, and other pertinent characteristics. I also find that window-dressing leads to higher trading activities and lower fund performance. ESSAY 2: A LIFE CYCLE ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE AND GROWTH IN U.S. MUTUAL FUNDS I propose a five-stage growth model to describe the life cycle evolution of mutual funds and show that mutual funds exhibit distinctive performance, size, expense ratios, asset turnover, and other pertinent characteristics through stages of incubation, high-growth, low-growth, maturity, and decline. I also investigate the viability of managerial strategies to affect a fund’s life cycle evolution and find that changing a declining fund’s investment objective is effective in rejuvenating asset growth and thus repositioning the fund to younger life cycle stages. However, the strategy of adding portfolio managers appears to have no such rejuvenation effect.

Do Mutual Fund Managers Have Superior Skills? An Analysis of the Portfolio Deviations from a Benchmark

Jean-Francois Guimond — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:04:02 PST

By construction, actively managed portfolios must differ from passively managed ones. Consequently, the manager’s problem can be viewed as selecting how to deviate from a passive portfolio composition. The purpose of this study is to see if we can infer the presence of superior skills through the analysis of the portfolio deviations from a benchmark. Based on the Black-Litterman approach, we hypothesize that positive signals should lead to an increase in weight, from which should follow that the largest deviations from a benchmark weight reveal the presence of superior skills. More precisely, this study looks at the subsequent performance of the securities corresponding to the largest deviations from different external benchmarks. We use a sample of 8385 US funds from the CRSP Survivorship bias free database from June 2003 to June 2004 to test our predictions. We use two external benchmarks to calculate the deviations: the CRSP value weighted index (consistent with the Black-Litterman model) and the investment objective of each fund. Our main result shows that a portfolio of the securities with the most important positive deviations with respect to a passive benchmark (either CRSP-VW or investment objective), would have earned a subsequent positive abnormal return (on a risk-adjusted basis) for one month after the portfolio date. The magnitude of this return is around 0.6% for all the funds, and can be as high as 2.77% for small caps value funds. This result is robust to all the performance measures used in this study.

Model Uncertainty and Mutual Fund Investing

Yee Cheng Loon — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:04:01 PST

Yee Cheng Loon’s dissertation abstract Model uncertainty exists in the mutual fund literature. Researchers employ a variety of models to estimate risk-adjusted return, suggesting a lack of consensus as to which model is correct. Model uncertainty makes it difficult to draw clear inference about mutual fund performance persistence. We explicitly account for model uncertainty by using Bayesian model averaging techniques to estimate a fund’s risk-adjusted return. Our approach produces the Bayesian model averaged (BMA) alpha, which is a weighted combination of alphas from individual models. Using BMA alphas, we find evidence of performance persistence in a large sample of US equity, bond and balanced mutual funds. Funds with high BMA alphas subsequently generate higher risk-adjusted returns than funds with low BMA alphas, and the magnitude of outperformance is economically and statistically significant. We also find that mutual fund investors respond to the information content of BMA alphas. High BMA alpha funds receive subsequent cash inflows while low BMA alpha funds experience subsequent cash outflows.

Cross-Sectional Differences between Topic 1: Money Market Mutual Funds and their Role in the Mutual Fund Families. Topic 2: Innovations in Financial Products. Conventional Mutual Funds versus Exchange Traded Funds.

Anna Agapova — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:04:00 PST

The first essay examines cross-sectional differences between money market mutual funds (MMMFs), in the context of the sponsoring fund family. While extant studies have shown that fund family characteristics impact the management of open-end equity mutual funds, results of this study’s analysis find that fund family characteristics also affect the management of MMMF assets, contributing to differences in the maturity of the fund’s holdings, expenses, and realized returns. I find that an MMMF is not simply a transitional account with a short-term low-risk investment objective, but rather, a critical role player within the fund family. Differences in maturity, yield, and expenses in MMMFs can be explained by family-specific characteristics, including diversification and cash management strategies at the family level. The second essay examines implications of substitutability of two similar financial assets: conventional index mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs). I seek to explain the coexistence of these fund types, since both offer a claim on the same underlying index return process, but have different organizational structures. This study compares conventional open-end index funds with matched ETFs on various underlying indexes. Aggregate flows are used to detect substitution and clientele effects. I show that conventional funds and ETFs are substitutes, while ETFs have smaller tracking errors and lower fund expenses. However, I find that these fund types are not perfect substitutes, and their coexistence can be explained by a clientele effect that segregates them into different market niches.

What Drives Firms to Diversity?

Rong Guo — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:03:59 PST

WHAT DRIVES FIRMS TO DIVERSITY? By RONG GUO Committee Chair: Dr. Omesh Kini Major Department: Finance This paper examines whether corporate governance structures, serving as proxies for agency costs, can explain firms’ decision to diversify. Specifically, it has been hypothesized that firms with worse corporate governance structures are more likely to diversify. The extant literature usually compares the governance characteristics of multi-segment firms to those of single segment firms to address this issue. However, different governance characteristics may simply reflect differences in firm characteristics of diversified firms and focused firms. Furthermore, industry factors may affect both the propensity of firms to diversify and their governance characteristics. To separate out the agency costs explanation of firms’ decision to diversify, I compare the corporate governance structures of single segment firms that choose to diversify with those of a matched sample of single segment firms in the same industry that choose to remain focused. I find that firms with a higher percentage of outsiders on the board and smaller board size are more likely to diversify. These findings are inconsistent with the agency costs explanation of why firms choose to diversify. In addition, the CEO pay-to-performance sensitivity of diversifying firms is also not significantly different from that of firms that stay focused. The corporate governance characteristics cannot explain the changes in excess value around diversification either. Although some of the governance characteristics are significantly related to the announcement effects of diversifying mergers, these relations are often inconsistent with the agency cost explanation. Taken together, my evidence indicates that diversifying firms do not systematically have worse governance structures than firms that stay focused and, therefore, higher agency costs do not appear to drive the decision to diversify.

Managerial Incentives and Takeover Wealth Gains

Ebru Reis — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:03:59 PST

ABSTRACT MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND TAKEOVER WEALTH GAINS By EBRU REIS DECEMBER 5, 2006 Committee Chair: Dr. Jayant R. Kale Major Department: Finance This study examines the relationship between managerial equity incentives and takeover wealth gains both for target and acquirer firms. Although there is some research about the effect of acquirer managers’ incentives on acquirer wealth gains, this paper is one of the first to investigate the effect of target managers’ incentives on the wealth effects of target firms in corporate takeovers. In addition, prior research has focused on the alignment effect of equity incentives in takeovers. However, takeovers provide an opportunity to liquidate personal equity portfolio for managers who hold an undiversified portfolio of their firms’ stock. In this study, I identify two hypotheses that potentially explain the effect of target managers’ incentives on wealth gains. While incentive alignment hypothesis predicts a positive relationship, diversification driven-liquidity hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between target managerial incentives and target wealth gains. I use a sample of 656 successful and 104 failed acquisitions over the period 1994-2003 to test these competing hypotheses. I find that for targets that are less (more) diversified, equity incentives are negatively (positively) related to wealth effects. I also find that the target managerial incentives increase the success probability of a takeover bid and this positive effect is less pronounced for diversified target managers. Based on these results, I conclude that incentive alignment argument is dominated by liquidity argument in less diversified target firms, however, holds in diversified firms. For acquirer managers, I do not find any evidence that supports incentive alignment or diversification arguments.

Flows, Performance, and Tournament Behavior

Marco Pagani — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:03:58 PST

Essay 1: The Determinants of the Convexity in the Flow-Performance Relationship There is substantial evidence that the flow-performance relationship of mutual funds is convex. In this work, I empirically investigate the determinants of such convexity. In particular, I study the impact that fund fees (marketing and non-marketing fees) and the uncertainty related to the replacement option of fund production factors (managerial ability and investment strategy) have on the convexity of the flow-performance relationship. I also analyze the impact of the priors about managerial ability and idiosyncratic risk on such convexity. The evidence suggests that marketing fees are positively related to the convexity of the flow-performance relationship. In addition, non-marketing fees do not have a negative impact on this convexity. The evidence associated with the value of the managerial and investment replacement option is mixed. Consistent with investment restrictions being relevant in explaining investors’ allocation decisions, sector, index, and hedge funds exhibit lower convexity in their flow-performance relationship than respectively diversified, non-index, and mutual funds. Finally, the dispersion of the priors about managerial ability and idiosyncratic risk are positively related to the convexity in the flow-performance relationship. Essay 2: Implicit Incentives and Tournament Behavior in the Mutual Fund Industry The convexity of the flow-performance relationship in the mutual fund industry produces implicit incentives for mutual fund managers to modify risk-taking behavior as a function of their prior performance (Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996)). Rather than focusing only on tournament behavior, I investigate the link between the determinants of the convexity in the flow-performance relationship and the inter-temporal risk-shifting behavior of a fund’s manager. Hence, I examine how the sources of implicit compensation incentives shape tournament behavior. The evidence indicates that the relationship between changes in managers’ relative risk choices and mid-year performance is non-monotonic (U-shaped). Higher convexity in the flow-performance relationship increases the convexity of the U-shaped tournament behavior. For extreme performers, an increase in the convexity of the flow-performance relationship directly translates into higher risk-taking incentives. For average performers, the incentive to increase risk produced by the convexity in the compensation schedule is counterbalanced by an increase in the risk of termination. I find that the uncertainty about managerial ability, marketing efforts, and the size of family complexes affect the convexity of the U-shaped tournament behavior. These results are robust to the consideration of termination risks due to funds’ organizational form, investment objectives, or past performance. My results suggest that the risk strategies of younger funds, funds spending more on marketing, funds belonging to smaller families, sector funds, funds that are team-managed, or funds that have experienced consistent poor performance are more sensitive to intermediate performance.

Two Essays on Investor Sentiment and Equity Offerings

Hsin-Hui Chiu — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:03:57 PST

ABSTRACT TWO ESSAYS ON INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND EQUITY OFFERINGS BY HSIN-HUI CHIU May 2, 2006 Committee Chair: Dr. Jason T. Greene Major Department: Finance Using monthly open-end mutual fund flows as a proxy for investor sentiment, I am able to examine the impact of sentiment on IPO volume and underpricing. I find that issuers’ filing decisions are significantly affected by the predicted future sentiment around the expected IPO dates. Furthermore, sentiment has an impact on the final offer price setting and over-allotment options exercised. While previous research documents IPO cycles with respect to other proxies for investor sentiment, I am able to examine IPO cycles and underpricing with respect to sentiment along with investor risk preferences. I hypothesize that a going public firm will try to issue its IPO when investor risk preferences are favorable to the firm’s own risk characteristics. Empirical results based on 5,661 initial public offerings between 1986 and 2004 are consistent with my hypotheses that issuers not only time the market with sentiment in general, but also attempt to incorporate investor risk preferences into their going public decisions. Furthermore, underpricing is more severe when firms issue equity during months with large inflows into equity mutual funds. In my second essay, I find that SEO firms appear to time market efficiently because of the shorter filing periods compared to the average 2-3 months of the IPOs. Also, sentiment not only affects a SEO offer price setting but also affects the over-allotment options exercised. I examine two subgroups of the SEO samples: shelf registration and non-shelf SEOs. I find that shelf-registered SEOs incorporate investor sentiment into offering price to a greater degree compared to regular SEOs. Lastly I find that investor risk preference plays a role in firms’ decision to file prospectuses with the SEC. In other words, firms rationally decide the timing of filing based on the predicted investor preference and try to match firm characteristics with investor preference around the expected SEO date.

Deposit Insurance: Is it Good for the Development of Financial Markets?

Kaysia Therese Campbell — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:03:57 PST

ABSTRACT Deposit Insurance: Is it good for the development of Financial Markets? BY Kaysia Therese Campbell April 25, 2006 Committee Chair: Dr. Stephen Smith and Dr. James Owers Major Department: Finance The literature on deposit insurance has focused primarily on the role it plays in promoting banking sector stability and growth, while little attention has been placed on its possible effect on the development of other markets. Failure to examine the impact of deposit insurance on other markets could lead to premature conclusions about the full effect it has on total financial market development and, in turn, economic growth. Using panel data and cross sectional averages on 96 countries covering the time period 1975 – 2004 to distinguish between short run and long run effects, and including a host of controls, I find evidence that deposit insurance is associated with greater long run, total financial market development, as measured by the size and activity of banks, equity markets, bond markets and non-bank financial intermediaries. This indicates that it is able to accelerate banking sector development without necessarily retarding the development of other markets so that overall financial market development is improved. It is important to note that this is primarily evident for countries with a strong legal and contracting environment. The results also suggest that the immediate impact of deposit insurance is greatest for middle income economies but over time there is no clear evidence that this persists. Using design features thought to contribute to the generosity and ability of the scheme to curb moral hazard and provide a credible guarantee, I construct two indices to summarize the various design features and examine their impact on financial market development. I find that countries adopting more credible schemes appear to have smaller and less active markets over time. However the results also indicate that more credible and generous design features are better able to promote total market activity in the long run. The hopeful conclusion to be made from this study is that the positive influence of deposit insurance on the banking sector is translated into the entire financial market system over time and may be irrespective of a country’s particular stage of economic development.

Forecasting Reurns to Pure Factors: A Study of Time Varying Risk Premia

George Famy — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:03:56 PST

I find evidence of predictability in out-of-sample data for four risk premia using simple econometric models. Two factor return models are used, an APT model and the Wilshire Atlas. I demonstrate that investors can exploit conditioning information to manage their exposures to risk factors. The results suggest that the investment opportunities set changes in a large and an economically significant way. I show that the growth rate in money supply and trend in stock market valuations are the main drivers respectfully of the risk premia associated with the Book-to-Market and Size factors from the Wilshire model. The predictability results are mixed with respect to Business Cycle Theory. At times investors price business cycle risk while at other times they exhibit herding tendencies.

Efficiency Implications of Corporate Diversification: Evidence from Micro Data

Ekaterina E. Emm — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 17:03:55 PST

In this study we contribute to the ongoing research on the rationales for corporate diversification. Using plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we examine whether combining several lines of business in one entity leads to increased productive efficiency. Studying the direct effect of diversification on efficiency allows us to discern between two major theories of corporate diversification: the synergy hypothesis and the agency-cost hypothesis. To measure productive efficiency, we employ a non-parametric approach—a test based on Varian’s Weak Axiom of Profit Maximization (WAPM). This method has several advantages over other conventional measures of productive efficiency. Most importantly, it allows one to perform the efficiency test without relying on assumptions about the functional form of the underlying production function. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first application of the WAPM test to a large sample of non-financial firms. The study provides evidence that business segments of diversified firms are more efficient compared to single-segment firms in the same industry. This finding suggests that the existence of the so-called ‘diversification discount’ cannot be explained by efficiency differences between multi-segment and focused firms. Furthermore, more efficient segments tend to be vertically integrated with others segments in the same firm and to have been added through acquisitions rather than grown internally. Overall, the results of this study indicate that corporate diversification is value-enhancing, and that it is not necessarily driven by managers’ pursuit of their private benefits.