Philosophy Theses

The Visual Experience of Kinds

Andrei I. Marasoiu — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 11:57:01 PDT

Do perceiving subjects represent kind properties in the content of their conscious visual experience when they see and recognize instances of those natural kinds? In Part 1 of my thesis I clarify this question, in Part 2 I answer it, and in Part 3 I raise a problem for previous answers. Part 1 conceives of conscious experience in an internalist way, and the unified conscious episode does not exclude having beliefs about what one sees. Following Siegel (2006) and Bayne (2011), Part 2 formulates two arguments in support of representing kind properties in the content of experience. In Part 3, I argue that attempts to distinguish visual experiences from visual beliefs might fail to account for the interplay of sensory and cognitive elements in visual object recognition. I conclude by suggesting it has not been established that visual experiences can be distinguished from visual beliefs.

Kant's Humanity Formula in the Groundwork

Zeyu Chi — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 11:56:59 PDT

In this paper I argue for an alternative reading of the humanity formula that Kant presents in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The standard reading takes “humanity” to mean the capacity for setting ends. I suggest this reading is problematic for it does not offer a satisfactory explanation for what it means to use humanity as mere means. My reading considers “humanity” as the capacity for appraising one’s maxims from the perspective of pure practical reason. On this reading, to use humanity as mere means is to look at one’s maxims from the wrong perspective, i.e., the perspective of happiness. Further, I argue that it is mistaken to take Kant’s claim about an end in itself as a claim about any ultimate value. Instead, the claim should be construed as a claim about the role of pure practical reason in moral appraisal, which should be understood in terms of Kant’s metaphysics of the mind.

Adam Smith: A Relational Egalitarian Interpretation

kathryn e. joyce — Mon, 08 Apr 2013 10:07:06 PDT

In this thesis I argue that Adam Smith is committed to moral egalitarianism, which extends to his theory of political economy. While Smith’s work is often used to justify economic inequality in society, I show that his political theory is best understood as a kind of relational egalitarianism. Using Elizabeth Anderson’s Democratic Equality as a model, I examine Smith’s commitment to equality in the space of social relationships. In particular, I argue that Smith’s focus on eliminating inequalities that cause oppression in society in conjunction with his efforts to design a political and economic system that will yield social conditions of freedom for individuals make him a relational egalitarian.

The Failure of Desire: A Critique of Kantian Cognitive Autonomy in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

Rebecca D. Harrison — Fri, 05 Apr 2013 08:16:30 PDT

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant offers a revolutionary approach to cognition, wherein cognition can be understood as an action carried out by a cognitive agent. But giving the subject such an active role raises questions about Kant’s ability to account for objective cognition. In this paper, I will argue that the cognitive autonomy thesis central to Kant’s model renders it unable to account for the normativity required for objective cognition, and that G.W.F. Hegel makes just this criticism in the Desire section of his Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel proposes an alternative: some basic intersubjective structure must be built into cognition on a fundamental level. For Hegel, the possibility of disagreement is an a priori requirement for objective cognition in general.

Extending Tomas Kulka's Aesthetic Dualism: Value, Not Meaning, in the Case of Absolute Music

Tyson J. Bittrich — Fri, 05 Apr 2013 08:16:29 PDT

Within the past few decades the topic of musical meaning in the case of absolute music has received increasingly greater attention in the philosophical communities. One discussion is a debate between Constantijn Koopman and Stephen Davies, on the one side, and Peter Kivy, on the other. In this paper, I argue that many of the features of the musical encounter captured in terms of meaning by Koopman & Davies’ position are better addressed in terms of value. On Kivy’s suggestions, I contend we avoid use of the term ‘meaning’. To wit, I extend a conceptual framework for aesthetic value, advocated elsewhere by Thomas Kulka, to make the case that absolute music has the kinds of value that explain our tendency to ascribe ‘meaning’ to it, and that absolute music is valuable in multiple philosophically relevant ways, even if not meaningful in any.

The Practical Impossibility of Cohen's Rescuing Justice & Equality

Kevin Stanley Wallace — Fri, 05 Apr 2013 08:16:28 PDT

In Rescuing Justice and Equality, G. A. Cohen argues that a state of affairs which is equality preserving and Pareto-optimal is possible. In doing so, Cohen adopts an incorrect view of practical possibility. For Cohen, a person (A) being able to realize a given state of affairs is evidence that most persons can realize that same state of affairs. In contrast, I contend that an example of person A being able to realize a state of affairs only evidences the fact that persons who possess similar talents to A can realize that same state of affairs. That is to say, on my view, a state of affairs is practically possible if and only if it is logically, nomologically, and psychologically possible for nearly all persons. As a result, I contend that an equality preserving and Pareto-optimal state of affairs is practically impossible.

Betrayal of Love and Volitional Necessity

Shawn M. Murphy — Fri, 05 Apr 2013 08:11:28 PDT

In his early work, Frankfurt conceives of the will as a set of hierarchically organized desires. I argue that the hierarchical model fails to provide an adequate account of free will because it does not render the will determinate. In Frankfurt’s later work, he contends that love establishes the boundaries of the will by giving rise to a volitional necessity. I take this to suggest that the notion of love is introduced, in part, to eliminate the problematic indeterminacy implied by the hierarchical model. However, I argue that the necessities of love may be understood in two importantly different ways, and on either interpretation of Frankfurt’s considered view, love does not provide the resources to account for the phenomenon of betrayal of love. I conclude that the introduction of love does not render the will determinate, and therefore fails to resolve a problem that beset the hierarchical model of the will.

The Pernicious Influence of the Ideal/Nonideal Distinction in Political Philosophy

Shanna K. Slank — Thu, 28 Feb 2013 09:22:07 PST

The notions of “ideal theory” and “nonideal theory” have become widely accepted in political philosophy. Recently, several philosophers’ have urged that ideal theory systematically produces practically irrelevant theories. Such philosophers argue that political philosophy ought move away from ideal theory in order to make the discipline more germane to the unjust real world. Call this tactic of eliminating ideal theory “Strategy.” In this paper, I argue that political philosophy would do well to abandon the ideal/nonideal distinction. Though the use of INID is widespread, philosophers do not have one uniform way of drawing the distinction; of the several common ways of drawing the distinction, none is categorical. As a consequence of this ambiguity, the role that INID plays in our political philosophical theorizing has become pernicious.

Resolving Conflicts within the Mind: Internal Warfare in Non-Human Primates

Michael Huddleson — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 05:56:53 PST

This thesis explores the implications of non-human primates’ propensity to hyperbolically discount the future. Hyperbolic discounting occurs when small, near-term rewards are preferred over larger rewards that are realized at a future point in time, but these preferences do not hold when the choice between long term and short term rewards is made at a time far removed from when the choice produces rewards-- i.e., at a time when the payoff of the choice is distant. I discuss two mutually exclusive models that attempt to explain why non-human primates hyperbolically discount: the cognitivist and the behaviorist model. I then present evidence that supports the cognitivist model and undermines the behaviorist model. I then argue that a “War of Interests” (WOI) occurs within the non-human primate mind. I explain this WOI model, discuss its philosophical implications, and then conclude with a general theory of the non-human primate mind.

The Effects of Learning on Moral Education for Rousseau

Patrick A. Cox — Mon, 26 Nov 2012 07:26:18 PST

Rousseau notoriously praises ignorance and censures learning for the moral corruption that it has inflicted upon his age, yet he admits that the arts and the sciences are good in themselves. I consider the effects of learning and knowledge on moral education, in an effort to answer the following question: What is the role of ignorance in moral education for Rousseau? While some interpreters have acknowledged his sensitivity to various groups in society with regard to moral education, none has properly systematized the different types of ignorance that Rousseau praises or identified the benefits of those types of ignorance to various individuals and societies. I distinguish the savage’s ignorance from that of Socrates and identify another important type of ignorance, the benefits of which stem from our natural sentiment and innate curiosity.

The Abstract/Concrete Paradox in Moral Psychology

Shane Reuter — Thu, 23 Aug 2012 09:36:39 PDT

The epistemology of intuitions has become popular recently with philosophers’ increasing use of experimental methods to study intuitions. Philosophers have focused on the reliability of intuitions, as empirical studies seem to suggest that conflicting intuitions are common. One set of studies, concerning what Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) calls the abstract/concrete paradox, suggests that conflicting intuitions are common and, hence, that mistaken intuitions are common. As Goldman (2007) notes, if mistaken intuitions are sufficiently prevalent, then we might have reason to think intuitions are unreliable. I argue that mistaken intuitions are not common, since studies concerning the abstract/concrete paradox have unknowingly studied several distinct phenomena instead of the abstract/concrete paradox and, hence, that they present merely apparently conflicting intuitions. I then discuss the import of empirical studies for debates about reliability, noting that those studies can inform us about the unreliability of intuitions but we are still unclear about the conditions for reliability.

Moral Responsibility "Expressivism," Luck, and Revision

Kyle Walker — Thu, 23 Aug 2012 08:16:16 PDT

In his 1962 paper “Freedom and Resentment," Peter Strawson attempts to reconcile incompatibilism and compatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. First, I present the error committed by the proponents of both these traditional views, which Strawson diagnoses as the source of their standoff, and the remedy Strawson offers to avoid the conflict. Second, I reconstruct the two arguments Strawson offers for a theory of moral responsibility that is based on his proposed remedy. Third, I present and respond to two proposed problems for the Strawsonian theory: moral luck and revisionism. I conclude with a summary of my defense of Strawsonian “expressivism” about moral responsibility, and offer suggestions for further research.

Hume on the Nature of Moral Freedom

Getty L. Lustila — Mon, 16 Jul 2012 12:15:15 PDT

Paul Russell argues that the interpretation of Hume as a classical compatibilist is misguided. Russell defends a naturalistic reading of Humean freedom and moral responsibility. On this account, Hume holds two theses: that moral responsibility is a product of our moral sentiments, and that our concept of moral freedom is derived from our considerations of moral responsibility. Russell claims that Hume’s theory of the passions is non-cognitivist, and thus that his account of moral judgment fails to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions or qualities of mind. He concludes that Hume’s account of moral responsibility is inadequate. I argue that Hume has a cognitivist account of the passions. For Hume, our character is judged to be a proper object of praise or censure on account of our ability to partake in a moral community with our fellows. I conclude that Hume does not naturalize freedom and moral responsibility, but socializes it.

A Test of Prinz's Air Theory: Is Attention Sufficient for Conscious Emotion?

Anais F. Stenson — Mon, 16 Jul 2012 12:15:05 PDT

Jesse Prinz proposes that attended intermediate-level representations (AIRs) are sufficient for conscious awareness. He extends this claim to emotion, arguing that attention is the mechanism that separates conscious from unconscious emotions. Prior studies call this entailment into question. However, they do not directly address the intermediate-level requirement, and thus cannot decisively refute the AIR theory of consciousness. This thesis tests that theory by manipulating participants’ attention to different features of subliminally processed words while recording both behavioral and electroencephalogram (EEG) data. Both measures suggest that subliminally processed stimuli are attended according to participants’ conscious intention to complete a task. In addition, the EEG data demonstrate that intermediate-level neural activity was modulated by the subliminal stimuli. Thus, these results suggest that AIRs are not sufficient for conscious emotion. This finding undermines Prinz’s AIR theory, and its account of the distinction between conscious and unconscious emotion.

Hans Kelsen and the Bindingness of Supra-National Legal Norms

Richard D. Latta — Mon, 16 Jul 2012 12:14:55 PDT

The pure theory of law is a positivist legal theory put forward by Hans Kelsen. Recently there have been two attempts to understand democracy as a source for the normativity that the pure theory assigns to law. Lars Vinx seeks to understand the pure theory as a theory of political legitimacy, in which the normativity that the pure theory assigns to the laws of a state depends on the state’s adoption of certain legitimacy enhancing features, including being democratic. Uta Bindreiter argues that, in the case of European Community law, an additional criterion of democracy must be added to the criteria that the pure theory normally requires of legal systems before the pure theory can presuppose the normativity of European Community law. This thesis will argue that neither of these two accounts succeeds in demonstrating that the normativity of the pure theory can be understood to depend on democracy.

Utility, Character, and Mill's Argument for Representative Government

Paul Vickery — Fri, 13 Jul 2012 11:40:52 PDT

John Stuart Mill’s Representative Government argues that the ideal form of government is representative. In this paper, I interpret Mill’s argument as a utilitarian argument for a political system with the salient feature of authoritative public participation. Mill argues for this feature in the first three chapters of Representative Government. This argument is interpreted in the context of Mill’s utilitarian views as elaborated in Utilitarianism, with emphasis on Mill’s understanding of pleasure formation and high quality utility.

Against the Linguistic Analogy

Noel B. Martin — Fri, 13 Jul 2012 11:40:48 PDT

Recently it has been proposed that humans possess an innate, domain-specific moral faculty, and that this faculty might be fruitfully understood by drawing a close analogy with nativist theories in linguistics. This Linguistic Analogy (LA) hypothesizes that humans share a universal moral grammar. In this paper I argue that this conception is deeply flawed. After profiling a recent and appealing account of universal moral grammar, I suggest that recent empirical findings reveal a significant flaw, which takes the form of a dilemma: either there is something wrong with the moral grammar model because we do not actually possess the innate contents (rules, principles, and concepts) it says we have, or the moral grammar model is simply the wrong model of moral cognition. In light of this dilemma, I conclude we ought to be skeptical that the Linguistic Analogy can adequately serve as a general account of moral cognition.

Hegel's Critique of Ancient Skepticism

John Wood — Fri, 13 Jul 2012 11:40:44 PDT

Recent work on the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel has emphasized his interest in skeptical concerns. These contemporary scholars argue that, despite common opinions to the contrary, Hegel actually had a very keen interest in skepticism, one that informed and motivated much of his overall project. While I welcome this recent literature, I argue here that contemporary scholars have overemphasized the importance of skepticism for Hegel. By looking closely at Hegel’s arguments against skepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit, I argue that Hegel’s anti-skeptical arguments are in fact major failures. Hegel’s failure is at odds with the emphasis that contemporary literature places on Hegel’s interests in skepticism. For a philosopher who was supposedly centrally concerned with skeptical issues, Hegel sure does not act like it. I conclude that the tension here is the result of contemporary scholars’ overemphasis of the role that skepticism plays in Hegel’s project.

Why Do People Seek Negative Emotions? A Solution to Hume's Puzzle

William J. Brady — Fri, 13 Jul 2012 11:40:40 PDT

In his 1757 essay “Of Tragedy”, Hume reflected on a curious puzzle about emotions. Sometimes people seek out emotions or experiences that are typically negative and associated with displeasure or pain. People often desire to watch horror films that will make them scared or listen to music that will make them sad. Some people even engage in the pursuit of negative emotions on a regular basis such as in the case of thrill-seeking. In this paper my goal is to update Hume’s puzzle with empirical evidence from the affective sciences and argue for two conclusions. First I will argue that Hume’s puzzle still runs deep. Though some recent scientific and philosophical accounts of emotions have tried to solve it, they have thus far failed. Second I attempt to construct a psychological account that solves the puzzle. Instead of focusing on how emotions are generated as previous theories have done, I argue that what is important is how emotions are regulated.

The Expanded Cluster Account of Art

Eric Murphy — Fri, 13 Jul 2012 11:40:35 PDT

I argue for the Expanded Cluster Account of art (ECA) by first inquiring as to whether “art” is best described by a cluster account and where ECA fits into the current landscape of theories of concepts. Second, I explicate the relevant aspects of Boyd’s theory of natural kinds and argue that his concepts of “disciplinary matrices” and “homeostatic property clusters” (roughly analogous to Gaut’s criterial properties for characterizing art, particularized for each individual kind) have relevant roles in a proper cluster account of art, thus explicating and expanding Gaut’s account in the process. Third, I defend the thesis that Boyd’s concept of “disciplinary matrix,” when applied to “art,” is fulfilled by George Dickie’s notion of “the Artworld.” Lastly, I consider objections to ECA and positively explain its heuristic and explanatory efficacy above and beyond other contemporary “anti-definitional” accounts.