Date of Award
7-31-2006
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Dr. Andrew Altman - Chair
Second Advisor
Dr. Peter Lindsay
Third Advisor
Dr. George Rainbolt
Abstract
This thesis will explain in detail two closely related but jointly defensible moral realist positions. I show how each position responds to the initial dilemma of whether moral judgments are propositions. Following this discussion, I defend this combined position against an objection that the position is inherently contradictory. I conclude that one can coherently maintain both positions without a contradiction.
Recommended Citation
Lesandrini, Jason, "A Defense of Moral Realism" (2006). Philosophy Theses. Paper 9.
http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/9
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